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Graeber, 2012; for an ethnographic account of these logistic devices, see Draus, 2004). 
One wonders whether patients, alongside non-patients, may relapse into crises or violent 
offenses	as	a	consequence	of	their	incapability	to	stomach	the	interpretive	labor	required	
by the structural violence of monological service provision interfaces.
What continues to fascinate me about this forensic ACT practice is that they operate at 
the juncture, on the threshold, of two public domains and must somehow be answerable 
for simultaneously servicing the societal objectives in those two domains: providing care 
to the patient and providing security to society (etymologically, to secure stems from 
the Latin se	‘free	from’	+	cura	‘care’).	As	such,	this	is	one	of	those	teams	that	operates	
from	day	to	day	behind	weekly	newspaper	headlines,	such	as:	‘Severely	disturbed	person	
harms or kills...’ Followed by questions infused with moral outrage, such as: How could 
this have happened? How could this predator be on the loose? Why did the organizations 
involved fail to take responsibility? The work practices of these practitioners dwell below 
the public’s radar. Faced with impossible, throbbing problems, they deliberate daily about 
the sensible thing to do and go on doing it, for people like the ones we read about in the 
newspapers, for the people around them, and for themselves. Indeed, in the wake of an 
ongoing deinstitutionalization of mental health care, forensic ACT has become something 
of	a	favorite	of	contemporary	political	debate	on	dealing	with	‘confused’	(‘verward,’ in 
Dutch,	which	might	translate	more	precisely	into	‘entangled’)	persons.	Community	teams	
like	this	are	heralded	as	effective	performers,	better	embedded	in	community	networks	
and,	finally,	operating	at	a	lower	cost	than	inpatient	arrangements,	although	academic	
research on forensic ACT has been scant and patchy. Concurrent with an emergence of 
hybrid forensic mental health care teams in the Netherlands is the rise in government 
funding for such programs, legal-political advances such as the coming into force of the 
Act of Forensic Care in 2019, and urban developments in which, as pointed out by Van 
der Post (2012), “the total absolute number of psychiatric patients coming into contact 
with the police before an emergency consultation increased more than fourfold” (p. 46) 
between 1983 and 2004. In sum, care, such as that provided on the basis of the ACT 
model, is increasingly applied to criminal justice-involved persons in the United States 
and since 2007 in the Netherlands as well. As such, hybrid care/security provision has 
become	a	panacea	for	dealing	with	so-called	 ‘confused	and	violent’	persons.	But,	as	
critical forensic care scholar McCann already argued in 1998:
There	is	a	real	need	to	investigate	the	effects	of	caring	for	forensic	patients	in	the	
community.	Issues	of	dangerousness,	of	treatability	and	of	supervision	are	difficult	
enough	within	the	confines	of	an	institution.	Without	the	boundaries	that	physical	
containment creates these issues become a daily, if not hourly, dilemma for the 
professionals	involved,	many	of	whom	will	not	have	the	experience	or	the	training	
necessary	 to	 be	 able	 to	 deal	with	 these	 issues	 confidently.	With	 the	 reality	 of	
interprofessional mistrust and inadequate collaboration just around the corner, the 
1 How is making people responsible for wicked problems 
not a relevant critical management studies question?1
When I started working as a managerial clerk at a mental health and addiction care 
organization situated in a city in the Netherlands, I became interested in a recently 
formed team of mental health care practitioners who provide what is called assertive 
community treatment (ACT) to persons with a criminal justice record and/or a history of 
violent	behavior,	‘forensic	ACT’	in	short.	This	forensic	ACT	team	is	a	small	part	of	a	large	
health	care	organization.	The	team,	established	in	2011,	was	one	of	the	first	teams	in	
the Netherlands to combine intensive outreaching mental health care with the criminal 
justice objective of diminishing recidivism. The team consists of about 12 practitioners 
to support a shared caseload of around a 100 patients, to treat their disorders and 
addictions with medication and therapy, to help them develop basic life skills to recover 
and participate in society, and to assist them in accessing the public services they are 
entitled to but fail to acquire. But, parallel to this care, the team monitors the risk that 
patients might pose to damage themselves and others around them, and ultimately 
society at large. The team will intervene, or have others intervene, forcefully, if deemed 
necessary.
As with most mental health care teams, the forensic ACT team employs a set of eligibility 
criteria	to	regulate	the	in-	and	outflow	of	patients.	People	with	(severe)	mental	illness	
who	have	been	convicted	of	a	violent	offense	and/or	have	recently	shown	violent	or	
threatening behavior toward either civilians and/or practitioners are eligible for forensic 
ACT,	which	sets	the	team	apart	from	other	ACT	teams.	The	typical	patient	is	a	‘frequent	
flyer’	who	has	been	detained	or	faced	compulsory	clinical	admission	several	times	and	will	
probably continue to do so (Place et al., 2011). Forensic ACT thus has its members, without 
the physical means to secure themselves (such as in a clinical setting, e.g., walls and 
nearby security teams), reach out to patients with a proven history of volatile behavior. 
Finally, while the mainstay of the team’s everyday work is meeting patients, there is 
a	substantial	amount	of	routine	desk	work:	reporting	and	fulfilling	requirements	for	
procedures such as patient placement schemes. But patient placement can amount to 
an impossible feat. The ACT model was created in 1970s United States at a time when 
its integrated approach was a response to a limited and patchy urban infrastructure 
(Salyers	&	Tsemberis,	2007).	Nowadays,	and	definitely	in	the	Netherlands,	the	institutional	
landscape is quite the opposite and, ironically, forensic ACT teams are now occupied 
to	a	significant	extent	in	navigating	their	patients	along	not	only	the	plethora	of	public	
service providers, but also along their interorganizational networks. The attempts of 
these networks to cut through the clutter have generated their own Kafkaesque gate-
keeping	instruments	on	top	of	those	exerted	by	their	members	(see	Hodson	et	al.,	2012;	
1 I presented a previous version of this thesis at the SCOS/ACSCOS Conference of 2018 in Tokyo, 
Japan.
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ability to control not only outcomes for patients, but for the professionals involved, 
has become a priority. (p. 48)
In professions such as nursing that already rank amongst the highest as regards to 
workplace violence (Jackson et al., 2002; Estryn-Behar et al., 2008), the team practitioners 
work toward realizing an amalgam of caring for and securing persons at the fringes and 
yet	in	the	heart	of	society:	an	extreme	alternative	case	of	organizational	ambidexterity,	
you might say. Understanding what this organizational borderline predicament means to 
the practitioners involved, as they enter into dialogue with each other about their daily 
experiences,	has	received	little	attention	thus	far;	 let	alone	understanding	how	their	
organization itself is related to their stories of responsibility. It is a practice permeated 
with unfinalizables,	as	 I	will	argue	below:	wavering	self–other	axes,	the	turbulence	of	
everyday	events,	and	discursive	ambiguities	on	and	between	each	conceivable	‘level.’	In	
every practical way, not a place for an awkward pen-pusher such as myself, as I would 
quickly	find	out,	but	just	the	place	for	me,	though,	in	theory.
In his In Praise of Bureaucracy: Weber – Organization – Ethics, Du Gay (2000) provided an 
analysis of how traditional public arrangements have been met with increased misgivings 
and	how	under	the	sway	of	New	Public	Management	a	‘fresh’	entrepreneurial	governance	
took hold of organizing across public sector domains. Accountable for both societal 
problems themselves (on a micro-scale) and for the cost of tackling them, fragmented 
responsibilities were reassembled into more individuated units, intended to cut through 
the bureaucratic clutter. As Du Gay (2000) contended:
Performance management and related techniques function as forms of 
responsibilization which are held to be both economically desirable and personally 
‘empowering.’	This	requirement	that	individuals	become	more	personally	exposed	
to the risks and costs of engaging in a particular activity is held to encourage them 
to build resources in themselves. (p. 85)
Accompanying	 this	approach	 is	 the	emergence	of	hybrid,	 ‘entrepreneur-like’	 teams	
characterized	 as	 ‘clusters	 of	 responsibilities’	 by	 Painter-Morland	 (2007),	 who	 was	
concerned with the ethical purview of this development. The practice of forensic ACT, 
which serves as the single case study in this thesis, appears as a particularly appropriate 
example	both	as	an	individuated	unit	and	of	such	a	cluster.	As	team	member	Uriah	(all	
practitioners’	names	are	pseudonyms)	explained	in	an	interview:
That’s ACT, you know, team members should support each other, that’s how it works. 
Look, with normal outpatient services, support stops when a practitioner falls ill, but 
here you remain in business. Patients can still be admitted; decisions can be made 
quickly;	someone’s	welfare	benefits	are	arranged,	we	can	arrange	a	shelter	if	you’re	
out	of	a	home,	doesn’t	matter	how	difficult,	we	can	arrange	something,	uh,	so	that’s	
the beauty of it. Everything is integrated, that’s the beauty of the system, you know. 
(interview II, 1 Nov. 2012)
The	‘beauty	of	the	system’	takes	on	flesh	in	the	intricate	everyday.	Patients	who	have	
had a turbulent past, or those who are still considered to be a risk for other inhabitants 
or	neighbors,	may,	for	example,	find	it	impossible	by	themselves	to	sleep	anywhere	but	
on the street or at acquaintances’ places until they are kicked out. Some have burnt 
through all the obvious and less obvious options, leaving the team wondering what 
to	do	next.	Not	having	shelter	may	quickly	aggravate	 their	mental	and	social	well-
being	and	safety	which,	in	turn,	makes	it	harder	to	find	and	keep	shelter.	At	times,	the	
team comes to an – albeit temporary – conclusion that they cannot do anything in 
their	power	to	resolve	the	problem.	The	example	of	these	patient	placement	logistics	
may remind us of the wicked problem: “that class of social system problems which are 
ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and 
decision	makers	with	conflicting	values,	and	where	the	ramifications	in	the	whole	system	
are	thoroughly	confusing”	(Churchman,	1967,	p.	141).	It	can	be	a	frustrating	experience,	
which may produce a sense of futility or despair. In other situations, it is not so much that 
all the options are burnt through, but practitioners become entangled in another kind 
of	dilemma,	such	as	the	one	discussed	below.	Now	this	is	quite	a	long	excerpt	to	read,	
and	there	will	be	more	excerpts	like	this	one.	One	reason	for	this,	marking	a	difference	
from	similar	qualitative	studies,	is	that	the	‘data’	gathered	are	mostly	recorded	dialogues	
in	which	I	did	not	participate	and	over	which	I	had	no	control	to	‘steer’	the	responses	
into manageable soundbites. So, much like joining an ongoing conversation of some 
strangers,	you	need	to	be	able	to	‘get	into’	the	story	first	before	we	can	really	understand	
and participate.
Mary: Mr. E., should we see him today again?
Ed: Yes, for sure. That’s become a whole fuss. Mr. E. cannot go back to his own Housing 
First [also a pseudonym] apartment and I had the key with me and uh…I had 
arranged with Housing First that I would return that key, but I hadn’t got around 
to it. Yesterday Mr. E. called me to ask for his key and I thought: “Oh shit. This has 
become very complicated now, like, What am I supposed to do with this?” I noticed 
that	it	was	just	TOO	complex	for	me	now,	and	I	thought:	“To	hell	with	this,	I’m	not	
doing this properly.” So, I had Nick bring the keys back to Housing First. And uh…
he’s not going to make it there, for long … …. Well yeah, I, I, I thought: “I actually 
don’t want to get involved. We are the ones providing mental health care, we got 
you out of your house already while we shouldn’t have.”
Nick: And Housing First is for housing.
Ed: And Housing First is for housing. And you [Mr. E.] should arrange your housing with 
them. Because now he hired a lawyer to make that…he is leaving the clinic today, so 
he has to, we have to arrange a night shelter for him. So that’s going to be tense, 
and if he handles that ok, then you know that that [Housing First] will open up, but 
1
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I am not going to tell him that, but I think he’s not going to make it there, at all. 
That, if he’s at shelter X or Y, he’ll start drinking immediately. I had to think about 
it, it was really on my mind, I woke up early this morning and it was on my mind 
already; it got to me.
Stan: I think you made the right choice; you know if you just let him go to those places 
he might end up drinking himself to death.
Ed: Right, he’s not going to make it, right now. Yes, but you know that’s the point.
Stan: We did not have any other choice and I think you made the right choice, did the 
right thing, you [Mr. E.] are safe to stay in the clinic for now but you cannot go back 
to your house because then you’ll drink yourself to death possibly, and then the 
Housing First program is there for housing him.
Ed: Yes, yes, that’s the point. Because I was thinking: “If I do not agree with this 
arrangement but there’s nothing really at stake, then, uh…” I would have, uh…I 
would have thought, well, you know, “We’ll just make a copy of his key and then 
we’ll give him a copy and give Housing First their key back and then he [Mr. E.] can 
figure	out	what	to	do	with	that	copy.	Then	it’s	just	out	of	our	hands.”	It	is	just	that	
it is not like that.
Stan: Now I need to call Xandra [Housing First worker] because he cannot enter his house 
anymore.	What	is	the	next	shelter	for	him	now?
Ed: No, I took care of that. But Xandra is putting this on us.
Stan: They have an obligation to provide care. Yes, I can’t believe this; she’s obliged to 
care for his housing. He’s made to leave his apartment. You can’t just say: “I’ll leave 
you on the streets.”
Ed: Yes, well she’s saying that we didn’t take care of the right placement access. But I 
think that’s their job too.
Nick: But I had called Christopher [of the governmental placement access bureau] and 
he said: “It’s a Housing First apartment. They just have to apply for an access.”
Ed: Yeah, well, Xandra won’t do anything now, that’s the thing. And I’m not the one 
to suddenly start moving mountains to get Xandra motivated to act and such. I 
mean, it’s pretty clear, on Monday I’ll talk to the access bureau and say: “Just give 
me that access already,” to get it over with. But then they do need to step it up and 
get him a place to live. Let’s put his case on the agenda of the network meeting, 
though they have had his case there already like a thousand times. I’ll put him on 
the agenda.
Nick:	 Admissions	officer	Christopher	did	a	check,	officially	the	access	that	Mr.	E.	has	to	
Housing First has not been suspended by them, so uh….
Mary: Right, so if we now ask for access then it’s on us, as an organization, then it’s on 
our name, not Housing First anymore,
Ed: Yes, you’re right, I’ll tell uh, Xandra that Housing First should be the one asking for 
access and that we will provide the diagnostic information required and they can 
wrap it up like that in the access procedure.
Stan: Yes, she can’t just pull back like that. It’s a whole procedure as such.
Ed: But that’s just what she’s doing. Yes. But well, that’s priority number two. Now, 
there’s no other way than to have him stay at the night shelter, although, uh…I 
don’t know…I already know for sure that he’ll totally start hitting the bottle there. 
And if he’d go to his apartment, there’s alcohol there too.
Stan: He’d start drinking there too.
Ed: He’s in a REALLY bad condition, you know.
Nick: But we just need to do what we have to do and that’s to have him stay at the night 
shelter and uh…his lawyer will press on with the access to his house and uh….
Ed: He needs to be seen by us. I am not going alone to him. He totally got under my 
skin, and uh…trying to make me emotional, yeah, I am not going to do this alone.
Nick: What time is the visit?
Ed: Well yeah, uh… when we have some news for him… (day 7, 19 Oct. 2012)
Ed is caught in a quandary. Mr. E. has been admitted to a clinic to treat his alcohol 
addiction, and soon he will be released. But he will be unable to return to his Housing 
First apartment because of transgressing the required conditions. Failing to return Mr. 
E.’s apartment key to Housing First immediately, he couldn’t tell Mr. E. that he had been 
unable	to	return	it,	even	though	it	should	not	have	been	his	responsibility	in	the	first	
place. The team point out that it is the legal responsibility of Housing First to take care 
of housing for Mr. E., and at the same time they know that Housing First is not doing 
what is required to enable Mr. E. to gain access to a placement at an alternative housing 
program with the care and support needed to address his addiction. However, if the team 
presses the matter further, they fear that they themselves will become responsible for Mr. 
E.’s impossible case. This interorganizational problem seems to run parallel with Ed’s own 
difficulties	with	Mr.	E.,	emphasizing	he	cannot	alone	address	and	answer	this	problem.	
In a more discursive perspective, the abstract linearity of institutional standards and 
procedures	is	on	display,	portraying	the	patient	as	a	case	that	does	not	fit	institutional	
arrangements. Running through this plotline are fragments of interpersonal appeals: a 
need to care for another unable to care for himself, to force Xandra to take responsibility, 
to give Mr. E. the key in spite of the promise not to, to break up the whole arrangement to 
get Mr. E. the access he needs, to not face up to Mr. E. who got under the skin of Ed. The 
threshold between the private and the public is crossed as Ed wakes up in the morning 
and instantly thinks about this predicament; he is becoming personally frustrated with 
both	the	ineffectiveness	of	bureaucratic	procedures	and	his	own	way	of	getting	entangled	
in	them.	And	they,	and	we,	are	left	with	Nick’s	final	conclusion	to	just	“do	what	we	have	
to do” (which implies following the rules of the arrangement, although this meaning is 
not	explicated).	It	gets	to	them,	at	other	times	as	well,	as	Naomi,	another	practitioner,	
reflected	in	an	interview	about	another	patient:
You know, what’s bothering me is where to place this man. Because, if he’s prone to 
lash out like that, when he feels cornered, then I do think, uh, it’s a big responsibility 
to have him placed somewhere. Afraid that, when he’s at an activity center or a care 
1
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farm, wherever, that he’ll act out like that…It’s the people around him I’m concerned 
about. Yes, those, mostly. That’s what is on my mind. Look, for him, surely, it’s hard 
too, but I’m concerned for the safety of those third parties, the social domain or what 
do you call it, that’s the problem for me…If I take the step of having him admitted 
somewhere, then it does feel like something I initiated…I would feel very guilty if 
something happens, I think. I don’t feel it’s safe. (interview III, 22 Nov. 2012)
In	sum,	a	question	such	as	where	to	house	forensic	ACT	patients,	who	find	themselves	
on the doorstep between health care and criminal justice, might pose an unending 
dilemma for the team. Not only housing, but many if not all fundamental life concerns in 
health, work, relationships, safety, are at stake for these people. Recurrently, the simple 
question made tangible is: Who is responsible here? But questions that are seemingly 
easy in theory dissolve in muddy practice when numerous persons and agencies are 
involved,	or	the	involvement	of	these	stakeholders	 is	already	anticipated,	prefiguring	
different	senses	of	responsibility	as	the	day	unfolds.	Here,	the	Dutch	saying	“de vraag 
stellen is haar beantwoorden” (to ask the question is to answer it) applies. When it is the 
team that is recurrently troubled by the question of who is responsible, one may conclude 
that it is the team itself that is made responsible, responsible for problems they cannot 
themselves solve.
A proposition of this thesis is not that there is an absence of easy answers due to muddy 
practice, rather, that the seemingly simple question (Who is responsible here?) is not at 
all that simple, in theory. The argument is that a single forensic ACT team practice case 
study may provide us with some insights into how a sense of (personal) responsibility 
is	interlocked	with	the	experience	of	the	unfinalizable,	enabling	people	to	do	what	they	
feel they should do in contemporary organizing around wicked problems they cannot 
hope to solve. I hope to redirect some of the potential for moral outrage away from 
persons and particular organizations into a critical outlook on how we have come to 
understand and organize responsibility. Along the iterative process of observing the team 
and reading critical management theory and the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, basic notions 
of	self/other,	(self-other	axis)	spatiotemporality	and	discourse	will	come	to	the	mainstage	
of my plotlines and the methods of (re)telling them. The main practical objective is 
to	disconcert	contemporary	organizational	praxis	by	 illustrating	how	people	expose	
themselves to precarious situations via the organized interplay of these three basic 
notions. Understanding how these schemes work may add to the theory of both business 
ethics	and	critical	management	studies	(CMS),	in	the	sense	of	a	box-breaking	contribution	
(Alvesson	&	Sandberg,	2014),	rather	than	further	pigeonholing	existing	CMS	niches.
This thesis, then, is a critical inquiry into the organization of responsibility; it makes ample 
use	of	Mikhail	Bakhtin’s	work	and	in	particular	his	concept	of	unfinalizability.	At	the	start	
of Part I, titled “Questions”, I introduce forensic assertive community treatment (ACT) 
which serves as a single case study in this thesis. The forensic ACT team operates on a 
threshold between providing care to patients and providing security to society. Their 
practice	is	permeated	with	unfinalizables	and	wicked	problems.	Chapter	1	reviews	critical	
management studies, with reference to the views of Churchman, and the conceptual tools 
of	performativity,	reflexivity	and	denaturalization.	It	then	asks:
How	is	it	that	in	some	contemporary	work	practices	an	exposure	to	precarious	situations	
is accompanied by a sense of personal responsibility, from a self to another?
How do we actually deploy ourselves and others in those precarious situations by talking 
about	them	first?
And how do we seem to not need anyone in particular to make us do this anyway?
Beyond	the	seemingly	simple	question	‘Who	is	responsible	here?,’	the	above	questions	
probe into the everyday work of teams of practitioners responsible for engaging with 
complex	 problems.	 They	 question	 the	 idea	 of	 responsibility	 as	 a	 benign	 notion	 in	
organizational practice and theory, the assumptions of discursive and corporeal fault 
lines,	and	the	possibility	of	moral	abdication.	Chapter	2	explores	the	self–other	axis,	
spatiotemporality and discourse with the help of Mikhail Bakhtin and his central concept 
of	unfinalizability.	In	this	theory	and	societal	objectives	chapter,	we	trace	Bakhtin’s	own	
evolving	moral	thought	on	the	relation	between	responsibility	and	the	unfinalizable.	
After a brief review of organization and management theory studies which touch upon 
Bakhtin’s	work,	unfinalizability	in	particular,	a	heuristic	approach	is	suggested	to	enable	
us to grasp how responsibility is played out in organizing. Central in this approach is the 
dynamic	between	the	three	‘unfinalizables’:	the	self–other	axis,	spatiotemporality	and	
discourse.
Chapter 3 is a methodology chapter. The case study of a forensic ACT team allows for an 
in-depth iterative process: slow and wandering, and responsive to promising detours.
Part II, titled “Answers?”, describes multiple accounts (Chapters 4-6) of organizational 
ethics	in	practice,	each	exploring	one	the	three	questions	posed	in	Chapter	1.
Part III, titled “Raveling”, contains a concluding Chapter 7.
While the above is intended as a brief overview, the structure of my thesis may still be 
confusing. While we started out here with the forensic ACT team, we will now leave this 
practice and properly return to it only in Part II. Rather than an empirical (ethnographic) 
study infused with theoretical considerations, I intend this thesis as a theoretical study 
interlaced	with	empirical	plotlines.	In	the	rest	of	this	chapter	I	first	trace	a	connection	
between critical management thinking, wicked problems and moral outrage, by drawing 
on the early work of the management science scholar C. West Churchman, putting a 
dent	in	CMS’s	box.
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1.1 Revamping CMS with Churchman’s moral outrage
The thinking man’s reply to the challenges to reason has been to construct a debate; whether 
the debate is an adequate response to the challenge remains to be seen.
The above quotation is from Challenge to Reason (1968) by the late management scientist 
C. West Churchman, who won an Academy of Management’s Best Book Award for this 
text.	Churchman	was	fierce	in	his	assessment	of	both	management	and	management	
science,	and	adamant	 in	his	call	 for	an	ethical	management	science:	a	reflective	and	
open science that moves beyond disciplinary and hierarchical boundaries, toward 
securing	improvements	in	the	management	of	the	‘whole	system’	across	nations	and	
generations. Challenge to Reason is a broad-ranging critique against instrumental cost-
benefit	reasoning,	purity,	 fragmentation,	the	separation	between	mood	and	reason,	
excellence,	seriousness,	neutrality,	 logical	consistency,	univocity,	and	the	likes,	thrust	
forward by a moral outrage about the wrongs of the world and the wrongs of science. 
Twenty-five	years	later,	Churchman	(1994)	reflected	on	the	current	state	of	management	
science; he concluded on a bitter note that we still know close to nothing, really, about 
how	to	manage	the	whole	system	or	even	one	organization	well.	 ‘Well’	 in	a	technical	
sense, but also, and more importantly, in a moral sense. His disenchantment with the 
work published in the top-ranking journal Management Science of which he was the 
founding editor, may remind us a bit of the disappointment of Courpasson (2013) later 
on. This thesis before you, too, is motivated by a concern for how to organize well in 
a moral sense (or less evil), stemming from a bewilderment of how people engage in 
moral work under precarious conditions every working day. I refer in particular to teams 
of practitioners who are made responsible for providing integrated (semi-)public service 
packages,	in	an	effort	to	engage	with	conundrums	deemed	so	complex	and	unresolvable	
that they are known as wicked problems.
Wicked	problems,	among	others,	cannot	be	defined;	wicked	problems	do	not	end,	their	
solutions are one-shot operations, they do not have ultimate tests, are not true or false but 
better or worse, and the people responsible for actions aimed at these problems do not 
have the right to be wrong (Rittel & Webber, 1973). These kinds of problems, such as, on a 
grand	scale,	the	greenhouse	effect	and	global	waste	disposal,	cannot	be	captured	within	
one particular (political, technical, organizational, ethical) approach, as they transgress 
the	limits	and	leeway	of	each	perspective	to	comprehend	and	explain	what	is	going	on.	
Instead	of	the	standard	response	of	‘unraveling’	and	compartmentalizing	these	wicked	
problems, other approaches seek to tackle a problem as a whole. One such persistent 
approach has come from the stream of thought known as New Public Management: 
to assemble teams with the autonomy and capabilities to make them responsible for, 
and engage with, a problem as a whole – but on a small scale. One assumption here 
is that small wins add up to larger-scale solutions. Another assumption is that this way 
of working empowers practitioners to tackle the full brunt of a problem, instead of 
making do with a fragment of it. Since its rise in the 1980s, New Public Management has 
received scornful, critical academic scrutiny, yet one of its key components, the downward 
displacement	of	exposure	to	precarious	conditions	by	responsibilization,	seems	to	be	
alive	and	kicking	in	contemporary	organizational	praxis	(Du	Gay,	2000).	And	so,	despite	
our	best	critical	efforts,	we	find	multidisciplinary	teams	made	responsible	for	taming	
small-scale wicked problems societally central yet marginal, pivotal yet obfuscated, 
problems such as those of troubled families and deprived neighborhoods. Problems that 
burst out through the mediated surface with the moral indignation of public opinion – as 
if these problems came from nowhere. As Churchman (1967) suggested half a century 
ago,	even	with	our	best	efforts	we	might	not	be	taming	the	whole	problem,	 just	the	
growl. Who, then, are these people facing unresolvable problems, thrown into dens to 
tame	growls?	And,	more	particular	to	my	own	inquiry	into	the	‘responsible	organization’	
here: How are they thrown in?
As	regards	to	the	role	of	theory,	Churchman,	in	his	1994	reflection	on	organization	and	
management theory (OMT), was not alone in making such a critical observation. In fact, 
two	years	earlier	CMS	was	 ‘officially’	born,	with	the	volume	edited	by	Alvesson	and	
Willmott (1992), although there was already a long polemic tradition between reformists 
and radicals in OMT, particularly in the UK. And about two decades after Churchman’s 
1994	 reflections,	 several	key	figures	 in	CMS	such	as	Parker	and	Delbridge	 reflected	
on	the	coming	of	age	of	CMS	and	saw	their	own	niche	waning,	its	‘non-performance’	
creeping back onto itself. Parker (2010), in his review of the Oxford Handbook of Critical 
Management Studies by Alvesson et al. (2009), stated: “Perhaps this is the fate of critical 
projects in many disciplines – whether in management, policy studies, law, criminology 
or	wherever.	They	finally	become	‘Oxford	Handbooks,’	and	then	the	game	is	up,	crushed	
beneath the cultural weight of mediaeval stone” (p. 297). That being said, I was prudently 
advised by my supervisors to embed my study, which draws heavily on the already out 
of fashion Bakhtin, into some body of OMT: to position myself as a scholar and my 
doctorate more clearly and focus my theoretical contribution. And what better place to 
embed oneself in than in CMS, on the margins of OMT: itself a discipline ridiculous at 
best and pure evil at its worst, according to the late Churchman. No better place to my 
mind, for hidden amid its ruins glitters a space for a concept fairly untouched, Bakhtin’s 
unfinalizability:	a	concept	which	might	prove	an	end,	a	purpose,	for	a	CMS	throwing	itself	
into	the	den.	In	critically	inquiring	into	contemporary	organizational	praxis	entangled	
in	wicked	problems,	the	incorporation	of	the	concept	of	the	unfinalizable	may	provide	
new theoretical ground. To do something about the fact that people are thrown into 
dens to tame growls.
Churchman is cited by very few people in CMS (Córdoba, 2007, being one of the notable 
exceptions),	which	might	be	understandable	considering	his	love	for	systems	thinking	and	
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considering the academic scorn he received, but it is a shame, nevertheless.2 Churchman 
should be given heed in CMS because his was:
…a lifelong struggle to swim against the stream of prevailing tendencies in the applied 
disciplines, e.g., their ever-growing specialization and fragmentation in spite of the 
common lip service paid to the ideas of interdisciplinarity and comprehensiveness; 
their inherent positivism and reductionism; incrementalism; a merely functionalistic 
and instrumental understanding of rationality that leaves no room for ethical 
considerations; and perhaps worst, the uncritical stance of most disciplines with 
respect to these tendencies and their repercussions on the social practice that they 
claim to improve. (Ulrich, 1988, p. 344)
His Challenge to Reason and its anger already provided us with all the ravelings that 25 
years of CMS seem to have left us with, still. I will try to knit them together anew with a 
common	pattern	that	many	in	CMS	touch	upon,	but	few	really	explore:	the	unresolvable,	
incomplete,	inconsistent,	unending	or,	more	precisely,	the	unfinalizable,	which	is	central	
to my own multiple accounts of organizational ethics in practice, in Part II. For now, I will 
connect my take on what Churchman has to say about the challenges to reason with 
major issues in the CMS debate about itself from around 2000 onward, paving the way 
for a more thorough treatment of the concept in Chapter 2.
Highly cited CMS papers on CMS itself, which are either review articles or position papers 
on the status of CMS, include: Fournier and Grey (2000), Thompson et al. (2000), Wray-
Bliss (2002), Reed (2005), Clegg et al. (2006), Adler et al. (2007), Dunne et al. (2008), Spicer 
et al. (2009), Butler and Spoelstra (2014), Delbridge (2014), King and Learmonth (2015), 
Wickert and Schaefer (2015), Fleming and Banerjee (2016) and Parker and Parker (2017). 
This	is	by	no	means	an	exhaustive	list,	and	neither	is	the	following	list	of	top	ranking	
(and	 ‘very	good’)	 journals	that	have	had	special	 issues	on	CMS	or	ongoing	debates	
on the status of CMS: Human Relations, Organization Studies, Management Learning, 
Organization, Journal of Management Studies and British Journal of Management. Of these 
journals, Human Relations and Organization	are	the	most	prolific	on	talking	about	CMS	
2 Churchman is a much cited author in the niche critical systems thinking (see e.g., Midgley, 1996, 
“What	is	this	thing	called	CST?”).	Churchman’s	work,	which	suffered	under	his	alcoholism,	was	
to be undone in a 1981 American Journal of Sociology book review by Alan Sica which charac-
terized it as “undisciplined,” “illogical” and “fraudulent” and laden with mesmerizing sentences 
such	as:	“Even	more	obnoxious,	however,	are	aging	full	professors	who	lard	their	work	with	
gratuitous	or	farfetched	references	in	a	‘homespun	manner’”	(p.	210).	Prof.	Sica	himself	was	
rated as “hilarious, caring, and understanding” by one student reviewer in Ratemyprofessors.
com and by another as “Simply hot. Tall black socks with shorts and brown dress shoes. What 
more	could	you	want	in	a	man.”	Three	people	did	not	find	this	a	useful	comment.	http://www.
ratemyprofessors.com/ShowRatings.jsp?tid=162553. Retrieved on 2 November 2018.
itself,	and	of	the	above	cited	papers,	two	in	particular	have	formed	the	most	cited	axis:	
Fournier	and	Grey	(2000)	and	Spicer	et	al.	(2009).	Since	Fournier	and	Grey,	when	we	reflect	
on	CMS,	we	talk	about	non-	(or	anti-)	performativity,	reflexivity	and	denaturalization.	
Put simply, about doing (things) well, looking back onto yourself and questioning the 
taken-for-granted. Second, we discern and celebrate the variety of strands within CMS 
and, since the end of the 1990s, we have often placed two of them at opposing ends of 
a spectrum: the realist labor process theorists and the postmodernists. Altogether, they 
suggest us to do right in the world in the face of oppression, violence, deprivation and 
exclusion.	 In	Challenge to Reason,	where	Churchman	explored	the	ultimate	goals	and	
scope of management science and operations research, Churchman made a similar call to 
arms.	His	text	reads	like	a	manifesto,	a	book-length	elaboration	of	the	mission	statement	
of the journal Management Science	of	which	Churchman	was	the	first	editor-in-chief.	
His	book	is	divided	into	three	sections,	but	there	is	one	overarching	appeal	in	the	text,	
which is that the science of management should be targeted at “securing improvement 
in the human condition,” emphasizing	the	importance	of	the	verb	‘to	secure’:	“that	in	the	
larger system over time the improvement persists” (Churchman, 1982, p. 19).3 A noble 
goal, but one which raises the question of how the management scholar may take any 
responsibility for this seemingly unattainable goal. As ten Bos (2007) stated:
Only idiots, Ronell (2002, 216) suggests, never dodge any responsibility…[she] reminds 
us of the necessary limitations that we should bear in mind if we are discussing 
responsibility. She takes issue with the hubris or arrogance that tends to permeate 
debates	about	responsibility.	An	example	would	be	the	claim	by	some	scientists	that,	
in order to cope with environmental disaster and climatic change, we need to take 
responsibility for nothing less than the entire planet and to manage it as if such were 
possible. Now, my suggestion is not that these ethicists or scientists—these beautiful 
souls—are simply idiots. The problem may be worse than that. The veritable idiot, 
after all, at least knows he is an idiot whereas “the stupid subject…does not have this 
knowledge about himself (Ronell, 2002, 218–219). (pp. 146–147)
While Churchman readily admitted his lack of understanding of the human condition, 
he persisted in conveying that management scientists should ultimately always strive 
toward a betterment in the human condition as a whole, unresolvable as that may be 
to understand, and impossible to complete. Below I deploy Churchman’s challenges 
to	 reformulate	CMS’	 three	notions	of	 non-	 (or	 anti-)	 performativity,	 reflexivity	 and	
denaturalization, somewhere along the tightrope between stupidity and idiocy.
3 P. 19; cited in Ulrich (1988).
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1.2 Performativity or the idea of improvement
…and the punishment of the greedy shall be because they hold a billion dollars of wealth while 
35,000 children die every day of poverty on this earth. (Churchman, 1994, p. 206)
Burning stakes smoldering and punishment delayed until further notice, we have entered 
a Faustian night where doing things well has become the only good thing. Let us join our 
reformist and revolutionary CMS choirs who each from their own study room gaze upon 
the	moonrise	and	ponder	one	last	time:	who	benefits,	and	suffers,	really,	from	performing	
better?	In	the	first	section	of	Challenge to Reason (1968), “Science and Management,” 
Churchman problematized the idea of improvement by asking “How can we design 
improvement in large systems without understanding the whole system, and if the answer 
is that we cannot, how is it possible to understand the whole system?” (p. 2). In search 
of a reasonable idea of the greater good, questions tend to sound better than answers. 
Churchman	reflected	on	the	societal	responsibility	of	the	scholar	and	observed	that	the	
age in which a scientist could distance herself from a client’s goals, if ever, has faded. 
He insisted that both scientists and managers must understand their responsibility in 
improving not only the techniques of their performance considering given goals, but 
also in asking whether their given goals are indeed the proper ones. Churchman (1968) 
explained	that	most	of	us	do	not	ask	ourselves	that,	not	even	in	light	of	our	own	interest	
in a better future for our children:
Indeed,	we	could	not	be	so	selfish	and	inbred	as	to	ignore	the	fact	that	many	of	our	
policies may be detrimental to another generation no matter how pleasing to ours. 
A rationalist in his approach to the development of social utilities must incorporate 
what he estimates to be the requirements of the world’s future inhabitants. (p. 59)
Churchman observed, along with scholars long before him, that society and academic 
inquiry, instead of tackling the dilemma of improvement in the whole system head 
on, have been fragmented into sections and disciplines that forego this concern for 
the larger whole, with each fragment delineating its own criteria on what counts as an 
improvement	and	its	beneficiaries	and,	more	generally,	delineating	‘who’	is (and who 
is	excluded	and	what	does	not	count	as	a	‘who’).	Instead	of	an	ongoing	critical	inquiry	
into	what	counts	as	progress	as	a	whole,	we	mistakenly	experience	sectoral	progress	
(education, health, science etc.) as progress of the whole, according to Churchman. But he 
argued that, when one dares to look a little closer, this demarcated progress produces all 
kinds of deterioration with which we are increasingly unable to cope: be it (nuclear) war, 
environmental pollution, loss of privacy, intellectual dumbing down by mass education, 
and the systematic humiliation of those in need of care and welfare assistance. Moreover, 
Churchman (1968) argued that the academic community is complacent in the sense that 
it	is	inclined	to	put	its	talents	and	resources	into	‘safe’	kinds	of	research	locked	within	
specific	such	sectors	and	seek	improvements	therein.	Churchman	(1968)	pointed	us	to	
the real problem with that:
Our	experts	 tell	us	 that	 the	only	 feasible	way	 to	plan	 for	progress	 is	piecemeal	
planning. What they fail to tell us is that their own prescription is based on a postulate 
of planning, namely, that if we improve sector by sector, leaving out considerations of 
the whole world, or of the whole nation, or of generations to come, our improvements 
will add up to social progress. The postulate on the face of it appears foolish, and 
there is certainly no evidence of its truth. It is a mistake to use man’s failure to 
develop an adequate measure of the utility of the social structure as evidence that 
such attempts are futile. There is every reason to urge that we vastly enlarge our 
study of man and his requirements far beyond the present very inadequate status 
of this research. (p. 60)
In	 other	words,	 already	 half	 a	 century	 ago	 one	 of	 the	 key	 figures	 of	 ‘mainstream’	
management science, in particular operations research and planning, tore away the 
assumption that piecemeal planning, and incremental and delineated change, will add 
up to improvement for the human condition as a whole. What have we learned from 
the CMS debate on itself and on the idea of non- (or anti) performativity, since then? 
The seminal Fournier and Grey (2000) article on this topic, drawing on the work of the 
philosopher	Lyotard,	defined	the	performative	intent	as	such:
to develop and celebrate knowledge which contributes to the production of 
maximum	 output	 for	 minimum	 input;	 it	 involves	 inscribing	 knowledge	 within	
means—ends calculation. Non-critical management study is governed by the 
principle of performativity which serves to subordinate knowledge and truth to the 
production	of	efficiency.	In	non-critical	management	study,	performativity	is	taken	
as an imperative towards which all knowledge and practice must be geared, and 
which does not require questioning. In other words, the aim is to contribute to the 
effectiveness	of	managerial	practice,	or	to	build	a	better	model	or	understanding	
thereof. Management is taken as a given, and a desirable given at that, and is not 
interrogated	except	 in	so	far	as	this	will	contribute	to	its	 improved	effectiveness.	
Critical work is not performative in this meaning, even though it may well have some 
intention	to	achieve	(e.g.	to	achieve	a	better	world	or	to	end	exploitation,	etc.).	CMS	
questions	the	alignment	between	knowledge,	truth	and	efficiency	(a	point	to	which	
we come back shortly) and is concerned with performativity only in that it seeks to 
uncover what is being done in its name. (p. 17)
It took me a few readings to get to the gist of their argument: performativity is the 
imperative of managed means–ends calculation (and as such, I might add, serves as 
a	proper	definition	of	 ‘value-based	health	care’)	and	CMS,	 in	spite	of	deploying	the	
same managed means–ends calculation, can still distance itself from the performative 
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imperative because of its proper purposes. Churchman (1968) noted, more simply, that 
we	all	manage	our	affairs	in	one	way	or	another.	He	elaborated	on	management	and	the	
manager herself, describing the latter as “a person who has the responsibility for the 
choices he has made in the sense that the rest of his fellow men (sic4) may judge whether 
he	should	be	rewarded	or	punished	for	his	choices;	he	is	the	person	who	justifiably	is	the	
object	of	praise	or	blame”	(pp.	17–18).	Churchman	(1968)	further	defined	management	
as “the burden of making choices about system improvement and the responsibility of 
responding to the choices made in a human environment in which there is bound to be 
opposition to what the manager has decided” (pp. 18–19). He then observed that we 
really know very little about management, the behavior of the manager, what makes for 
a	‘great	manager’	(seemingly	with	a	sense	for	the	greater	whole	and	a	greater	good)	nor	
even	when	a	decision	is	made,	enquiring	bemusedly	whether	there	might	exist	something	
like	a	‘decision’	in	the	first	place.
In the somewhat less bemused tone of their OMT article, Fournier and Grey (2000) argued 
that	one	goal	of	CMS	is	to	not	improve	the	effectiveness	of	the	means–ends	principle	
of managerial control. One could argue, along the tone of Churchman, that there is no 
better way to improve (managerial) control than to show how it fails to do so. Spicer et 
al. (2009) added that the legitimacy of performative knowledge does not lie in its truth 
but in its technical value in producing results, in increased technological control. Putting 
the problem of truth aside, they see some problems with regarding CMS as purely anti-
performative	(with	‘purely’	as	the	rhetoric	device	to	contrast	with	their	own,	apparently	
more nuanced, argument): ignoring real societal or human concerns, not asserting 
what CMS does want, becoming cynical and abdicating responsibility, and ignoring 
the fact that CMS within itself has a very strong performative intent. Instead of anti-
performativity, Spicer et al. (2009) proposed, invoking the work of J.L. Austin and Judith 
Butler,	a	‘critical	performativity’:	one	that	“involves	active	and	subversive	intervention	into	
managerial	discourses	and	practices…achieved	through	affirmation,	care,	pragmatism,	
engagement	with	potentialities,	and	a	normative	orientation”	(p.	538).	In	short,	affirmation	
entails engagement with ambiguity and tensions within organizations; care involves an 
openness of researchers to have their views radically challenged; pragmatism means 
making incremental “incisions into particular processes”; potentiality understood as an 
attempt to create a sense of what could be; and normative as in “directly engaging in 
the criteria we might use to make ethical judgement” (pp. 550–552).
It remains unclear whether Spicer et al. (2009) do not (wish to?) escape the focus on 
doing things well (management) instead of doing to right things (management?). But for 
my purposes here, we shift focus to the pragmatist aspect in particular, which directly 
4 In his writing, Churchman (and some other scholars I cite) is primarily concerned with his fellow 
men.	Here	I	have	added	a	(sic);	in	other	occurrences	I	will	not	insert	a	(sic)	again,	with	one	ex-
ception.
touches on the sense of performativity that Fournier and Grey had in mind. Spicer et 
al. (2009) insisted, drawing on the work of Latour (2004, 2005), that such a pragmatist, 
incremental approach “rejects attempts to present powerful systems as totally integrated, 
all	powerful,	singular	entities”	and	focus	on	complex	gatherings	of	“a	whole	range	of	
people, technologies, and institutions,” by “engaging with organizations in a piecemeal 
way”	(pp.	549–550).	They	provided	an	example	of	such	an	incision,	encouraging	a	genuine	
listening in an open dialogue. However, they also warned us against the forces that may 
instrumentalize	and	close	off	such	an	engagement,	effectively	undercutting	the	basic	
assumption of piecemeal incremental incisions themselves. In its vague description, it does 
not	seem	to	differ	much	from	the	incrementalistic	approach	of	which	the	‘mainstream’	
management study is accused. Others since then have critiqued this aspect of critical 
performativity, such as Fleming et al. (2016) who questioned the impact of this approach 
of	incisions	and	micro-emancipations.	Moreover,	Churchman’s	idea	of	the	‘whole	system’	
does	not	seem	that	different	from	Latour’s	‘complex	gatherings.’	Both	seem	to	be	looking	
for	a	‘glocal’	kind	of	science	in	which	boundaries	are	scrutinized	as	friction	lines	instead	
of	taken	as	given	limitations	of	what	 is	 ‘self’	and	what	 is	 ‘other’	 (be	 it	the	social,	 the	
agent,	 the	actant,	and	so	on).	This	way	of	 thinking	exactly	demands	us	 to	aspire	 to	
an	approach	that	does	not	shy	away	from	complex	gatherings,	 transgressing	public	
sectors and academic disciplines. Along with Latour, then, Churchman’s critique against 
incrementalism, against the assumption that small incisions and piecemeal interventions 
add up to a better whole, may breathe some new life into searches within CMS for this 
glocal approach, in particular in the critique of what is self and what is other in the 
practices	below	the	more	general	question	of	taking	responsibility	for	the	‘system	as	a	
whole.’	Then,	a	‘slow	science’	(Stengers,	2011)	may	emerge:	an	ongoing	engagement	into	
whole	complex	assemblages	that	opens	up	their	ambiguities,	contradictions	and	tensions	
in	an	unfinalizable	enterprise,	 into	matters of concern, “with their mode of fabrication 
and their stabilizing mechanisms clearly visible” (Latour, 2005, p. 150). We will return to 
this slow science in Chapter 3. The point for now is that when we pursue the problem 
of improvement for the human condition further, we begin to pursue the problem of 
what	is	counted	as	a	‘who’	and	the	processes	by	which	one	comes	to	answer	another	as	
a matter of concern.
Churchman	(1968)	concluded	his	first	section	by	another	attack	on	the	fragmentation	
of science and especially against what might be regarded as “one of the most ridiculous 
manifestations of the disciplines of modern science, social science”:
Enough evil was done in dividing the physical sciences into various kinds of 
specialized disciplines. The social scientists above all should have recognized the 
deficiencies	of	such	an	organization	of	their	society	and	refused	to	let	themselves	
be organized into the same kind of disciplinary structure that the physicists erected. 
Of course, they have failed in their attempt to gain disciplinary status and rightfully 
are regarded with suspicion not only by other scientists on university campuses but 
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also	by	politicians,	who	in	principle	should	be	eager	to	make	use	of	their	findings	
had they any value (pp. 85–86)
Ironically,	or	not,	partitioning	itself	into	special	subdisciplines	is	exactly	what	happened	
to	CMS	as	well:	moreover,	 even	 the	use	of	 such	 an	 ‘umbrella	 term’	offends	 critical	
management	scholars	and	(sub)disciplines	who	do	not	wish	to	be	defined	as	such,	or	
at all. The above-mentioned CMS scholars writing about CMS thus acknowledge the 
theoretical diversity within and around the discipline, and most strike a reconciling tone 
by proposing stimulating debates along these boundaries between them and with society. 
But	they	tread	carefully,	as	the	risk	of	fierce	polemic	and	deepening	disciplinary	rifts	is	
never absent. Alongside the historical development of the political Left in the twentieth 
century and before, the traditional debate within CMS has been between reformists who 
seek	counter-balancing	forces	against	the	excesses	of	market	and	profit	and	proponents	
of radical change who see the root problem in that system itself (although an all too sharp 
dividing line between cannot be drawn, either; Adler et al., 2007). In the wake of a similar 
inflow	in	other	social	sciences,	postmodernism	came	to	the	fore	and	another	debate,	
instrumental for our purposes here, arose in the 1990s, starring Martin Parker, Hugh 
Willmott, David Knights, Chris Smith, Paul Thompson and Stephen Ackroyd, culminating 
in	Parker	(1999)	and	Thompson	et	al.	(2000).	Substantive	and	methodological,	different	
kinds	of	sore	spots	are	exchanged	 in	 this	debate,	 including	the	 role	of	self-identity	
processes (e.g. class consciousness). Here, Parker’s (1999) remark “This permanent 
oscillation	between	doubting	the	 ‘is’	 in	order	to	clarify	the	 ‘ought’	seems	to	me	the	
only way past the impasse that these positions currently occupy” (p. 43), is interesting. 
While trying to resolve one problem, by disclosing a space for scrutinizing stabilizing 
structures	and	especially	those	that	normalize	boundaries	into	given	‘who	haves	versus	
who have-nots,’ Parker foregoes a problem with permanent oscillation, if that indeed 
entails	embracing	an	ongoing	process	of	unfinalizing	structures,	also	 those	of	 self-
identification.	The	problem	is	that	it	may	have	the	opposite	outcome	of	the	one	socially	
desired, as Thompson et al. (2000, p. 1155) argued. The repressed and subdued may be 
left more bereft than they were before, compared to those who stand out and who may 
both	successfully	resist	and	mobilize	that	oscillation	process	to	their	own	benefits.	Thus,	
we	can/ought	to	do	well	in	acknowledging	a	positive	potential	that	finalizing	forces	may	
have to unlock a capacity for resistance and change, such as an emancipating labor force 
against	the	managerialist	employer.	A	sore	spot	of	who	comes	to	(self-)defined	and	who	
is	excluded	also	festers	within	CMS’s	own	practices.	Returning	to	Churchman	(1968),	his	
outrage	is	clear	in	his	discussion	of	one	of	those	‘intolerable’	and	‘un-called-for	snobbery	
principles’	of	scientific	survival:	academic	excellence.	Obviously,	excellence,	if	it	is	applied	
in the wrong way, may result in more destruction. But Churchman (1968) argued against 
the	idea	of	‘the	outstanding’	altogether:
At the present time the human race is just about able to cope with the number of 
outstanding	men	that	exist	 in	a	given	generation.	The	“ordinary”	man	has	good	
reason not to be terribly grateful for the activities of outstanding men, considering 
what outstanding men often do to society. Whether they be scientists, artists, or 
politicians,	the	outstanding	are	often	deficient	in	some	fundamental	function	of	the	
human psyche, are frequently narrow in their perspective, and indeed can only be 
regarded as potentially dangerous individuals by their fellow humans. (p. 70)
I can only imagine how Churchman received his 1968 Academy of Management book 
award. Churchman’s argument in a sense scorns the mainstay CMS argument against 
academic	excellence:	the	critique	against	the	apparatus	of	excellence	as	in	the	systems	of	
citations,	tenures	and	so	on.	Consider	for	example	the	argument	of	Butler	and	Spoelstra	
(2014), when they concluded that science should be an end in itself. This is an idea to 
which Churchman would have been sympathetic, were it not for the fact that Butler and 
Spoelstra’s	idea	of	this	good	science	is	quintessentially	excellent:	interviewing	successful	
CMS professors and publishing in the top tier British Journal of Management.	The	‘ordinary	
man,’ the well-informed public, and the idea of a science by and for everyone from school 
onward, is absent here, which adds to Churchman’s insight that scientists in no special 
way qualify to determine what ought to be, in the world (1968, p. 64). Churchman asked 
whether there can be a science of the ethics of the whole system and suggested that we 
at least may start by creating an undisciplined science that does not lie in one sector of 
society.	He	imagined	an	academic	community	geared	not	toward	‘standing	out’	among	
themselves, but toward stimulating an unbound public interest to inform itself well on 
whatever all of its members themselves choose to inquire into, outside the endgame 
of means–ends calculation. And if the more basic matter of concern of performativity 
revolves around the process of how one comes to answer another, it is where at least this 
inquiry will proceed, undisciplined. But we will have to take on board two other elements: 
a	revised	reflexivity	and	a	reshuffled	outlook	on	the	matters	at	hand.
1.3	 Reflexivity’s	‘maximum	loop’
In the second section of his Challenge to Reason Churchman argued, in his tendency 
to	drill	 the	complexities	of	 (scholarly)	 life	down	to	some	simple	dichotomies,	 that	 in	
science	there	are	those	who	are	satisfied	and	those	who	are	dissatisfied.	The	satisfied	do	
not	sense	(or	ignore)	the	agony	that	the	problem	under	scrutiny	might	be	inextricably	
part of a larger whole. In fact, these scientists will try to make the problem as small 
as	possible	and	make	the	outside	‘all	other	circumstances	equal’	as	large	as	possible.	
Churchman	(1968)	depicted	the	satisfied	as	the	pure scientists: searchers for problems 
that can reasonably be solved: “Thus the purity of pure science lies in its isolation; it 
creates	a	small	system	that	it	can	work	on	and	expects	that	various	gifts	it	calls	data	can	
be obtained. It is a marvelous creation of the human intellect, sometimes beautiful to 
behold and understand—but all in all it is not very heroic” (p. 128). To determine the 
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extent	to	which	an	observation	has	been	influenced	by	unwanted	variables,	the	pure	
scientist is forced:
to study those aspects of nature where he recognizes that he can control the variables, 
but	the	studies	themselves	turn	out	to	be	of	the	most	trivial	and	insignificant	sort.	
The	literature	of	science	becomes	filled	with	reports	of	experiments	that	were	‘very	
carefully done’ but were of very little or no importance to man in his pursuit of 
knowledge of the natural world. (Churchman, 1968, pp. 40–41)
In	the	other	corner	are	the	dissatisfied,	who	keep	on	asking	questions	that	irritate	the	
satisfied	(and	the	dissatisfied	no	less),	such	as	why	they	study	the	topics	that	they	do.	
Finding loopholes and making the small problem larger and larger,
They	wish	to	make	the	problem	large	enough	so	the	next	problem	that	emerges	will	
be a better one. They are faithless at heart. Or rather, they put their faith in the non-
obvious rather than the obvious. In a way, their faith is deeply obscure. (Churchman, 
1968, p. 116)
Crawling	at	the	rim	of	the	satisfied	they	are,	the	impure,	gazing	deeply	into	problems	that	
seem, or may very well be, bottomless: “taking upon themselves the hopeless task of all 
those who aspire to do good in the world. It’s a tragic aspiration, really” (Churchman, 1968, 
p.	128).	But	though	the	winding	road	toward	the	unresolvable	may	prove	insufferable,	
it might just as well be the most reasonable. Churchman, with philosophers long gone, 
scrutinizes the idea that reason is built out of common sense notions. He insisted that it is 
wrong to assume that the principles of rational behavior, and likewise rational policy, must 
be	obvious	and	clear.	As	a	remedy,	self-reflection	and	denaturalization	(apperception	as	
he	calls	it)	must	be	included:	the	dissatisfied’s	weapons	of	choice.	As	to	self-reflection,	
Churchman	(1968)	explored	the	idea	of	understanding	oneself	as	a	function	of	the	other,	
and vice versa: “For something to be able to look at itself, it must look at itself as though 
it	were	something	other”	(p.	106).	Self-reflection,	then,	is	much	more	than	merely	looking	
inward, it is looking from without toward oneself. And, something left unspoken in CMS, 
that	Churchman	(1968)	added,	‘from	without’	must	be	interpreted,	and	travelled	into,	as	
an outside that is as wide and diverse as possible: “The principle is fantastic. It says that 
self-reflection	is	possible	only	if	one	returns	to	the	self	after	the	longest	possible	journey.	
It	is	exemplified	in	the	great	myths	of	the	heroes:	Ulysses	must	go	through	every	deep	
experience	of	human	life	before	he	can	come	to	his	resting	point”	(p.	113).
In contrast, the minimum loop, Churchman contended, has always been a favorite object 
of study by philosophers searching in vain for some pure and meaningful proposition 
that directly implies itself. Most scientists will ignore this philosophical dead end of the 
minimum loop and pursue a career that is ultimately a science of minimum loops, of 
x	equals	x.	The	maximum	loop	is	an	irreversible	 journey	few,	understandably,	set	out	
to	travel	on.	But	what	about	CMS	scholars,	surely	the	(seemingly)	dissatisfied?	In	their	
reflections,	they	stress	the	urgency	for	CMS	to	broaden	its	horizon,	and	to	take	note	of	
pressing global concerns such as war, genocide, modern-day slavery and population 
displacement, and the destruction of the environment. In practice they hardly do. 
According to Dunne et al. (2008), both non-CMS and CMS remain mostly silent over these 
issues,	and	even	over	ethics	within	the	narrower	organizational	context,	demonstrating	
a myopia that leads them to ask: “Why is business and management scholarship so 
marginal to the central concerns of many people on our planet? Do such scholars have 
a responsibility to stop being silent?” (p. 272). These questions for the most part remain 
rhetorical	 in	 their	paper,	and	Dunne	et	al.	 (2008)	 leave	 little	ambiguity	 in	 their	final	
remarks:
The question that our survey seems to raise hinges on the link between silence and 
a lack of response to the troubles of the world, or (in more forthright terms) the 
link between complicity and a refusal to acknowledge that the products of our own 
labors are implicated in the production of the troubles of others. At the moment, 
management academics appear to want to claim power, but not responsibility. (pp. 
275–276)
When it comes down to confronting global concerns and atrocities, to the ethics of the 
‘whole	system,’	CMS	scholars	are	not	quite	so	dissatisfied,	it	seems.
And what about from within a yet smaller loop: their own research practices? CMS 
scholars do not fare much better here, according to themselves. Fournier and Smith 
(2012), along with Wray-Bliss (2002), observed that CMS scholars routinely distance 
themselves from those they study and speak for them from their own privileged position, 
subordinating them in the process. They argued that “critique can only have impact, be 
meaningful, if it starts from the personal” (p. 465), and that CMS and its scholars should 
do well to take a good look at their own comfort zone: reluctant to take risks and make 
sacrifices	which	are	implied	by	what	CMS	says	it	stands	for.	Fournier	and	Smith	(2012)	
argued that alternatives are indeed not unconceivable, just rarely sought: to challenge 
the institutionalization of CMS and to counteract the systems of material and statutory 
benefits.	They	note	that	“making	anything	we	feel	worth	saying	available	freely	online,	
may	not	be	a	career	building	strategy.	But	this	is	a	choice	we	can	exercise”	(p.	473).	Their	
message, in the end, is to face honest choices:
We all have to make a living and sometimes this is what is most important. Doing 
or not doing things is not the only question, what is important is that we recognize 
the reasons, conditions and consequences of our action or inaction. (Fournier & 
Smith, 2012, p. 472)
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But do we, then, at least do that? In a similar analysis, Tatli (2012) demanded that CMS 
face its own demons and asked why its scholars ignore the elephant in the room: the 
exclusionary	tendencies	within	CMS	itself.	An	exclusion	that	is	embedded	within	practices	
infused with forces of normalization, “not imposed on us as an alien power from above 
but	rather…daily	reproduced	by	us	in	our	everyday	embodied	reproduction	of	‘normal	
life’” (Wray-Bliss et al., 2002, p. 9). Tatli (2012) added that the approach of personal 
narratives may fail to emphasize the structural problems of a CMS community, which 
“replicates the wide ranging symbolic violence in academia by keeping silent about the 
exclusionary	mechanisms	which	keep	the	CMS	community	homogeneous	in	terms	of	
not only theoretical approaches but also the demographic make-up of its members” (p. 
26). She asked, “Well, so much for radical alternatives. How can a community which is 
characterized by the numerical and hierarchical domination of the privileged segments 
of society provide alternatives for the disadvantaged and oppressed?” (p. 26). Tatli’s 
suggested	ways	out,	unfortunately,	offer	 little	guidance	on	how	to	get	 there,	which	
may leave the doubtful, impure scientist willing to remain true to herself (whatever that 
means), again, inevitably without proper shelter.
The	CMS	scientist	aspiring	to	do	good	is	a	tragic	figure,	scrutinizing	everything	in	each	
direction, doubting with good reason whether she is really making a positive contribution 
in the larger scheme of things. Churchman (1968) wondered, as did old philosophers 
and scholars such as Parker and Parker (2017) in more recent work on agonism (see also 
ten	Bos,	1997),	whether	a	person’s	strongest	desire	is	to	struggle:	finding	meaning	in	
tragedy as well as in the comedy of life, in despair as well as joy, and that the truth of 
progress may depend on a kind of disagreement such that “the ethics of whole systems 
must	depend	in	part	at	least	on	concepts	of	conflict,	struggle,	and	despair”	(Churchman,	
1968, p. 62). Yet this, too, can be an intolerable predicament:
No	wonder	applied	scientists	avoid	the	heroic	and	turn	back	to	the	pure.	They	find	far	
greater security and comfort in isolating themselves from the heroic mood. Perhaps 
they simply adopt a master–slave attitude, and recognize that they work for some 
organization that supports them. (Churchman, 1968, p. 129)
King and Learmonth (2015) even wondered whether CMS could ever be practical, and 
feared	that	its	insights	may	have	rather	paralyzing	effects.	Reading	Foucault,	they	did	see	
potential for disrupting the ways in which we take the world and our own subjectivities 
(as managers, too) for granted, as well as in an “ability to live with not always knowing 
what to do” (p. 367), but to stomach it, and persevere. Yet melancholy turns to satire 
when CMS scholars become managers in such organizations themselves, as they often 
do, in some role or another. They may endure something like an identity crisis, akin to “a 
werewolf	looking	anxiously	in	the	mirror,	checking	for	unusual	facial	hair”	(Parker,	2004),	
and lament, “why do good people do this?” (Parker, 2004, p. 55). In practice, unfortunately, 
both	Parker	and	King	resolved	their	untimely	critical	manager	predicament	by	exiting	it,	
displaying	little	humor	in	their	final	remarks.
Churchman	(1968)	argued	that	humor	and	self-reflection	are	 intimately	related,	and	
touched upon the humor of science:
…because I have long felt the essential incompleteness of our modern concept of 
science. The humanists are right in their claim that science—as it is described by 
scientists themselves—is a kind of in-human monster. One rather successful young 
scientist	I	know	likes	to	differentiate	between	hard	and	soft	science;	presumably,	hard	
science means the inhuman beast who tries to gobble up reality by its monstrously 
mathematically precise teeth and digest it in its huge programmed belly which can 
accommodate a million variables. Soft science, I suppose, is soft in the head. Hard 
science is precise, rigorous, objective; it is also humorless, ugly, and at best amoral. 
It goes around creating “knowledge about the world,” and it doesn’t care who uses 
the knowledge, or why. This is not quite accurate, of course. When he’s not hard at 
work, the hard scientist is usually a very nice fellow, just like the felon. (p. 136)
More	to	the	point,	humor	is	a	kind	of	apperception,	which	Churchman	(1968)	defined	
as	“the	act	of	looking	at	the	same	thing	in	two	quite	different	ways”	(Churchman,	1968,	
p.	139).	Apperception	allows	us	to	look	at	the	world	from	different	moods	and	this	shift	
in moods is necessary for the applied scientist to both get closer and more precise 
(more	‘hard	and	pure’),	without	succumbing	to	that	desperate	modality.	She	may	then	
shift mood to scrutinize her own study and herself in the process, and “we’ll know we’re 
getting somewhere when we don’t have to take ourselves so seriously” (Churchman, 
1968, p. 142). More obviously, apperception, or denaturalization as we might as well 
call it in this sense, allows us to touch upon assumptions behind people’s reasonings, 
allows us the possibility to see things in another way, and not only as the given state 
of	affairs.	Churchman	(1968)	acknowledged	that	we	cannot	ascertain	whether	we	can	
speak	of	different	viewpoints	at	all,	or	to	what	extent	they	contribute	to	a	 ‘complete’	
understanding, but “As for completeness, we try as best we can to learn about the 
different	ways	that	people	have	looked	at	their	world”	(p.	155).	Instead	of	choosing	one	
viewpoint	and	excluding	others,	Churchman	(1968)	suggested	we	should	 listen	to	all	
of	them,	because	different	stories	tell	us	different	things	separately	and	tell	us	another	
thing when taken together:
It is not necessary for us folk of the tribe to believe wholeheartedly in what model 
builders say, any more than we need believe in practical men or wise men. But we 
should listen most carefully to the story that each has to tell. And this brings us back 
to the theme of the large model. A large planning model is a story—it is one idea of 
what reality is like and what it could be like. It is a marvelously told story in its way—
not dramatic perhaps, but as a mosaic of details it is unsurpassed. One can wander 
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endlessly	in	the	ramifications	of	the	fabric	of	the	tale,	touching	on	this	or	that	episode	
and	the	way	it	will	affect	our	lives.	The	main	trouble	with	this	type	of	storytelling	
is that the storytellers believe they must be consistent. Now no storyteller who is 
worth anything at all as a concocter of tales should ever try to be consistent. (p. 166)
The OMT scholar aspiring to grasp a larger whole should thus not try to cram everything 
into one consistent model or one unambiguous viewpoint. On the contrary, she should 
in her accounts allow for, and take in, unresolvability and inconsistency. This is part of 
making	the	maximum	loop.	In	one	inspiring	example	of	this,	Wray-Bliss	(2001)	generated	
three	different	representations	of	call	center	clerks’	use	of	‘customer	service.’	As	Wray-
Bliss (2001) argued,
our	texts	 inscribe	or	encourage	particular	social	relations;	a	multitude	of	further	
plausible	representations;	 If	 it	 takes	a	discourse	of	 ‘customer	service’	 to	help	us	
shift from relating to the researched as objects of our study to viewing them as 
people to whom we are responsible and accountable, then I would suggest that this 
is	one	positive	step	toward	unsettling	the	often	subordinating	authority	of	‘expert’	
academic tests. (p. 55)
In other words, it is not nearly enough to allow for theoretical and methodological 
diversity in CMS as a discipline; even if that by itself seems too much to ask, and besides 
the	now	obvious	pitfalls	of	defining	oneself	as	a	discipline.	The	maximum	loop	begins,	and	
ends, with the aspiration of the impure scientist, herself faced with the messy practices in 
which	she	finds	herself,	to	look	from	without	and	to	take	in	as	many	different	viewpoints	
as she can. And to take them in intensely, before she can start to look back onto herself 
and aspire to develop some inconsistent notions of what might secure improvement for 
both those practices and ultimately the human condition. Churchman, to be sure, has 
some	suggestions	to	this	end,	in	his	book’s	final	section.
1.4 Denaturalizing the real, the beautiful and the good
In the third section of Challenge to Reason, Churchman (1968) skimmed over the ancient 
philosophical	triptych	in	a	final	search	of	the	challenges	to	reason,	to	somehow	secure	
ways	to	improve	the	human	condition.	As	regards	to	the	‘real,’	he	contrasted	the	realist	
with the idealist, with the latter running “the risk of becoming disinterested with reality 
and with implementation of his precious ideas, looking increasingly impractical and 
absurd when compared with the realist that aims to get things done, and on time” (p. 
184). But the realist, too, is made absurd:
The realist wants to thump hard, look hard, and “what happens” to him is supposed 
to be reality!…Idealism is an absurdly easy philosophy because its opponent is so 
ridiculous. Yet the strange situation still continues. Realism in our culture is the 
more popular philosophy. People admire the straightforward man of action, just 
as	in	science	they	admire	the	individual	who	does	not	drift	off	too	vaguely	into	ill-
defended theories. (Churchman, 1968, p. 186)
Churchman (1968) lamented that “with the belief in the disinterested observer, the 
realist philosophy has dominated the social sciences” (p. 195), and has acquired research 
technology for itself, far beyond that of the idealist. Regarding aesthetics, Churchman 
readily	admitted	he	has	no	clear	idea	about	what	it	exactly	means,	and	that	in	his	last	
section	he	would	probably	squeeze	out	any	excitement	that	goes	with	it.	Churchman	
(1968) picked out one palpable aspect of aesthetics: the irritating,
because	irritation	itself	is	a	marvelously	paradoxical	feeling.	Irritation	arises	out	of	a	
feeling of the incompleteness of system design. Of course, in itself, incompleteness 
is not a sign of the unaesthetic; indeed, some of the most creative pieces of art and 
literature are incomplete. It is some particular kind of incompleteness that makes 
large systems so irritatingly unaesthetic. (p. 199)
Clearly agitated himself, Churchman (1968) elaborated on the irritating qualities of large 
systems:	“for	(against)	the	masses	but	never	by	the	masses.	It	never	expresses	any	more	
than the single-minded purpose of some mind, the administrator, engineer, entrepreneur, 
or politician” (p. 200). This single-mindedness in particular Churchman (1968) targeted: 
“akin to the irritating behavior of someone who tries to step in line ahead of those who 
have waited longer: His egoistic determination plays havoc with human dignity” (p. 
203).	This	irritation	runs	rampant	because	everyone	is	expected	to	repeat	this	single-
mindedness over and over again. Churchman (1968) called this the choleric, or complaint 
mood, and stated that its nature, the nature of complaint, itself is irritating beyond 
measure. The one that is single-minded is irritating “just because one sees that in his 
mind there is no image of an other—an opposite of his purpose” (p. 202). Therefore, 
dissatisfied	beware,	for	the	complaint	itself	is	single-mindedness	on	a	particular	theme,	
too,	amidst	opposing	minds.	In	a	final	chapter	titled	“War	and	Peace,”	Churchman	(1968)	
culminated by spurting out another binary, but now regarding moralists. He described 
hard	moralists	as	those	concerned	with	compliance	with	explicit	 rules,	whereas	soft	
moralists	concern	themselves	with	‘vaguer’	codes	and	virtues.	When	faced	with	war,	the	
soft moralist risks turning introvert and:
gets	involved	with	its	own	thinking	in	order	to	remain	‘objective’…This	is	an	introvert’s	
way of getting rid of the outside world. In the spirit of his own thoughtfulness, he 
ought to be asking himself whether the direct, hard approach of war isn’t a basic 
need, as basic as the need for fairness. (Churchman, 1968, pp. 211, 213)
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Churchman (1968) drew on the literary novel as the “one place where men can tell the 
stories	that	we	can	appreciate.	But	novel	writing	is	just	another	example	of	our	social	
segregation;	no	one	seems	to	know	how	to	use	novels	in	the	management	of	our	affairs”	
(pp. 216–217). Churchman (1968) remained hungry “for more and better stories from 
soft morality—not stories that just account for hard morality, but stories that put hard 
morality into the system” (p. 217). Where does this leave the shelter-less CMS scholar? 
CMS	scholarship	needs	 ‘multi-minded’	accounts	that	animate,	excite,	anger,	ridicule,	
self-debase, destabilize, provoke and unhinge; accounts that do not only turn inward but 
concern themselves with the hard realities of brute force and oppression, concurrently.
And thus, along a trail of partial agreements, we draw near the end of CMS: geared 
toward the messy world out there and in here, tracing and connecting narratives that 
do	not	shy	away	from	‘hard	morality’	as	we	have	already	explored	above,	producing	
accounts that are linked “within a wider historical problematic and structural arena” 
(Reed,	2005,	p.	1637).	In	inquiries	that	generate	“multivocal	texts	where	an	event	is	given	
meaning	first	in	one	way,	then	another”	(van	Maanen,	2011,	p.	52),	we	find	a	“refusal	to	
totalize” (Letiche, 2006, p. 172). In addition, the task at hand is not only to generate radical 
alternatives	(Cunliffe,	2008,	p.	2).	Drawing	on	Latour,	Clegg	et	al.	(2006)	insisted	on	tracing	
the	translation	between	accounts,	more	specifically,	about	the	translations	“between	
discourses	enacting	different	worlds	where	power	 is	 at	 stake…Speaking	practically,	
these processes of translation are ongoing organizational events unfolding both intra- 
as well as inter-organizationally” (p. 14). As King and Learmonth (2015) suggested, these 
disconcerting	texts	should	seek	to	be	“disruptive	and	disturbing	to	those	with	whom	they	
engage.	They	should	offer	people	different	and	unsettling	ways	of	seeing	the	world”	(p.	
367).	A	similar	argument	is	offered	by	Wickert	and	Schaefer	(2015),	who	insisted	that	“the	
task of CMS researchers should be continuously to point out ambiguities” (p. 122). And, 
as Fleming and Banerjee (2016) noted, the CMS scholar should not aspire to anything 
less than radical alternatives despite the critique of radical being “too far removed from 
everyday managerial constraints and thus impractical for engaging with practitioners” (p. 
273) in the face of a “general trajectory of neoliberal capitalism [that] looks almost suicidal 
in its radicalism” (p. 273). Parker and Parker (2017) insisted on pulling “abstractions into a 
particular	instance	of	organizing,	presenting	a	messy	and	complex	example”	(p.	18)	and	
insisted	with	Gramsci	and	with	Laclau	and	Mouffe,	on	a	form	of	critique	of	hegemony	as:
an	endless	struggle	to	fix	meanings	in	a	certain	way…This	form	of	critique	would	
refuse the inevitability of the present, assuming it to be a temporary hegemony that 
can be contested…There are no organizations or practices that are unambiguously 
good	or	bad,	no	final	judgements	can	be	made.	(pp.	12–14)
Contrary to the single-minded complainer, the CMS scholar has a responsibility to 
concern herself with the right and the wrong in all their ambiguities, evoking toward 
this ambiguity a mode of responsiveness from the reader.
1.5 Becoming responsive to the study of wicked problems
It takes a decent amount of undisciplined idiocy to gaze deep into a pit of big problems 
and an even amount more to say or do something about them, but well: here we are. 
I started this chapter introducing the forensic ACT team under scrutiny, but that focus 
wavered in favor of more theoretical thoughts, which will happen recurrently below. 
Not much of an organizational ethnography, this study is more concerned with theory. 
But	the	key	critical	ingredients	of	its	‘hard	morality’	are	all	here	in	practice	for	us	to	feed	
on. Making casual sense of the forensic ACT practice with the given conceptual tools 
of	performativity,	reflexivity	and	denaturalization	will	give	us	yet	another	study	on	how	
practitioners are pushed to perform better on the basis of managerial key performance 
indicators,	by	an	outside	scholar	reflecting	on	his	own	outsideness,	shedding	little	light	
on a relatively young yet already bloated research tradition. Instead, I will try to be a 
little more irritating, if only because the wickedness of the practice demands it. So again: 
how	is	it	that	in	some	contemporary	work	practices	the	exposure	to	precarious	situations	
is accompanied by a sense of personal responsibility, from a self to another? How do 
we actually deploy ourselves and others in those precarious situations by talking about 
them	first?	And	how	do	we	seem	to	not	need	anyone	in	particular	to	make	us	do	this	
anyway? These are the kinds of questions that drive us deep into the wicked problems of 
forensic ACT practice and contemporary (semi)public sector organizing more generally, 
redirecting our moral outrage toward how we make ourselves do this, without providing 
any easy ways out.
Twenty-five	years	of	CMS	resonate	with	Churchman’s	(1968)	Challenge to Reason to such 
an	extent	that	it	leaves	one	aspiring	scholar	to	doubt	the	birthplace	of	CMS.	Again,	to	
many a CMS scholar such a suggestion may amount to horror, being associated with a 
self-professed systems-thinker like Churchman (1968) who simply insisted: “the system is 
rational,	it	explains,	it	unifies”	(pp.	122–123).	However,	at	least	in	this	Challenge to Reason, 
he in no substantial way discussed the actual workings of systems or system thinking. 
It	is	the	‘whole	system’	that	is	at	stake	and,	if	anything,	it	is	clear	from	Churchman’s	text	
that we should interpret this as a system not in the common sense, but rather as a moral 
imperative	to	aspire	to	move	beyond	given	fragmentations,	however	difficult.	With	ten	
Bos (2005b): “This is what ethics is all about: to think a possibility that might prove to 
be impossible” (p. 36). When we inquire, then, into performativity we should start by 
scrutinizing how lines are drawn between and within other and self, and between those 
who	benefit	and	those	who	suffer,	or	whose	existence	is	obscured,	in	organizing.	And,	
second,	in	that	organizational	inquiry	we	should	seek	out	the	maximum	loop	of	quotidian	
work life, stretching toward the perimeters of space and of time, as our starting point, and 
start	connecting	the	dots	from	there.	But	not	by	developing	a	single-minded	or	‘excellent’	
stance toward it, regarding everyday life as the derivative of the abstract. Coming to 
terms with as many and as much otherness as one can take in, one may develop alternate 
accounts that each provide incomplete answers, both in theory and in responding to 
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those	studied	and	those	addressed,	avoiding	a	“sort	of	(superior)	‘realism’…which	emerges	
from	the	comparison	of	difference…supposedly	more	complete	or	whole	than	its	parts”	
(Letiche, 2010, p. 265). And in answering, the CMS scholars should do well to develop 
an	awareness	of	both	the	finalizing	and	destabilizing	force	that	their	words	carry.	The	
challenge	is	to	generate	multivocal	texts	without	losing	sight	of	the	endless	possibilities	
in which their words may be appropriated and made instrumental for purposes directly 
opposed to any emancipatory objectives. What we are left with, then, the common 
thread,	is	that	which	is	open,	incomplete,	unresolvable,	be	it	in	the	self–other	axis,	in	the	
expanse	of	the	spatiotemporality	of	work	life,	and	in	discourse,	itself.	In	the	following	
I	seek	to	inquire	into	these	unfinalizables	themselves,	with	the	help	of	a	self-professed	
antagonist	of	systems	thinking:	Mikhail	Bakhtin,	and	his	central	concept	of	unfinalizability.
1
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2	 Unfinalizawhat?5
Ken: He has been refused there. He’s been rejected everywhere…Yes, it’s an uh…too 
difficult	an	issue.
Olive: But why was he rejected there?
Ken: They don’t think, they don’t think, they don’t think he’s a patient for long-stay 
psychiatry. We don’t have to solve it today because he’s not around.
Olive: Well yeah, it doesn’t mean that this can be solved.
Ken: No, I’ll just uh….
Olive: That he’s put in some lodging, something like that.
Ken: For the moment it’s unsolvable. (day 1, 24 Sep. 2012)
The	term	‘unfinalizability’	 (Незавершимый: nezavershennost’), is an imperfect English 
translation of once carefully chosen Russian words. I do not speak Russian, so I will be 
relying	extensively	on	inevitably	imperfect	translations	of	the	original	works	written	by	
the literary theorist and moral philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975). The translations 
are in English, which, as you may well have noticed, is not my mother tongue either.6 
‘Unfinalizability’	we	could	understand	as	the	 impossibility	to	finalize	or	as	the	ability	
to	make	something	 ‘unfinalizable,’	which,	 in	 itself,	may	be	 translated	 imperfectly	as	
unfinished,	unending,	unresolved,	incomplete,	indeterminate,	inconclusive,	unachieved,	
unaccomplished, imperfect, unvollendet, inachevé, onvoltooibaar. And more of such, 
generously employed by my loved ones to depict this thesis writing process, which for 
me at times seemed impossible to end, while they in turn stressed my propensity to make 
it	unending.	Either	way,	unfinalizability	thus	stands	for	the	impossibility	to	make	final,	
but the broader sense of the term also hints at the inability to fully put to rest, secure, 
constrain,	discipline,	normalize,	disregard,	exonerate,	abdicate,	appropriate,	exclude,	
isolate,	rationalize,	compute,	clarify,	purify,	essentialize,	unify,	validate,	define,	resolve,	
determine	and	exhaust,	not	only	oneself	and	another,	but,	more	so,	all	that	surrounds	
us and everything we utter. It holds both a message of optimism and a desperate threat. 
The hypothesis here is that all meaning, all understanding also of oneself, can never be 
encapsulated into one perfect system, into a single coherent consciousness. Because 
5 I presented part of a previous version of this chapter at the 8th Annual Liverpool Symposium 
on Current Developments in Ethnographic Research in the Social and Management Sciences of 
2013 in Amsterdam, The Netherlands (Best Paper award, with the address containing remarks 
such	as	‘there	is	so	much	bullshit	in	there’)
6	 Fortunately,	next	to	the	traditional	lexicons	we	now	we	have	unlimited	resources,	such	as	the	
Urban	Dictionary	that	generally	offers	superior	translations,	by	adding	tone,	color	and	value	
judgments.	For	example:	“For	 lack	of	a	better	word	-	Phrase	used	by	people	with	a	 limited	
vocabulary	or	those	who	want	to	get	away	with	saying	something	obscene	in	public.	‘And	for	
lack of a better word, she’s a bitch.’”
#dumb#catch#phrase#set#words by LunaLayla April 17, 2010.” Retrieved 4 May 2017, http://
www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=For%20lack%20of%20a%20better%20word
there are no such systems: in theory or in practice. To be clear about one thing from 
the	outset,	I	do	not	mean	infinity	when	I	say	unfinalizability.	On	the	contrary;	well,	not	
completely	to	the	contrary.	Infinity,	the	writer	Jorge	Luis	Borges	once	said,	is	a	concept	
that	corrupts	and	upsets	all	others.	If	infinity,	then,	is	the	great	corruptor,	one	may	wonder	
if	unfinalizability	may	serve	as	its	resolving	anti-hero.	But	once	captivated	by	the	infinite,	
the	unfinalizable	itself	might	draw	us	toward	our	undoing	altogether.	In	January	1978,	
Kurt Gödel, arguably the greatest logician ever, starved himself due to “malnutrition and 
inanition	resulting	from	personality	disturbance,”	according	to	his	death	certificate.	As	
Dawson (1997) noted in his biography, “Gödel’s demise was fraught with Pyrrhic irony” 
(p. 255). Called Mr. Why as a child by his parents, in his twenties Gödel put an end to the 
positivist	quest	that	had	occupied	minds	for	millennia:	to	integrate	all	axioms	on	which	
arithmetic rested into a perfect single formal system; a consistent and complete logic 
in which every proper claim could be proved to be true or false. As Churchman (1968) 
explained,
Logic is the caretaker of man’s reason. Without logic we are all insane. The hallmark 
of reason is consistency. The hallmark of consistency is redundancy. If I say, “p is 
true” then this implies “p is true.” To give up such a straightforward principle of 
reasoning is to give up all grounds for thinking. A proposition must imply itself—
at least—and above all. What’s wrong with this? It merely says that a proposition 
reflects	its	own	truth,	a	beautiful	way	to	say	the	most	prosaic	thing	we	know.	What	
can disturb the equanimity of logical perfection? Why, a Cretan can. This Cretan—call 
him	Epimenides	—says	that	all	Cretans	are	liars.	More	specifically,	he	says,	“I	am	now	
lying.” If he is truly referring to his own veracity, he must be truly telling us that he 
lies, in which case he truly tells us that he is untruthful. If he is falsely referring to his 
own veracity, he must be falsely telling us that he lies, in which case he untruthfully 
tells us that he is truthful. Seemingly, we must forbid Epimenides to speak about his 
own lying. But we will permit him to say that a true proposition implies itself. Can we 
forbid the one and permit the other? Anyone who has studied the problem knows 
the tortuous pathways that must be constructed to keep our logic sane: the theory of 
types, the fundamental inability of arithmetic to prove its own consistency. To some 
it comes as a distinct shock to realize that even in today’s enlightened world, we still 
do not fully understand what it means to be consistent: We may not understand the 
consistency of consistency, or the sanity of being sane. (pp. 108–109)
Gödel	managed	to	translate	Epimenides’	paradox	into	mathematical	 language	which	
systemically corrupted any systemic consistency from within. As of 1931, it is understood 
in Gödel’s incompleteness theorem that each and every formal system will, if mature 
enough, contain claims that are true but cannot be proved, making that system 
inconsistent and, always, incomplete. For many, this was a hard pill to swallow; and 
still	 is.	Gödel	himself	 increasingly	 suffered	 from	paranoid	plots	which	besieged	his	
daily life at Princeton, up to the point that his wife proof-tasted everything due to his 
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conviction that poisoned food would kill him. Tragedy struck when his life partner had to 
be hospitalized for a few months herself, leaving Gödel alone amid the humdrum of the 
everyday. Captivated by obsessive fear that food and refrigerator cooling vapors would 
get the better of him, he proved utterly unable to take care of himself. And when his wife 
finally	returned,	Mr.	Why	passed	away,	weighing	just	65	pounds	(29	kg).
From within the abstract world of the concise and the precise, of the secure and the 
pure, the sense of a mundane reality permeated with the inconclusive corrodes, infects, 
and	defiles	this	pure	world	in	an	overwhelmingly	terrifying	and	grotesque	manner.	And	
if	it	is	indeed	a	possibility	that	the	unfinalizable	of	the	everyday	may	completely	corrupt	
the	mind	immersed	in	the	infinite,	we	might	reflect	on	our	own	performative	mode	of	
clarity	and	efficacy	in	organizing	(and	science)	today,	where	we,	too,	try	to	do	away	with	
the	unfinalizable.	We	tend	to	discard	via	labels	such	as	dirt,	danger,	deviance,	stupidity,	
ugliness, indecency, irrelevance and immorality: that which refuses to be consistently 
translated	and	made	instrumental	into	doing	things	well.	In	a	sense,	the	unfinalizable	
points us toward the non-instrumental, the non-commutable, the irreplaceable, to our 
holiest of holies. Zygmunt Bauman described this tendency as a “garden culture,” as ten 
Bos and Willmott (2002) noted:
Expunging	anything	that	comes	from	the	gut,	including	the	“moral	impulse”	which	
is regarded as “a weed.” The ideal-typical bureaucrat behaves as the prototypical 
gardener who strives to create “an ideal life and a perfect arrangement of human 
conditions” where the unsettling uncertainties of chance are, in principle, eliminated 
by weeding out every source of unpredictability, including the moral impulse. (p. 784)
In a co-authored paper, Kaulingfreks and ten Bos (2005) argued that organizing itself is 
a	process	that	aims	at	excluding	damaging	influences,	a	process	permeated	by	the	fear	
of the impure, or hosophobic as they call it. Hosophobia is now the norm:
Whatever is uncontrollable is deemed to be unacceptable or at least problematical. 
Organization is, we claim, a hosophobic project in a hosophobic civilization. This 
is	not	merely	an	abstract	point.	Everyday	 language	 in	organizations	exemplifies	
the	hosophobic	obsession.	People	 in	organizations	speak	 in	terms	of	 ‘healthy	or	
unhealthy	cultures,’	‘transparent	leadership,’	‘moral	excellence,’	‘weeding	out,’	and	
so on. (Kaulingfreks & ten Bos, 2005, p. 88)
Some	quixotic	CMS	scholars	such	as	ten	Bos	and	Kaulingfreks	have	thus	agitated	against	
this purity and the morality of it, and I am content to join this waning bunch of the 
chronically	dissatisfied.	But,	to	be	fair,	 I	do	not	completely	trust	my	own	refrigerator,	
either. It makes eerie noises at night.
As Irving and Young (2002) put it, “Bakhtin lays before us inherent multiplicity and 
openness	against	the	hard	reifications	of	stability	and	closure	–	an	endlessly	subversive	
process	of	unfinalizability”	(p.	21).	But	to	state	that	unfinalizability	is	endlessly	subversive	
is to start with the principles of the abstract and the perfect: to gaze upon it with Gödel’s 
eyes.	The	unfinalizable	is	of	the	everyday,	and	not	of	systems	and	high	theory.	It	is	a	messy	
concept from the muddy realm of the tangible present. As Simons (1988) so forcefully 
insisted in her dissertation:
In	its	imagery,	[unfinalizability]	suggests	a	known	concrete	world	which	cannot	be	
closed	down,	rather	than	an	infinite	and	ultimately	unknowable	universe.	It	suggests	
a	meaning-filled	moment,	an	epoch	which	remains	open	to	another	meaning	rather	
than	the	limitlessness,	the	boundlessness	of	infinity.	(p.	215)
In	this	theory	chapter,	this	unfinalizable	is	placed	front	and	center,	as	we	trace	Bakhtin’s	
own	evolving	moral	thought	on	the	relation	between	responsibility	and	the	unfinalizable.	
After we gloss over the OMT studies which touch upon Bakhtin’s work, and his 
unfinalizability	in	particular,	a	heuristic	approach	is	suggested	to	enable	us	to	grasp	how	
responsibility is played out in organizing. Central in this approach is the dynamic between 
the	three	‘unfinalizables’	that	we	generated	in	the	previous	chapter:	the	self–other	axis,	
spatiotemporality and discourse.
2.1	 Drawing	responsibility	into	the	unfinalizable
Since	the	introductory	work	of	Hazen	(1993),	Jeffcutt	(1994)	and	Boje	(1995),	the	work	
of Mikhail Bakhtin has been a source of inspiration to CMS, and OMT more generally, 
with key concepts such as polyphony, the carnivalesque, the chronotope, and, to a lesser 
extent,	heteroglossia,	speech	genres,	answerability,	the	dialogic	self	and	the	grotesque.	
Only	a	few	organization	studies	have	touched	upon	the	concept	of	the	unfinalizable	
explicitly,	mostly	via	the	concept	of	polyphony:	polyphony	and	self	(Belova,	2010)	and	
other	(Letiche,	2010)	in	organization,	organizational	‘truths’	(Sullivan,	2008)	and	stories	
about	strategy	(Riad,	2011;	Barry	&	Elmes,	1997),	leadership	(Cunliffe	and	Eriksen,	2011),	
stakeholders (Brown & Dillard, 2015), organizational communication (Barge & Little, 
2002; Hawes, 1999) and organizational change (Jabri, 2004; Jabri et al., 2008). In these 
studies,	we	again	find	that	the	concept	of	unfinalizability	is	applied	to	self	and	other	and	
their	relationship,	to	the	messy	and	open	‘event’	of	being	in	which	we	find	ourselves,	
and to the ambiguity of meaning(making) and representation. Some other studies are 
methodological	in	character,	focusing	on	the	problems	of	unfinalized	writing	(Flory	&	
Durant, 2007; Helin, 2015; Helin & Avenier, 2016; Smissaert & Jalonen, 2018) and the 
potential	of	unfinalizability	for	management	learning	(Ramsey,	2008;	Larsen	&	Madsen,	
2016). Outside OMT, literary theorists Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, in their 
seminal work Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics (1990) upon which the above OMT 
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scholars	recurrently	draw,	consider	unfinalizability	one	of	three	key	contributions	(the	
other	two	being	dialogue	and	what	they	coin	‘prosaics’)	of	Bakhtin’s	conceptual	thought.	
They	argued	that	the	concept	is	found	in	many	different	contexts	in	Bakhtin’s	work	and	
designates:	“a	complex	of	values	central	to	his	thinking:	innovation,	‘surprisingness,’	the	
genuinely new, openness, potentiality, freedom, and creativity” (Morson & Emerson, 
1990,	p.	37).	They	explained	that	Bakhtin,	in	a	lifelong	exploration	of	the	possibility	of	
moral responsibility, struggled, alongside many Russian thinkers and writers, with the 
question of whether the world is an already determined or an open place. Not convinced 
by a common distinction between objective laws of nature and subjective sense of 
freedom, and their irreducibility, Morson and Emerson argued that “Bakhtin’s several 
theories	of	language,	literature,	culture,	and	the	self	offer	visions	of	the	world	in	which	
freedom	and	unfinalizability	are	real”	(p.	38).
Of	course,	there	is	a	fine	line	between	the	observed-to-be	and	the	ought-to-be	in	
both CMS and business ethics research, and science more generally, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter. And we should not “get stuck in one of the most basic 
philosophical	fallacies,	i.e.	the	‘is-ought’	fallacy”	(Painter-Morland	&	ten	Bos,	2011,	pp.	
8–9). However, we have seen others, such as Martin Parker, venturing alongside that 
narrow trail, and so, too, will I. Since, with Bakhtin, only statements void of meaning 
are value-free. And in the same vein, to observe is to infuse meaning: to live, to 
breath, to see is to bestow value, is to bestow an ought-to-be, is to respond, to be 
responsible, answerable. As ten Bos and Willmott (2002) argued with Vetlesen (1994),
philosophers, in their ethical theories have departed from fatally wrong epistemological 
assumptions: the moral object is invariably considered as a given that is independent of 
the moral judgment…that is understood to precede moral action. The basic objection to 
this sequence is that there is no pre-given object that causes us to be ethical or which 
arouses	morality	in	us.	It	is	argued,	for	example,	that	when	we	observe	that	refugees	from	
Kosovo	are	suffering,	we	already	see	them	in	a	particular	way,	or	to	invoke	a	thoroughly	
Kantian	notion,	we	actively	 constitute	 them	as	 suffering.	As	Vetlesen	 (1994,	p.	159)	
explains:	 ...	 [t]o	see	suffering	as	suffering	is	already	to	have	established	an	emotional	
bond	between	myself	and	the	person	I	“see”	suffering.	It	is	not	that	an	observation	of	the	
refugees triggers moral concern or respect or whatever. It is more that the observation 
itself is, right from the outset, already thoroughly moral. Not being capable of perceiving 
the	suffering	of	refugees	from	Kosovo	is	a	failure	of	an	emotional	as	well	as	of	a	rational/
cognitive character. Being capable of perceiving a moral situation, Vetlesen (1994, p. 162) 
argues, involves an “active receptivity” — that is to say, it involves an emotional-cognitive 
openness to the world that allows human beings to be attentive, in this case, to the suffering 
of the other. (p. 787, my emphasis)
It	 is	 this	 ‘active	 receptivity’	 (which	 I	would	 translate	 in	Dutch	as	ontvankelijkheid: a 
combination of openness, receptive, sensitive, accessible, impressable, open-hearted 
and	open-minded)	which	drives	the	unfinalizable	into	the	heart	and	mind	of	the	observer	
unable	to	disentangle	the	morality	of	the	 ‘object,’	 the	 ‘observation’	and	the	sense	of	
self. Unable, unwilling, to withhold the possibility of self-transformation in the process. 
It is this already thoroughly moral active receptivity that is Bakhtin’s understanding 
of	what	it	means	to	be	responsible.	Bakhtin’s	notion	of	unfinalizability	is	meant	to	be	
positively immanent to our everyday life. It should, again, not be approached from a 
mode of thinking that begins with the abstract (of rules, systems), because these modes 
of thinking, in their abstraction: “lose something essential about language or any other 
cultural	entity:	their	‘eventness,’	which	means	they	also	lose	their	unfinalizability”	(Morson	
& Emerson, 1990, p. 39). This eventness of the prosaic, the messiness of the everyday, 
is	very	much	intertwined	with	unfinalizability.	And	if	we	want	to	grasp	how	openness	is	
possible	in	the	world,	we	should	look	for	unfinalizability	“in	ordinary	processes,	as	Bakhtin	
puts	it,	in	the	very	‘prose	of	life’…Those	processes	are	open	to	the	future	because	they	
are and have been the product of accumulated tiny alterations constituting the daily 
‘event	of	being’”	 (Morson	&	Emerson,	1990,	p.	40).	As	such,	unfinalizability,	and	the	
ethical	that	comes	along	with	this	openness,	is	not	something	exceptional	or	poetic,	but	
rather ordinary and prosaic. This, too, is in line with Bakhtin’s thought on the eventness 
of	the	everyday:	it	draws	us	in	the	modality	of	meaning-filled	moments,	the	modality	of	
the	unfinalizable	everyday,	where	memory	will	always	be	imperfect,	and	the	extent	of	
knowledge	of	situational	contexts	of	then	and	now	is	always	incomplete.
And then it may occur to us again that all these notions – of I and you, of what is abstract 
and	what	is	real,	right,	wrong,	binary	and	ambiguous	–	are	unfinalizable.	Words.	Stories.	
Words	and	stories	that	are,	at	best,	merely	inadequate	to	convey	what	you	sense	is	‘really’	
going on, and, at worst, the henchmen of death and destruction. Analytical philosopher 
Galen	Strawson	(2004)	has	argued	against	stories,	or	narrativity	to	be	specific,	in	two	
senses: people do not actually live life like they are living a narrative and neither should 
we try to live our life as an ongoing story. I agree on both accounts. But if we forget 
words	are	unfinalizable,	we	will	come	to	believe,	by	living	the	story	of	pure	logic	alone,	
that moral responsibility is impossible. This is Strawson’s Basic Argument (1994):
(1) Nothing can be causa sui – nothing can be the cause of itself. (2) In order to 
be truly morally responsible for one’s actions one would have to be causa sui, at 
least in certain crucial mental respects. (3) Therefore, nothing can be truly morally 
responsible. (p. 6)
But I am all for narrativity, for stories, and for words. We just have to remind ourselves 
that	these	words	and	stories,	too,	are	unfinalizable;	a	comfort	to	the	poor	storyteller	
before you. For then we realize that words, narrative or, more generally, discourse is the 
pervious realm where answerability in all its own tiny alterations comes to life, where 
it protrudes its way into our entangled lives and needs. This is why Bakhtin became 
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infatuated	with	novels	as	the	‘maximum	loop’	to	an	inquiry	into	moral	responsibility:	a	
study of the human condition by means of philology (Morson, 2010).
My now already repetitive point is this: only when we forget that discourse itself is 
unfinalizable,	do	we	start	to	believe	in	the	principle	of	purity,	and	take	carefully	placed	
words	like	‘truly’	in	‘truly	morally	responsible’	as	truthful.	But,	in	light	of	Gödel’s	plight,	
I	 urge	 you	not	 to	 take	a	 turn	 for	 the	pure.	Because	 there,	 indeed,	we	will	 not	find	
responsibility; there we will not answer each other. Moral responsibility does not have 
to be truly pure moral responsibility for it to be moral responsibility; on the contrary, 
the complete contrary, if you will. Maybe the only beautiful thing logic, ultimately, has 
proved	is	the	unbearableness	of	its	own	consequence.	Unfinalizable	discourse	matters,	
and a question of this thesis is how it matters for our understanding of responsibility 
in organizing.
The ways in which moral responsibility as the active receptivity in answering is related 
to	 the	 ‘lived	 truth’	 of	 the	 unfinalizable	 in	 the	 swirling	 triptych	 of	 self–other	 axis,	
spatiotemporal	 ‘eventness’	and	discourse,	 is	–	 in	a	nutshell	–	Bakhtin’s	work.	 In	 the	
rest	of	this	chapter,	we	follow	Bakhtin’s	exploration	into	ethics,	guided	by	Morson	and	
Emerson	(1990)	who	identified	an	order	in	Bakhtin’s	thinking	about	unfinalizability:	the	
early	‘architectonics’	of	responsibility,	the	middle	and	late	period	of	the	dialogic	word,	and	
the Rabelaisian grotesque embodiment intervallic period.7	How	the	three	unfinalizables	
relate	to	each	other	differs	 in	these	three	(I	conflate	the	middle	and	 late)	phases	of	
Bakhtin, and so does the sense of what responsibility is about. Each of these phases of 
Bakhtin provides us with a particular approach to how responsibility is, for lack of a better 
word, calibrated in organizing: how the moralities are there already from the outset. 
Via these three pathways we may come to understand how in organizing we become 
enmeshed	into	the	dynamics	between	these	unfinalizables	and	come	to	answer	each	
other in particular ways. For better maybe, possibly, but also for worse, probably, surely.
7 The early phase comprised Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Art and Answerability and “Author 
and Hero in Aesthetic Activity.” The Rabelaisian phase consists of his Rabelais and His World 
and, one might say, in the later added chapter on carnival in his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. 
The intermediate phase comprises his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art, “Discourse in the Novel,” 
“Epic and Novel,” “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel,” “The Bildungsroman 
and	its	Significance	in	the	History	of	Realism”	and	his	later	works	of	“Toward	a	Methodology	
for the Human Sciences,” “The Problem of Content, Material and Form in Verbal Creative Art,” 
“The	Problem	of	the	Text	in	Linguistics,	Philology,	and	the	Human	Sciences”	and	“The	Problem	
of Speech Genres.”
2.2	 Scaffolding	personal	responsibility
It is in his early inquiries on the (moral) relationship between self and other that Bakhtin 
was interested in the positive aspects of how an outsider, in particular an author, may 
provide	a	self	(a	hero)	with	defining	features.	As	Morson	and	Emerson	(1990)	intimated,
In	his	earliest	works,	he	stressed	the	value	of	finalization,	so	long	as	it	is	not	carried	
to	excess	and	so	 long	as	a	person	does	not	assume	he	can	finalize	himself…An	
integral	self,	a	tentative	self-definition,	requires	an	other.	To	know	oneself,	one	needs	
another’s	finalizing	outsideness…Finally,	ethics	requires	finalization	and	outsideness,	
because ethical action by its very nature consists of a free gift to another from a 
different	integral	position.	The	ethical	person	seeks	not	full	identity	with	a	sufferer,	
but “live entering,” a special relation that adds something new and valuable from an 
outside	and	temporarily	finalizing	perspective.	In	short,	these	manuscripts	contend	
that	without	finalization,	there	would	be	no	art,	no	self,	no	responsibility.	(p.	91)
The	finalizing	gaze	of	the	other	rescues	her	 from	her	own	inner	unboundedness	by	
bestowing	her,	from	the	outside,	with	some	finalizing	characteristics,	and	anchors	the	
moral	self	through	the	gaze	of	another.	Without	explicitly	articulating	it	as	such,	Bakhtin	
developed	an	idea	of	unfinalizability	in	this	period	by	contemplating	how	a	person	can	
never coincide with the image that person constructs of herself, as opposed to the image 
she constructs of another:
The	other	human	being	exists	for	me	entirely	in	the	object	and	his	I	is	only	an	object	
for	me.	I	can	remember	myself,	I	can	to	some	extent	perceive	myself	through	my	
outer sense, and thus render myself in part an object of my desiring and feeling—
that	is,	I	can	make	myself	an	object	for	myself.	But	in	this	act	of	self-objectification	
I shall never coincide with myself—I-for-myself shall continue to be in the act of 
this	self-objectification,	and	not	in	its	product,	that	is,	in	the	act	of	seeing,	feeling,	
thinking,	and	not	in	the	object	seen	or	felt.	I	am	incapable	of	fitting	all	of	myself	into	
an	object,	for	I	exceed	any	object	as	the	active	subiectum	of	it	(Bakhtin,	1990,	p.	38).
In other words, there is both a surplus of the other to see me as a whole, as an image, 
which	the	‘I’	cannot	acquire	because	she	gazes	outward	from	herself.	And	this	in	turn	
points	to	an	inability	of	the	I	to	finalize	a	self-image	because	she	keeps	exceeding	it	in	
being	answered	by	others,	thus	always	remaining	an	‘I-in-becoming.’	It	is	this	unfinalizable	
relationship	that	prefigures	the	intersubjective	character	of	any	person,	always	potentially	
breaking with her own image and with those others have of him, yet simultaneously 
dependent of the capacity of the other to provide him with an image of self that is in 
surplus of her own. On the borderline. Preoccupied in this phase by the relation between 
aesthetics	and	ethics,	Bakhtin	argued	in	favor	of	the	aesthetic	act	of	finalizing	an	image	
of another person, since this adds a surplus to the other’s conception of self. However, 
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Bakhtin	strongly	argued	against	‘aestheticism,’	as	a	way	of	living	the	life	of	a	pretender,	
fixed	on	leading	one’s	own	life	in	terms	of	finalized	images,	denying	the	unfinalizable	
center	of	the	architectonics	of	life	that	is	any	human	being.	Bakhtin	explained	that	the	‘I’	
cannot, and should not, aestheticize itself: “I am not the hero of my own life” (Bakhtin, 
1990,	p.	112).	Ultimately,	 in	Bakhtin’s	view,	no	person	has	an	‘alibi’	 for	being.	Such	an	
approach to responsibility makes us aware of the ways in which we tend to construct 
and hide behind alibis such as our roles as employees, as authors, and so on which 
prescribe both the scope and nature of the responsibilities and obligations as well as 
the ways these may be directed toward other roles. Such alibis, also described as frames 
by	Goffman	(1974),	come	between	us	and	around	us;	they	enable	us	to	fragment	our	
answerability and regard others from within particular roles instead of from within the 
unity of everything and everyone that relates to me from my unique place and moment. 
Crucially,	these	alibis	make	us	do	something	specific:	to	engage	with	a	generalized	yet	
fragmented image of another by disengaging with the livingness of others from their 
unique place, and to regard the requirement to answer them as wholly as possible as 
irrelevant, or irritating, and improper. In other words, the problem with these roles, 
although very useful in the contemporary life of separated domains (cf. Bakhtin, 1990, 
p. 1), is that we abstract ourselves from the unity of our dwelling place (our ethos) and 
lose ourselves in separated domains that prescribe our behavior, our thoughts and our 
moral	responses.	To	be	provided	with	tasks	to	fulfil,	in	this	way,	we	“are	simply	no	longer	
present in it as individually and answerably active human beings” (Bakhtin, 1993, p.7). 
What we, according to Bakhtin, should be answerable for, is how these domains become 
related in the unity of our answerability. But, instead, we have become divided, specialized 
and play parts in specialized domains, such as the parent in a household, the employer 
in a company, the writer in academia and so on. If with Bakhtin we begin to understand 
responsibility	as	answerability,	we	need	to	grasp	the	unfinalizables	of	both	the	self–other	
relationship	under	construction	and	the	unfinalizability	of	the	‘eventness’	of	the	ethos as 
the once-occurring time and place in which one actively undersigns the palpable deed 
for the other.
From a tradition which Simons (1988) has labeled radical humanism – sounding 
wonderfully out of fashion in academia today – Bakhtin began with the idea that everyone 
is thrust into this being-as-event where each moment is once-occurring, and no one 
can take another’s place in that singular moment and place. We become responsible for 
what we do and for who we are for ourselves and toward the other when we authorize, 
undersign, what we do: “It is not the content of an obligation that obligates me, but my 
signature below it – the fact that at one time I acknowledged or undersigned the given 
acknowledgment” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 38). What makes this sound old-fashioned is the 
impression that the idea of a subject is given, while the idea of an author-subject had 
already been declared dead a long time ago. But a radical aspect of Bakhtin’s approach 
to answerability is that the ethical subject only comes with answerability, not before it, 
and that each one may be right “answerably, not subjectively” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 46). 
Likewise,	when	answerability	ceases,	so	does	the	subject.	But	what	is	this	‘unique	place	
in	being,’	this	‘once-occurrent	eventness	in	time	and	space’	that	Bakhtin	speaks	of?	In	
the end of Toward a Philosophy of the Act, an early work written when he had not yet 
directed his attention toward literature and in particular toward the novel, Bakhtin (1993) 
foreshadowed his later work on the relationship between personal responsibility and 
time and place, here centered around the participating individual:
My active unique place is not just an abstract geometrical center, but constitutes an 
answerable, emotional-volitional, concrete center of the concrete manifoldness of the 
world, in which the spatial and temporal moment – the actual unique place and the 
actual, once-occurrent, historical day and hour of accomplishment – is a necessary 
but	not	exhaustive	moment	of	my	actual	centrality	–	my	centrality	for	myself.	(p.	57)
In this early period, Bakhtin (1993) tied the possibility of ethics around the presence of 
an individual who acts in the moment as it occurs, where anything is valued against the 
limited	life	of	‘mortal	man’:
Only the value of mortal man provides the standards for measuring the spatial and 
temporal orders: space gains body as the possible horizon of mortal man and as 
his possible environment, and time possesses valuative weight and heaviness as the 
progression of mortal man’s life…even eternity possesses a valuative meaning only 
in correlation with a determinate life. (p. 65)
Faced with the transcendental imperatives of Kant, Bakhtin sought to redeem the 
prosaic	of	the	everyday	and	firmly	place	(‘architectonize’)	the	ethical	into	the	heart	of	
the individual, bound by the events surrounding her. Bakhtin thus sought to develop an 
understanding of responsibility based on the idea that it is a human being who is the 
highest	value,	and	not	an	idea	of	the	‘good,’	whatever	content	or	formula	it	may	have.	
Not	yet	drawn	into	the	destabilizing	unfinalizability	of	discourse,	this	early	Bakhtin	was	
clear about what it meant to be responsible: to be answerable, from your own unique 
place in the event of being, to other persons outside that unique place. What you do 
from	that	place	affects	and	helps	shape	those	others,	and	vice	versa.	As	Michael	Gardiner	
(1996) summed up:
Bakhtin,	through	this	critical	appraisal	of	theoretism,	affirms	that	Being-as-event	
is the inescapable “value-center” of human life. It is only from this location, within 
everyday sociality, that I construct meaningful relations with the world at large, 
transforming	the	“givenness”	of	the	world	into	a	coherent	‘world-for-me.”	Otherwise,	
the world remains a world of objective, empty possibility. If I remain in communion 
with	the	concrete	deed,	with	 immediate	experience,	 then	 I	exist	 in	a	 relation	of	
“answerability” to the world at large, in the sense that I can accept full responsibility 
for my actions and thoughts. Because my participation in the world is unique and 
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non-recurrent, shared by no other person, no one else can accept responsibility on 
my	behalf.	This	explains	Bakhtin’s	striking	phrase:	there	is	no	‘alibi’	in	Being,	it	implies	
that we cannot justify our deeds by recourse to an abstraction like the Categorical 
Imperative, the Unconscious, the Historical Mission of the Proletariat or whatever. 
This provides us with just such an alibi for evading our responsibility, in which case 
“what we have is not an answerable deed but a technical or instrumental action,” 
[Bakhtin,	1993,	p.	52]	which	is	justified	by	an	appeal	to	efficiency	rather	than	morality.	
(p. 139)
However, what is not yet clear is how one comes to this sense of personal responsibility 
beyond the particularities of one role or the other. Zooming in on a particular event in the 
everyday work life of the forensic ACT team, I hope to illustrate in Chapter 4 that Bakhtin’s 
thought in this early phase makes for a particularly suitable framework to understand 
how	personal	responsibility	emerges	from	the	 ‘real-life’	of	organizing	as	a	threshold	
phenomenon. In organization, we dwell in everyday working life, yet we are caught in 
teleological	schemes;	we	drink	our	coffee	and	hold	scheduled	meetings	about	projects	
in	tiny	office	rooms.	OMT	scholars	such	as	Chia	and	Holt	(2006,	2009)	elaborated	on	this	
divide and rejoiced in the dwelling mode and its ethos as relationality. As Painter-Morland 
and ten Bos (2016) argued, the study of this ethos has become a topic of interest precisely 
because it supplements and strengthens the performativity of organizing:
This	 ‘goal-directedness’	 should	 be	 balanced	 by	 the	 kind	 of	 Gelassenheit that 
celebrates	care	and	hesitation	alongside	efficiency.	Taking	care	requires,	above	all	
other things, an acceptance of incompleteness of our knowledge, our insight, and our 
control…it involves a process that requires engagement, relationality, and openness 
as	conditions	for	the	emergence	of	new	ways	to	flourish.	(p.	561)
But, as I will argue, far from the idea of being able to shift from mode to mode, this 
threshold	 itself	 ‘builds’	our	sense	of	presence	 in	 it,	as	personal	responsibility,	made	
tangible	in	moments	of	disarmament	and	anxiety,	where	“network	of	relationships	that	
people rely on for orientation and impetus break down” (Painter-Morland & ten Bos, 
2016, p. 557).
The	concept	of	chronotope	(Chronos,	time;	topos,	place)	will	be	explored,	as	it	“provides	
an indirect and easier access to meaning-making habits, professional and organizational 
values and identities, from a theoretical, methodological and practical point of view” 
(Lorino, 2010, p. 25). I will suggest that organization works like a spatiotemporal threshold 
in which a sense of personal responsibility comes about. I will argue that chronotopic 
interplay, much like in the literary novel, conditions a sense of responsibility and 
henceforth	prefigures	who	is	(not)	answerable	and	for	what	(not).	Of	particular	empirical	
interest are chronotopic motifs, which we can trace, and which may tell us how people 
are	made	to	answer	each	other	in	organization.	Specifically,	I	will	introduce	Bakhtin’s	take	
on	how	personal	responsibility	for	the	first	time	in	literary	history	was	devised	in	the	
chronotopic construction in Apuleius’ (2011) The Golden Ass and use it as an analogy of 
how personal responsibility comes about in organizing. In short: as in The Golden Ass, 
organizing	the	chronotope	of	the	goal-oriented	adventure	is	juxtaposed	with	dwelling	
in the chronotope of the everyday, thrusting the individual protagonist at the crossroads 
and alongside an unending road to personal purgatory (see also Kaulingfreks & ten 
Bos, 2005). So, instead of portraying organization as some bureaucratic entity outside 
the	people	it	employs	and	‘making’	those	people	align	themselves	with	conventional	
habits	and	rules,	I	understand	organization	as	the	experience	of	an	ongoing	process	of	
spatiotemporal	juxtaposition	in	between	which	people	become	personally	answerable.	
More	conceptually,	 it	 is	not	so	much	the	parameter	of	the	abstract	 infinite	which	we	
encounter in the face of the other (cf. Levinas) and in which we would drown, but rather 
the	experience	of	the	partial,	and	incomplete	recognition	of	the	other	as	self,	that	leaves	
us with an awkward sense of personal responsibility.
2.3 Moral prolapse8
Several scholars have been quick to draw parallels and crossroads between Bakhtin’s 
thought and his personal life, and a brief sideward glance at Bakhtin’s life is particularly 
relevant in his Rabelaisian interval phase. Two aspects come to mind: the Stalinist regime 
and his osteomyelitis (bone infection). Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin was born into a 
middle-upper class family in 1895 in Oryol in Southern Russia and enjoyed a safe and 
sheltered youth, moving around Russia from time to time due to his father’s career; he 
did not partake in the Bolshevik or the counter-revolutionary royalist movements (Clark 
& Holquist, 1984). As a young and promising scholar in the early 1920s, he befriended 
like-minded scholars such as Pavel Nikolaevich Medvedev and Valentin Nikolaevich 
Voloshinov,	and	formed	what	would	become	known	as	the	 ‘Bakhtin	circle,’	and	met	
his wife Elena Aleksandrovna whom he married in 1921. From the 1920s onward, the 
Soviet regime was to become more oppressive and while most of Bakhtin’s intellectual 
friends	disappeared	forever,	Bakhtin	faced	trial	and	was	‘merely’	banished	for	six	years	to	
Kazakhstan, where he took up several jobs as a clerk and a teacher (initially banished to 
Siberia for 10 years, his sentence was lowered due to his chronic osteomyelitis, which in 
effect	may	well	have	saved	his	life).	In	1936	he	and	his	wife	could	move	back	into	Russia,	
and from 1940 to 1945 he lived in Moscow, working on his doctoral dissertation “Rabelais 
and his World” (RAHW). It was only after Stalin’s death and with Khrushchev’s political 
reforms and modest liberalization of the arts that Bakhtin’s star began to rise again in 
8	 “Prolapse:	a	term	mistakenly	used	in	the	place	of	relapse	with	humorous	results.	‘That	asshole	
Yolanda got outta rehab, but she done had a prolapse an it turn her inside out agin...drugs an 
evil	thang.’	By	harry	flashman	July	12,	2003”	https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?ter-
m=prolapse. Retrieved on 24 November 2017.
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the Soviet Union and, after his death in 1975, in the West via Julia Kristeva and Tzvetan 
Todorov. Bakhtin’s most cited work, RAHW is unlike the work in his other two phases. 
A	volatile	and	transgressive	text,	 it	was	both	rejoiced	and	scorned	inside	the	Soviet	
Union, and later outside it by scholars such as Richard Berrong (2006) who was critical 
toward the historical factuality of RAHW and the quality of its argument. In his Rabelais 
and Bakhtin – Popular Culture in “Gargantua and Pantagruel,” Berrong (2006) made an 
interesting opening for our purposes here, when he asked, after critiquing Bakhtin in his 
first	100	pages,	if	Bakhtin	could	really	have	been	such	an	“unobservant	critic,	as	not	to	
have	seen	what	his	own	citing	of	Rabelais’s	texts	suggests”	(p.	105),	answering	himself,
I don’t believe so. Not at all…By 1936–38, Stalin’s purges of “undesirable” elements 
among the inhabitants of the Soviet Union, his attempts to create a culturally, 
ethnically, and intellectually homogeneous society had reached heights that even 
his	ally	across	the	Oder	might	have	admired.	This	is	the	historical	context	of	Rabelais	
and His World...If the Stalinist regime could create a mythical “folk” who incarnated 
all the qualities that it sought to instill in the Soviet citizenry, so Bakhtin could create 
his	own	mythology	of	a	people	who	exemplified	all	the	principles	of	revolution.	As	
Clark and Holquist have noted, “While opposing one idealized conception of the 
folk, Bakhtin’s own counter-image is no less idealized.” If Stalin’s ideologists moved 
to an ever-greater puritanism and denial of the human body, Bakhtin’s image of the 
officially	glorified	people	would	be	“dripping	with	urine	and	feces”	(C&H,	p.	310)…
Rabelais and his World is an allegorical work of political criticism and theory. To the 
extent	that	the	allegory	is	transparent,	Bakhtin’s	writing	and	presentation	of	this	work	
was a highly courageous work. Indeed, one may paraphrase one of his own remarks 
about Gargantua and Pantagruel, his dissertation – or at least the writing of it – is 
among the most fearless in the history of literary scholarship. (p. 109)
It is thus not only the writing itself, but also the act of writing, which may be regarded 
from an ethical purview, in light of the author being answerable for having written in a 
regime which persecuted him because of what he had written. Understanding RAHW 
necessitates	an	awareness	of	the	sociopolitical	context	 it	was	written	in	and	against,	
and,	deploying	its	argument	 in	another	context,	which	we	will,	necessitates	a	similar	
awareness. As a matter of fact, how, in organization, we are drawn into the grotesque, 
exactly	by	means	of	sociopolitical	context	 that	 is	evidenced	by	particular	discursive	
techniques within and beyond organizing, is a primary argument of Chapter 5.
In his “The Grotesque of the Body Electric,” Peter Hitchcock (1998) drew a strong 
connection between Bakhtin’s personal health and RAHW’s approach to the grotesque. 
During	periods	where	he	suffered	from	pain	and	fevers	due	to	his	osteomyelitis,	Bakhtin	
was unable to work or to even leave his bed for days or weeks on end, and during a 
particularly bad fever his right leg had to be amputated, in 1938. Bakhtin’s wife took care 
of Bakhtin during these periods, and her ever-present care for him might remind us of 
the	other	aberrant	figure	and	his	wife	mentioned	earlier	 in	this	chapter.	As	Clark	and	
Holquist (1984) intimated,
This condition made Bakhtin especially dependent on his wife, but they were very 
close	in	other	ways	as	well.	He	was	extremely	impractical,	and	she	was	his	anchor	in	
reality. He was like a child without his wife. He refused to talk on the telephone and 
rarely answered letters…Her most important function was to attend to all the needs 
of a man who was very set in his habits, enabling him to think and write. (pp. 51–52)
Without	a	 leg,	and	with	continuing	inflammations	in	other	parts	of	his	body,	Bakhtin	
continued to think and write, fueled by his wife with cigarettes and cups of tea, and gave 
birth to his RAHW. Hitchcock (1998) suggested that Bakhtin’s imagery of the grotesque 
body	“is	symptomatic	of	imagery	with	a	real	foundation	in	his	existence…Interestingly,	
the	phantom	limb	expresses	a	desire	for	the	complete	body	that	is	not,	but	this	is	not	
a	thesis,	or	prosthesis,	that	neatly	fits	Bakhtin’s	outlook”	(p.	89).	More	importantly,	for	
our chapter in part II later on about the grotesque and risk-taking in organization, is 
Hitchcock’s	(1998)	next	observation.
As Russo (1994) astutely points out, the grotesque has a crucial role in the discourse 
of risk-taking: the error or aberration is a realm of possibility (certainly, this is one way 
we might understand the pathos and deep irony of Shelley’s “monster,” as a literal 
embodiment of the risk of creation). As such, grotesque performances are those that 
challenge the normative by invoking not only the lower bodily stratum, but an array 
of practices that foreground and oppose the disciplinary zeal of social hierarchies. 
We know that modes of socialization create aberration and that the body tenaciously 
fights	the	surveiller/punir	system	of	domination	that	Foucault	explores.	What	is	less	
understood, however, is the ambivalence inscribed in opposition by the mode of the 
excessive	in	grotesque	imagery	itself.	The	revolting	body	is	not	necessarily	a	body	
of revolt. (p. 90)
Confined	in	an	inflamed	physique,	under	the	yolk	of	an	oppressive	regime	at	war,	Erdinast-
Vulcan	(2008)	speculated	that	Bakhtin’s	view	of	the	finalizing	other	“was	somewhat	less	
benign in 1943” than his initial view of the early 1920s of an author making the hero 
whole;	finalization	now	become	deadening,	and	“violent	containment”	 (p.	26).	With	
RAHW,	Bakhtin	attempted	to	fully	unleash	the	potential	of	discursive	unfinalizability	
(and, one might say, in the later added chapter on carnival in his Problems of Dostoevsky’s 
Poetics).	In	RAHW	it	is	unfinalizable	discourse,	as	in	Rabelais’	centrifugal	Gargantua and 
Pantagruel, which sweeps away the boundaries between self and other in favor of a 
collective	‘discourse-body’	growth	that	protrudes	the	humdrum	prosaic	in	favor	of	folk	
laughter	and	carnival.	As	Morson	and	Emerson	(1990)	contended,	unfinalizability	was	
Bakhtin’s	main	concept	to	explore	discourse	on	the	body,	and	unfinalizability	 itself	 is	
presented as:
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the	only	supreme	value….Everything	completed,	fixed,	or	defined	is	declared	to	be	
dogmatic	and	repressive:	only	the	destruction	of	all	extant	or	conceivable	norms	has	
value…In carnival no one is outside, and nothing ever reaches a whole image, which 
could only be restrictive. (pp. 91–92)
A	main	theme	of	his	later	RAHW,	Bakhtin	already	conceptually	explored	the	body	in	earlier	
work such as “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” (Bakhtin, 1990) with a historical 
treatise on the body and a conceptualization of the body as always in-becoming. In 
RAHW, Bakhtin further elaborated how “in the grotesque concept of the body a new, 
concrete, and realistic historic awareness was born and took form” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 
367), when the world of the Middle Ages was crumbling, and the Renaissance emerged. 
He	described	how	this	passage	is	reflected	in	the	writing	of	François	Rabelais’	Gargantua 
and Pantagruel, where a focus on the human body contributed to overthrowing the 
medieval picture of the world. Via the idea of the grotesque body, the image of the 
human body as collective, ongoing and open is foregrounded as deeply positive, even if 
it is near to immanent transgression and violence. Indeed, in the canon of this collective 
body-in-becoming, where the limits between self and world are blurred, violence and 
transgression are natural manifestations of that ongoing growing body itself, instead 
of a threat to it.
But near the end of the Renaissance in the passage toward modernity, Bakhtin tells us 
that the body once again became an abstract ideal, now an object of one’s own property 
that	should	be	kept	pure	and	proper.	 In	the	canon	of	the	‘proper	form’	(Bakhtin	also	
depicted	it	in	different	terms	like	classical	and	modern),	the	image	of	the	body	is	the	
polar opposite to that of the grotesque: individualized, private and limited, seen from the 
outside as individual. As Kaulingfreks and ten Bos (2002) added, “In the new paradigm, 
the body came to be understood as an entity in its own right, or, to be more precise, 
as a functional unit separate from other units” (p. 140). What separates the body is an 
opaque, impenetrable smooth surface. All the events taking place within it “acquire one 
single meaning: death is only death and hence, no signs of duality are left” (Bakhtin, 
1984a, pp. 281–322). Crucially, the two canons of the grotesque and the proper form do 
not	exist	separately,	but	they	feed	off	one	another,	in	an	oppositional	co-existence	of	a	
‘polarized	body.’	In	this	interval	phase	of	Bakhtin,	then,	what	was	ambivalent	before	and	
after, is thus polarized into a confrontation of unambiguous rights and wrongs, where 
the	individual	predicament	is	resolved	into	a	‘higher/lower’	vocation,	and	the	intimate	
prosaic of the everyday is torn apart, leaving only the clinically distant and the sputtering 
guffaw.	And	the	path	to	responsibility,	as	the	ability	to	answer,	 forks	 into	a	Moebius	
ring. From without the grotesque canon, the organization is seen as a bureaucratic, 
dehumanizing	mechanism,	and	the	only	‘real’	way	out	here	is	to	sense	a	moral	impulse,	a	
moral outrage, which, if at all possible, frees the organizational member to risk genuine, 
tangible encounters with others outside this distant and regulated realm. Here we enter 
Zygmunt	Bauman’s	world	and	critique	on	his	work	by,	for	example,	ten	Bos	and	Willmott	
(2002). From without the canon of the proper form, the organization is regarded as a 
pile of throbbing, oozing protuberances. Things not proper are considered improper: 
deviance, defect, defection, dirt and disease eat away at this proper form, violate it, and 
should be distanced at least and eradicated at best. In another paper, Kaulingfreks et 
al. (2011) pondered,
perhaps the wonder of organisation is that it makes our lives miraculously smooth. 
Here,	wonder	just	means	the	overcoming	of	difficulties.	Indeed,	so	many	products	of	
our daily life do work miracles and ease our sorrows. Imperfections such as pain and 
acne are just there to be overcome and the same holds for all sorts of organisational 
imperfections (p. 325)
The main strategy to eradicate such imperfections is by a “closed instrumentality 
responsive to reason and command which is its primary datum,” as Ferguson (1997) 
elaborated. The proper form, then, is the realm of alignment, calculation and polish, 
in	which	the	organization	may	be	understood	primarily	to	be	made	up	of	such	stuff:	
procedures and regulations such as job descriptions and mission statements that 
optimize both goal-directedness and its sweeping compliance to it. As Kaulingfreks 
and ten Bos (2007) argued,
the ethics of business and perhaps the business of ethics is paralysed by this obsession 
with	pure	and	static	 forms…we	are	 in	need	of	a	serious	ethics	of	disfigurement,	
formlessness, violence, and versatility. Such an ethics would pierce through the clean 
and hygienic images that speak to us…Ethics is not about recognizing faces but about 
recognizing the moral worthiness in those who are being defaced and those who 
have always already been defaced. (pp. 305, 311)
And to concur with ten Bos (1998),
managerial techniques have never fully succeeded in making organizations tidy, neat 
and also dead places where logic and rationality reign supreme. That is, organizations 
are still rude and sometimes unhealthy places that are shot through with superstition, 
violence, danger and chaos. Management and organization theorists who do not 
face this allow their insights, whatever their inhering inventiveness and creativity, to 
deteriorate into kitsch, a very important concept in Burrell’s book. Kitsch is, as Milan 
Kundera (who is approvingly quoted by Burrell) has pointed out, “the absolute denial 
of shit”; it tries to blind you from what is essentially intolerable and unacceptable 
about life. (p. 603)
But	instead	of	suggesting	that	we	need	an	ethics	of	disfigurement,	I	will	argue	that	a	kind	
of ethics from within the grotesque canon is already at play in organizing, oppositionally 
interlinked with the ethics of the proper form, and I insist that we need to see how 
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their	 interplay	exposes	those	 involved.	 In	short,	 the	more	proper	the	procedure,	the	
more grotesque that which lies at the heart of what the procedure cannot grasp, cannot 
prescribe, leaving a gap: the unclear relation between procedures and desired result, in 
which “practitioners will always have to rely on their own judgement” (ten Bos, 2003, p. 
282),	and	producing	an	ambivalence	which,	following	Munro	(1998),	works	as	a	‘socializing	
force’ where a refusal to comply is quickly understood as a challenge to an esprit de corps 
necessary to do team work in volatile conditions. Organizational members may thus be 
polished into proper fashion before they are made to protrude out of their own protocols. 
One common thread in both canons is the denial, the suspension (cf. Giorgio Agamben), 
of answering each other in the messiness of the everyday, which in the grotesque canon 
enables risk taking in the face of physical violence, and in the proper canon leads to a 
recurrent growth in administrative burdens. Both the ongoing discursive interplay set in 
the	sociohistorical	context	of	and	in	organizing,	and	the	force	of	the	unfinalizable	body	
at the heart of that interplay drive the process of how people may come to answer each 
other in organizing under pressure. In Chapter 5, I will try to ravel these threads together 
into	the	concept	of	the	chiasmus:	a	rhetorical	device	that	‘jumps	over’	that	which	it	cannot	
penetrate	by	circumscribing	it.	I	argue	against	Merleau-Ponty’s	take	on	(human)	flesh	
as	chiasmus,	by	arguing	that	the	body,	our	‘anatomy’	(literally:	cutting	up)	as	a	constant	
reminder of the anomic bodily force, is only at the heart of the chiasmus, whereas the 
discursive interplay circumscribing it is the chiasmus proper.
2.4 Close encounters of the third kind9
In the 1920s, Bakhtin discovered the potential of the word and the novel (Morson & 
Emerson, 1990), and this insight profoundly changed his search for and understanding 
of responsibility. The early Bakhtin was concerned with how an individual may act 
responsibly. He argued that for anything to have value as an act, a deed, it must ultimately 
be grounded in the center of a concrete and living person, someone who may sign this 
act, author it. The problem is that it is impossible to ascertain whether some occurrence 
may be regarded as a deed without reverting to a particular narrative in which it is as such 
ascribed	to	a	particular	agent,	by	himself	or	herself,	or	by	another.	A	‘deed’	then,	is	always	
already more than a seemingly neutral observation: it is a narrative, a story about how one 
relates to the other. (Un)fortunately, Bakhtin quickly learned that the realm of the word 
is	messy	and	ambiguous	as	the	eventness	of	our	lives	in	our	minds	and	‘out	there.’	To	
pretend otherwise is to deny the yet-to-be obvious: we will never achieve univocity; even 
9	 Derived	“from	a	classification	of	close	encounters	with	aliens	as	set	forth	by	American	UFO	
researcher J. Allen Hynek. Close Encounters of the First Kind refer to the sighting of a UFO. 
Physical evidence of a UFO is classed as Close Encounters of the Second Kind. Actual contact 
with an alien is a Close Encounter of the Third Kind.” https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075860/
faq. Retrieved on 17 September 2018.
our	own	thoughts	and	utterances	overflow	with	meanings	that	do	not	originate	or	end	
with us. The work of Fyodor Dostoevsky plays a pivotal role in Bakhtin’s epiphany and into 
his novels Bakhtin read a literary (but also ethical) Copernican revolution: a decentering 
of the relation of the author to its heroes in such a profound way, that it displaced the 
characters themselves in favor of dialogue between discourses. According to Bakhtin, in 
Dostoevsky’s (mature) novels the word in all its ambiguity begins to answer to itself, and 
characters	become	secondary	figures	to	the	swirl	of	utterances	with	partial,	double,	and	
overlapping meanings. But instead of sliding into the realm of moral relativism, or the 
anything-goes nihilism Dostoevsky argued against, Bakhtin located the possibility of the 
ethical,	not	so	much	in	the	existence	of	indeterminism	(the	possibility	of	free	will),	but	
in the linguistic open-endedness and one’s active receptivity to that open-endedness. 
Bakhtin’s quest from here on was to trace, not so much sociohistorical moral deeds, but 
rather,	via	philology,	how	that	linguistic	unfinalizability,	the	receptivity	toward	it,	and	its	
interplay, evolved and manifested itself. In short, how, in literature, characters came to 
answer	each	other	and	came	to	be	unhinged	from	the	definitions	others	including	the	
author imposed upon them. Moreover,
This open orientation toward the listener and his answer in everyday dialogue and in 
rhetorical forms has attracted the attention of linguists. But even where this has been 
the case, linguists have by and large gotten no further than the compositional forms 
by	which	the	listener	is	taken	into	account;	they	have	not	sought	influence	springing	
from more profound meaning and style. They have taken into consideration only 
those aspects of style determined by demands for comprehensibility and clarity – 
that is, precisely those aspects that are deprived of any internal dialogism, that take 
the listener for a person who passively understands but not for one who actively 
answers and reacts. The listener and his response are regularly taken into account 
when it comes to everyday dialogue and rhetoric, but every other sort of discourse 
as well is oriented toward an understanding that is “responsive” – although this 
orientation is not particularized in an independent act and is not compositionally 
marked. Responsive understanding is a fundamental force, one that participates in 
the formulation of discourse. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 280)
It is in the works of this phase where Bakhtin’s thought, according to Morson and 
Emerson (1990), achieves its greatest richness, and colorful concepts like heteroglossia 
and polyphony are jettisoned into the world of linguistics and beyond. And with 
a growing awareness of the historic and technical development of the novel and its 
predecessors,	 Bakhtin	 enriched	 the	 textual	 landscapes	 in	 his	winding	 road	 toward	
the ethical by reformulating these landscapes, literary genres in the commonsensical 
meaning, and speech genres more broadly: evolving constellations of meanings which 
both shape and infuse the speakers and addressees as they utter into dialogue with each 
other, and are shaped themselves as genres and infused by those utterances as they 
unfold into the eventness of everyday. It is by means of recognizing recurring patterns 
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in those utterances that we can start to identify them as indicators of particular genres. 
And	Bakhtin,	 inspired	by	the	idea	of	ever-evolving	dialogue,	extended	this	 insight	by	
suggesting	that	not	only	utterances,	but	different	genres	may	and	do	enter	into	dialogue	
with	each	other	themselves,	 like	colliding	galaxies	swaying	into	each	other’s	fields	of	
gravity, impacting all those worlds involved, catapulting them into voids or vortices, 
unhinging and locking new orbits. These are the voyages of Dostoevsky’s protagonists, 
who boldly go and voice such moral collusions as they enter into dialogue with each 
other,	and	themselves,	and	the	author.	In	this	phase,	the	unfinalizables	of	the	self–other	
axis,	of	spatiotemporality,	and	of	discourse,	are	 locked	into	a	shaky	balance.	Balance	
might imply equanimity, but it is a balance on the borderline, as Dostoevsky’s heroes 
exist	on	the	verge	of	isolation,	futility,	self-destruction,	and	insanity.	This	is	where	the	
unfinalizable	in	all	its	tragic	thresholds	and	moral	dilemmas	might	become	inexorable,	
and the promise of equanimity unbearable.
This Bakhtin thus immersed himself in the study of the novel as the quintessential means 
to	explore	the	ethical,	shifting	emphasis	toward	the	eventness	of	the	utterance,	where	
the inside-outside divide of the singular subject has faded (but is not swept away such as 
in the Rabelaisian interval), and polyphonic sounds of discourse have come to populate 
the	moral	self.	It	is	at	this	point	that	the	positive	aspects	of	finalization	of	the	early	phase	
dim in Bakhtin.
In	the	1929	Dostoevsky	book,	the	ratio	of	unfinalizability	to	finalization	shifts	in	favor	
of	the	former…The	act	of	finalizing,	defining,	or	accounting	for	another	“causally	and	
genetically” and “secondhand” is described as a fundamental threat to the essence 
of	selfhood,	which	lies	in	the	ability	to	render	untrue	all	finalizing	definitions…The	sin	
of “theoretism” – in Western thought of the past few centuries – is to reduce people 
to the circumstances that produced them, without seeing their genuine freedom to 
remake themselves and take responsibility for their action. Now Bakhtin argues that 
without	unfinalizability,	there	is	neither	selfhood	nor	ethical	responsibility.	(Morson	
& Emerson, 1990, p. 92)
In	this	phase,	the	responsible	person	does	not	seek	to	aestheticize	the	other,	to	finalize	
an image of the other. As is the duty of the novelist to develop open-ended personalities 
instead	of	finalized	characters,	decentering	herself	as	author	in	this	Copernican	revolution,	
a responsible person is one who engages another by engaging the ongoing dialogue 
of the unmerged voices within that other, including the otherness within the self. Here, 
unfinalizability	refers	to	the	idea	that	everyone	has	the	potential	to	render	untrue	any	
externalizing	and	finalizing	definition	of	them,	and:
the	characters	no	 longer	carry	on	a	 literary	polemic	with	finalizing	secondhand	
definitions	of	man	(although	the	author	himself	sometimes	does	this	for	them,	in	a	
very	subtle	ironic-parodic	form),	but	they	all	do	furious	battle	with	such	definitions	
of their personality in the mouths of other people. They all acutely sense their own 
inner	unfinalizability,	their	capacity	to	outgrow,	as	it	were,	from	within	and	to	render	
untrue	any	externalizing	and	finalizing	definition	of	them.	As	 long	as	a	person	is	
alive	he	lives	by	the	fact	that	he	is	not	yet	finalized,	that	he	has	not	yet	uttered	his	
ultimate word…Dostoevsky’s hero always seeks to destroy that framework of other 
people’s words	about	him	that	might	finalize	and	deaden	him…A	man	never	coincides	
with	himself.	One	cannot	apply	to	him	the	formula	of	identity	A	≡	A.	In	Dostoevsky’s	
artistic thinking, the genuine life of the personality takes place at the point of non-
coincidence between a man and himself, at his point of departure beyond the limits 
of	all	that	he	is	as	a	material	being,	a	being	that	can	be	spied	upon,	defined,	predicted	
apart from his own will, “at second hand.” The genuine life of the personality is made 
available only through a dialogic penetration of that personality, during which it 
freely and reciprocally reveals itself…The truth about a man in the mouths of others, 
not directed to him dialogically and therefore a secondhand truth, becomes a lie 
degrading and deadening him, if it touches upon his “holy of holies,” that is, “the 
man in man.” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 59)
Instead	of	the	‘pretendership’	and	aestheticism	in	his	first	phase,	but	in	a	way	similar,	
Bakhtin, immersed in the realm of the word, now replaces his early interlocutor Kant in 
philosophy	to	find	a	new	one:	formalism	in	linguistics,	and	the	way	it	foregrounds	abstract	
form and general devices of language. Responsibility in this phase calls on us to undo 
the monologic principle that underpins this formalist perspective, a principle that gathers 
“everything	capable	of	meaning	in	one	consciousness	and	subordinated	to	a	unified	
accent…whatever does not submit to such a reduction is accidental and unessential” 
(Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 82). This monologic formalism, totalitarianism in language, seeks to 
refuse both open-endedness and the receptivity toward it; seeks to withhold the ability 
to answer. In the same vein, a person cannot be an object itself for a person to study 
“objectively,” but is a “living addressivity toward itself and toward the other” (Bakhtin, 
1984b,	p.	251)	and	outside	this	dialogic	relation	the	consciousness	“does	not	exist,	even	
for itself” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 251).
In this sense it could be said that the person in Dostoevsky is the subject of an 
address. One cannot talk about him; one can only address oneself to him. Those 
“depths of the human soul,” whose representation Dostoevsky considered the main 
task of his realism “in a higher sense,” are revealed only in an intense act of address. 
It is impossible to master the inner man, to see and understand him by making 
him	into	an	object	of	 indifferent	neutral	analysis;	 it	 is	also	 impossible	to	master	
him by merging with him, by empathizing with him. No, one can approach him and 
reveal him – or more precisely, force him to reveal himself – only by addressing 
him dialogically. And to portray the inner man, as Dostoevsky understood it, was 
possible only by portraying his communion with another. Only in communion, in the 
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interaction of one person with another, can the “man in man” be revealed, for others 
as well as for oneself. (Bakhtin, 1984b, pp. 251–252)
The Dostoevskian hero then, without fusing with the author (“if the umbilical cord uniting 
the hero to his creator is not cut, then what we have is not a work of art but a personal 
document”; Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 50), has the potential to break the hermetic down. And 
the	way	that	Dostoevsky	brought	out	this	breakdown	was	by	inflicting	“moral	torture”	
(Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 54) upon his heroes, dissolving any outward event or plot device into 
the consciousness of the hero, assimilating it into the thought and the utterances of the 
hero about himself. The way in which Dostoevsky achieved this was by dialogue, dialogue 
seemingly	on	the	surface	level	between	the	different	characters	who	voice	certain	felt	
truths (hero-ideologists), but on a deeper level, dialogue was to be regarded
not as a means but as an end in itself. Dialogue is not the threshold to action, it is 
the action in itself. It is not a means for revealing, for bringing to the surface the 
already-made character of a person; no, in dialogue a person not only shows himself 
outwardly,	but	he	becomes	for	the	first	time	that	which	he	is	–	and,	we	repeat,	not	
only for others but for himself as well. To be means to communicate dialogically. 
When dialogue ends, everything ends. Thus dialogue, by its very essence, cannot 
and must not come to an end. (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 252)
This indicates a very particular view that Bakhtin had on language, where the primacy 
lies in the utterance. Bakhtin saw the utterance as the foundational building block of all 
language, where words and sentences are secondary, derivative of these utterances and 
seemingly impersonal and detached from a speaker and a listener, whereas
the utterance has both an author…and an addressee. This addressee can be an 
immediate	participant-interlocutor	in	an	everyday	dialogue,	a	differentiated	collective	
of specialists in some particular area of cultural communication, a more or less 
differentiated	public,	ethnic	group,	contemporaries,	like-minded	people,	opponents	
and enemies, a subordinate, a superior, someone who is lower, higher, familiar, 
foreign,	and	so	forth.	And	it	can	also	be	an	indefinite,	unconcretized	other	(with	
various kinds of monological utterances of an emotional type). All these varieties 
and conceptions of the addressee are determined by that area of human activity 
and everyday life to which the given utterance is related. Both the composition and, 
particularly, the style of the utterance depend on those to whom the utterance is 
addressed, how the speaker (or writer) senses and imagines his addressees, and the 
force	of	their	effect	on	the	utterance…	(Bakhtin,	1984b,	p.	95)
From Bakhtin’s viewpoint, each of us is immersed in linguistic indeterminacy from the 
outset, within which we relate to each other via the ability to answer each other. And 
this ability is a task, an ought-to-respond. Ten Bos (2005a) pointed to a task Giorgio 
Agamben has called for:
This task implies nothing less than an ongoing commitment to show what all human 
beings have in common – their linguistic openness to the world – and therefore to 
show	the	humanity	of	all	human	beings	(including	those	who	are	excluded).	That	
we can all speak is what ultimately matters much more than the quid about which 
or from which we are supposed to speak. (Agamben 2000b: 116; 1999a: 66). (p. 26)
Bakhtin, before Agamben, insisted one should not foreclose but embrace open-ended 
dialogue, and to be actively answerable, endlessly. In the realm of the spoken word, 
dialogue unfolds not (only) between persons, the word itself is dialogized: an utterance 
carries	within	itself	the	history	of	its	own	use	and	carries	the	potential	of	all	its	different	
intonations	and	meanings.	Any	word	 is	thus	already	charged,	and	no	 ‘neutral’	word	
exists	 in	the	event	of	being	uttered:	the	word	is	“internally	open-ended,	open	to	the	
possibility	of	further	meaning,	to	a	future,	unfinalizable	by	its	very	nature”	(Simons,	1988,	
p.	209).	This	reminds	us	of	Garfinkel’s	early	ethnomethodology.	In	his	short	but	seminal	
study “‘Good’ organizational reasons for ‘bad’ clinical records,”	Garfinkel	(1967)	asked	why,	
from a researcher’s perspective, most of the clinical records of an outpatient psychiatric 
clinic were fragmented and poorly documented, and of seemingly very low quality. 
Garfinkel’s	(1967)	final	answer	lies	in	how	the	records	make	sense	not	as	self-contained	
descriptions but as sets of “utterances in a conversation with an unknown audience 
which, because it already knows what might be talked about, is capable of reading 
hints” (p. 200). Understood in such a sense, the record is in “open anticipation” of a 
situated readership and presupposes a setting in which it is put to normal medical use. In 
many	ways,	Garfinkel’s	early	ethnomethodological	work	echoes	much	of	today’s	critique	
and contributions to both institutional theory and strategic management scholarship. 
Whereas	strategic	management	in	the	last	decade	has	taken	a	turn	toward	situated	praxis	
(Jarzabkowski, 2003, 2004; Whittington, 1996) and discourse (Vaara & Pedersen, 2013; 
Vaara, 2010), institutional theory has developed into the mainstream analysis of how 
organizations	at	the	field	level	behave	in	structured,	legitimate	ways,	focusing	increasingly	
on how cognitive processes “constitute the legitimate ways of acting socially in particular 
organizational settings” (Cornelissen et al., 2015, p. 11). One of the key concepts in what 
is now called neo-institutional theory is self-regulation. As Phillips et al. (2000) have 
argued, what makes institutions particularly distinct is the presence of self-regulating 
controls, involving “mechanisms that associate nonconformity with increased costs in 
several	different	ways”	(p.	28).	Assuming	that	self-regulation	has	to	do	with	mechanisms	
of compliance to inner projections of what pressures from another onto the self amount 
to,	the	focus	of	interest	is	that	(inner)	dialogue.	Both	in	Garfinkel’s	medical	record	case,	
as in the case of the self-regulating, institutionalized worker, anticipated interlocution, 
the	interlocuting	presence	of	not	only	a	‘real	life’	second	but	also	a	third	party	within	
the realm of discourse itself makes for a crucial topic. The analytic potential of such an 
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anticipated (third) interlocutor is to disclose that threshold inhabited by self-regulatory 
dialogic	processes	that	may	otherwise	be	difficult	to	observe	and	to	analyze.	To	do	so,	a	
radical linguistic approach is called for, which is not to be found in ethnomethodology 
or communicative institutionalism, but in the works of this phase of Bakhtin. Moving 
with Foucault and Agamben toward this linguistic open-endedness and away from “the 
figurative	modes	of	discourse”	 in	which	the	(human)	sciences	have	remained	captive	
(White, 1973, p. 24), some sense of redemption may in the end lie in wait for us, as White 
(1973) argued:
Once language is freed from the task of “representing” the world of things, the world 
of things disposes itself before consciousness as precisely what it was all along: a 
plenum of mere things, no one of which can lay claim to privileged status with respect 
to any other. Like “sanity” itself, the human sciences, once they are freed from the 
tyranny	which	the	repressed	word	exercised	over	them,	have	no	need	to	claim	the	
status of “sciences” at all. And man is released to a kingdom in which everything is 
possible	because	nothing	is	excluded	from	the	category	of	the	real.	(p.	44)
In Chapter 6 I attempt to make these high and dry musings more palpable by telling a 
story	about	my	first	day	of	field	work	at	the	forensic	ACT	team,	somewhat	similar	to	the	
structure of Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground,	reflecting	and	recounting	permeated	
with the anticipated response of the third party. It is when we become caught in these 
Dostoevskian threshold moments, that our answerability and our propensity to answer 
to other people is redirected inward toward anticipated interlocution with third parties 
dialogically organized.
2.5 Understanding organized responsibility
In	 this	 theory	 chapter,	 I	have	not	 so	much	clearly	defined	Bakhtin’s	 concept	of	 the	
unfinalizable,	which	would	be	a	comical	misstep,	as	elaborate	on	the	sense(s)	it	makes:	
in how a moral self relates to other amid the eventness of everyday and the ambiguities 
of language. I described three phases in Bakhtin’s thought as three modes of moral 
inquiry,	where	the	interplay	of	the	self–other	axis,	spatiotemporality	and	discourse	bring	
about	different	accounts	of	what	the	responsible	in	organizing	might	look	like.	Part	II	
of	this	thesis	offers	these	as	a	triptych	of	one	and	the	same	organizational	practice.	
Each chapter is in dialogue with the other chapters, and partially complements as well 
as	refutes	them.	Each	offers	its	own	incomplete	answer	to	the	larger	question	of	where	
to	locate	‘the	responsible’	in	organizational	praxis,	and	what	we	might	think	of	it.	The	
previous chapter grounded the possibility for these incomplete answers onto three 
conceptual pillars of the CMS: performativity understood as the problem of the self–
other	relationship,	reflexivity	as	a	spatiotemporal	maximum	loop	to	look	back	onto	one’s	
own moral practice, and denaturalization as the representational unhinging of discourse. 
Their interplay in each of Bakhtin’s phases points to the possibilities and consequences 
of	an	active	receptivity	toward	the	undefinable,	unresolvable,	in	organizing.	But	before	
we continue with these chapters, some more words on how to get there seem in order, 
not	in	the	least	to	justify,	or	apologize	for,	the	ways	in	which	this	text	and	its	tones	might	
irritate	some	and	exclude	others.
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3 Could a method of inquiry be made answerable?10
Clarity’s essential, and detail, no fake mysticism, the facts are bad enough. But we’re 
embarrassed for people who tell too much, and tell it without surprise. How does he know what 
happened? unless it’s one unshaven man along in a boat changing I to he, and how often do you 
get a man alone in a boat, in all this... all this...
The Recognitions. William Gaddis
A	PhD	methodology	chapter	should	sooth	the	academic	reader,	anxious	after	being	
fed loosely connected sets of theoretical ideas and societal objectives, each oozing 
insightfulness and urgency – or so the aspiring scholar argues. Moreover, delineating a 
thesis chapter to methods implies that we can draw a line between the content of the 
matter	at	hand	‘out	there’	and	the	ways	of	understanding	it.	These	lines	should	then	
be meticulously charted into a periodic table of methodological elements so that it 
is obvious we are not just muddling our way through alongside the likes of amateurs, 
activists, forgers, artists, artisans, politicians, liars, fools, rogues and clowns. We thus 
head	toward,	or	in	hindsight	come	to	find	ourselves	at,	a	research	design:	the	common	
strategy in the methodologically linear approaches, but arguably also in the more 
nomadic, post-qualitative work out there too, given the few opportunities to escape 
commonsensical chronology imposing its consequences on us, and the hesitation to 
be answerable beyond the parts we think we played. The method section also makes 
for	a	fine	apology	no	one	asked	for:	‘yes,	I	have	been	extremely	privileged	to	prod	into	
the lives of others and spend a massive amount of time behind a desk away from other 
responsibilities,	but	just	look	at	the	deliverance	of	my	own	suffering!	Surviving	the	ordeals	
of scholarly procedures and techniques, writer’s block, research and ethics committees, 
the	occasional	alcoholism	and	anxiety	attack,	I	proudly	confess	that	I	have	come	out	a	
different,	maybe	not	a	better,	but	at	least	a	more	rigorous	and	more	self-aware,	arguably	
a better, person.’ Now, I could pretend otherwise, but this is pretty much what I set out 
to do in this chapter. I may have one thing to add anew to what has already been said by 
so many other scholars concerned with methodology, which is: the quality of academic 
inquiry should be judged in terms of how well it draws in all those involved to be ready 
to answer each other for what has been written. Everything else in this chapter should be 
instrumental	to	the	‘is	and	ought’	of	this	claim,	even	if	it	appears	not	to	or	fails	to	do	so.
I have introduced this as a critical management study into responsibility in organizing, 
to	 which	 I	 have	 attributed	 three	 challenges	 of	 inquiry:	 the	 self–other	 axis,	 the	
spatiotemporality of eventness and the ambiguity of discourse. Or, put simply: if we wish 
to	understand	and	critique	how	people	in	their	organizations	come	to	find	themselves	
responsible	for	difficult	problems,	it	could	help	if	we	look	at	three	interrelated	issues.	The	
10 Previous versions of parts of this Chapter 3 combined with Chapter 6 have been published: 
Smissaert, C., & Jalonen, K. (2018) and Smissaert, C. (2018).
process	of	how	a	dilemma	at	work	becomes	a	personal	problem	is	the	first	issue.	How	
our	sense	of	time	and	place	is	influenced	by	us	being	organized	and	how	that	makes	us	
take risks in a volatile world is the second issue. The third issue is how ambiguity, instead 
of opening practitioners up toward each other, redirects their receptivity inward (and 
alterity outward). I argued that these three link up as the basic elements in three modes 
of	moral	inquiry	Bakhtin	developed	throughout	his	life:	the	‘scaffolding’	of	the	self–other	
answerability	in	light	of	the	messiness	of	everyday;	the	‘slipping	out	of	place’	of	the	moral	
lines	drawn	between	one	answering	body	and	another;	and	the	‘thresholds’	from	within	
which the ability to answer is redirected inward toward anticipated interlocution with a 
third party. Far from reaching some kind of integral resolve, these modes may each tell 
us	different,	disconcerting	things	about	the	moral	predicaments	of	organizing	praxis	
today. Key in the route to this end is a bricolage of organizational discourse studies and 
ethnography, drawing in particular on the work of Tony Watson and Paul Sullivan. But 
before we embark, a few methodological alleyways need to be probed, that of the type 
of	researcher	idiotic	enough	to	set	sail	on	this	maximum	loop,	and	that	of	the	clientele	
of	forensic	ACT,	the	so-called	‘mad,	bad	and	sad.’
3.1 Almost an idiot, or: to each his own11
The irony of knowing never stops
Stupidity, Avital Ronell
Pushing	Churchman’s	sense	of	moral	outrage	 forward	 into	 the	 twenty-first	century,	
science philosopher Isabelle Stengers calls upon us, to resist “the fast, competitive, 
benchmarked research, which is, seemingly unavoidably, becoming the norm” (Stengers, 
2011, p. 2, see also Stengers 2000, and the paper on McUniversity by Parker & Jary, 
1995).	Stengers	(2011)	recalled	the	nineteenth	century	chemist	Liebig,	who	created	a	‘fast	
chemistry’	scientific	practice	in	which	one	would	be	able	to	acquire	a	PhD	in	a	matter	of	
four years, learning only standardized protocols, methods and techniques, and nothing of 
the “traditional crafts and recipes” (p. 7) one would learn during a lifetime. Slow science, 
by	contrast,	Stengers	(2011)	defined	“as	the	demanding	operation	which	would	reclaim	
the art of dealing with, and learning from, what scientists too often consider messy, that 
11	 “’To	each	his	own’:	A	corruption	of	the	saying,	‘To	each,	his	zone.’	Simply	referring	to	the	fact	
that	people	need	their	personal	space.	For	example,	my	friend	and	I	are	listening	to	some	guy	
just	blabber	on	and	on	about	his	own	little	world.	We	look	at	each	other	puzzled	and	I	say,	‘Well,	
to	each	his	zone.’	Simply	due	to	sounding	the	same,	this	has	been	altered	by	some	to	‘To	each	
his	own’.	Similar	to	the	idea	of	someone’s	‘own	little	world’.	I	could	just	as	easily	say,	‘Man,	he	
just lives in his own little world.’ It would have the same meaning. #to#each#his#own#zone. 
by	ShinjiLa	July	02,	2007.	143	likes,	1473	dislikes.”	https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.
php?term=To%20Each%20His%20own.	Retrieved	2	February	2019.
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is, what escapes general, so-called objective, categories” (p. 10). What is singular in this 
slow	scientific	mode	of	thinking,	aiming	to	produce	reliable	results,	is	not	so	much	the	
production	of	the	‘objective,’	but	that	it	involves	what	Stengers	called	“third	parties”;	third	
parties which are both the academic colleagues of the scholar who keep on engaging as 
critically as they can with the production and the research results, and the phenomenon 
itself	as	a	third	party	which	is	ever-changing	in	our	lived	experience	“overloaded	with	
multiple	meanings”	(Stengers,	1997,	p.	107)	and	being	authorized,	and	disqualified,	as	
evidence	in	different	situations.	In	effect,	Stengers	(2005)	likened	this	slow	researcher	
to the Dostoevskian Idiot, “the one who always slows the others down, who resists the 
consensual way in which the situation is presented and in which emergencies mobilize 
thought or action…[to] create a space for hesitation regarding what it means to say 
‘good’”	(p.	995).	Stengers	(2005)	asks	of	us	to	seek	ways	to	slow	down	and	bestow	value	
on	the	“murmurings	of	the	idiot,	the	‘there	is	something	more	important’	which	is	so	
easy	to	forget	because	it	cannot	be	‘taken	into	account’”	(p.	1001).
As	to	 idiocy,	up	until	the	ninth	revision	of	the	International	Classification	of	Diseases	
(WHO,	1977),	people	whose	IQ	measured	between	0	and	30	were	classified	as	idiots,	a	
term	(next	to	imbeciles	and	morons)	reinvented	as	such	by	the	paradigm	of	scientific	
(and later evidence-based, or fast, if you will) medicine of the late nineteenth century.12 
The idiot originated in ancient Greece, not as a fool or an ignorant, but as a private 
citizen	 (from	 ἴδιος:	 one’s	 own,	 private)	 as	 opposed	 to	 citizen	 holding	public	 office	
or a professional role. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) marked the idiot as “the private 
thinker…a very strange type of persona who wants to think, and who thinks for himself,” 
(p.	62)	 in	the	age	of	Dostoevsky	they	add	to	the	figure	an	 intense	desire	to	restore	
“the incomprehensible, the absurd…to him” (p. 63). In “Stupity,” Ronell (2002) devoted a 
chapter to Dostoevsky’s Idiot, Prince Myshkin, a “simpleton…at once uncomprehending 
and	magically	perceptive”	(p.	174),	resonating	the	boundless	good	of	the	figure	of	Christ.	
Delineated	(“submitted”)	by	 language,	the	Prince	 is	made	ridiculous,	which	 in	effect	
enables	his	goodness:	“ridicule	must	be	risked	in	the	elaboration	of	the	extreme	good:	
the	good	cannot	be	restricted	to	the	merely	innate	but	must	be	public,	exposed”	(Ronell,	
2002,	p.	175).	Myshkin	 is	 thus	“a	 traveling	mark	of	 insufficiency,	open	and	exposed,	
politically	anxious	and	socially	improbable”	(Ronell,	2002,	p.	219).	But	in	doing	so,	the	idiot	
tends	to	“signify	the	absolute	destitution	of	the	other:	he	maintains	the	inextinguishable	
appeal of the stranger” (Ronell, 2002, p. 200). Moreover,
despite it all, Myshkin…is maintained as the guarantor of unbreachable responsibility. 
Caressing	the	murderer	in	an	effort	to	soothe	him,	Myshkin	displays	what	it	means	
to be responsible for the other…without “doing”: it is an action without doing, an 
12	 Ronell	(2002)	noted	how	the	work	of	Stephen	Jay	Gould	exposed	the	IQ	system	as	“the	social	
rigging	of	intelligence…based	on	abusively	exploited	philosophical	presuppositions”	(p.	59).
ethically maintained passivity. He slips into the other’s anguish…His place has been 
designated from the start as being open to displacement. (Ronell, 2002, p. 205)
Readiness is another quintessentially idiotic quality of the Prince, a “readiness to trust, to 
respond”	(Ronell,	2002,	p.	210),	a	readiness	so	profound	it	is	akin	to	a	sacrificial	readiness,	
yet denied such grandeur “which is why we are faced with an idiot and not a prophet, or 
poet, or even philosopher (the gap admittedly is closing)” (Ronell, 2002, p. 211). The Prince 
is always ready to take, and indeed takes, full responsibility, for everything and everyone, 
and will say sorry for anything and to anyone: “Because he cannot take responsibility as a 
conscious,	sufficient	subject,	because	he	cannot	be	present	to	a	task	the	failure	of	which	
he stands accused, he is responsible for all. The idiot has to apologize for everything 
because there is nothing for which he is not responsible” (Ronell, 2002, p. 216). And yet 
Myshkin is not a complete idiot:
But in order to say that he is sorry, he has had to refer to himself as someone who 
was almost an	idiot,	which	modifies	the	accusers’	sentence.	The	“almost”	 is	what	
engages the absolute: it is only because he was almost an idiot that he assumes 
absolute responsibility. If he had been a total idiot, as we now freely say, he would 
have been home free as concerns the assumption of ethical liability. The rhetorical 
force that renders him a responsible subject lies within the “almost” – the crevice or 
opening that allows for consciousness and decision. He was “almost an idiot,” which 
means there can be no refuge, no ducking out as concerns the reach and breach of 
ethicity. It is because he posits himself as having been almost an idiot that he can – 
he must – take total responsibility. (p. 217)
As Michael (2012) argued in his endeavor to translate Stengers thought into social 
research	method,	Stengers’	“figure	of	the	idiot…is	particularly	helpful…By	attending	to	
the	nonsensicalness,	we	become	open	to	a	dramatic	redefinition	of	the	meaning	of	the	
event…the suggestion here is that it might be possible to approach this openness or 
virtuality through a practice of proactive idiocy” (pp. 170-171). In sum, for a slow science 
we need almost idiots: ready to think your own thoughts while causing confusion, and to 
jump	into	messy	practices	and	continually	changing	research	‘objects’	while	remaining	
open to surfacing idiosyncrasies and scholarly criticism. I thus need to be a slow learner, 
risking	ridicule	in	exposing	the	good	and	siding	with	the	destitute,	taking	my	time	to	let	
the study simmer, instead of dipping it, and myself, into the cataclysmic deep-fryer of 
academic discipline.
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3.2	Othering	the	‘mad,	bad	and	sad’
No need to hear your voice, when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. 
No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then 
I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, 
my own. Re-writing you, I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer, the 
speaking subject, and you are now at the center of my talk.
bell hooks, “Marginality as a Site of Resistance” (1990, p. 343; initially found in Wikipedia)
In	his	paper	“Polyphony	and	its	Other,”	Letiche	(2010)	was	in	search	of	a	text	that	was	
polyphonic, allowing for a dialogic between unmerged voices, and claimed to have found 
it in the work of postcolonial theorist Gayatri Spivak, in particular, her book A Critique of 
Postcolonial Reason (1999):
The	challenge	of	Spivak’s	work	is	to	try	to	keep	all	these	conflicting	voices	alive	in	
the	text,	interacting	and	in	relation	to	one	another,	without	all	the	themes,	issues,	
and perspectives collapsing into a single truth, principle or totalization. Spivak’s 
attempt	at	polyphony	is	exemplary	because	it	addresses	text	(epistemology)	and	
social circumstances (processes of ethics) and their interrelationships. (Letiche, 2010, 
p. 263)
With	his	hypothesis	“that	organizational	studies	have	made	the	‘self’	of	the	organizationally	
dispossessed invisible, unrecoverable and abject-ed” (Letiche, 2010, p. 275), Letiche paid 
considerable attention to Spivak’s central concept of the subaltern. The subaltern is 
defined	not	by	himself	but	by	those	in	hegemonic	power	who	exclude	and	silence	her,	
not	simply	by	oppression	but	more	so	by	denying	him	answerability	in	the	first	place,	
the possibility to have a voice and to enter dialogue as a body that speaks. Letiche (2010) 
argued	that	with	very	few	exceptions,	the	subaltern	in	organizational	studies,
are	‘fore-closed’	—	absented	from	the	text.	The	(very)	poor	are	maintained	in	the	
abject — …Organizational and management studies have no space for the subaltern’s 
voice and the subaltern has no voice of her or his own. CMS avoids the subaltern, 
sticking to (anti-) managerial themes closer to home. (p. 274)
I am not pretending to do any better, here, on the contrary you could even say. I think 
the	forensic	mental	health	care	patient	might	well	be	something	akin	to	a	‘first-world’	
subaltern,	one	who’s	voice	to	existence	is	not	heard	unless	on	very	rare	and	very	mediated	
moments, slashing through the societal fabric and into the papers. The lack in this thesis 
of directly answering to the people who, moreover, I depict as ill and violent, is, to my 
mind, nothing less than an act of violence by itself. I may profess to write against othering 
(Krumer-Nevo & Sidi, 2012), but in the practice of this critical management study, I have 
chosen to focus primarily on the ethics of organization and on its working members, 
and	not	on	its	‘customers,’	’clients,’	‘recipients,’	‘stakeholders,’	and	other	depictions	of	
the ones being patient, the persons, in question. In light of Letiche’s critique, let me 
answer why. In short, an organization man myself (Whyte, 1956), I have been interested 
more in the predicaments of working life than in the lives of the patient.13 And because 
I	had	professional	experience	with	policy	and	organization	work,	and	none	with	dealing	
with	patients,	I	found	myself	more	equipped	to	contribute	something	to	my	‘own	field’	
of	work.	Beyond	the	mundane,	I	found	it	difficult	to	understand	how	to	both	voice	and	
answer the persons who are at the receiving end of forensic ACT. What does it entail to 
ask patients’ permission, to have their voices storied by me in such a way that it does 
not	lead	to	instrumentalization	and	unintended	exposure?	What	does	it	entail	–	in	all	its	
condescending	intonations	–	to	ask	permission	of	people	who	might	have	difficulties	
grasping	the	consequences	of	that	permission,	or	what	a	permission	might	be	in	the	first	
place? What does it entail to ask permission at a single point of time and place when 
the	changing	context	or	readings	of	their	stories	and	this	thesis	may	alter	the	meaning	
of their words and mine, and generate shared meanings with audiences about which 
neither the patient nor the author might have been aware of at that point? What does it 
entail to ask patients to have their stories voiced, stories which may have been, or may 
become, subject to criminal justice investigation? What does it entail to ask patients’ 
permission to share personal intimacies which subsequently may become the object of 
public	news	channel	stories,	outlets	that	publish	about	‘crazy’	persons	who	committed	
‘horrific’	crimes	and	such,	often	without	the	space	needed	to	allow	for	all	the	different	
angles of how a tragedy came to be? How do we enter dialogue with vulnerable people 
in	the	first	place,	dialogue	being	the	“weapon	of	the	powerful”	(Burrell,	1996,	p.	650,	
cited	in	Fournier	&	Grey,	2000,	p.	24)?	How	can	we	‘hear’	behind	the	personas	they	have	
13 In his The Organization Man, Whyte (1956) argues that contemporary man is absorbed into 
organizational	life	to	such	an	extent	that	it	is	nigh	impossible	to	even	become	aware	of	this	
immersion, let alone resist the decline of individualism and individual thought plea against 
organization and in particular the social ethic as an “imprisonment in brotherhood” that comes 
with it (Whyte, 1956, p. 16). Yet Whyte (1956) stresses that his is not an appeal to non-conformi-
ty: “Such pleas have an occasional therapeutic value, but as an abstraction, non-conformity is an 
empty goal, and rebellion against prevailing opinion merely because it is prevailing should no 
more be praised than acquiescence to it. Indeed, it is often a mask for cowardice, and few are 
more	pathetic	than	those	who	flaunt	outer	differences	to	expiate	their	inner	surrender”	(p.	15).	
Whyte	gained	polemic	power	by	exposing	false	collectivist	ideas	of	scientism,	belongingness	
and togetherness, and the tendencies in organization to herald esprit de corps and downplay 
individual leadership. The problem, according to Whyte (1956), is: “In the 1984 of Big Brother 
one would at least know who the enemy was – a bunch of bad men who wanted power because 
they liked power. But in the other kind of 1984 one would be disarmed for not knowing who 
the enemy was, and when the day of reckoning came the people on the other side of the table 
wouldn’t be Big Brother’s bad henchmen; they would be a mild-looking group of therapists 
who, like the Grand Inquisitor, would be doing what they did to help you” (p. 33).
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been	finalized	into,	such	as	the	‘criminally	insane’?	I	find	these	questions	painstakingly	
important, yet I cannot, or rather will not, hope to come to some kind of resolution as 
to tackle them, still. Therefore, in this thesis, the forensic ACT patient remains silent. All 
I	offer	is	a	sideways	glance	onto	her	images,	and	the	ways	she	is	made	a	silent	other,	an	
instrument to serve my own main purpose in this regard: to hold something of a dark 
mirror in front of the organization man. A dystopic foreshadowing of what might become 
of	her	in	future	organization:	the	finalization,	the	violence,	the	exclusion,	the	voicing-over,	
the being made abject, being made to align, and being made to rehabilitate, recover, 
participate,	integrate,	purify	and	redeem	at	one’s	own	expense,	in	spite,	I	might	add,	of	
many of our best intentions. 
First,	 the	 idea	of	a	road	toward	self-directed	recovery	(previously	 ‘rehabilitation’)	 for	
persons	with	mental	health	illness	and	addiction	issues	has	achieved	a	level	of	orthodoxy	
from	where	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 imagine	alternative	accounts.	Rogers	and	Pilgrim	(2003)	
depicted this as a “responsibilization,” a plotline of plight with light at the end of tunnel. 
It is ultimately up to the self-responsible patient to drag herself through it, supported 
as minimally as possible by others (i.e., care and public services). Where relapses are 
accepted, non-recovery in itself is not really an option. And if it does turn out this way, 
one is left, ultimately, to name and blame oneself for it. As such, this approach may 
lead	us	astray	from	scrutinizing	the	ways	‘non-individual’	agency	enforces	and	reaffirms	
patterns of suppression, inequality, injustice and so on, which subvert the potential for 
collective action and lure us toward small stories of personal achievement and failure. 
As Mason & Mercer (1998) argued, 
From	this	process	of	identification	of	the	“sick”	and	the	establishment	of	a	distance	
between normality and abnormality, Foucault (1967) argued that those deemed 
abnormal could be forced to embark upon a journey of compulsory treatment. They 
could be coerced, through medicine, to leave their anchorage point of abnormality 
and be set in transit towards normality. Unfortunately, it is often a journey from which 
there is no disembarkation. Some are unable ever to reach the state of considered 
normality and will remain forever in transit, forced upon a journey on the “Ship of 
Fools” named Rehabilitation. (p. 132). 
Second, the image of a forensic ACT patient is an embodiment, a Foucauldian fusion if you 
will, a verwarring (entanglement) one might ironically add in contemporary Dutch debate, 
of	two	societal	others,	the	‘mad’	and	the	‘bad’	that	have	for	centuries	been	excluded	
and incarcerated in separate societal regimes. Through a process of extramuralisering 
(‘outsidewalling,’	so	you	will,	for	lack	of	a	proper	translation),	conditional	sentencing	and	
parole,	and	conditional	compulsory	‘admissions’	by	court	order,	the	forensic	ACT	patient	
is	an	outsider,	unendingly	contained	‘on	the	outside’	in	the	community,	or	homeless,	in	
sheltered housing, and at the threshold of other, often temporary arrangements. Where 
a violation of rules set by the judge or the psychiatrist may instantly lead to enforced 
readmission in either a regular clinical unit, a regular penitentiary, or, more frequently, 
in	 something	 of	 a	 mix	 of	 both	 (forensic	 mental	 hospitals,	 long-term	 penitentiary	
arrangement	for	 ‘frequent	flyers’).	Within	these	secured	settings	the	patient	may	be	
forced to undergo medical treatment or forced into isolation and away from others when 
it is ruled the patient is a clear and present danger to herself or others. Ironically, the risk 
of the patient becoming a victim of verbal and physical violence herself is a number of 
times higher within these clinics than it is in the community (De Mooij et al., 2015; Choe 
et	al.,	2008).	And	third,	as	elaborated	already	in	the	first	chapter,	what	an	‘eligible’	patient	
is	–	a	proper	‘case’	to	be	managed,	what	her	voice	is	–	a	prestructured	‘life	story	interview,’	
and what her problems and disorders are, are generated by a machinery of devices and 
instruments	that	has	the	tendency	to	make	itself	increasingly	complex	(multidisciplinary,	
interinstitutional) and increasingly become the matter of concern itself, instead of the 
patient	who	the	care-industrial	complex	was	supposed	to	provide	for.	
3.3 Collecting data
One of the most absurd myths of the social sciences is the “objectivity” that is alleged to occur 
in the relation between the scientist-as-observer and the people he observes. He really thinks he 
can stand apart and objectively observe how people behave, what their attitudes are, how they 
think, how they decide. If his intent were to be the clown rather than the objective scientist, we 
could appreciate him more, because in some ways his own behavior and the manner in which he 
describes the behavior of others is hilarious. (Churchman, 1968, p. 86)
How	does	gathering	observations	contribute	to	the	composition	of	a	scientific	account	
that	is	more	than	‘just	a	story’?	This	has	been	a	heartfelt	problem	in	both	quantitative	
and qualitative research, and in OMT no less. One recurring shape this problem has taken 
is	the	debate	between	putting	theory	(deduction)	or	data	(induction)	first.	Others	such	
as organizational ethnographer Tony Watson (2011) argued that it is: 
a vastly more productive way to proceed…to work neither in a primarily deductive 
way (“testing” established theory for instance) nor in an inductive way in which 
“data” gives birth to theory. Instead, the investigator works iteratively, switching 
back and forth (sometimes even minute to minute) between the inductive and the 
deductive (cf. Orton, 1997)…anyone setting out to do organisational ethnography 
should equip themselves at an early stage with as full as possible a knowledge 
of organisation theory and research and make sure that they have a good grasp 
of the sociological, anthropological, psychological and methodological thinking 
which has informed the study of organisations so far. Ethnography is not surgery. 
But to embark on organisational ethnography without being equipped in this way 
would be like trying to operate on a hospital patient without knowledge of anatomy 
or an awareness of what to do with anaesthetics, scissors, scalpels, sutures and 
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stitches…And	the	researcher	will	add	to,	refine	and	select	from	this	“bank”	to	shape	
and reshape a conceptual apparatus which makes theoretical sense of the research 
puzzles	arising	in	the	fieldwork	–	as	well	as	leading	to	generalisations	in	the	finished	
ethnography about “how things work” in the organisation and associated social 
organisation which they have studied. This theory, because it has “grown in the 
field”,	so	to	speak,	 is	thoroughly	grounded.	 In	this	version	of	grounded	research,	
theoretical	concepts	are	ingredients	that	go	into	the	ethnographic	mix,	alongside	
and	 in	 interaction	with	observed	fieldwork	episodes	and	recorded/remembered	
utterances and conversations. (pp. 18-19)
I am in full agreement with Watson’s statements here, permeated as this study is with 
a conceptual apparatus from a number of scholars interested in the threshold, the 
awkward,	and	the	unfinalizable.	I	am	not	trying	to	‘prove’	the	ideas	of	these	scholars,	
but I make do with their concepts while simultaneously making do with my observations 
and the process of doing observations. Still, one has to stay wary for the many pitfalls of 
making do methodologically, such as concerns for generality, plausibility and neutrality. 
In his seminal In Search of Management: Culture, Chaos and Control in Managerial Work, 
Watson (1994) focused on one particular setting to observe managerial work as it unfolds 
in everyday working life, hoping to contribute to our more general understanding of it in 
contemporary organization. Any researcher who does not follow the mainstream road of 
large	numbers	and	prestructured	questions	is	cornered	into	a	defense	of	doing	‘good’	
research, and so is Watson. The recurring argument (see also e.g., Yin, 1984) is that we 
may generalize from the particular if we keep ourselves to theoretical and not empirical 
inferences.	So,	for	example,	if	we	observe	in	the	team	at	hand	that	some	practitioners	
feel threatened at times, we cannot simply claim on the basis of that observation that 
‘teams	such	as	these	are	fraught	with	threatening	work	events’	(which	is,	notwithstanding,	
what I am stating here and there). But we could do a couple of things in theory. We could 
relate	the	particularity	of	the	single	case	to	argue	against	an	existing	theory	that	should	
be	applicable	to	the	case	but	does	not	(quite)	explain	it.	Then	the	argument	would	be	
something	akin	to	‘Although	theory	x	argues	that	practitioners	feel	threatened	due	to	
phenomenon	a	or	b,	the	particularities	of	this	case	study	actually	(and	here,	different	
“levels” are possible): cast doubt on how phenomenon a or b are related to each other 
and	to	the	sense	of	threat;	point	us	toward	a	yet	unexplored	phenomenon	c,	or;	suggest	
an	altogether	theoretical	reinterpretation	of	the	 idea	of	 ‘threat’	and	so	on.’	The	first	
two	levels	engage	with	an	existing	framework	and	seek	to	challenge	either	the	strength	
or	scope	of	 it.	 In	the	 last	 level	the	scholar	 is	not	confined	to	a	particular	 framework	
of	another	theorist,	but	more	so	with	developing	a	‘new’	stream	of	thought,	more	or	
less shaped into at least some already familiar patterns of reasoning. Here we enter 
more	clearly	into	the	realm	of	abduction,	or	inference	to	the	best	possible	explanation.	
What	the	best	possible	explanation	is,	however,	is	in	itself	by	definition	impossible	to	
ascertain, so we end up with a story that may very well sound the most plausible. And 
that will to have to do, in most, arguably all, cases. Watson (2011) deployed this argument 
by implying that there are some familiar things (basic human processes and universal 
conditions)	whose	existence/relevance	we	can	take	for	granted:	
But how is it possible to relate the particular and the general in this way? It is possible 
because	of	the	existence,	in	the	first	place,	of	the	common	characteristics	that	every	
human being possesses and of the subsequent involvement of all human beings in 
certain basic social and psychological processes. Underlying individual uniqueness 
and cultural variation there are processes whereby every human being has to make 
sense of the world, make a living, engage with their culture, relate to others, shape 
identity, manage emotions and, ultimately, come to terms with mortality. There 
are thus continuities within basic processes underlying the variations that can be 
observed	in	how	human	beings	across	the	world	manage	their	existence.	And	it	is	
possible, in the second place, to relate the particular and the general, the unique 
and the variable, because of the sociological and political-economic continuities 
which run through the circumstances of managers generally: the circumstances of 
advanced	industrial	capitalism.	(p.	xiii)	
From	the	purview	of	the	unfinalizable	in	the	self–other	relationship,	in	spatiotemporal	
experience	and	in	language,	it	is	impossible	to	agree	with	Watson’s	argument,	but	even	
from	within	his	own	reasoning	it	 is	difficult	to	entertain.	“Circumstances	of	advanced	
industrial	capitalism”	seems	abstract	to	such	an	extent	that	anything	might	fit	under	
that	label,	and	‘basic	human	processes	to	manage	their	existence’	Watson	defined	as	
very basic (commonsensical, animal-like behavior-ish?) because they are…well, very 
basic.	However,	we	seem	to	be	engaging	now	with	his	statement	on	a	superficial	level,	
arguing that its core framework is shaky. It is a gratifying activity, but not very interesting, 
considering	our	earlier	premise	that	the	purity	of	x	=	x	is	meaningless.	So	one	might	
conclude that complete plausibility is void of meaning. Outside the cold shelter of our 
crystal	palace,	we	find	ourselves	murmuring	that	the	ideas	we	have	come	up	with	are	
the best possible (almost	plausible)	explanation.	
As to the pitfall of supposed neutrality, Watson (2011) does not present himself as a 
neutral observer, although he does “attempt a degree of objectivity by allowing readers 
to	judge	for	themselves	something	of	the	way	[he]	influenced	the	events	and	accounts	
[he	 is]	writing	about”	 (p.	23).	 I	find	 it	difficult	 to	 imagine	a	way	Watson	could	really	
force	readers	not	to	make	up	their	own	mind	anyway.	Watson	also	explained	that	by	
articulating one’s own afterthoughts on top of preselected fragments of dialogue – that 
mostly	feature	Watson	himself	as	the	interviewer	as	well	–he	provides	as	‘something	of	
a	way’	of	judging	how	Watson	influenced	the	events	and	accounts	he	wrote	about.	But	
does	he?	It	seems	to	only	add	layer	onto	layer	of	Watson’s	own	purviews.	In	effect,	toward	
this	other,	‘soft,’	side	of	the	scholarly	spectrum,	we	actually	risk	the	same	x	=	x	problem,	
having a qualitative researcher turning inward, making the surrounding world smaller 
and	smaller	by	crowding	it	with	one’s	own	reflections	and	anticipated	reactions.	But	
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fortunately Watson already provided a loophole, i.e. dialogue: “not just dialogue between 
individuals themselves – even dialogues between ideas within our minds” (Watson, 2012, 
p. 23). Drawing on Bakhtin’s work (although despite his emphasis on Bakhtinian dialogue, 
this is the only reference to him), Watson (2012) continued: 
…our dialogue with our culture is a dialogue with others. It is not just a matter of 
face-to-face dialogue, though; our very process of thinking and decision-making 
involves us in a dialogue in our minds with the arguments of human others, whether 
these be remembered arguments of particular people…or cultural norms. Thinking 
and deciding…has a dialogic form….I have already revealed the key role that my 
own dialogues with managers have played in the development of my thinking about 
managerial work. This relates to a view of human beings as rhetorical animals…and of 
human life as essentially dialogic (Bakhtin 1981)…To think and to speak is to engage 
with counter-thoughts and counter-arguments. It is part of the process whereby we 
negotiate reality with others through the cultural medium of discourse and through 
which we justify and make sense, to ourselves and others, of what we do…Social 
science	writers,	in	crafting	their	work,	must	have	some	kind	of	scaffolding	with	which	
to	work,	even	if	it	is	a	scaffolding	which	they	build	up	piecemeal	as	the	edifice	rises	
from the ground. (pp. 24–26) 
What I have come to study is the way team practitioners on a day-to-day basis together 
enter into dialogue about their team responsibilities and, more particularly, the ways they 
answer to themselves and each other for these responsibilities in their work. Although 
my	focus	 is	not	 the	moral	consciousness	of	managers	 (except	my	own,	as	manager	
nowadays),	I	follow	Jackall’s	(1988)	approach	in	exploring	firsthand	everyday	moral	work	
as	a	reality	to	be	studied,	while	refraining	from	referring	to	“any	specific	or	given,	much	
less absolute, systems of norms and underlying beliefs,” but to “how the social and 
bureaucratic	context	of	their	work	–	the	warp	across	which	the	threads	of	their	careers	
are stretched—shape their occupational moralities” (p. 4). As Jackall (1988) argued, 
…only	an	understanding	of	how	men	and	women	in	business	actually	experience	
their work enables one to grasp its moral salience for them. Bureaucratic work 
shapes people’s consciousness in decisive ways. Among other things, it regularizes 
people’s	experiences	of	time	and	indeed	routinizes	their	 lives	by	engaging	them	
on a daily basis in rational, socially approved, purposive action…bureaucratic work 
causes people to bracket, while at work, the moralities that they might hold outside 
the workplace or that they might adhere to privately and to follow instead the 
prevailing morality of their particular organizational situation…What matters on 
a day-to-day basis are the moral rules-in-use fashioned within the personal and 
structural constraints of one’s organization…Actual organizational moralities are 
thus	contextual,	situational,	highly	specific,	and,	most	often,	unarticulated.	This	book,	
then,	examines	business	as	a	social	and	moral	terrain.	I	offer	no	programs	for	reform,	
should	one	think	that	reform	is	necessary.	Nor,	I	am	afraid,	do	I	offer	tips	on	how	to	
find	one’s	way	onto	the	“fast	track”	to	managerial	success.	(pp.	5–9)	
I	 think	 Jackall	does	actually	offer	very	concrete	 tips	on	how	to	find	one’s	way	onto	
managerial success, for those readers ready to frisk the moral low ground. But more 
importantly, I follow Jackall, and Watson, in their choice to observe the day-to-day (moral) 
practice	and	how	people’s	experiences,	often	not	explicitly	articulated	or	experienced	as	
moral	work,	are	regulated	by	the	organizationally	contextual,	situational	and	specific.	I	
concur	with	Jackall	(1988)	that	“only	detailed	fieldwork,	which	necessarily	limits	breadth,	
can yield in-depth knowledge of a subject like occupational ethics” (p. 16). Thus safely 
embedded	in	an	ever-growing	flock	of	followers,	I	concur	with	Flyvbjerg	(2006),	too,	that	
the	in-depth	case	study	may	have	considerable	strength	as	an	example	and	provide	us	
with	valuable	knowledge	that	may	be	of	use	in	various	stages	and	modes	of	scientific	
inquiry. Flyvbjerg (2006) insisted on an open attitude, by telling 
the	story	in	its	diversity,	allowing	the	story	to	unfold	from	the	many-sided,	complex,	
and	sometimes	conflicting	stories	that	the	actors	in	the	case	have	told	me.	Second,	I	
avoid linking the case with the theories of any one academic specialization. Instead, 
I relate the case to broader philosophical positions that cut across specializations. In 
this	way,	I	try	to	leave	scope	for	readers	of	different	backgrounds	to	make	different	
interpretations and draw diverse conclusions regarding the question of what the case 
is a case of. The goal is not to make the case study be all things to all people. The 
goal	is	to	allow	the	study	to	be	different	things	to	different	people.	(p.	238)
Collecting talk
In	the	beginning	of	the	process,	I	did	not	know	where	the	‘richest’	data	would	be	available	
for me, so I hopped on every kind of activity the practitioners had during the week, in 
an approach called shadowing (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2007): observing, but not really 
participating	substantively.	 In	effect,	 I	 could	not	and	did	not	want	or	dare	 to	 really	
participate as if I was able to care for patients in the way these trained professionals (and 
supervised interns) were. For the most part, I was in awe of these practitioners who were 
bold enough to meet up with patients and to both adhere to their training and improvise 
on the spot. I could not see myself doing that, and I actually still cannot. So, participating 
was not really an option in practice and pretty much against the law anyway since I am 
not a trained health care professional, nor was I supervised by one. In face of these 
legal requirements, I could not be responsible nor be held answerable for establishing a 
practitioner–patient relationship. I did answer the phone sometimes if the admin worker 
was	absent	for	a	moment,	and	I	went	to	get	coffee	once	or	twice.	But	other	than	that,	
I did not actively participate. When I did go out with a practitioner a couple of times 
to	meet	a	patient,	either	in	the	office,	in	their	home	or	in	some	shelter,	the	practitioner	
would introduce me and ask the patient’s permission, that is, the practitioner asked the 
patient if it was OK with them that I was present (otherwise I would leave, but nobody 
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refused). I said hello and/or shook the hand of the patient. I did not interview the patients, 
nor did I record or take notes. On the way there I would interview the practitioners 
on	their	daily	routines	and	how	they	experienced	them	and	asked	them	about	their	
sense of responsibility. When I was in meetings with other professionals from other 
institutions,	I	would	stay	silent	after	being	introduced	and	say	‘Hi,’	just	like	with	being	
with the patients, and take notes. In those inter-professional meetings, I did not, with 
one	exception	(and	asking	permission	first),	record	the	talk	with	my	audio	recorder.	After	
having	shadowed	all	the	different	kinds	of	activities	at	least	once,	I	realized	that	most	of	
the	actual	‘natural’	talk	and	dialogue	happened	when	the	team	practitioners	met	during	
their daily meetings together and debriefed each other. For me it was both a particularly 
efficient	medium	to	get	a	sense	of	what	everybody	had	done	the	day	before	and	what	
they	would	do	next,	and	to	have	most,	if	not	all	(everybody	working	was	expected	to	
participate as it is prescribed in the ACT model), practitioners present and talking to each 
other: data was there for the taking, so to speak. In an iterative process, data gathering 
finally	concentrated	on	the	audio	recording	of	two	series	of	daily	team	meetings	and	
during the process of recording I made notes in which I highlighted utterances that I felt 
were	important	and	that	might	help	me	navigate	the	transcriptions.	I	did	not	film	these	
meetings	to	get	‘richer’	data	because	I	did	not	want	to	be	too	intrusive	and	make	the	
team members feel they were being observed. 
As to those meetings, every working day morning since April 2011, at 8.45 a.m., all 
available	forensic	ACT	team	members,	on	average	eight	(±	four)	from	different	disciplines	
(a psychiatrist who is also the doctor-manager, a psychotherapist, psychiatric nurses of 
which one is the team coordinator, nurses, social workers, a housing worker, a peer-
support worker, admin worker and two or three interns at any given time), assembled 
at	their	office	room	for	their	planning	meeting	that	lasted	between	25	and	45	minutes.	
The	office	was	situated	in	an	old	building	close	to	the	city	center	and	was	home	to	about	
eight	different	outpatient	teams,	 including	two	other	 (non-forensic)	ACT	teams.	The	
office	room	supported	about	10	workspaces	in	small	groups	in	a	U-shape	alongside	its	
walls, with a large screen on the wall at the open part of the U, and a large meeting table 
in the middle of the room big enough for about ten people to sit at. During meetings, 
most people would sit at the table, but some would stay at their workstation, including 
the one operating the spreadsheet on the screen. Supported by a planning spreadsheet 
projected	on	a	large	screen,	they	first	briefed	each	other	on	the	previous	day’s	activities	
and then checked and assigned the current day’s scheduled activities. The spreadsheet is 
structured by day and by type of activity (outbound and inbound visits, the administration 
of	medication,	and	‘other’).	Generally,	every	conversational	episode	is	linked	to	an	entry	
with a scheduled time and represents an action that is assigned to one or two team 
members. Most entries display the last name of a forensic ACT recipient, on average 35 
a day, out of a total of 100 persons (± 15) in the collective caseload at any given time. 
For	example:	 ‘15:00.	(team	member)	Cindy	visits	(patient)	Mrs.	S	to	update	treatment	
plan.’ The day after this action, Cindy briefs the rest of the team on what happened. 
If there was anything remarkable about the event, according to Cindy or to someone 
else,	it	would	be	discussed	briefly.	In	a	way,	the	members	thus	perform	and	sustain	a	
meticulous collective diary in an episodic format. The meeting has a certain rhythm, with 
most	episodes	ending	within	minutes	or	even	seconds,	in	utterances	such	as:	‘done	that’;	
‘yeah,	talked	to	him’;	‘no,	he’ll	be	here	an	hour	earlier’;	‘OK,	I’ll	do	it.’	After	such	a	finish,	
the	next	episode,	usually	involving	another	recipient,	begins.	At	first	glance,	the	sense	
of responsibility here amounts to an apparently clear task to (be) assign(ed) to; the plot 
wrapped	up	by	a	subsequent	silence	that	is	broken	with	the	start	of	the	next	episode.	
Some episodes take longer and become more intense, the rhythm temporarily broken 
by deliberations about predicaments that, if too long, will generally be passed over to 
another kind of meeting (case discussion). 
Concerned	with	the	tentative	question	of	how	the	team	in	those	meetings	‘made’	sense	
together of their dual objective of caring for patients and helping to make society 
secure, I set out to collect snippets that would be an indication of that sense-making in 
practice,	and	I	did	find	relevant	fragments,	which	are	displayed	throughout	this	thesis.	
If I was in a meeting and such a fragment seemed to be unfolding, I would sometimes 
approach the practitioner in question after the meeting ended, to talk about that topic 
a	bit	more	in	an	unstructured,	recorded	interview.	Next	to	this	predetermined	collection	
approach I tried to sustain an open awareness, an active receptivity, of everything as it 
was discussed, I noted which kind of topics seemed to recur often and which moments in 
the	performance	of	the	meetings	to	me	felt	extra	intense,	through	(emotional-volitional)	
tone,	increase	in	non-verbal	expressions,	and	conversational	changes.	I	was	aware	that	
this	approach	of	purposively	 looking	for	 ‘significance’	through	apparent	quality	and	
quantity	of	dialogue	obscured	the	apparent	‘insignificant,’	be	it	silences,	rare	occurrences,	
mistakes, and so on, and I also noted these. Some fragments of recordings I could not 
translate into words because of low volume and chaotic patterns of dialogue involving 
many	practitioners	with	some	moving	in	and	out	of	the	office	room	meeting.	I	did	not	
choose to hire a professional transcriber, primarily because I wanted myself to go over 
and over the utterances and the words myself, becoming familiar with my own data. At 
first,	I	tried	different	software	applications	for	this	process,	but	I	found	the	popular	Atlas.
ti and NVivo too complicated. I did not see the need for, or the purpose of, making use 
of their advanced analysis tools because I would then rely on procedures I would not 
understand myself or spend a vast amount of time entering data in the way required for 
these	tools	to	function,	thereby	investing	myself	in	an	application	to	such	an	extent	that	
I would not be able to do without it, anymore. I was content to settle with Transana, light 
and	flexible	in	its	use.	The	program	has	some	popularity	with	conversation	analysts	and	
ethnomethodologists, and was recommended in ten Have’s seminal Doing Conversation 
Analysis	(2007).	Next	to	these	performed	dialogues,	I	collected	documents	(not	patient	
files)	as	I	could	see	them	used	by	the	team,	either	hung	on	the	wall	such	as,	temporarily,	
a poster of the code of conduct on the room door (not discussed though when I was 
around) or talked about in the meetings and the interviews.
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Collecting things?
In both my data collection and my analysis, and throughout my thesis as a whole, the 
emphasis	 is	on	discourse,	on	text,	talk,	utterances,	what	people	say	about	what	they	
do, what they say about themselves and others. So, you would think I place myself 
comfortably on the discourse side of the once raging but now seemingly calmed debate 
on	discourse	versus	materiality,	with	the	first	being	accused	of	colonizing	the	latter.	The	
debate in question was about organizational discourse analysis in the journal Human 
Relations, going back to 2000 (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000) but culminating in 2011–
2013 with: a contribution by Alvesson & Kärreman (2011a) “Decolonializing discourse: 
Critical	reflections	on	organizational	discourse	analysis”;	the	responses	by	Iedema	(2011),	
Mumby (2011) and Bargiela-Chiappini (2011); the response by Alvesson and Kärreman 
(2011b) on those responses; another response on that one by Hardy and Grant (2012) and 
the	final	response	to	that	response	by,	again,	Alvesson	and	Kärreman	(2013).	Alvesson	
and Kärreman (2000) drew upon the work of Fairclough to raise their concern that 
anything “non-discourse” is marginalized through the broad use of the term “discourse,” 
encompassing everything deemed meaningful, and suggested “allowing space for the 
non-	or	extra-discursive	(and	including	more	than	materiality	in	the	extra-discursive)”	
(pp. 1364–1365). Missing in the above discourse debate about the non-discursive is the 
current of actor-network theory (ANT), developed by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John 
Law,	Lucy	Suchman,	Annemarie	Mol,	and	others.	Mol	in	particular	has	written	extensively	
about health care and her work may prove of much value to CMS, according to Letiche 
(2006). In her seminal study, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice, Mol (2002) 
wondered “about the way medicine enacts the objects of its concern and treatment,” 
and portrayed a series of hospital practices in which the entity of atherosclerosis is being 
“sliced, colored, probed, talked about, measured, counted, cut out, countered by walking, 
or	prevented,”	generating	an	entity	which	is	“a	slightly	different	one	every	time”	(p.	vii).	
Mol’s concern is to theorize a politics “that has to do with the way in which problems are 
framed, bodies are shaped, and lives are pushed and pulled into one shape or another” 
(2002, p. viii). Mol is not interested in “the preconditions for acquiring true knowledge,” 
but to enter a mode of thought in which knowledge is understood as a matter of 
manipulation. This entails “foregrounding practicalities, materialities, events” (Mol, 2002, 
p. 13), and Mol provided what she called snapshot-stories to draw the reader into those 
events; Mol had the research informants tell their stories about how their atherosclerosis 
is done in practice, how it is enacted into being. Mol is interested in the modes of 
ordering, which “pervade organizations” (2002, p. 68), in which translations between 
different	test	outcomes	become	possible	via	calibration,	and	different	enactments	are	
distributed	throughout	the	different	hospital	practices	(pathology,	surgery,	outpatient	
clinic,	laboratory,	and	so	on).	One	of	Mol’s	conclusions	of	what	she	calls	praxiography,	
stressing	multiplicity,	is	that	“the	juxtaposition	of	different	ways	of	working	generates	a	
complexity	that	rationalization	cannot	flatten	out	–	and	where	it	might,	this	is	unlikely	
to be an improvement” (2002, p. 182). Mol ends by insisting “This study does not try to 
chase	away	doubt	but	seeks	instead	to	raise	it.	Without	a	final	conclusion	one	may	still	
be partial: open endings do not imply immobilization” (2002, p. 184). 
Mol	made	a	convincing	case	that	stuff	indeed	means,	that	is,	that	things	like	devices	may	
enact particular coming-into-beings, such as the-patient-as-a-particular-diagnosis, which 
are	then	drawn	upon	by,	and	imposed	upon,	people	(as	differential	coming-into-beings	
themselves) as meanings. Through such instruments, such dividing devices, the human 
body	is	enacted	multiple.	Throughout	my	chapters	in	Part	II,	materiality,	stuff,	does	play	
a crucial role: be it in the way rooms, corridors, weapons and food impose themselves 
on our senses; in the way our own body relates itself as a member of an organizational 
body-in-becoming; or in the ways diagnostic and assessment tools, electronic interfaces, 
protocols	and	so	on	‘calibrate’	our	shared	understanding	of	what	is	patient,	practitioner,	
stakeholder	and	so	on.	Materiality,	matter,	material,	figure	firmly	from	within	Bakhtin’s	
work and in this thesis, but one could say this idea, any idea, of materiality is colonized in 
a discursive hermeneutic framework, in modes of ordering. One point that Bakhtin himself 
stressed	is	the	distinction	between	the	realm	of	the	text	and	that	which	extends	beyond	
the written word: “As we have already said, there is a sharp and categorical boundary 
line between the actual world as source of representation and the world represented in 
the work” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 254). Yet Bakhtin (1981) was quick to add that this categorical 
line	should	not	be	thought	of	as	an	absolute,	‘real’	divide:	
It is also impermissible to take this categorical boundary line as something absolute 
and	impermeable	(which	 leads	to	an	oversimplified,	dogmatic	splitting	of	hairs).	
However forcefully the real and the represented world resist fusion, however 
immutable the presence of that categorical boundary line between them, they are 
nevertheless	indissolubly	tied	up	with	each	other	and	find	themselves	in	continual	
mutual	interaction;	uninterrupted	exchange	goes	on	between	them,	similar	to	the	
uninterrupted	exchange	of	matter	between	living	organisms	and	the	environment	
that surrounds them. (p. 254) 
‘The	organization,’	then,	is	a	complex	case	in	point,	demanding	from	the	researcher	to	
zoom in its particularities, such as meetings, forms and letters, each with their own sense 
of materiality that seems obvious yet at the same time each immersed in a discursive 
realm where notions of addressivity and receptivity calibrate not only their materiality 
and its sense but also that of those addressing and receiving. When someone would 
say,	‘At	home	I	am	a	different	person	than	at	work,’	we	thus	might	consider	taking	that	
statement somewhat literally. And in one of his last works, Bakhtin (1986) concerned 
himself with how we may work “Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences” and 
had some things to say about things. Some points in particular are relevant here, in which 
Bakhtin	(1986)	separated	the	exact	(“precise”)	sciences	from	the	human	sciences,	where	
the	first	contemplates	
3
78 79
3 | Could a method of inquiry be made answerable?Part 1 | Questions
a	thing	and	expounds	on	it…In	opposition	to	the	subject	there	is	only	a	voiceless	
thing. Any object of knowledge (including man) can be perceived and cognized as 
a thing. But a subject as such cannot be perceived and studied as a thing, for as a 
subject it cannot, while remaining a subject, become voiceless, and, consequently, 
cognition of it can only be dialogic. (p. 161) 
Bakhtin	 is	quite	clear	that	we	are	dealing	with	different	kinds	of	entities	here,	which	
demand	a	different	approach	to	inquiry.	Studying	(or	treating,	more	generally)	a	person	
as an object is possible, but not desirable since it foregoes being answerable which is the 
precondition of subjectivity. Unlike things, understanding a subject and regarding it as a 
phenomenon secondary to the dialogue between and within discourse, is to understand 
it dialogically. However, again, things are not that simple: 
one must not forget that “thing” and “personality” are limits and not absolute 
substances. Meaning cannot (and does not wish to) change physical, material, and 
other phenomena; it cannot act as a material force. And it does not need to do this: it 
itself	is	stronger	than	any	force,	it	changes	the	total	contextual	meaning	of	an	event	
and	reality	without	changing	its	actual	(existential)	composition	one	iota;	everything	
remains	as	it	was,	but	it	acquires	a	completely	different	contextual	meaning.	(Bakhtin,	
1986, p. 165) 
In other words, we should be aware that these ideas of a thing or a personality (or soul) 
are	limit	concepts	within	an	unfinalizable	spectrum	of	possible	meanings	attached	to	each	
other. Following Bakhtin, Stengers, and ANT scholars, even objects that seems an obvious 
‘things,’	allow	themselves	to	be	studied	dialogically.	Approaching	the	study	dialogically	
implies	taking	the	contextual	(praxiographic)	meaning	into	account.	As	Bakhtin	suggests,	
the impact of this realm of meaning on us is greater than any material force might have, 
as	it	directly	bears	upon	our	idea	of	who	and	where	we	are	and	why.	But	not	‘by	myself.’	
Bakhtin (1986) added that: 
The limit here is not I but I in interrelationship with other personalities, that is, I and 
other, I and thou…Our thought and our practice, not technical but moral (that is, our 
responsible deeds), are accomplished between two limits: attitudes toward the thing 
and attitudes toward the personality. Reification and personification. Some of our 
acts	(cognitive	and	moral)	strive	toward	the	limit	of	reification,	but	never	reach	it;	
other	acts	strive	toward	the	limit	of	personification,	and	never	reach	it	completely.	
(pp. 167–168)
Put	differently,	in	the	responsible	deed	we	answer	to	another	for	something,	indeed:	we	
require	the	personification	of	that	other	in	order	to	relate	to,	to	answer	to,	just	as	we	
need to reify, make outside of ourselves and our relationship, that which we answer for. 
But just as I cannot place anything meaningful completely outside of our relationship, I 
cannot completely regard you as a thou for you always, however partial, remain an object 
to	me,	too	(an	example	of	this	might	be	the	threshold	experience	of	the	erotic).	In	short,	
Bakhtin	suggested	we	become	and	stay	aware	of	the	unfinalizable	nature	of	discourse	
and to grasp our limitations in understanding both the thing and the persona, and that 
which separates them and that which conjoins them. For our purposes here a crucial 
recurring	point	is	the	critique	that	the	above	CMS	scholars	share:	the	idea	that	“‘discourse	
constitutes’ poses a problem to be investigated, not an investigative point of departure” 
(Iedema, 2011, cited in Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011b, p. 1199). 
3.4 Data analysis and writing
Clarity is the disappearance of what could shock. 
Totality and Infinity, Levinas (1969)
In his Qualitative Data Analysis Using a Dialogical Approach, Sullivan (2011) adopted 
Weber’s distinction between the bureaucratic and the charismatic tendencies in every 
stage	of	the	research	process.	Whereas	the	bureaucratic	approach	features	verifiable	
rules	and	procedures	and	the	virtues	of	being	systematic,	exhaustive	and	impersonal,	
the charismatic approach draws its strength from the personality and the intuition of 
the scholar. Sullivan makes use of this distinction not to argue that they can be clearly 
separated, or that one is better than the other, but to “illustrate how authority of analysis 
resided both in the bureaucratic procedures that are followed and the charismatic style 
of	 the	analyst…both	 ‘bureaucracy’	and	 ‘charisma’	offer	 the	 researcher	different	and	
complementary possibilities” (Sullivan, 2011, p. 64). Sullivan argued that even in the 
transcription of data one cannot rely completely on following established procedure. 
What I have chosen to do in the transcription of audio recordings is to write down 
the	whole	 recordings	without	 the	use	of	 the	symbols	 in	 the	 Jeffersonian	system	of	
transcription common in conversation analysis, relying on my own memory when 
rereading the transcribed events; thereby running the risk of forgetting the intonation, 
the emotional-volitional register in which the words came to life. Of course, I still had 
the audio recordings themselves to listen back to, which I have done repeatedly. In 
the presentation of fragments of transcribed (and translated into English) utterances, 
following Sullivan (2011), I prefer: 
not	to	use	[the	many	symbols	in	the	Jeffersonian	system]	as	I	find	that	they	distract	
away from the readability of a transcript and foreground attention to the sounds of 
the	words,	for	the	reader,	at	the	expense	of	what	is	being	said	and	the	format	used	
to say them. (p. 69) 
When	a	speaker	significantly	raises	the	volume	of	his	or	her	speech,	I	present	this	by	using	
capital letters. Finally, I have already touched upon the unpleasantly long team dialogue 
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excerpts	presented	in	this	thesis	chapter.	The	majority	of	talk	recorded	is	talk	which	was	
not directed at me, or, more precisely, I was not an actively uttering participant in those 
team conversations. The consequence of that is that I have been unable to direct the 
utterances	of	team	members	to	such	a	deliberate	extent	so	as	it	would	produce	proper	
soundbites to stand out and hit a theoretical point right on the empirical mark. One has 
to	be	drawn	into	the	dialogue	for	a	while	first,	before	it	‘muddles	into	its	sense,’	before	
we are drawn into the story as it unfolds in between the utterances. That makes for a 
difficult	read	at	times,	but	rewarding	ultimately,	I	hope.
Sullivan	(2011)	elaborated	on	different	styles	and	techniques	as	they	have	been	developed	
in	the	crowded	field	of	discourse	analyses,	before	guiding	the	reader	toward	Sullivan’s	
own, dialogic, method. I do not think it is enough to merely apply his dialogic approach 
for	 two	 reasons:	 first,	 because	 I	 am	 not	 primarily	 interested	 in	 subjectivity	 but	 in	
answerability; second, because I think (as Sullivan himself displays an iterative dialogic 
process	of	method-finding)	not	discarding	one	or	the	other	method	but	finding	levels	of	
agreement does more justice to the iterative approach of both Sullivan and Bakhtin, that 
is, to perform at least an attempt at following a similar itinerary of partial agreements. 
Moreover, the three accounts below each arise from their own research question, and 
what	we	come	to	want	to	know	should	in	principle	determine	what	method	fits	best,	
and not the other way around (even though in practice it may very well work this way, 
too). These questions are: how does a grand-scale work problem comes to be boiled 
down	to	a	personal	concern;	how	do	people	come	to	expose	themselves	and	others	to	
situations of physical force; and how do people acting on a moral impulse may actually 
become of no concern to each other? 
These	questions	presuppose	a	particular	attitude	from	the	analyst	toward	her	‘data,’	which	
Sullivan (2011) drew into a hermeneutic spectrum between trust and suspicion (which may 
remind	us	of	Churchman’s	satisfied	and	dissatisfied	scholars).	Chapter	4	takes	a	trusting	
approach, in Chapter 5 a suspicious approach, and Chapter 6 is somewhere in the middle. 
If the analyst trusts her data, it means that she presupposes at least a certain level of 
unambiguity	between	the	words	uttered	and	the	meanings	‘behind’	them,	in	order	for	
her	to	regard	these	words	as	content	codable	and	quantifiable	into	fairly	unambiguous	
aggregates. The trusting discourse scholar attributes meaningfulness to what is said 
(the	content	of	the	talk	itself	as	well	as	the	content	of	what	the	scholar	‘distilled’	from	it).	
Sullivan elaborated that the trusting analyst sees “the content of talk as a gateway into 
lived	experience”	and	suspicious	analysts	as	“those	that	look	at	the	form	that	this	talk	
takes	as	reflective	of	power	relations	and	the	local	negotiation	of	identity”	(Sullivan,	2011,	
p. 8). The suspicious hermeneutic is not so much interested in the content of what has 
been uttered, but more so in interpreting the functions that these utterances might have 
in foregrounding or obscuring a particular position of power(lessness). To the suspicious 
one, it is all about relations of power, whereas the trusting one is less consumed by the 
contextual	(social-economic)	equality	in	being	answerable.	On	the	trusting	side	of	the	
spectrum	we	find	grounded	theory	(e.g.,	Glaser	&	Strauss,	Charmaz)	and	on	the	doubtful	
side	we	find	the	critical	discourse	analysts	(e.g.,	Wodak,	Fairclough).	Sullivan	 located	
narrative analysists (e.g., Bruner, Bamberg) somewhere in the middle. Sullivan depicted 
those on the trusting side as adventurous anthropologists, who dare to step into the lived 
experience	of	the	subject	talking,	wondering	how	to	reveal	(or	better	yet:	translate)	this	
‘strange,	new	world.’	Those	on	the	suspicious	side,	the	not-so-adventurous,	instead	seek	
to have their data corroborate that same world permeated with power relations a little 
further.	In	a	different	categorical	distinction	resembling	the	suspicious,	Hayden	White	
classified	the	critical	further	into	the	positive	and	the	eschatological	structuralists.	The	
positive	structuralists	such	as	Marx	and	Saussure	seek	to	identify	an	integrative:	
structure	of	structures…concerned	with	the	scientific	determination	of	the	structures	
of consciousness by which men form a conception of the world they inhabit and on 
the	basis	of	which	they	contrive	modes	of	praxis	for	coming	to	terms	with	that	world.	
(White, 1973, p. 53) 
The eschatological on the other hand, such as Lacan and Foucault, understand the world 
as fundamentally opaque and irreducibly varied and dispersive, concentrating “on the 
ways in which structures of consciousness actually conceal the reality of the world and, by 
that	concealment,	effectively	isolate	men	within	different,	not	to	say	mutually	exclusive,	
universes of discourse, thought, and action” (White, 1973, p. 53). The narrative analysts, 
finally,	concerned	with	understanding	the	utterances	before	them	in	terms	of	narrative	
structure such as plot, genre, and so on, are interested in both the content and the form 
of what is uttered, and may choose to adopt a more trusting, adventurous approach as 
well	as	a	more	critical	stance.	More	in	touch	with	my	own	end	here,	you	may	find	little	
room for the trusting approach as I oscillate between the narrative analysists and the 
eschatological structuralists.   
As	Sullivan	explained,	Bakhtin’s	work	 is	 so	wide	 ranging	and	 thought	evoking,	 that	
it	has	been	used	across	the	spectrum,	evidencing	the	different	readings	of	his	work.	
Differences	in	Bakhtin’s	own	early	and	later	work	with	their	different	emphases	“allow	for	
many	different	means	of	appropriating	his	work	across	different	qualitative	frameworks”	
(Sullivan, 2011, p. 13), amounting to “a jack of all trades, but a master of none” (Sullivan, 
2011, p. 14). Sullivan suggested there are some unique elements to Bakhtin’s thought 
which	 have	 not	 yet	 been	 developed	 in	 the	 existing	 hermeneutic	 frameworks:	 the	
“existential	insistence	of	a	needy	self,”	the	“emphasis	on	‘truth’	as	‘pravda’ in a dialogical 
approach” and “otherness and mystery can be built into the fabric of talk” (Sullivan, 
2011, pp. 14–16). First, As regards to the needy self, Sullivan (2011) argued that the self 
and the other “are theorized as anticipative of each other,” which means that both the 
author and the research subjects in question are “selves as knowers – who are capable 
of interpreting and re-interpreting what they had trusted as suspicious, and vice versa” 
(p. 14). For the analyst this means we are left with no unambiguous meaning of data, 
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but that various interpretations are possible, are always potential. Of course, there are 
already many discourse analysts who readily admit that this is the case and allow for 
multiple accounts of the same data, as we have seen above. However, what sets this 
needy	self	in	anticipation	of	the	other	principle,	the	unfinalizable	self–other	axis	if	you	
will, apart from these other analyses is the “rhetorical features of language are viewed as 
both	internally	addressed	to	self	and	externally	addressed	to	others”	(Sullivan,	2011,	p.	
14).	A	level	of	distrust	is	necessary	to	consider	this	in	the	first	place,	and	Sullivan	argued	
that this is the case with Bakhtin, and we might corroborate this by how Bakhtin analyses 
the utterances of Dostoevsky’s protagonists, which he regarded as permeated with the 
anticipated response of the other already inside the thought as it is on display in stories 
such as with the Underground Man (from Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground). What 
we gather from this is that answerability, as a relational concept, is not only to be found 
in between dialogue of persons, but equally, possibly even more so, hidden within the 
utterances that are of themselves already an internal dialogue on how answerable the 
self allows itself to be toward itself, permeating the utterance, the thought, with internal 
conflict,	for	the	analyst	to	tease	out	in	the	content	and	form	of	the	utterances	by	making	
use of dialogical concepts such as the sideward glance, the sore spot, and the loophole. 
These concepts are more than particular aspects to shape an idea of subjectivity, such 
as Sullivan is after, they allow us to tease out the shapes and forms of answerability as 
it is played out: withholding complete commitment to a particular stance, inserting a 
disclaimer, appealing toward addressees to take responsibility or to shift responsibility 
toward them, and so on. 
Second,	Sullivan	drew	our	attention	 to	 the	 idea	of	 ‘truth’	as	 ‘pravda’ in a dialogical 
approach,	which	he	explained	as	‘lived	truth’	as	opposed	to	‘objective,’	cognized	and	
unshakeable truth (istina in Russian). Drawing on the work John Shotter, Sullivan argued 
that “Methodologically, a focus on pravda	allows	an	examination	of	different	‘lived’	truths,	
with	different	levels	of	personal	investment,	in	terms	of	how	they	shape	self	and	other…
such	truth	can	be	embodied	in	different	lives	and	indeed	lifestyles”	(Sullivan,	2011,	p.	
15).	The	connection	of	truth	with	lived	experience	discloses	a	plane	of	analysis	in	which	
we	turn	our	attention	to	the	discursive	devices	that	construct	that	lived	experience	as	
evidenced in the utterances under scrutiny. In other words, when we direct our attention 
to the lived truths as they are uttered, we make sense of them by turning toward the way 
in which the utterances portray the environment in which their truth indeed becomes 
‘lived.’	This	is	where	we	touch	upon	our	earlier	idea	of	the	unfinalizable	eventness	of	the	
everyday, our attention toward knowledge “that is grounded in the concrete, the particular 
and	everyday	life”	(Sullivan,	2011,	p.	15).	This	is,	for	example,	how	the	intended	use	of	
electronic devices such as the electronic patient record (how the system is supposed 
to work, objectively, laid down in a manual) oftentimes is not the actual use in the lived 
work practices (e.g. generating a sense of red tape, but also the ever-present chance of 
poaching upon it such as de Certeau, 1984, described). By using the concepts in narrative 
analysis, such as genre, and in particular time-space mode (chronotope in Bakhtinian), 
we	get	a	differentiated	sense	of	what	lived	truth	in	different	genres	and	chronotopes	
entails, what lived truth of the ability to be answerable and hold answerable (within 
self	and	with	others)	might	involve.	Sullivan	provided	the	example	of	the	epic	genre	(in	
which	there	is	no	unfinalized,	messy	everyday	life)	in	which	the	gist	of	the	utterances	
by the speaker is to authorize her own plight to overcome a certain ordeal, and we can 
discern this epic genre in terms of how this world is constructed by the speaker herself 
and	by	the	discourse	in	which	we	observe	the	speaker	to	find	herself	in.	The	differences	
in	chronotope	and	genre,	the	nature	and	level	of	unfinalized	messiness	of	the	event-as-
discourse, may reveal the mode of uttered lived truth of answerability, from authoritative 
discourse	(‘you	must	do	this’)	to	what	Bakhtin	calls	“internally	persuasive	discourse”	(I	feel	
I should do this). Chronotope, as a side note, might serve to be a key concept connecting 
discourse studies and actor-network theory approaches such as Mol’s.
Finally,	Sullivan’s	third	aspect	of	‘otherness	and	mystery	built	into	the	fabric	of	talk’	more	
directly engages the anticipation of interlocution. For a further grasp on answerability it 
entails	that	we	direct	our	attention	to	how	discourse	both	finalizes	and	unfinalizes	“the	
boundary	lines	between	what	is	other	and	what	is	self”	(Sullivan,	2011,	p.	16).	‘Double-
voiced	discourse’	is	permeated	with	this	anticipated	interlocution,	ostensibly	unfinalized	
and indirect, drawing in otherness and ambiguity and making ourselves change speech 
and	tone	while	talking	without	the	need	of	an	‘actual’	response	of	somebody	else.	Sullivan	
(2011)	provided	an	example	to	illustrate	how	we	should	apply	this	and	the	other	two	
aspects to get a sense of his dialogical approach:
It	may	be	of	benefit	to	return	to	the	example	of	the	individual	in	pain	to	establish	the	
differences	to	other	qualitative	methodologies.	A	dialogical	approach	would	focus	on	
how	the	“pain”	is	authored	or	the	value	it	is	given	by	the	participant,	it	would	examine	
their anticipation of judgements of others around how they are authored as a person 
in	pain	(for	example,	through	paying	attention	to	their	reservations	in	speech	and	
in	the	 introduction	of	other	voices	through	indirect	discourse)	and	explore	their	
dialogues	with	their	own	self	around	the	significance	of	the	pain.	It	would	seek	to	
locate these in a particular conception of time and space (chronotope), such as future 
redemption,	past	suffering,	the	potential	of	the	present,	the	significance	of	others	
on the landscape of the pain. (p. 16)
Bakhtin’s understanding of language is that it is “permeated with dialogic relationships: 
among whole utterances, toward a signifying part of an utterance, even toward an 
individual word, between language styles, toward one’s own utterance speaking with 
an inner reservation” (Bakhtin, 1984b, pp. 182–183). Crucial here is to understand that 
putting dialogue center stage makes possible the analysis of how a single utterance may 
already be dialogized, without even having a response yet from any listener. Interlocutors 
may be other persons in everyday intersubjective talk, yet while talking there are other 
interlocutors at work at the intrasubjective level, that is, intralocutors (following the 
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boundary	construct),	in	which	the	utterance	as	voiced	by	a	‘real’	person	is	already	an	
outcome	of	the	intrapersonal	dialogue	taking	place	between	the	‘virtual’	voices.	Sullivan	
and McCarthy (2005, 2008; Sullivan, 2008, 2011) directly addressed the idea of anticipated 
interlocution. As Sullivan (2011) insisted:
Methodologically, the possibility of anticipated interlocutors spilling out and into 
our dialogues with concrete others is missing or understated in other qualitative 
approaches. In discursive approaches, the “other” tends to be primarily considered 
as the immediate interlocutor or the obvious audience of a public address… The 
benefit	of	the	dialogical	approach	is	that…it	admits	the	possibility	of	a	multi-leveled	
experience	with	a	diversity	of	sometimes	competing	addressees	and	replies.	(p.	172)
In	dialogue	as	 it	unfolds,	what	Sullivan	called	 ‘inside-out’	and	‘outside-in’	utterances	
coalesce. As Sullivan (2011) argued with Bakhtin,
the epic, tragedy and lyric [genres] tend to organize “outside-in” types of discourse, 
while irony, parody, and the novel, tend to organize “inside-out” types of discourse. 
“Outside-in” discourses are more “monological” in so far as they privilege a singular 
truth…the more “dialogical” genres are more anti-authoritative and irreverent. (p. 46)
The struggle between these two, inside-out and outside-in, and the presence of third 
addressees	can	be	traced	by	discourse	trying	to	find	loopholes	out	such	as	sideward	
glances and hidden dialogue which may indicate sore spots and threshold moments, 
such as in the parable of the Grand Inquisitor in a novel of Dostoevsky. The parable is 
a monologue by the head of the Spanish Inquisition toward his prisoner that he plans 
to	execute	the	next	day.	The	Inquisitor	makes	immediately	clear	to	his	prisoner,	who	is	
believed to be Christ reincarnated, that he cannot be anything but a character in the 
Church’s plot and is not allowed to enter into dialogue anew.
“Is it thou? Thou?” But receiving no answer, he adds at once, “Don’t answer, and be 
silent. What canst thou say, indeed? I know too well what thou wouldst say. And thou 
hast no right to add anything to what thou hadst said of old…When the Inquisitor 
ceased speaking he waited some time for his prisoner to answer him. His silence 
weighed down upon him. He saw that the prisoner had listened intently all the time, 
looking gently in his face and evidently not wishing to reply. The old man longed 
for him to say something, however bitter and terrible. But suddenly he approached 
the old man in silence and softly kissed him on his bloodless aged lips. That was all 
his answer. The old man shuddered. His lips moved. He went do the door, opened it, 
and said to him: “Go, and come no more….come not at all, never, never! (Dostoevsky, 
2005/1879–1880, p. 238)
With	a	doubting	author,	aware	of	anticipated	interlocutors,	a	focus	on	 ‘lived	truths,’	
thresholds moments and its gestures, and a primary interest in narrative structures as 
relevant	to	the	‘self–other	axis,’	Sullivan’s	dialogic	approach	finds	itself	somewhere	in	the	
middle of the spectrum, not too far from the narrative analyst approach, something akin 
to	a	socially	anxious	Ricoeurian	style,	which	I	have	adopted	in	this	study.	The	three	aspects	
that set Sullivan’s Bakhtinian dialogic approach apart from other kinds of discourse 
analysis	resonate	with	the	three	unfinalizable	aspects	we	discerned	from	our	gloss	over	
both CMS and Bakhtin’s evolving thought on answerability. But where Sullivan is primarily 
interested in the study of subjectivity and introduces the Bakhtinian sense of dialogue 
into	his	methodological	approach	to	study	that	subjectivity,	 I	am	first	and	foremost	
interested in responsibility, or rather answerability. One may ponder whether Bakhtin was 
primarily interested in subjectivity or in answerability since Bakhtin shared Dostoevsky’s 
mistrust toward the psychologizing of the human condition. Answerability, moreover, is 
an intrinsically relational concept as opposed to subjectivity, which always needs further 
explanation	as	to	why	we	should	understand	it	as	dialogical	(intersubjective,	see	e.g.	
the dialogical self theory of Hermans & Kempen, 1993). Sullivan’s dialogical approach 
might even work better when focused not on subjectivity but on answerability. Sullivan 
converted these three aspects into the format of a table that depicts a key moment that 
is	significant	for	the	study	of	subjectivity.	Sullivan	discerned	the	following:	participant(s);	
genres	and	discourses;	emotional	register;	time-space	elaboration;	and	context.	As	much	
as	it	offers	a	quick	overview	of	the	data	analyzed,	I	found	the	presentation	in	a	table	too	
restrictive	for	my	own	purposes,	and	the	distinction	between	‘time-space	elaboration’	
and	‘context’	confusing.	With	Sullivan,	I	am	interested	in	the	shifts	between	the	three	
aspects and in their interrelationships.
3.5 Toward an answerable inquiry
It	is	difficult	to	draw	sharp	lines,	chronologically	and	categorically,	between	the	collection,	
the analysis and the writing of research. These processes feed into each other. With too 
much of a blur you run the risk of getting lost and becoming desperate from time to time, 
and	that	certainly	happened	to	me.	As	an	external	PhD	student,	I	enjoyed	a	first	year	
of talking and learning about research, being in a classroom once a month with a small 
group of colleagues on the same track as I was set. But after that year, my connection 
with university life quietened down to a few meetings each year, meeting my supervisors. 
What I felt really helped was to visit conferences and present draft chapters as papers 
there.	 It	provided	a	fleeting	sense	of	an	academic	belonging	and	togetherness	and	
to meet (not so) like-minded, to get feedback on draft papers (getting accepted into 
conferences was feedback in itself) and, last but surely not least, to impose some time-
bound schedules onto my own writing processes and be answerable for it. Deadlines did a 
great deal to get me writing quickly, which then helped me to collect some more data and 
helped me particularly in the analysis. Sullivan’s approach allows us to methodologically 
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shift ourselves in between narrative analysis, the more critical discourse analysis, and 
Sullivan’s dialogical approach, to retain the methodological dialogue between these 
approaches and see how they may answer each other, and that is what I set out to do 
in	Part	II	below.	In	exploring	critically	the	possibility	of	an	answerable	inquiry	(see	also	
Burdick	and	Sandlin,	2010),	I	will	draw	toward	the	unfinalizables	of	a	wavering	self–other	
axis,	the	eventness	of	spatiotemporality	and	the	ambiguity	of	discourse.	I	hope	to	disclose	
not complete and unambiguous answers in this inquiry, but instead to disclose alternative 
ways of understanding. I draw upon the three phases in Bakhtin’s moral thought, each as 
a	different	constellation	of	the	three	unfinalizables,	to	generate	a	triptych	of	answerability.	
A single case study of a forensic ACT team relevant to this inquiry and empirically rich, 
allows for an in-depth iterative process: slow and wandering, responsive to promising 
detours,	returning	to	my	‘phenomenon’	with	a	readiness	to	be	answerable	for	it.
In Chapter 4, I will suggest how personal responsibility comes about in organizing, by 
analogy of Mikhail Bakhtin’s analysis of Apuleius’ The Golden Ass, as a genre of its own: 
an	‘adventure	novel	of	everyday	life.’	Apuleius’	 innovation,	according	to	Bakhtin,	was	
to construct a tale of personal responsibility emerging from a chronotopic interplay. 
Organization, I argue, works like such an interplay between the chronotopes of the 
adventure novel of ordeal and that of everyday life. I suggest how this genre permeates 
our	thinking	in	organization	today,	and	how	it	prefigures,	and	limits,	the	ways	we	feel	we	
are able to answer each other and ourselves. Chapter 5 provides a reconceptualization 
of what some authors characterize as the threshold between the discursive and the non-
discursive. I will instead propose that we never leave the discursive but wrap ourselves 
around	a	polarization	of	 the	body	 that	 ‘helps’	 us	 to	 routinely	 engage	 in	physically	
precarious situations to answer each other. In Chapter 6, we zoom in on the unending 
dilemma	of	a	hybrid	team	balancing	on	the	tightrope	between	different	regimes,	othering	
societal	‘strangers’	in	interorganizational	interaction,	but,	more	so,	how	this	othering	is	
already	anticipated	to	such	an	extent	that	open	dialogue	becomes	replaced	by	a	more	
internal	dialogue	of	anticipated	interlocutors	and	I	will	add	a	reflective	note	to	illustrate	
further how this might work.
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	I	had	the	torment	of	being	set,	like	a	sacrificial	victim,	between	the	altar	and	the	flint	knife,	as	
the old saying goes.
The Golden Ass, Apuleius
A forensic ACT team engages people whose lives cut through predetermined sectoral 
and	organizational	boundaries.	Many	of	them	could	be	labeled	as	 ‘difficult	patients,’	
walking	on	society’s	tightropes	and	managing	to	fall	or	jump	off	either	side,	repeatedly	
(see	Koekkoek	et	al.,	2006,	for	a	review	on	how	this	‘difficult	patient’	is	constituted	by	
practitioners’ discourse). As an organizational response to care and to deal with their 
disparate challenges, forensic mental health care amounts to an intertwining of mental 
health and addiction care and criminal justice surveillance. Although this intertwining 
might seem practical, one may call into question its self-evidence. For in the everyday 
betwixt	and	between,	apparent	safeguards	designed	for	patients’	and	practitioners’	
well-being	and	the	roles	they	play,	may	quickly	unravel,	including	the	‘difficult	patient’	
definition.	A	sense	of	responsibility	then	comes	to	the	fore,	not	in	spite	of	organization,	
but emerging from it. This chapter elaborates on such an unraveling in practice. Olive, a 
forensic	ACT	team	member	and	Tim,	an	external	parole	officer,	enter	a	meeting	with	Mrs.	
N., a patient who risks incarceration if she refuses the care provided by Olive and the 
team. The encounter does not end very well. My angle here is on how Olive and another 
colleague, Ed, make sense of the meeting and of their own actions, as a matter of personal 
responsibility. I argue that they do so, in particular, because the organization they are 
embedded in provides a perpendicular sense of time and space that evokes this sense 
of personal responsibility. As such, Mikhail Bakhtin’s etiology of personal responsibility 
is	crossed	over	toward	a	critical	interpretation	of	the	‘responsible	organization,’	in	this	
chapter.
4.1 Grid and play in the space of the everyday
The door that closes is precisely what may be opened.
The Practice of Everyday Life.
Michel de Certeau.
Most studies on organizational ethics have yet to scrutinize the temporal and spatial 
dimensions that precondition a sense of value (and ethics). Although there is a substantial 
amount of studies to rethink the notion of time and its relation to organization (e.g. 
14 A previous version of this chapter was presented at the Sociology of Health and Illness and 
Exeter	University	Symposium	‘Concerning	Relations	–	Sociologies	of	Conduct,	Care	and	Affect’	
of	2014	in	Exeter,	UK.
Ancona	et	al.,	2001,	for	an	overview),	few	organization	studies	have	focused	specifically	
on	this	‘underlying’	time-space	configuration	of	an	organizational	ethics	or,	put	otherwise,	
in	the	contention	that	parameters	of	space	and	time	are	axiologically	constitutive.	Put	
a	little	bit	more	simply,	our	idea	of	what	is	valuable	is	prefigured	by	the	sense	of	time	
and	space,	constituting	the	event	as	we	experience	it.	Rämӧ’s	(2004)	is	one	of	those	few,	
providing	an	axiological	matrix	that	produces	different	images	of	organization	and	their	
moral	‘worldviews,’	as	it	were.	Sharing	the	notion	that	chronological	time	is	not	a	given	
and	is	thus	open	to	scrutiny	(see	also	Pedersen,	2009;	Crossan	et	al.,	2005;	Cunliffe	et	
al., 2004; Lorino & Mourey, 2013; Nicolini, 2007; Chia, 2002; Lilley, 1995), Rämö suggests 
that	different	space-time	frameworks	are	constitutive	of	organizational	ethics.	Opening	
up the possibility of several discursive frameworks and their concurrent senses of ethics, 
Rämö	suggested	focusing	on	the	contextuality	of	practice	to	answer	the	question	what	
moral	sense	prevails	when	and	where.	But	that	contextuality	matters	is	where	Rämӧ’s	
argument ends, while there is much more to be said about it, theoretically, and via 
empirical observation. As I will elaborate below, space-time modes are pivotal in Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s understanding of moral responsibility. Bakhtin calls these modes chronotopes 
(literally:	time-place).	According	to	Bakhtin,	they	function	as	a	defining	structural	element	
in	the	organization	of	the	literary	novel:	chronotopes	underpin	the	narrative	and	define	
value;	‘calibrate’	what	the	sense	of	the	moral	course	of	action	is.	Morson	and	Emerson	
(1990) related the chronotope to ethics succinctly: “as for Bakhtin all meaning entails 
evaluation,	chronotopes	also	define	parameters	of	value”	(p.	369).	A	complex	concept,	
Bakhtin himself gives a description, as:
The intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically 
expressed	 in	 literature.…In	the	 literary	artistic	chronotope,	spatial	and	temporal	
indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time as it were 
thickens,	takes	on	flesh,	becomes	artistically	visible;	likewise,	space	becomes	charged	
and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 84)
In search for the grounds of moral responsibility, in “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope 
in the Novel,” Bakhtin traced the historical development of the literary novel in its 
different	genres	and	in	particular	the	chronotopic	underpinnings	of	these	genres.	One	
of the crucial conclusions in his work, Bakhtin contended here that “every entry into the 
sphere of meaning is accomplished only through the gates of the chronotope” (Bakhtin, 
1981,	p.	258).	When	we	are	interested	in	the	contextuality	of	responsibility,	with	Bakhtin,	
we should be interested in how motifs of time and space may indicate a particular mode 
into which the meaning of (moral) behavior is forged. In forensic ACT, dealing with 
threatening behavior and verbal violence – at least during the year that I was making 
observations	–	the	notion	of	contextuality,	and	how	it	constitutes	the	ways	people	come	
to	answer	to	each	other,	is	overt,	and	explicitly	articulated	by	practitioners	themselves.	
As Uriah elaborated, when I spoke to him after the planning meeting and the incident 
featuring Ed and Olive that I will discuss later:
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Things become more normal. Of course, you choose yourself to work with this target 
group,	so	you	think:	“OK,	things	like	this	can	happen,”	but	it	is	always	contextual.	
Aggressive	stuff	will	happen	regularly,	but,	 it’s	different	here,	 […]	 it	happens	 in	a	
certain	context.	Outside	it	happens,	outside	where	there	are	conflicts,	that’s	where	
it happens, but never in the consultation room, there it doesn’t really happen, 
there,	although	you	might	think	that	stuff	might	happen,	but	I	have	never	actually	
experienced	something	like	that	[…]	It’s	the	context,	and	then	there’s	also	the	parole	
officer	who	enacts	his	supervisory	duty	of	course,	so	it’s	his	job	to	confront	her	and	
then there’s the question of how to go about that, you know? We can confront, 
too, but we’re trained so that it doesn’t escalate, right? But then, still, it can happen 
anyway. (interview II, 1 Nov. 2012)
Uriah	drew	a	clear	distinction	between	the	context	 in	the	consultation	room	and	the	
context	of	‘outside.’	Uriah	himself	just	joined	the	forensic	ACT	team	a	couple	of	weeks	
earlier. What is more, this forensic ACT team itself was only established one and a half 
years earlier, and during the time of my observations some routines were still fresh 
(or incomplete or missing), such as sharing a meeting with a patient together with the 
parole	officer.	This	in	effect	mixes	two	different	public	services	with	two	very	different	
goals	and	paths:	the	parole	officer	recurrently	examining	whether	the	patient	should	
be allowed to venture outside the penitentiary. The team started doing these meetings 
together for practical reasons just a couple of weeks earlier and used a consultation 
room	on	the	ground	level	at	their	office,	their	own	office	team	room	being	on	the	first	
level of the building. In the account above, Uriah emphasized both the possibility of 
aggressive	behavior	and	the	very	absence	of	just	that	in	his	earlier	work	experience	in	
forensic care. When it does happen, it is outside, outside the consultation room but also 
located outside the view of the forensic workers, he seems to imply. Uriah suggested 
that	escalation	may	follow	from	the	way	the	parole	officer	composed	himself,	with	such	
aggression normally being avoided because the care workers are trained to de-escalate 
in	their	interaction	with	patients.	The	incident	itself	is	reported	in	the	following	excerpt,	
recorded	a	few	minutes	into	the	daily	planning	meeting	at	the	team	office	room	earlier	
that day. In every working day morning planning meeting, Ed, Olive, Uriah, Carol and 
other	members	of	the	Forensic	ACT	team	exchange	small	stories	about	what	happened	
to them and their patients. On the below occasion, Ed and Olive in particular, recount 
the incident involving themselves and Mrs. N. (who has been anonymized for privacy 
considerations. And as said, all practitioners’ names are pseudonyms).
Ed: Well, about Mrs. N., uh, we have said enough, I think, who, uhm…well not completely, 
it	concerned	a	meeting	with	the	parole	office,	and	with	Olive,	that	did	not	turn	out	
as a dialogue but a quarrel, wherein, after a little while, a knife, and not such a small 
one, really, was thrown on the table, uhm…with the message being, what? [Turns 
toward Olive]
Olive: Well, I uh, so Mrs. N. had a knife in her pocket, and at one point Tim [Tim is the 
parole	officer	who	was	present	at	this	meeting,	in	a	small	office	room	at	the	team	
headquarters, together with Mrs. N. and Olive] said: “Well hey, that’s a pretty big 
knife you have there, could you not bring that anymore?” And then, at a certain 
moment, the conversation disintegrated between these two and Tim said: “I am 
leaving.” And so, Mrs. N. had to talk to me alone, well, because I would help her 
apply to the online housing service. Upon which I said to her: “I’m OK to help you 
with it, but you are going to hand over that knife at the front desk.” Then she said, 
like: “No, I won’t.” Then I said: “Well, then it ends here.” And, reluctantly, [she] took 
that knife out of her pocket and slid it over the table, and then the knife dropped. 
And…uh, I said: “You are going to pick it up.” Well, then she did pick it up. And she 
handed it over, to the front desk.
Uriah:	 Quite	firm	of	you.
Carol: Great, indeed!
Ed: She did, in the end, like, a good thing about it, she did, you know, like stay with you 
inside, for quite a while.
Olive:	 Yes,	yes,	and	that	was	fine,	you	know.
Ed:	 And	that	was	fine.
Olive: Yeah, yeah.
Ed: It just had to get ruined toward the end, yeah, I had her, uh…I just gave her a letter, 
just because, uh…weapons are an absolute no-go, and if it happens again then the 
conversation will just end, inside.
Uriah: But there is no security check, no one is checked.
Ed: No, but well. There, there is no guarantee, that’s a pretty conscious choice, like, 
there’s some real, uh […] yes, we will, we are not going to go for a security gate or 
whatever	now.	But,	uh,	she	immediately	tore	the	letter	apart,	and	uh,	she	drove	off	
angrily, because you engage her outside, and then they want to engage her again 
and someone feels threatened by that, yeah.
Carol: Yes. (day 3, 1 Oct. 2012)
Along with most others, I was not present when this event occurred, and so what we 
have here is my account of the accounts of others, who in their turn reported the speech 
of	yet	others.	A	retelling	in	which	practitioners	together	process	their	experiences	of	
what was an eventful episode: Mrs. N. leaving upset, ultimately, when she was handed 
a	letter	by	Ed.	The	letter	contained	an	official	warning	not	to	bring	weapons	into	the	
office	building,	by	penalty	of	suspension	of	all	 the	team’s	care,	by	penalty	of	ending	
dialogue, together. This warning is required even more since management decided 
against the installation of a security gate, presuming this gate increases the threshold 
for	patients	to	enter	the	building.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	‘place’	of	forensic	ACT	
is undetermined, as the work unfolds not only in the consultation room, but more so 
anywhere the patient is to be found: at his or her home, on the street, in a clinic, shelter, 
safe house, police station or penitentiary, at friends’ or family’s house et cetera. And 
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contrary	to	the	clinic,	the	specifics	of	some	spaces	like	the	patient’s	home	are	unknown	
before the practitioner actually arrives there (other people and objects such as weapons 
might or might not be present). The daily planning meeting functions as a collective 
grid for practitioners to collectively pinpoint their times and places of the day before 
and the day to come. Another important aspect of space is the environment of the 
practitioners’	office	workplace	which,	from	the	perspective	of	flexible	work	spaces,	 is	
(albeit unsuccessfully) cleansed of personal idiosyncrasies and dislocated. Practitioners 
who need to do the inevitable paper work may log on to the system and the electronic 
patient	files	anywhere,	such	as	in	a	consultation	room,	at	home	or	on	the	streets	with	
a tablet. Logged on, they are submerged in an electronic environment that forces an 
algorithmic thinking upon them, but over which they have little to no control, and any 
(inevitable) computer glitch unmasks the electronic space as an alien environment which 
may at any moment delay or disable the work processes of the worker indeterminately.
In sum, here we have spatial motifs of the indeterminate and the linear (grid). Other 
spatial motifs of forensic ACT are very tangible as well: being routinely deployed into 
situations	of	everyday	life,	such	as	drinking	coffee	together	on	the	couch	of	the	patient’s	
home or in a shelter somewhere. The practitioner is immersed in the biography of his 
patient, in the network of social and public service ties, where personages interact via 
their respective roles. The daily work of the practitioner (and the patient) is very much 
prescribed	through	these	interconnections,	where	dwelling	within	physical	proximity	of	
another (such as visiting the patients) is regarded as something natural and an essential 
part	of	good	care.	Furthermore,	the	practitioner	finds	herself	mostly	in	an	environment	
of	the	‘lower	social	stratum,’	with	most	patients	living	at	the	margins	of	society.	Conflict,	
difference	and	encounter	and	connectedness	are	part	and	parcel	of	everyday	praxis,	both	
at the patient’s home but also routinized in working space. And even the organization’s 
policy is to not have metal detectors, another indication of the preference of relationality 
over security in engaging patients.
The episode above is a narrative fragment of the work life of the team at hand, the 
practitioners doing their work as it unfolds and as they retell, re-fold, their understanding 
of what unfolded, and their roles in it. I then started to indicate motifs of space as they 
are reported by the practitioners and as I have observed myself during team visits, 
reading	about	forensic	ACT,	and	from	personal	experience	working	for	this	health	care	
provider.	Zooming	in	on	the	experience	of	moral	responsibility	in	everyday	team	work	is	
the	stuff	of	the	stream	of	OMT	thought	promulgated	as	‘ethics-as-practice’	(Clegg	et	al.,	
2007). As Phillips (1992) foreshadowed earlier: “Business ethics must become the study 
of ethics in practice, the study of the negotiation and invocation of the organization, 
which will undoubtedly complicate the discussion of ethics but will also ground it in 
the	world	 it	wishes	 to	affect”	 (p.	243).	From	this	purview,	ethical	considerations	are	
attached	to	the	contingent	and	situational	of	everyday,	which	may	turn	out	to	be	‘for’	
or	‘against’	management	(Clegg	et	al.,	2006;	Parker,	2002):	entrenched	in	organizational	
techniques of moral management and surveillance (Iedema et al., 2006; Iedema & 
Rhodes, 2010) or deployed as a critical source of resistance to these techniques (Ezzamel 
& Willmott, 2014; Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013; Pullen & Rhodes, 2013). An ethics-in-
practice, in short, is concerned with the indeterminate everyday. But as Sandywell (2004, 
p. 163) argued, connotations of the everyday itself move beyond its quotidian sense 
(“the	normal	run	of	things,	 the	usual	and	the	commonplace.	Everyday	experience	 is	
what happens in typical form today as it has done yesterday and will do tomorrow”). 
Sandywell (2004) discerned three ways in which social theory understands the everyday: 
as a substantive a-historical domain of “doing being ordinary” as the target for empirical 
research	(Garfinkel’s	ethnomethodology);	as	a	way	“‘of	transcending’	or	‘deconstructing’	
philosophy” (Wittgenstein); and as a “vital source of transgression in contemporary 
culture	(the	ordinary	as	a	recalcitrant	existential	surd	exposing	the	limits	of	specialist	
disciplines,	institutions	and	orthodoxies)”	(p.	169).	Through	the	course	of	this	chapter,	
we will be touching upon these three ways, following Sandywell (2004), who insisted:
…abandoning	 the	 false	 security	 of	 everyday	 life	 to	 reveal	 the	 complex	 play	
of decentered, heterological lifeworlds (and their associated discourses and 
forms of subjectivity)…a recalcitrant ordinariness through which bureaucratized 
and technocratic worlds and discourses are put in question and transformed. 
“Ordinariness”	becomes	a	generic	index	of	hitherto	uninvestigated	processes	through	
which people make sense of their lives given the material and cultural resources 
available to them (p. 175).
In an article from within OMT, Courpasson (2017) inquired into how the everyday might 
be	interesting	for	understanding	work	experiences,	and	asked:	“How	can	we	make	sense	
of the myriad of disconnected actions, gestures and encounters that make the everyday?” 
(pp. 843–844). Drawing on the work of Lefebvre and de Certeau, Courpasson (2017) 
argued that the everyday designates both alienating aspects of work life (repetition, 
frustration, oppression) and its creative potential (emancipation, resistance), motivated 
by	a	concern	for	offering	workers	ways	to	“free	themselves	from	the	constant	control	of	
their thoughts and moves by the authoritarian everyday of management” (p. 845); against 
“the progressive partitioning of times and places, the disjunctive logic of specialization 
through and for work, [which] no longer has an adequate counterpart” (p. 26). Courpasson 
(2017) highlighted de Certeau as looking “deep into the subterranean potentials that this 
very alienation can trigger” (p. 845), in search of “the ruses that individuals constantly 
devise	to	free	themselves	from	the	protocols	imposed	upon	them”	(p.	846),	ruses	defined	
as “micro-social activities (walking, reading, cooking) [that] are invisible to forces of 
control” (p. 846). Protocols in practice, or rather routines, make up the bulk of the normal 
forensic ACT working day. Olive, who has been with this team from the start, recalled the 
incident with Mrs. N. when I interviewed her alone some days later.
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I mean, safety is at stake and, yeah, we shouldn’t doubt the fact we’re working 
with a rough crowd and I, uh, I should have drawn the line much earlier, but past 
a certain point you’re already so…I’ve been working for one and a half years now 
with this outpatient group: after having faced so much aggression, getting spat on, 
threatened, that past a certain point it just seems normal. And that has me slightly…
that’s what went through my head, that night, like: I wasn’t even scared. Like, huh? 
How come? (interview I, 26 Oct. 2012)
For Olive, aggressive behavior is not a possibility but a lived reality: the presence of 
violence	has	acquired	the	status	of	normality	to	such	an	extent	that	Olive	did	not	even	
seem to blink when she asked Mrs. N. to hand in her knife. And it only occurred to her 
afterward, at home, that it was not normal what happened nor what she did. On this 
occasion, there is no evidence for ruses or micro-social activities as sources for resistance. 
Instead, Olive seems to come to her senses, to her sense of what is normal behavior, 
when she is already at home in the evening, at a physical distance from her work place 
in	which	she	both	ventures	into	places	unknown	and	dwells	in	the	proximity	of	others.	
As regards to the distinction between the everyday work life in which we dwell and utter 
together (make do, engage in tactics) and the purpose-driven order of goals, projects 
and the written word (strategize and appropriate) that seem to have taken hold of us, de 
Certeau	argued	that	these	two	realms	are	not	located	in	different	moments	and	places.	
On	the	contrary,	the	two	realms,	or	modes,	co-exist.	The	teleological	schemes	of	the	
purpose	driven	order	encroaches	upon	where	we	dwell,	and	‘making	do’	from	where	we	
dwell poaches on the mode of the telos. As Sandywell (2004) similarly argued,
in	 the	wake	of	globalization	and	total	commodification	we	should	ask	 ‘where	 is	
everyday life’? We seem compelled to answer: everywhere and nowhere? Every 
human	science	that	strives	to	resist	objectivism	and	scientism	appeals	to	‘life,’	every	
minimally	reflexive	hermeneutic	study	invokes	‘lived	experience,’	every	critical	theory	
finds	its	ground	in	the	liberation	of	reified	socialities.	(pp.	172–173)
As de Certeau (1984) himself insisted,
[everyday practices] do not form pockets in economic society. They have nothing 
in common with these marginalities that technical organization quickly integrates 
in	order	to	turn	them	into	signifiers	and	objects	of	exchange.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	
through	them	that	an	uncodable	difference	insinuates	itself	into	the	happy	relation	
the system would like to have with the operations it claims to administer. Far from 
being	a	local,	and	thus	classifiable,	revolt,	it	is	a	common	and	silent,	almost	sheep	
like subversion – our own. (p. 200)
De Certeau, motivated to draw out possibilities to act for the weak against the strong, 
traced how senses of time and space are pivotal in how people come to understand what 
their abilities and relations are. De Certeau’s (1984) radical point, moreover, is not to do 
useless things (useless in the eyes of management), but for the oppressed to use the:
rituals, representations, and laws imposed…quite different from what their 
conquerors had in mind; they subverted them not by rejecting or altering them, but 
by using them with respect to ends and references foreign to the system they had 
no choice but to accept. They were other within the system they had no choice but 
to	accept.	(p.	xiiii)
De	Certeau	(1984)	argued	for	an	‘antidiscipline’	from	within	the	everyday	–	not	a	non-
discipline – one that sits on top of a “ubiquity of the place” and on “gaps in time” (p. 
200). With ubiquity of place de Certeau suggested we live in “piling up of heterogeneous 
places.	Each	one,	 like	a	deteriorating	page	of	a	book,	 refers	 to	a	different	mode	of	
territorial	unity,	of	socioeconomic	distribution,	of	political	conflicts	and	of	identifying	
symbolism”	(de	Certeau,	1984,	p.	201),	while	gaps	of	time	refer	to	the	experience	of	a	
“broken and jerky temporality” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 202):
…subjected to “servitudes” and dependencies, theoretical time is in fact a time linked 
to the improbable, to failures, to diversions, and thus displaced by its other…The 
gap or failure of reason is precisely the blind spot that makes it accede to another 
dimension, the dimension of thinking,	which	articulates	itself	on	the	different	as	its	
indeterminable necessity. The symbolic is inseparable from gaps. Everyday practices, 
based on their relation to an occasion, that is, on casual time, are thus, scattered all 
along duration, in the situation of acts of thought. Permanent practices of thought…
Thus	 to	eliminate	 the	unforeseen	or	expel	 it	 from	calculation	as	an	 illegitimate	
accident and an obstacle to rationality is to interdict the possibility of a living 
and “mythical” practice of the city. It is to leave its inhabitants only the scraps of a 
programming produced by the power of the other and altered by the event. Casual 
time is what is narrated in the actual discourse of the city: an indeterminate fable, 
better	articulated	on	the	metaphorical	practices	and	stratified	places	than	on	the	
empire of the evident in functionalist technocracy (de Certeau, 1984, pp. 202–203, 
italics in original).
It is on this pillage of places and in between gaps of time, stories may reveal “the models 
of good or bad ruses that can be used every day. Moves, not truths, are recounted” (de 
Certeau, 1984, p. 23). De Certeau (1984) put much weight on these stories: “The story 
does	not	express	a	practice.	It	does	not	limit	itself	to	telling	about	a	movement.	It	makes 
it”	(p.	81).	In	essence,	stories,	narrativity,	mark	both	our	entry	point	to	our	experience	
of spatiotemporality and allow us to grasp the ambiguity of the discursive threshold 
in	the	everyday	 in	between	the	 ‘functionalist	technocracy’	and	the	 ‘casual	dwelling.’	
Stories move us from the one to the other: “Stories thus carry out a labor that constantly 
transforms places into spaces or spaces into places” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 118), where 
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stability	and	the	“law	of	the	‘proper’	rules	in	the	place,”	whereas	the	space	is	a	“practiced	
place, composed of intersections of mobile elements” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 117).
Between these two determinations, there are passages back and forth, such as the 
putting to death (or putting into a landscape) of heroes who transgress frontiers and 
who,	guilty	of	an	offense	against	the	law	of	the	place,	best	provide	its	restoration	
with their tombs; or again, on the contrary, the awakening of inert objects (a table, a 
forest, a person that plays a certain role in the environment) which, emerging from 
their stability, transform the place where they lay motionless into the foreignness 
of their own space…In the story, the frontier functions as a third element. It is an 
“in-between”…the story privileges a “logic of ambiguity” through its accounts of 
interaction. It “turns” the frontier into a crossing, and the river into a bridge. It 
recounts inversions and displacements. (de Certeau, 1984, pp. 127–128)
In sum, the gest of de Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life lies in his articulation of a 
continuous	vortex	of	two	forces,	that	of	a	grid and of a play, if you will, that encroach and 
poach upon each other, from within an everyday that discloses a space, an antidiscipline, 
for people to make do with those forces and their interaction, primarily through narrativity 
and stories in particular. But concerned as de Certeau is with empowering the weak with 
tactics to resist oppression, he is less concerned with scrutinizing the sense of moral 
responsibility itself. Moreover, our relation to another, and relationality more generally, 
occupy little space in this work. For this, we turn to another French thinker who engaged 
with space and, in particular, time: Emmanuel Levinas.
4.2 Time in touch with the other
In the separated being the door to the outside must hence be at the same time open and closed.
Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas
Next	to	spatial	motifs	we	have	temporal	motifs	to	consider.	Forensic	ACT	is	saturated	by	
measured,	chronological,	time.	A	regular	team	working	day	starts	at	the	office	at	8.45	
a.m. with a planning meeting that last about 40 minutes, followed by inbound outpatient 
contacts until midday, followed by outbound outreach contacts and concluded with desk 
work at the end of the day (though some disperse this desk work otherwise throughout 
the day). To facilitate the planning process, the organization provides the team with a 
number	of	devices	(coming	from	the	Latin	 ‘dividere’: divide, to force apart) that help 
finalizing	a	course	of	action.	For	example,	in	order	to	keep	a	quick	overview,	the	team	
meetings are supported by having the daily planning schedule (another grid) projected 
on a large screen, in which every working hour is accounted for, retrospectively and 
prospectively.	Furthermore,	on	their	office	room	wall	a	whiteboard	is	put	with	the	initials	
of the recipients up for release from the penitentiary in one column, and in another a 
set	of	recipients’	expiration	dates	of	court-ordered	admissions.	Another	example	is	the	
treatment plan, and how it structures the team’s time and the way they talk about it. 
As such, a practitioner’s time is a primary target of managed care. As Ware et al. (2000) 
argued, time “is a key object of management – to be parsed, packaged, and above all, 
limited, in the interest of containing the cost of treatment” (p. 14). MacBride-Stewart 
(2013)	stressed	the	active	role	these	practitioners	themselves	play	in	the	‘rationalization’	
of their work time, describing “their working day in terms of discrete units of time” (p. 
564). Essential to this chronological time is the demarcation of crucial (start and end) 
points,	in	between	which	time	is	quantified.	This	technical	time	prefigures	finalization	as	
an aesthetic ideal rather than a moral duty, as a logical end-game; the proper completion 
of	plans	and	optimization	of	potential	performance,	triage	and	efficiency.	And	things	
turn	sour	 if	one	turns	up	late,	as	did	Mrs.	N.,	Olive	explained	when	I	 interviewed	her	
about the incident.
I saw it happening, yeah. And uh, Mrs. N. was twenty minutes late. Mrs. N. is almost 
always late and, uh…when she entered Tim started immediately, like: “I can’t stay 
long,” but at a very high pitch, you know, like: “I can’t stay long, you’re late AGAIN” 
and, uh…He threatened a lot to stop supervision while we were talking. Uhm…so 
that invoked a lot of stress in Mrs. N. because that would result in her forced return 
to the penitentiary. (interview I, 26 Oct. 2012)
This chronological time, this sequential avoidance of being late, is percolated and distorted 
by how people engage with each other, when the encounter itself starts to obfuscate 
purpose	and	deadline.	Then,	time	loses	its	ordering	flow	and	is	itself	subordinated	to	the	
fizzing	of	interpersonal	action.	Talking	with	the	patient	on	her	couch,	for	example,	there	is	
a	‘timelessness,’	a	dwelling	in	relationality	that	is	prior	to	the	individual	experience	of	the	
passing	of	quantified	time.	In	a	similar	vein,	when	a	patient	is	in	crisis,	the	event	does	not	
allow	regular	planning	and	time	management.	Time	flow	and	time	spent	are	secondary	
outcomes of the movements set in action to manage the crisis. If the crisis takes a minute, 
it takes a minute. If it takes a day, a day. As Brodwin (2011) argued,
When a client’s life starts to spiral out of control, clinicians become painfully aware 
of	the	limits	of	goal	setting,	and	by	extension,	their	own	therapeutic	power.	The	
frustration	appears	 in	the	give	and	take	of	staffroom	discussions,	when	the	stark	
limits of clients’ lives collide with the demands for a narrative of improvement. (p. 198)
The	drama	of	 relationality	disperses	 temporal	 direction,	 and	not	only	 in	 staffroom	
discussions, but in particular when a turbulent event demands it, such as the incident 
under scrutiny. Olive recounted how Tim saw the knife, and what she said in response 
to Mrs. N:
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“I’m not going to help you if you don’t hand over the knife at the entrance security.” 
And then, uh, she got mad […] Tim stayed completely quiet at that point […] Well, 
then Mrs. N. got angry, she was like: “Yeah well this is my knife, I’m not going to 
hand it over, I won’t.” And then I said: “Well, that’s the end of this conversation then, 
I am ending this meeting here and now.” And then she started mumbling all kinds of 
things, and at a certain point, she, like, drew the knife […] She slid it across the table 
in MY direction, after which I backed away on my chair and then the knife fell down 
right there […] I think it did hit my leg […] but it was still folded, luckily. It was really a 
quite	big	knife,	you	know?	[…]	Uh	so	let’s	see,	so	it	fell	on	the	floor.	And	then	I	said:	“I	
am not going to pick it up.” Tim still didn’t say anything. I think he was a bit startled. 
I was completely focused on the patient. (interview I, 26 Oct. 2012)
Olive made a distinction between her own response to Mrs. N.’s action to slide the knife 
and	Tim’s,	deducing	that	although	Tim	himself	started	agitated	and	saw	the	knife	first,	
it was he who became startled by the situation, contrary to Olive. Deadlines evaporate 
when relationality is really at stake. Olive continued.
In hindsight I think, as regards to the way I handled it then, that I wouldn’t have done 
that if it was someone I wasn’t familiar with. But I’ve supported this woman for about 
a year now. And I’ve oftentimes said in the team, like: “with her I feel like I’m raising 
her [like a child]. That you have to tell her everything.” And that’s why I said: “I’m not 
going to pick up that knife. You go and pick it up yourself.” […] So then she did pick 
it up. And she went to the entrance security desk with it, mumbling. That’s when 
Tim apologized to me. He said: “uh sorry, uh…that things turned out this way. But it’s 
just that, uh…she’s late, she comes with this attitude…” So apparently she somehow 
triggered Tim, too. So I said: “It doesn’t matter now, for me the important thing is 
that she’s unarmed when I talk to her again now.” And then uh, I said, yeah, actually, 
I don’t think I did say that we would have to talk it over afterwards. And in hindsight, 
I am thinking: “These are all things I should have talked them over with him, traced it 
backwards. His behavior. How I acted.” And that’s what I missed, afterwards. Because 
I did notice things. I saw how it deteriorated rapidly. But I didn’t, like, stop it there 
and then. So I did feel a shortcoming of my part there […] (interview I, 26 Oct. 2012)
In	hindsight,	Olive	can	reconstruct	a	sequential	plotline	and	find	gaps	in	her	own	course	of	
action.	But	not	during	the	event	in	its	contextuality	of	facing	each	other,	in	its	temporality	
in particular, where chronological foreclosures of planned events stop making sense. It 
is from this purview that OMT scholars such as Byers and Rhodes draw upon the work 
of Levinas to suggest an alternative to principle-based and rules-based approaches 
to organizational ethics. Levinas’s work is but infrequently found in CMS and business 
ethics (e.g., Kaulingfreks & ten Bos, 2007; Parker et al., 2005; Jones, 2003), despite his 
own	description	of	his	work	put	simply:	“It	is	an	original	‘After	you,	sir!’	that	I	have	tried	
to describe” (Levinas & Nemo, 1985, p. 89). As Byers and Rhodes (2007) argued,
Despite the depth and radicality of Levinas’s rethinking of ethics…it is nonetheless 
true that those interested in his ethics are left for themselves to elaborate what 
might be the processes of justice that can be built on the foundation of this ethics of 
responsibility	and	radical	alterity	(Hudson	2003).	Even	less	does	Levinas	explore	the	
implications of his thinking for the just conduct and administration of organizations. 
(p. 239)
It	is	not	the	‘just	conduct	and	administration	of	organizations’	directly	what	we	are	after	
here, but his idea of time and how it relates to responsibility for the other. As Byers and 
Rhodes (2007) insisted,
ethics in organizations can only emerge through an openness to the Other that is not 
pre-determined…the task is not to be ethical, but to manage the tension between 
ethics and justice through organizational practices that reject an eschatological 
foreclosure of the future in the present. (p. 246)
In	short,	Levinas	regarded	time	as	the	experience	of	radical	alterity	 in	the	encounter	
with the Other: “time itself refers to this situation of the face-to-face with the Other” 
(Levinas, 1987/1947, p. 79). Contrary to our idea of time as something outside ourselves 
that happens to us, as either a duration through which we wade, or an ever-moving 
moment that encapsulates us, temporality in Levinas is an emergent phenomenon which 
we	experience	when	we	are	with,	 in	proximity	of,	the	Other,	when	the	‘I’	 is	not	alone	
but in the face of the other. Levinas asked how one can enter in relation with the other 
“without allowing its very self to be crushed by the other” (Levinas, 1987/1947, p. 77), and 
without	being	crushed	by	the	idea	of	one’s	own	mortality.	But	it	is	exactly	both	the	self’s	
own	inability	to	grasp	her	future	finality	and	her	inability	to	be	reduced	to	sameness,	
that	she	faces	up	to	this	event	as	personal	experience,	as	responsibility	for	the	Other.
Relationship with the future, the presence of the future in the present, seems all the 
same accomplished in the face-to-face with the Other. The situation of the face-to-
face would be the very accomplishment of time; the encroachment of the present 
on the future is not the feat of the subject alone, but the intersubjective relationship. 
The Condition of time lies in the relations between humans, or in history. (Levinas, 
1987/1947, p. 79)
In	Levinas’s	work,	we	see	that	temporality	flows	from	the	distance	that	the	self,	“the	
very	pulsation	of	the	‘I’”	(1969/1961,	p.	113),	experiences	in	a	desire	to	approximate	the	
otherness of the Other. This otherness is radical, unattainable:
the radical separation between the same and the other means precisely that it is 
impossible to place oneself outside of the correlation between the same and the 
other so as to record the correspondence or the non-correspondence of this going 
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with this return. Otherwise the same and the other would be reunited under one 
gaze,	and	the	absolute	distance	that	separates	them	filled	in.	(Levinas,	1969/1961,	
p. 36)
The personal, the unicity of the person, is how one enjoys, lives from, this desire, in 
the inability to assimilate the otherness of the other, faced with “no satiety, but an 
uncharted future before me…This revelation of distance is an ambiguous revelation, for 
time both destroys the security of instantaneous happiness, and permits the fragility thus 
discovered to be overcome” (p. 117). In enjoying things, persons do not appropriate and 
organize “into a system” but allow them to “graciously” take hold of us so we can take 
hold of them, lingering in “the air, on the earth, in the street, along the road” (p. 130). 
But against this gracious enjoyment, Levinas (1969/1961), alongside de Certeau, argued 
that we are faced with a dominant mode of thinking and doing in which,
The meaning of individuals (invisible outside of this totality) is derived from the 
totality.	The	unicity	of	each	present	is	incessantly	sacrificed	to	a	future	appealed	to	
bring forth its objective meaning. For the ultimate meaning alone counts; the last 
act alone changes beings into themselves. They are what they will appear to be in 
the already plastic forms of the epic. (p. 22)
This	mode	of	thought	and	action	of	totality	thus	aims	to	exclude	engaging	with	otherness,	
to submit enjoyment into an interiority of a single subject, in which thought ultimately 
does not transcend but remains “closed in itself despite all its adventures – which in the 
last analysis are purely imaginary, or are adventures traversed as by Ulysses: on the way 
home” (Levinas, 1969/1961, p. 27). Withstanding being absorbed by this totality, and 
welcome	alterity,	is	to	have	an	“inexhaustible	surplus	of	attention”	(Levinas,	1969/1961,	p.	
97), opening up an order that goes “beyond the rules of formal logic” (Levinas, 1969/1961, 
p. 104). Being in relation to the other, the non-encompassable, the “elementary gesture 
of the being that refuses totalization” (Levinas, 1969/1961¸ p. 281) is an awareness of the 
distance of time.
Across	 this	 distance	of	 time	 the	definitive	 is	 not	 definitive;	 being,	while	 being,	
is not yet, remains in suspense, and can at each instant commence…Thus true 
temporality,	that	in	which	the	definitive	is	not	definitive,	presupposes	the	possibility	
not of grasping again all that one might have been, but of no longer regretting the 
lost	occasions	before	the	unlimited	infinity	of	the	future…of	escaping	the	crushing	
responsibility	of	existence	that	veers	into	fate,	of	resuming	the	adventure	of	existence	
so	as	to	be	to	the	 infinite.	The	“I”	 is	at	the	same	time	this	engagement	and	this	
disengagement – and in this sense time, drama in several acts. (Levinas, 1969/1961, 
pp. 281–282)
In short, theorizing personal responsibility in organization by means of Levinas’s work 
begins with the idea of the primacy of a dyadic and asymmetrical relation between 
the self and another. An other who is always beyond my ability to know, understand, 
and	categorize	her:	another	who	is	an	infinite	Other	who	(and	whose	actions)	I	cannot	
foresee.	Infinity	here	is	understood	as	“the	idea	of	an	entity	that	exceeds	adequation	in	
a	concept	or	regime	of	signification	–	the	Other	is	non-representable	in	that	it	overflows	
the capacity to think it” (Byers & Rhodes, 2007, p. 241). Levinas and Nemo (1985) himself, 
referring to the work of Dostoevsky, presented the appeal of the Other like this:
You know that sentence in Dostoevsky: “We are all guilty before all and for all men 
before all, and I more than the others.”15 This is not owing to such or such a guilt 
which	is	really	mine,	or	to	offenses	that	I	would	have	committed;	but	because	I	am	
responsible for a total responsibility, which answers for all the others and for all in 
the others, even for their responsibility. The I always has one responsibility more 
than all the others. (pp. 98–99)
The	responsibility	for	all	the	others,	then,	is	infinite,	but,	fortunately,	not	as	in	its	actual	
totality: 
but a responsibility increasing in the measure that it is assumed; duties become 
greater in the measure that they are accomplished. The better I accomplish my duty 
the fewer rights I have; the more I am just, the more guilty I am. (Levinas, 1969/1961, 
p. 244) 
This	relation,	then,	must	always	remain	primary,	also	in	organization,	where	‘I’	submit	
and answer to the demand of the Other face to face, the demand that I cannot escape. 
A	similar	drama	in	several	acts,	Olive	reflected	on	how	the	event	unfolded	within	the	
organizational	context	in	which	it	took	place,	and	starts	reflecting	on	the	routines	of	the	
team, as well. 
Yes, these are some things we haven’t really talked over with the team. You know, like 
when someone carries a weapon inside, that he should be prohibited from entering. 
But in this case she WAS already inside, she was already inside, and we were already 
TALKING […] So, uh…. well, to get back to the story, Tim said to me: “Sorry I was 
irritated.	And	now	I’m	out	of	time,	my	next	appointment’s	up.”	And	that’s	how	Tim	
left,	he	was	late	for	his	next	meeting	[…]	Then	the	patient	returned.	At	that	point	I	
was alone in the room. Mrs. N. told me she had handed over the knife at the front 
15 This sentence is actually not to be found in The Brothers Karamazov:	 the	first	part	stops	at	
“before all.” The last part, “I more than others,” Dostoevsky does elaborate upon in the book 
in	proximity	to	the	first	part,	but	hitherto	not	as	one	full	sentence,	which	is	Levinas’s	own.
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desk. So then I said: “Well, that’s really nice of you.” It’s just that I didn’t have Mrs. N.’s 
file	with	me,	and	her	logon,	so	I	had	to	go	upstairs,	so	that’s	what	I	did…so	I	headed	
upstairs	myself.	I	grabbed	her	file	and	I	briefly	told	my	colleagues	what	happened	
and uh, yeah…At that moment Ed didn’t tell me what he was going to do. So then I…
Well, I did tell him what happened and that the patient had handed over the knife 
and that now I would go downstairs to sit down with her, to search for a place to live 
and that now Mrs. N. appeared to be calm enough again, so I’d give it a go again. 
(interview I, 26 Oct. 2012)
Instead	of	dismissing	Mrs.	N.	and	ending	the	conversation,	Olive	explained	how	she	
kept the engagement going, thanking her kindly for handing over the knife at the front 
desk. The knife was an unwelcome moment in an otherwise welcome encounter between 
persons. Olive’s demand of handing over the knife put the relation between her and Mrs. 
N. on the line, and it was a demand she could not escape. But the demand of Mrs. N. 
toward Olive in maintaining the conversation was not betrayed by Olive, either, in face 
of the organizational prohibition of weapons and the act (intentional or not). The proper 
path according to Levinas, one might say, is to engage in a relation that is “ethical in its 
sacrificial	opening	to	the	Other	who	is	not	yet	another	of	me,	ethical	in	its	subjugation	
not to a law, a duty, or a principle, but to the other person concretely, face to face, in 
‘proximity’”	(Byers	&	Rhodes,	2007,	p.	240).	As	ten	Bos	and	Kaulingfreks	(2002)	suggested,	
when we talk to and look at this other, 
we	may	find	that	the	profound	otherness	of	the	other	calls	for	a	reaction.	I	can	deny	
it. I can incorporate the face within my horizon and rob it of its otherness. But then 
the	relation	ceases	to	exist.	There	is	no	other	anymore	and	hence	there	is	no	me.	My	
responsibility is to keep the relation alive. (p. 306) 
And so Olive gave it a go again. Up close and personal. 
A similarity between the thought of de Certeau (emphasizing space in the everyday) and 
Levinas (emphasizing time in the Other) is the binary construct (grid vs. play, totality 
vs.	 infinity)	and	how	an	ongoing,	unending	in-between	marks	the	human	condition.	
De Certeau sought to develop ways in which the powerless through everyday tactics 
may subvert and rearticulate the dominant mode of forceful appropriation. With both 
modalities poaching and encroaching upon each other, piling up onto each other, 
opportunities for resistance against the grid are ever-present. Yet, with an increasing 
refinement,	resolution,	of	the	grid	it	becomes	more	difficult	to	recognize	these	moments	
and places to do so. In Levinas, we see a similar divide, now between a distant mode 
of being that consummates and totalizes, and a mode of responding to each other, 
face to face. Levinas inquired into preconditions for the ethical and found it in the non-
encompassable alterity, which commands the self to acknowledge, and submit, to it, to 
the	Other.	Time	for	Levinas	is	the	experience	of	approaching	the	infinity	of	the	Other,	
of otherness. The phenomenon of temporality, then, is inherently relational, vis-à-vis 
the	false	temporality	of	the	epic,	of	totality,	of	the	finitude	of	fate.	Set	amidst	between	
these two temporalities, alongside being set in between the playful everyday and the 
functionalist grid, persons move back and forth at the interval, in the gap, at the doorstep, 
producing	and	reproducing	language,	stories	that	offer	pathways	to	cope	with	both	the	
infinite	call	of	the	Other(s)	and	the	inclination	to	reduce	them	to	sameness.	Amid	two	
spatiotemporalities set perpendicularly, at the doorstep, we may come to a sense of 
personal responsibility. But having accompanied de Certeau and Levinas thus far, we part 
ways and set foot with Bakhtin, who elaborated not only similarly upon on this personal 
responsibility construct, but tied the ideas of the modularity of spatiotemporality, of 
the	relational	(re)production	of	language	and	of	the	threshold	between	finitude	and	the	
non-encompassable into a broader (philological) framework of understanding senses 
of responsibility since the literary antiquities. In this purview, we may come to further 
understand the (im)possibilities of this personal responsibility construct as an “adventure 
of everyday life” pervasive to the organizational condition. In his search of responsibility, 
Bakhtin takes us thousands of years back to the peripheries of the Roman empire. And 
there we may encounter in the work of Apuleius a genre that may help us understand 
how the organizational condition as a generic threshold itself produces a rudimentary 
sense of personal responsibility found in organizational practice today. And allows 
us to understand how we are lifted from a larger sense of historical awareness and 
answerability and drawn into a game of individual guilt and blame, and limited chances 
to collectively break away from that predicament. This requires an even bigger loop, if 
you will. 
4.3 Bakhtin’s Golden Ass 
Everything essential is dissolved in dialogue, positioned face to face. The threshold, the door, 
and	the	stairway.	Their	chronotopic	significance.	The	possibility	of	transforming	hell	into	
paradise in a single instant. (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 299)
Bakhtin (1981) argued in his “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel” that 
personal	responsibility	emerges	as	a	literary	concept	for	the	first	time	in	history	in	what	
he	calls	the	genre	of	the	‘adventure	novel	of	everyday	life,’	made	up	almost	exclusively	
by Apuleius’ The Golden Ass (also known as Metamorphoses, and accompanied, to a lesser 
extent,	by	Petronius’	Satyricon). Apuleius, raised at the outskirts of the Roman Empire in 
modern day Algeria, wrote his The Golden Ass in the late second century AD. The satirical 
novel	had	a	profound	impact	on	Western	literature	and	is	also	the	only	work	of	fiction	
from that era to have survived in its entirety to this day. The story revolves around the 
course of the life of Lucius: a man who is, due mostly to his inveterate curiosity, magically 
transformed	into	an	ass.	Set	in	the	first	person,	the	narrator	describes	his	violent	and	
bawdry adventures as a donkey and allows other characters to narrate in-set tales (the 
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largest and most famous of which consists of the love story of Cupid and Psyche). Lucius 
wanders around Thessaly, a region of ancient Greece, where along the road he plunges 
into the often brutal and obscene life of the lower social classes, close to the point of 
death on more than one occasion. Along the numerous episodes of mishap and mischief, 
Lucius is recurrently punished for both being an ass and for acting as one, having others 
scold him like so: “In the name of all the gods, you four-footed piece of depravity, even 
if you could get the loan of a human voice, what kind of complete moron could you have 
convinced that you don’t share the blame for this atrocity?” (Apuleius, 2011, p. 157). In 
the	end,	he	seems	to	find	redemption	and	transformation	back	into	his	human	form,	in	a	
cult	of	priests.	Not	knowing	“with	what	kind	of	discourse	[he]	could	fitly	inaugurate	[his]	
resurrected access to language” (Apuleius, 2011, p. 258), Lucius concludes: “I can now even 
feel a gracious gratitude toward my past as an ass because while his form was my secure 
covert,	I	could	be	drilled	in	many	different	contingencies	and	rendered	well	round,	if	not	
wise” (Apuleius, 2011, p. 195). This last quote indicates the way the protagonist is made 
to	experience	a	sense	of	personal	responsibility:	his	actions	and	the	way	he	experiences	
their	consequences	bear	significance	for	how	events	unfold,	exactly	because	the	way	
time and space is constructed by Apuleius enables the protagonist to be and to do so. 
Concerned with the moral development of the literary protagonist, Bakhtin argued 
that The Golden Ass is a decisive break from earlier types of narrative, because of its 
interplay between two time-space modes, or chronotopes, interwoven in the narrative. 
Bakhtin’s analysis of Apuleius’ The Golden Ass can serve as a looking-glass through 
which organizing and its relationship with senses of personal responsibility might be 
understood as an outcome of a chronotopic interplay, as well. Bakhtin himself in his 
essay on the chronotope mentioned organizations and claimed real-life chronotopes are 
constantly	present	in	them,	providing	the	example	of	the	“real-life	chronotope	of	meeting	
[which] is constantly present in organizations of social and governmental life” (Bakhtin, 
1981, p. 99). OMT scholars such as Boje, Lorino, Pedersen, and Vaara have inquired 
into	the	relevance	of	the	chronotope	in	organization.	Pedersen	(2009)	explored	stories	
of changes in a medical ward and suggested how, through Bakhtin’s chronotopes, we 
might	understand	time	as	narrative	time,	“open	time	yet	to	be	defined	by	storyteller	and	
listener”	(p.	392).	Another	scholar	exploring	the	use	of	the	chronotope	for	organization,	
Lorino	(2010)	saw	several	benefits:	to	overcome	dualist	approaches,	to	exploit	it	in	change	
processes, and to critically assess and question habitual meaning making schemes by 
“identifying	and	making	explicit	the	tacit	chronotopes	of	present	organizing	processes”	
(p. 25). Lorino stressed the notion of an interplay of chronotopes as well, and raises 
the question of moral calibration: “are there common characters or not between both 
chronotopes, are there common, distinct or contradictory purposes and values?” (p. 12). 
Boje (2008) elaborated on the adventure chronotope and discerned it in organizational 
narratives, 
in how people story a business history, or story its strategy: an adventure of 
conquest (our strengths and opportunities overcoming each weakness and threat), 
or	application	of	a	chivalric	code	(McDonald’s	clean,	efficient,	friendly	service),	an	
encounter	with	accident	or	novelty	(Enron’s	off-the-balance-sheet	transactions	come	
undone),	or	the	heroic	CEO’s	biography	of	exploits	(such	as	Bill	Gates,	or	Phil	Knight).	
(p. 23) 
Set	in	the	context	of	health	care,	Fraser	(2006)	explored	this	tension,	suggesting	that	
chronotopes	can	and	do	conflict	which	may	disturb	the	care	practice	itself.	Following	
Burton	(1996)	in	her	analysis	of	the	co-existence	of	chronotopes:	“they	are	always	both	
possible	and	present,	existing	on	the	margins	if	not	contending	for	the	center.	It	is	this	
juxtaposition	and	interrelation,	not	the	typology	of	forms,	that	matters	most”	(p.	48).	
But contra to Burton’s claim, that despite “the importance of the dialogical in his work, 
Bakhtin	does	not	develop	this	provocative	idea	of	a	‘dialogue	of	chronotopes’	explicitly”	
(Burton, 1996, p. 47), it is my contention that Bakhtin does exactly this, in his analysis of the 
‘adventure	novel	of	everyday	life,’	offering	a	literary	‘etiology’	of	personal	responsibility.	
So, although there are several takes on chronotopes and their relation to organization, 
no study as of yet regards the chronotopic interplay of the adventure and the everyday 
as	axiologically	equivalent	to	the	process	of	organizing	itself.	This	requires	a	purview	
on organization, as an ongoing coagulation of organizing processes geared toward 
the teleological and the everyday, a transitional interplay at the generic level between 
the chronotope of the adventure novel of ordeal and the chronotope of the novel of 
everyday life.
Concerning The Golden Ass, Bakhtin argued that the two chronotopes had been 
developed separately, as the chronotope of the adventure novel of the ordeal and the 
chronotope of the everyday life story, but not in conjunction. The chronotope of the 
adventure novel of the ordeal is typical for the literary genre of the Greek romance 
(emerging from the earlier epic): a category of ancient Greek stories that revolve around 
an amorous couple forced apart by some calamity. One of them, the protagonist, must 
endure some strange adventure in which his/her integrity and love for the other is put 
to the test, and ultimately rejoins the other to live happily ever after (as such, the genre 
is	very	popular	still	today,	e.g.,	in	Disney	films).	The	hero	of	the	story	typically	crosses	
some	unknown	land	detached	from	any	specifics	that	could	tie	it	to	an	existing	place	
in	real	life.	Space	as	such	is	an	abstract	realm	in	service	of	the	extraordinary	adventure	
that takes place. And like space, even more so, time in the adventure is abstract. It is 
“taken out of history and biography” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 15), as if it were not there at all, 
except	for	two	points	in	time:	calamity	and	rejoice.	The	time	in	between	these	two	points	
traces essentially only one step: “a test of the heroes’ integrity” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 106). 
The	flow	of	time	(and	connection	to	space)	is	a	technical	sequence	that	divides	that	step	
into moments, consisting “of the most immediate units-moments, hours, days-snatched 
at random from the temporal process. Typical temporal descriptions in this kind of novel 
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are:	 ‘at	the	same	moment,’	and	‘the	next	moment’”	(Bakhtin,	1986,	p.	11).	As	Keunen	
argued, “like Bergson, Bakhtin associates the generic chronotope of the adventure with 
mathematical	rationality.	Adventure	time	is	characterized	by	an	‘elementary	clear,	formal,	
almost mathematical character’” (Keunen, 2010, p. 47; see also Linstead & Mullarkey, 2003, 
for Bergson in organization studies).
Bakhtin’s portrayal of the chronotope of everyday life in “Forms of Time and of the 
Chronotope in the Novel,” and elsewhere, is less clear-cut than that of the adventure 
novel	of	the	ordeal.	This	chronotope	may	occur	in	different	kinds	of	stories,	such	as	a	
novel of everyday life, a social-psychological novel, a family or biographical novel. The 
chronotope provides these types of stories with common motifs and themes, such as 
extensive	descriptions	of	everyday	scenes	and	an	emphasis	on	the	mundane	and	prosaic,	
instead	of	the	heroic	and	the	public.	Time	here	is	‘lived	time,’	in	which	one	dwells,	set	in	
a place that unfolds through the description of prosaic detail, the space of the common 
life	with	all	its	small	differences	and	conflicts.	Here,	Lucius	descends,	where	he	
must play the most humiliating role in that setting, not even the role of a slave, but of 
an ass. As an ass, a beast of the burden, he descends to the very depths of common 
life, life among muleteers, hauling a millstone for the miller, serving a gardener, a 
soldier, a cook, a baker. (p. 121) 
As Bakhtin (1981) argued, the everyday world in Apuleius is like a “maelstrom of personal 
life…chopped	up	into	separate	segments…[which	serve]	Lucius	as	experience,	revealing	
to him human nature…itself static…it does reveal social heterogeneity” (pp. 128–129). 
This everyday marks an: 
exclusively	 personal	 and	 private	 life…All	 its	 events	 are	 the	 personal	 affairs	 of	
isolated people…By its very nature this private life does not create a place for the 
contemplating	man,	for	that	‘third	person’	who	might	be	in	a	position	to	meditate	
on this life, to judge and evaluate it. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 122) 
Day in, day out the same round of activities are repeated, the same topics of 
conversation, the same words and so forth. In this type of time people eat, drink, 
sleep,	have	wives,	mistresses	(casual	affairs),	involve	themselves	in	petty	intrigues,	
sit	in	their	shops	or	offices,	play	cards,	gossip.…The	markers	of	this	time	are	simple,	
crude,	material,	 fused	with	everyday	details	of	specific	 locales,	with	quaint	 little	
houses,	with	the	sleepy	streets,	the	dust	and	the	flies,	the	club,	the	billiards	and	so	
on and so on. Time here is without event and therefore almost seems to stand still. 
Here there are no “meetings,” no “partings.” It is a vicious and sticky time that drags 
itself slowly through space. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 248) 
What is peculiar, and pivotal, about both the chronotope of the adventure novel of ordeal 
and that of the everyday life, is that the protagonist in each chronotope separately does 
not	bear	‘plot-bearing	significance,’	and	no	responsibility,	albeit	for	different	reasons.	
In the adventure tale the hero is fully determined by the ordeal that she is destined to 
overcome,	without	actually	experiencing	a	change,	or	making	one.	As	in	the	prior	epic	
genre,	there	is	a	wholesome	‘alibi	for	being’:	the	high	and	mighty	role	laid	out	at	the	end	
of the aforementioned test of character of this accidental hero. Contrary to the epic, the 
personality	of	the	protagonist	is	touched	upon,	but	there	is	no	real	conflict	of	values	that	
is a concern for her. In the novel of everyday life on the other hand, nothing is accidental. 
The life of the protagonist amounts to all what ties him to his environment and the others 
in it. The ties that bind are both his environment and himself. Individuality is no more, or 
less,	than	the	relationality	of	which	the	protagonist	is	an	inextricable	part.	The	image	of	
the	protagonist	is	embedded	in	relationships,	to	such	an	extent,	that:	
the modes for plotting the story link one character to another not as one person to 
another but as father to son, husband to wife, rival to rival…The hero is assigned to a 
plot as someone fully embodied and strictly localized in life, as someone dressed in 
the concrete and impenetrable garb of his class or social station, his family position, 
his age, his life and biographical goals. His humanness	 is	to	such	an	extent	made	
concrete	and	specific	by	his	place	in	life	that	it	is	in	itself	denied	any	decisive	influence	
on plot relationships. (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 104) 
In the adventure tale the plot of the story is “like clothing draped over the hero which he 
can change as often as he pleases” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 104), where an unparticular and 
unbound	figure	is	made	the	protagonist.	In	a	novel	of	everyday	life,	the	plot	is	embedded	
in relationality and particularity: These make up for the characters “body and their soul” 
(Bakhtin,	1984b,	p.	104).	Bakhtin	explains	that	in	the	epoch	leading	up	to	Apuleius’	writing,	
external	positions	that	one	may	have	in	the	world	were	devaluated	into	mere	roles	in	
the theater of life, “leading to the destruction of the epic and tragic wholeness of a man 
and his fate” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 119). Man lost his predetermined (epic) fate, but it was 
only	substituted	by	mere	roles,	both	still	‘alibis	for	being.’	And	then	Apuleius	enters	the	
stage, venturing to combine both genres into a single narrative. And it is here that the 
protagonist ceases to coincide with herself. According to Bakhtin, in The Golden Ass the 
chronotope of the adventure novel of ordeal and the chronotope of the everyday life 
interchange,	inextricably.	The	combination	of	these	contradictions	interlock	in	what	he	
called the chronotope of the adventure novel of everyday life, constituting a radical break 
from prior narratives.	The	epic	character,	where	the	image	of	man	was	one	of	“exclusive	
beauty, wholeness, crystal clarity and artistic completeness” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 35), was 
abandoned by Apuleius. As Bakhtin (1981) continued, 
The destruction of the epic distance and the transferal of the image of an individual 
from the distanced plane to the zone of contact with the inconclusive events of the 
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present (and consequently of the future) result in a radical re-structuring of the image 
of the individual in the novel – and consequently in all literature. (p. 35) 
Apuleius introduced two key elements in the portrayal of the protagonist here: a 
wandering through space and a metamorphosis through time. The protagonist is a 
hero on a winding road (a motif chronotope), traveling alongside the spatial and social 
diversity of the everyday world (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 10). Dwelling along the edge of a telos 
between A and B, he looks to “attach himself to life’s plot” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 101) and 
finds	himself	recurrently	at	crossroads	(another	motif).
An	intersection	always	signifies	some	turning	point	in	the	life	[and]	an	individual’s	
movement through space, his pilgrimages, lose that abstract and technical character 
that they had in the Greek romance…Space becomes more concrete and saturated 
with	a	time	that	 is	more	substantial:	space	is	filled	with	real,	 living	meaning,	and	
forms a crucial relationship with the hero and his fate…the concreteness of this 
chronotope of the road permits everyday life to be realized within it. But this life is, 
so to speak, spread out along the edge of the road itself, and along the sideroads. 
The main protagonist and the major turning points of his life are to be found outside 
everyday life. He merely observes this life, meddles in it now and then as an alien 
force. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 121)
In	the	adventure	novel	of	everyday	 life,	space	 is	made	more	tangible,	offering	more	
detailed descriptions of places of common life, although the world as a whole retains its 
abstract spatial character, connected only through a winding road in a land otherwise 
unknown. Moreover, the everyday life in The Golden Ass is presented as the lower stratum 
of real life, illustrating aspects such as thievery and beatings. Throughout his wanderings 
as	an	ass,	Lucius	ends	up	in	places	where	he	himself	suffers	the	dire	consequences	of	
his own misfortunate mistakes, only to wind up in similar mishap, unable to resist the 
seductions that come his way. Everyday life is looked down upon, as something that the 
protagonist tries to move beyond, and can never really be part of: 
It is always the case that the hero cannot, by his very nature, be a part of everyday 
life; he passes through such life as would a man from another world…everyday life is 
that…with which he will never internally fuse himself. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 121) 
Crucially, the chronotopic motif of the road itself functions as a passage between both 
the requirements of the larger journey versus the minor dwellings, and of the larger 
path	in	life	versus	its	critical	incidents,	the	crux	being	how	the	protagonist	is	positioned	
amidst these contrasts and is made to respond to his in-betweenness by the attempts 
to elevate himself out of it. 
By	creating	the	figure	of	a	donkey,	Apuleius	produced	a	narrative	 intermediation	of	
the tension between the public and private portrayal, as the protagonist is enabled to 
eavesdrop and disclose the privacy of the commoners and mischiefs he can get close to 
without notice. But more importantly, Apuleius also generates quite literally character 
transformation in time. Critical events occur that cannot be reversed in time like in the 
previous genres. In the new chronotope of the adventure novel of everyday life, Bakhtin 
insists	that	a	mere	“mechanical	mix	of	these	two	different	times	is	out	of	the	question.	
Both adventure- and everyday time change their essential forms in this combination, 
as they are subject to the conditions of the completely new chronotope created by this 
novel” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 111). As Allan (1994) suggested, 
It is through a close reading of the temporal and spatial features of The Golden 
Ass	that	Bakhtin	discerns	how	adventure	time	“mixes”	with	everyday	time,	not	in	a	
mechanical fashion, but rather in such a way that both forms of time are compelled 
to change their elementary forms. (pp. 203–204) 
What is rendered is an everyday time “chopped up into segments,” and “arranged, as it 
were,	perpendicular	to	the	pivotal	axis	of	the	novel”	(Bakhtin,	1981,	p.	128).	The	new	form	
of time Bakhtin (1981) described is a timeline with knots in it, with each knot representing 
a key moment in the life of a transforming protagonist: 
We	are	offered	various	sharply	differing	images	of	the	one	and	the	same	individual,	
images that are united in him as various epochs and stages in the course of his life. 
There is no evolution in the strict sense of the word; what we get, rather, is crisis and 
rebirth.…Apuleius presents three images of Lucius: Lucius before his transformation 
into	 an	 ass,	 Lucius	 the	Ass	 and	 Lucius	mysteriously	 purified	 and	 renewed…The	
everyday	life	is	depicted	only	in	exceptional	fragments,	shaping	the	definitive	image	
of man, his essence, as well as the nature of his entire subsequent life. (pp. 115–116) 
The	earlier	epic	protagonist	was	a	figure	whose	image	was	made	up	of	an	outside	surface	
only:	a	public	and	unitary	hero,	without	inner	experience	or	development.	Then	in	the	
world of the genre of the Greek romance, the glimpse of another, inner, image of man 
is added, creating a tension between narrating the private and the public image of 
man.	This	tension	between	the	internal	and	external	man	resulted	in	Apuleius’	time	in	
the	idea	that	“the	subjectivity	of	the	individual	becomes	an	object	of	experimentation	
and representation” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 57). The private becomes public through pivotal 
moments	like	public	addresses	and	criminal	courts:	“events	acquire	a	public	significance	
as such only when they become crimes. The criminal act is a moment of private life 
that becomes, as it were, involuntarily public” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 122). In the time of 
Apuleius, the image of man was already one of contradiction, having both a “public and 
rhetorical side of the individual, which is responsible for his unity and which he bears with 
him throughout his adventures” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 110) and a private side with an inner 
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experience.	The	innovation	of	Apuleius	was	to	generate	a	tale	where	the	protagonist	
explicitly	responds	from	within	to	the	call	of	becoming	the	complete	hero	from	without:	
“his	guilt,	retribution,	purification	and	blessedness	are	private	and	individual:	 it	 is	the	
personal business of a discrete, particular individual” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 119). The private is 
made visible in narrating its place in public events that ultimately transform the individual 
of the protagonist: “the public and rhetorical unity of the human image is to be found in 
the contradiction between it and its purely private content” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 119). In the 
spasmodical sequence and wandering through key events, the human image is individual, 
but unlike the Greek romance, the life course is not shaped by an accidental ordeal. 
As	Allan	(1994)	explained,	“Lucius,	unlike	the	characters	from	earlier	Greek	romances,	
experiences	 time	and	space	 in	a	more	 ‘realistic’	manner:	 there	 is	 the	appearance of 
personal development” (p. 204). The protagonist is made responsible, as he “attracts the 
power of chance to himself. The initial link of the adventure sequence is thus determined 
not by chance, but by himself and by the nature of his personality” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 
116). It is the combination of the two chronotopes, then, that enable a tale of guilt and 
transformation: 
What is emphasized here is Lucius’ individual guilt.…Thus the entire adventure 
sequence must be interpreted as punishment and redemption…what we have 
is guilt, moral weakness, error (and in its Christian hagiographic variant, sin) as 
initiating forces…The adventure sequence, governed as it is by chance, is here utterly 
subordinated to the other sequence that encompasses and interprets it: guilt → 
punishment → redemption → blessedness…It is an active sequence, determining 
(as	the	first	priority)	the	very	metamorphosis	itself,	that	is,	the	shifting	appearance	
of the hero. (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 116–118) 
This guilt is inevitably human; not mechanical or depersonalized. As Bakhtin intimated: 
“Guilt is a function of individual personality itself…This entire sequence is grounded in 
individual responsibility” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 119, italics in original). In the narrative of The 
Golden Ass, then, not only individuality but a sense of personal responsibility emerges, 
which Bakhtin views, not only as an essential contribution to the historical development 
of the novel, but moreover, an essential contribution to the moral inquiry into the human 
condition.	As	Burton	(1996)	argued,	“For	Bakhtin,	narrative	offers	the	richest	ground	for	
exploring	the	nature	of	both	the	chronotopic	unconscious	and	the	human	experience	
of temporality” (p. 50). So instead of seeing time as something given out there, as some 
primordial essence outside the realm of human understanding, in Bakhtin’s analysis of the 
novel, time and space are subject to the words that indicate them, whilst those indicators 
together shape a whole where “all the novel’s abstract elements – philosophical and social 
generalizations,	ideas,	analyses	of	cause	and	effect	–	gravitate	toward	the	chronotope	
and	through	it	take	on	flesh	and	blood,	permitting	the	imaging	power	of	art	to	do	its	
work” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 250). As such, chronotopes are the “organizing centers for the 
fundamental narrative events of the novel. The chronotope is the place where the knots 
of	narrative	are	tied	and	untied”	(Bakhtin,	1981,	p.	250).	More	specifically,	each	and	every	
word for Bakhtin is a word in dialogue, and as such:
Each	word	enters	 into	a	“comp1ex	play	of	 light	and	shadow”	where,	he	suggests,	
it	 ‘cannot	fail	to	brush	up	against	thousands	of	 living	dialogic	threads,	woven	by	
socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot 
fail to become an active participant in social dialogue’ (1935/1981: 276). This “dialogic 
imperative” of a word, that is, this constant struggle over its evaluative meaning, is 
always carried out in relation to a distinct set of temporal and spatial dynamics. To 
state	that	all	discourse	is,	by	definition,	dialogic	is	to	highlight	the	ways	in	which	all	
words	are	shown	to	be	riddled	with	the	fluid	contradictions	of	contending	definitions	
of its real or proper meaning. (Allan, 1994, p. 197)
As Bemong et al. (2010) argued in their volume on Bakhtin’s chronotopes, the chronotope 
as	a	concept	works	on	different	levels,	and	without	this	insight	one	might	lose	track	of	
how	the	chronotope	shapes	narrative.	Vaara	and	Pedersen	(2013)	for	example,	in	their	
study	on	the	stories	in	a	medical	ward,	conflated	chronotopic	motifs (spatial-temporal 
indicators such as the road and the encounter) and generic chronotopes (world views 
as generic, such as the adventure novel of ordeal and the idyllic chronotope). It is the 
dynamic interplay at the generic level that has been the focus here. Concerned with 
deploying Bakhtin’s work on the chronotope toward “human action in a profoundly 
ethical fashion,” Bemong et al (2010, p. IV) emphasized that “enquiry into the connections 
between chronotopes and action is probably one of the most promising lines of future 
research” (p. IV). In his study inside the same volume, Morson (2010) constructed a similar 
argument, claiming that Bakhtin’s interest in temporality was not (merely) literary and 
stressing that “his primary concerns were ethical. Bakhtin shaped his major concepts so 
as	to	show	why	moral	responsibility	in	a	strong	sense	exists”	(p.	97).	But	Morson	does	not	
provide an analysis of the pages on the adventure novel of everyday life, even though it is 
here	where	Bakhtin	most	explicitly	writes	about	the	connections	between	internal	generic	
chronotopic interplay and the matter of responsibility. Instead, Morson articulated a 
chronotope	 of	 ‘humanness,’	 highlighting	 open-endedness	 and	 unfinalizability,	 and	
foregoing the interplay of the in-between as such. But if anything, Bakhtin’s thought 
always was on the threshold, and to pass by the generic chronotopic interplay is to pass 
by Bakhtin’s idea of how personal responsibility in a strong sense might have emerged. 
It is remarkable that in this volume dedicated to the chronotope and the ethical, both 
an analysis on Bakhtin’s pages on how this responsibility comes about in the adventure 
novel of everyday life and Apuleius’ The Golden Ass itself are absent. But for now, time 
to reconnect with Olive, Ed and Mrs. N. 
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4.4 Problems of personal responsibility
Olive’s	story	was	interrupted	at	the	point	where	she	said	she	would	‘give	it	a	go	again.’	
While leaving Mrs. N. for a moment alone in the consultation room, she told her 
colleagues,	 including	Ed,	 in	their	staffroom	upstairs,	what	happened	briefly.	She	then	
continued. 
So	then	I	went	downstairs.	I	first	passed	by	the	security	desk	to	check	whether	the	
knife was actually in their possession. Mrs. N. had handed it over there, like she said. 
So then I continued the conversation with her. And actually the conversation from 
that	point	onward	went	fine.	You	wouldn’t	have	noticed	that	before,	things	got	ugly.	
She	was	quite	relaxed.	We	were	having	fun.	She	made	some	instant	soup	for	me.	
Really!	She	made	soup,	for	both	of	us.	And	she	was	cooperating	just	fine.	Yes,	it	was	
quite pleasant, actually. Yeah. […] It’s just that we do not accept that people carry 
weapons	inside.	That’s	the	end	of	the	line.	If	you	carry	a	weapon	again	the	next	time,	
no one will even come down to see you. But in that conversation it didn’t come up 
again […] Uhm, so somewhere midway in our talk, Ed entered the room. The patient 
was busy talking on the phone at that moment. Ed told me: “when the patient leaves, 
come and get me, because I’ve got a letter ready for her,” and he wanted to give 
it	himself.	I	said,	“OK	that’s	fine”	[…]	When	we	finished	the	conversation	I	told	the	
patient: “Ed was just here, and he would like to speak with you for a moment, he’s got 
a letter concerning the weapon that you carried inside here before”…So instantly, I 
saw her demeanor changing, you see all of these changes directly…Well she, uh, she 
didn’t like it at all, but she was also like, alright, just give me the letter. And at that 
point I think […] at that point things went wrong AGAIN. (interview I, 26 Oct. 2012) 
With both Tim and the knife now out of view, the atmosphere improved immediately, 
according to Olive, who was quite surprised by the warm gesture of the instant soup 
that	Mrs.	N.	made	for	her.	In	contrast,	the	next	object	coming	into	play	was	the	official	
warning letter which Ed had been drafting in the meantime. 
So I went upstairs to get Ed, but he wasn’t there. He had told the others to tell me I 
would have to give that letter. But THAT is not what I had told the patient. I told her: 
“Ed wants to speak with you and he will give you the letter.” With this lady you need 
to be very consistent. What you say is what you do. That’s important for a lot of our 
patients, you know, they’re very sensitive like that. So, then, I went downstairs again, 
with the letter. And uh…I could see she was all over the place. When she saw me 
coming downstairs with the letter myself, she was like: “No, he was going to give it 
to me, not you!”…She couldn’t make sense of that. Ed was close by somewhere, but 
busy with something else, and uh…I don’t know, then we were outside the building. 
And I was outside and the patient as well. And then she really got mad, I got the 
feeling she got so angry because I gave her the letter and not Ed […] The security 
guard was outside with me the whole time. So then I started reading the letter out 
loud. Not the whole letter, just the most important details that I mentioned, like: 
“you	showed	up	today	carrying	a	knife,	next	time	you	do	that	you’ll	get	a	restraining	
order.” That was in the letter. So uh…I gave it to her and she tore it up. Right after Ed 
joined us outside, because you know, Mrs. N. was really yelling, losing her temper 
completely	[…]	Nobody	could	even	interrupt	her,	and	then	she	drove	off	[…]	That’s	
how it happened […] I think I had another appointment right after […] Yes, yes it’s 
only when I was back home, when the whole event kept on spinning in my head. And 
yeah, I actually did not like how it went and how Tim responded and uh…Well, at a 
certain point it, like turned out OK, but you want to know how things should have 
gone better, you know, for me too […] It actually did have quite an impact on me. It 
just kept running through my head. Normally, when I leave here at 5 [p.m.] I leave 
those troubles behind. But when I keep on thinking about it, that’s when I know it 
got to me. (interview I, 26 Oct. 2012) 
In summary, Olive recounted her story about Mrs. N. carrying a pocket knife into the 
consultation	room	with	the	parole	officer,	Tim,	present.	Tim	was	pressed	to	leave	shortly	
after, while Mrs. N. was told by Olive to hand in the knife and did so. Olive continued to 
talk with Mrs. N. but had to go upstairs to get a login, during which she told Ed what had 
happened.	Olive	returned	to	find	Mrs.	N.	having	made	soup	for	her	and	the	two	of	them	
continued in a pleasant atmosphere. Then, while Mrs. N. was answering a phone call, Ed 
came	in	to	tell	Olive	to	inform	Mrs.	N.	that	he	would	hand	her	an	official	warning,	which	
he did not as he was absent when Olive tried to get him, and instead Olive tried to give 
her the letter while Mrs. N. was already leaving upset, again. At that time, I had little idea 
how – or even if – I could use these accounts, and for what purpose other than displaying 
a daily-yet-not-so-daily event of this team at work. More than anything, what puzzled 
me in the accounts of Olive and Ed was how the mood of the story (and Mrs. N.) changed 
so	dramatically,	from	very	tense	(knife),	to	very	relaxed	(instant	soup),	to	the	very	tense	
again abruptly (the letter). Like in most narratives, their accounts were permeated with 
motifs	of	space	and	time.	In	the	above,	we	find	terms	such	as	‘at	the	front	desk,’	‘inside,’	
‘outside,’	‘the	street,’	‘in	the	consultation	room,’	‘upstairs,’	and	‘at	a	certain	moment,’	‘for	
quite	a	while,’	‘toward	the	end,’	‘immediately,’	‘never,’	and	‘twenty	minutes	late.’	But	more	
than window-dressing, these spatiotemporal motifs may also provide us with a sense 
of	what	is	emphasized	and	what	backgrounded	contextually	by	the	storytellers,	giving	
color to the unfolding drama. In the conundrum of Olive, Ed and Mrs. N., a conjunction 
of chronotopic motifs form one indication that we are dealing with the chronotope of 
the adventure novel of everyday life. There are motifs of the adventure tale: the knife, 
for	example,	is	an	adventure	motif,	and	so	is	the	chronological	recounting	(at	that	point,	
right after, etc.) of the event. Another key element was the letter of notice, stating the 
rules,	and	how	Mrs.	N.	did	not	comply	and	how	she	might	be	excluded	as	a	consequence.	
And in the team meeting afterward, Olive’s courage during the event is heralded. On 
the	other	hand,	the	event	is	told	in	mundane	detail.	For	example,	Olive	and	Mrs.	N.	had	
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a nice time together, sharing instant soup. And Olive compared supporting Mrs. N. with 
raising a child, invoking a discourse of relationality. 
Both de Certeau and Levinas have suggested that opposed to the wrongs of a totality or 
a grid (the chronotope of the adventure), there is/should be a modality of the up-close-
and-personal, the playful, the antidisciplinary, the non-teleologic (the chronotope of the 
everyday). Of course, Bakhtin applied similar binary divisions as well, and there are more 
similarities in particular with Levinas, as Erdinast-Vulcan (2008) suggested: “…philosophers 
of	exile.	Writing	on	the	ruins	of	a	civilization,	they	share	both	the	sensibilities	of	survivors	
in	a	world”	(p.	43).	But	for	Levinas	the	face	(the	infinity	in	the	face	of	the	Other)	is	the	
primordial (and a primordial demand upon the self), whereas for Bakhtin we could say the 
unfinalizable	itself	might	be	a	first	assumption.	Bakhtin	does	not	draw	a	priori/posteriori	
line,	or	speak	about	the	‘primordial,’	a	critique	that	other	scholars	such	as	Derrida	have	
attested to Levinas’s thought. As Erdinast-Vulcan (2008) argued: “Levinas retains, in fact, 
the metaphysical absoluteness of the unconditional, unreciprocal subjection to the Other. 
His	perception	of	the	ethical	subject	remains	entirely	within	the	realm	of	the	‘said,’	a	
categorical imperative which is absolute, binding, and non-negotiable” (p. 54). Bakhtin 
would	set	 the	 ‘face’	 into	 the	chronotope	of	 the	everyday,	emphasizing	the	tangible	
relationality	of	family,	friends	and	foes	instead	of	drawing	the	significance	of	the	face	
into	the	anonymous	and	indeterminate,	into	the	chronotope	of	the	adventure	in	effect.	
Either	way,	the	absolute	demand	of	the	Other	as	encountered	in	the	infinity	of	the	face	
leaves	little	‘plot-bearing	significance’	for	anybody.	For	the	eloquent	effort	that	Byers	
and Rhodes (2007) put into drawing the consequences from the heart of Levinas’s work, 
in their search for a possibility for the idea of justice in organization, they have run into 
this same basic problem. Returning to the dichotomy, Bakhtin elaborated on a discursive 
modality of the threshold, between the two chronotopes of the adventure and of the 
everyday, and exactly on this threshold a sense of personal responsibility emerges and not 
in	opposition	to	the	totality	and	the	grid.	Opposed	to	the	idea	of	a	‘true’	responsibility	
enabled	by	the	relation	with	the	infinite	of	a	pre-existing	Other,	Bakhtin	offered	us	a	
conception	of	personal	responsibility	that	is	limited,	flawed,	very	much	 incomplete, in 
which a self and its capacity to (morally) act is constituted through the chronotopic 
underpinnings	of	 the	discursive	relationships	 it	finds	 itself	 in.	And	 in	organization,	 I	
suggest,	we	are	witness	of	exactly	the	generic	 interplay	between	the	chronotopes	of	
the	adventure	and	of	the	everyday,	creating	a	context	such	as	in	The Golden Ass, with a 
similarly limited conception of responsibility, a scattered everyday life which is devaluated 
and	“systematically	denigrated	 in	 the	very	act	of	being	theorized	as	 ‘everyday	 life’”	
(Sandywell, 2004, p. 161), an appearance of personal development, and an a-historicity 
in which the protagonist never really connects with the social reality of the world. As 
Sandywell	(2004)	insisted,	it	marks	a	“millennial-long	denigration	of	ordinary	experience	
(‘the	devaluation	of	the	most	valuable’)…everydayness	 is	manifestly	a	product	of	the	
rhetorics of modernity constructed upon the denigratory dualisms of élite world-views 
that can be traced back to classical antiquity” (p. 175). 
Taken	not	directly	from	the	dialogue	excerpts,	I	have	already	made	the	case	that	the	work	
life of the forensic ACT team is set in between the two spatialities (the indeterminate 
anywhere and the closely connected), where the practitioner meanders along the realm 
of the lower social stratum. The practitioner is never really an inside member of that 
realm, but only touches upon it alongside its edges, just as she remains an outsider to 
the electronic interfaces imposed upon her. Travelling along these edges, the practitioner 
ventures	on	a	winding	road,	a	road	which	is	discursively	constructed	as	such,	with	‘spots	
at	the	horizon’	to	strive	toward,	situated	in	‘care	pathways’	aimed	at	further	delineating	
and optimizing the physical whereabouts of the worker. And for a substantial part of 
the working day, the outreaching practitioner is indeed on the road, on her way to 
see	patients	and	co-workers,	 in	an	effort	to	fulfill	 treatment	plan	goals	as	they	were	
mapped	out	in	earlier	moments	of	time	in	the	electronic	patient	file.	As	such,	there	is	a	
crisscrossing of the goal-directed and abstract with the close and tangible. In other words, 
the spatial character of forensic ACT is a threshold between the goal-oriented and the 
prosaic relational, creating a meandering in-between for workers, always on the move. 
Similar to the two spatial modes, everyday time is set perpendicular to chronological time. 
At the in-between, time becomes knotted, with the practitioner jumping from one prosaic 
episode	in	the	 life	of	his	patients	to	the	next,	yet	strung	together	by	the	prescribed	
linear course of a treatment plan. Practicing forensic ACT, then, is a continuous jolting 
between	the	exigencies	of	managed	time	and	the	relational	contingencies	of	everyday	
time. Seen in conjunction, the intertwining of these temporal modalities indicates a 
chronotope of the adventure novel of everyday life. Combined with the spatial modality 
of the meandering road, forensic ACT organizing operates as a double (time-space) in-
betweenness for its protagonists. And it is this type of in-betweenness that may evoke 
a sense of personal responsibility, like in The Golden Ass. In the conundrum of Olive, Ed 
and Mrs. N., we see a wandering through spaces, where critical moments are recounted. 
Tensions arise, between the abstract rule of prohibiting weapons but the palpable event 
in which the patient was already inside. And between the promise of handing over 
a formal letter of notice (future oriented, role-driven) vis-à-vis failing to uphold that 
promise (immediate, personal). At the turning points when a shift is made from one 
chronotope to the other, there is a concurrent shift in discourse. When the adventure 
chronotope halts, Tim falls silent and leaves. Prosaics take over; the atmosphere becomes 
more pleasant and intimate. Mrs. N. makes a gesture with the soup which is warmly 
welcomed by Olive. Then the adventure chronotope returns when Ed enters the scene. 
Mrs. N. is made answerable and becomes infuriated, especially when Olive fails to do 
what she said she would do, earlier. And then there’s a sense of guilt on the part of Olive. 
She feels she should have acted earlier and that she should have discussed it properly 
with Tim afterward. Personal responsibility emerges: I made an error, he was not being 
consistent, you promised me. Shifting between the chronotopes of everyday life and 
the adventure of the ordeal, the practitioner is never fully part of either and ceases as a 
person	to	coincide	with	the	expected	roles	in	both	tales.	In	the	adventure	tale	there	is	
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no	plot-bearing	significance	for	the	protagonists	because	there	the	plot	and	its	rules	are	
already	established,	finalized.	In	the	everyday	life	tale	relationality	dictates	the	plot	and	
the movements of its characters. But setting their chronotopes perpendicularly, a sense 
of personal responsibility is what emerges in the narration of organizing. Set in the in-
betweenness that is forensic ACT organizing, practitioners cannot be fully incorporated 
by	the	relationality	of	the	everyday,	nor	can	they	have	an	 ‘alibi	 for	being’	through	a	
complete immersion in the telos of its adventure tale. 
In a study on the relation between time and ethics in the practice of social work, and 
followed up by Juhila et al. (2014), Fahlgren (2009) pointed at this ambivalence at work 
that is the outcome of a similar in-between. Fahlgren (2009), acknowledging the inevitable 
ambivalence	of	the	social	work	praxis,	stressed	that:	
social work has to operate both within the discourse of linear development, which 
awards it political and social legitimacy, and within the discourse of the time of 
the mindful body. The latter supports a subjectively adapted and non-linear form 
of assistance...It is not a question of either/or, but of both together. There are 
contradictions and they must be dealt with as ethical dilemmas. (p. 226) 
My	point	is	that	this	is	exactly	the	‘problem’:	this	in-betweenness	engenders	the	ethical	
dilemma as a matter of personal responsibility for the practitioners involved. The problem 
on top of that, is that these ethical dilemmas are thus restricted to the up-close-and-
personal,	and	do	not	transcend	the	specific	context	of	the	event	in	question.	
Bakhtin depicted the construct of personal responsibility through metamorphosis in 
The Golden Ass as a-historical, which “leaves the world itself unchanged” (Bakhtin, 1981, 
p.	119).	As	Allan	 (1994)	added,	citing	Bakhtin,	 “The	 logics	of	 the	 ‘adventure-time	of	
everyday	life’	dictate	that	the	novel’s	temporal	sequence	is	‘a	closed	circuit,	isolated,	not	
localised in historical time’ (1938/1981: 120)” (p. 204). The adventure novel of everyday 
life, while portraying some social heterogeneity, fails to let these social contradictions 
surface. Only when these surfaced would “the world start to move, it would be shoved 
into the future, time would receive a fullness and historicity. But this process was not 
brought to completion in ancient times, and certainly not with Apuleius” (Bakhtin, 
1981, p. 129). Metamorphosis, then, is ( just) a vehicle for portraying an individual, not a 
social,	becoming:	“a	fate	cut	off	from	both	the	cosmic	and	the	historical	whole”	(Bakhtin,	
1981, p. 114). Therefore, as described by Bakhtin, the ethics of personal responsibility 
is an old, rudimentary construct of what responsibility might entail, outmoded in the 
subsequent development of the literary novel, novels that did bring out, amongst 
others,	the	 intricacies	of	a	historical	and	societal	context	to	set	 its	 ‘world	 in	motion,’	
transgressing the boundaries of individual subjectivity and responsibility. As Allan 
(1994) elaborated: “The everyday world, far from being organized around a single 
systematizing	temporal	sequence,	 is	to	be	recognized	as	 ‘scattered,	fragmented	and	
deprived of essential connections’” (p. 205). Following the analogy of Bakhtin’s analysis of 
personal responsibility in The Golden Ass, the organizing of forensic ACT seems dislocated 
from	a	more	historical	and	broader	societal	context,	where	its	stories,	unbound	by	the	
limits	of	the	chronotope	of	the	adventure	novel	of	everyday	life,	might	find	an	impetus	
strong enough to set the world in motion. Locked within this narrow scope, problems 
may	indeed	be	‘small-scale’	wicked	problems	that	prove	indeterminable,	unresolvable	
and	unfinalizable.	In	this	construct,	we	see	the	practitioners,	as	the	protagonists	of	the	
threshold, maneuvering through the in-between of the grid and the play, the public and 
the private, and the self and other, making do, always alongside the road of their patients, 
with	a	limited	sense	of	plot-bearing	significance,	which	turns	into	a	question	of	personal	
guilt and transformation (instead of the potentiality of collective action).
4.5 The gesture of Mrs. N.
In sum, I argued that organization works like an ancient literary construct Bakhtin found 
in the ancient novel The Golden Ass by Apuleius, in that it generates a sense of personal 
responsibility by means of an in-between of two narrative time-space modes. I have 
argued that Bakhtin’s thoughts on time and space and make for a particularly suitable 
framework	to	understand	how	personal	responsibility	emerges	from	the	 ‘real-life’	of	
organizing with the individual protagonist thrust at the crossroads and alongside an 
unending road to personal purgatory (see also Kaulingfreks & ten Bos, 2005). According 
to Bakhtin, Apuleius’ innovation was to design an in-between of an adventure tale of 
a hero and his ordeal on the one hand, and a tale of the hardships in the lower social 
stratum’s	everyday	 life	on	the	other.	The	protagonist	has	an	 inner	experience	of	the	
public duties that he should perform in the social turmoil he is thrown into. Driven to 
fulfil	a	hero’s	role	but	simultaneously	an	awkward	outsider,	his	sense	of	purpose	is	routed	
into critical turning points. As such, a tale of personal responsibility was constructed, in 
which the protagonist struggles to come to terms with the unsettledness both of the 
events and of his own capricious self. Crucially, the ways in which time and space are 
set	perpendicular	to	each	other	prefigure	how	the	story	unfolds	and	the	main	character	
develops. According to Bakhtin, The Golden Ass is a blend between two time-space 
modes: that of the adventure novel of the ordeal and that of the everyday life, but also 
something profoundly more than merely a combination of the two. While the protagonist 
in	both	modes	separately	does	not	carry	plot-bearing	significance	personally,	he	does	
so	in	Apuleius’	story	for	the	first	time.	Understanding	organization	first	and	foremost	as	
a discursive phenomenon, I argued that organization on a generic level is itself a similar 
in-between	of	the	same	two-time	space	modes	set	perpendicular,	and	thus	prefigures	
how its stories of responsibility unfold. As the analogy draws toward closure, the question 
remains	whether	the	praxis	and	scholarship	of	‘responsible	organizing’	has	yet	to	outgrow	
Apuleius. As I have tried to suggest, the forensic ACT team is concerned with its patients 
and their immediate surroundings, but the threshold toward a more historical, societal 
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context	is	hardly	ventured	into.	Concurrently,	through	the	ongoing	shifting	between	the	
chronotopes of the adventure and that of the everyday, the relationality and responsibility 
in	it	are	never	really	deepened	to	such	an	extent	that	it	would	approach	the	casuistic	of	
a full-blown novel. Instead, the everyday remains something episodic, the temporary 
ventures into the turbulence of the patients’ lives, calibrated by the pathways plotted by 
the team. Yet one last motif deserves closer inspection and that is Mrs. N.’s gesture of 
the instant soup, the warm liquid this chapter culminates in. Here is the fragment again.
Olive:	 You	wouldn’t	have	noticed	that	before,	things	got	ugly.	She	was	quite	relaxed.	We	
were having fun. She made some instant soup for me. Really! She made soup, for 
both	of	us.	And	she	was	cooperating	just	fine.	Yes,	it	was	quite	pleasant,	actually.	
(interview I, 26 Oct. 2012)
Earlier I was quick to link this to the dwelling of the everyday, where time for a moment 
ceases to be counted and submits itself to an oozing relationality, there and then. It is 
remarkable and surprising, in the eyes of Olive at least, that Mrs. N. provided care to 
Olive for a moment, breaking with the asymmetrical practitioner–patient relationship. 
Just two human beings now, enjoying a cup of soup. Where Mrs. N. may precisely reveal 
herself in her “alterity not in a shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon 
of gentleness” (Levinas, 1969/1961, p. 150). As ten Bos (2011, p. 284) argued, a gesture is 
“a bodily technique that gives information about who someone is or rather about what 
this	particular	person	is	(the	condition	in	which	she	finds	herself:	her	role,	her	function,	
her state of despair, her happiness and so on).” Sharing soup together, in what some 
may have called a moment of formlessness (cf. Agamben, see ten Bos, 2005a, 2005b), 
the only thing that may be left for us to cling to is the gesture, the gesture that “both 
refuses to become a means to an end and refuses to become an end in itself” (ten Bos, 
2003, p. 280). As Levinas (1969/1961) remarked:
We live from “good soup,” air, light, spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, etc.…These are not 
objects of representations. We live from them…Moreover, whereas the recourse to 
the	instrument	implies	finality	and	indicates	a	dependence	with	regard	to	the	other,	
living from…delineates independence itself, the independence of enjoyment and of 
its happiness, which is the original pattern of all independence. (p. 110)
On	the	other	hand,	hardly	 ‘good’	as	 in	 tasty	or	nutritious,	 the	 instant	 soup	 itself	 is	
a	particularly	elegant	example	of	the	vulnerable	position	in	which	the	worker	herself	
finds	herself	in	organization:	being	offered	the	single	most	cheap,	fast-food	surrogate	
for actual food, something of a drizzly fuel for the being-as-human-resource, such as 
water	and	coffee.	As	such,	the	 instant	soup	is	not	a	 ‘gift’	at	all,	does	not	count	as	a	
diversionary	tactic,	an	act	of	voluntary	loss	against	the	profit	economy,	not	“as	an	excess	
(a	waste),	a	challenge	 (a	 rejection	of	profit),	or	a	crime	 (an	attack	on	property)”	 (de	
Certeau,	1984,	p.	27),	but	is	part	and	parcel	of	that	profit	economy.	But	de	Certeau	might	
enjoy the irony of this capitalist device of managerialism being redeployed as something 
very	different:	as	a	gesture	that	defies	univocal	interpretation,	also	for	us	here.	In	the	
gesture, Mrs. N. becomes the teacher in the Levinasian sense, and Olive is drawn into 
the	unfinalizable	self–other	axis	where	both,	and	their	relationship,	is	not	yet	defined,	
undefinable.	Where	Olive	and	Mrs.	N.	become	‘whos’	instead	of	‘whats’	for	a	moment.	
Here, Mrs. N. becomes more than just patient, and Olive is invited to become more than 
just practitioner, entering a zone of indeterminacy, where the chronotopic perpendicular 
axis	becomes	suspended:	in	the	sense	that	the	personally	answerable	is	not	merely	a	
‘forceful’	becoming	public	of	the	private	by	way	of	either	crime	or	professional	discourse,	
but through the more corporeal invitation to face not only each other but also the 
broader	social	and	historical	context	we	find	ourselves	in,	responding	to	the	world.	The	
gesture of Mrs. N., then, disables the chronotope of the adventure of everyday life, breaks 
it open, and discloses an alternative space that both belies the telos of the adventure, 
the social predetermination of the everyday, and their intertwining, opening an active 
responsivity, a responsive understanding, to the other and to the world: “To be able to 
respond in this way is what integrity might be all about” (ten Bos, 2011, p. 286). But ten 
Bos doubts whether organizations are capable of this kind of gesture, and it may then be 
particularly remarkable that the gesture of the instant soup, in all its ambiguity, comes 
from the-one-made-patient, Mrs. N., as our navigator of sorts. Ten Bos (2011) suggested 
that organizational moral discourse:
has	never	been	‘grounded’	in	the	body.	It	never	had	an	eye	for	the	gestural.	It	never	
understood that morality goes beyond words, codes or legislation. In this sense, it 
is part and parcel of culture that has lost its gestures and therefore fears nothing 
more than its own morality. (p. 290)
It is here that we will part ways, as it is my contention that organizational moral discourse, 
in a less philosophical sense, has already wholly embraced this morality beyond words, 
and put it into practice.
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5 Organizing moral prolapse16
Puis…qu’une foys en avez iecté le dez,
…reste seulement la mettre à execution.
…Il se y convient mettre à l’adventure
…puys qu’une foys l’on se y veult mettre.
The Third Book of Pantagruel (Ch. 9–10), Rabelais17
5.1 An idea of embodied generosity in organization
This will be a critical study in what some might call corporeal responsibility or embodied 
ethics, and my theoretical concern is targeted particularly against just this strand of 
studies. In maneuvering along the edge of discourse, a diverse assortment of studies 
concerned with organizational life engrosses the relationship between discourse and the 
human body (for an overview, see e.g., Hassard et al., 2000). This may be seen in light of a 
scholarly	trend	to	call	attention	to	the	‘non-discursive’	aspects	of	organizing	that	should	
be disclosed to organizational discourse studies (e.g., Iedema, 2011; Phillips & Oswick, 
2012). One strand of studies develops an understanding of the body as a non-discursive 
source	of	potential	change	in	organizations,	always	 in	excess	of	structures	that	may	
seek to encapsulate it. Studies on organizational ethics evoking this picture, suggest the 
possibility	of	a	different	kind	of	‘embodied	ethics’:	immanent,	caring,	and	disarming	(e.g.,	
Pullen & Rhodes, 2014; Hancock, 2008). Concerned with a series of corporate scandals, 
Hancock provided an outline of the discipline of business ethics, indicating a supposed 
gap	that	existing	research	has	failed	to	address.	He	theorized	about	another	kind	of	ethics	
that might resolve it: an ethics of embodied generosity, as developed by Rosalyn Diprose 
(2002), who drew upon the work of, amongst others, Merleau-Ponty. Diprose described 
this embodied generosity as “the nonvolitional, intercorporeal production of identity 
and	difference	that	precedes	and	exceeds	both	contractual	relations	between	individuals	
and	the	practices	of	self-transformation	figured	in	some	postmodern	aesthetics	of	self”	
(2002, p. 75, as cited in Hancock, 2008, p. 1368). Hancock puts this in somewhat simpler 
terms,	explaining	that	she	is	concerned	with	an	openness	toward	the	other	that	“involves	
a mode of givenness, and therefore recognition of and by the self, that is not calculated 
and,	as	such,	expects	no	reciprocation	or	symmetry	of	exchange”	(Hancock,	2008,	p.	
1368).	Following	up	on	Hancock,	Pullen	and	Rhodes	(2014)	explored	how	Diprose’s	ethics	
could serve as a pathway to resistance to organizational arrangements targeted at the 
management of employee behavior. Again, the argument is used that the body may 
serve	as	a	non-discursive	source	that	engenders	a	pre-ordinate	relation	of	affect	toward	
16 A previous version of this chapter was presented at the 30th EGOS Colloquium of 2014 in Rot-
terdam, The Netherlands and at the 9th Annual Liverpool Symposium on Current Developments 
in Ethnographic Research in the Social and Management Sciences of 2014 in Ipswich, UK.
17 Discussed in Duval, E.M. (1997).
others involved: “From an understanding of bodily practice that precedes rationality and 
intellect	(and	hence	precedes	also	organization)	in	an	affective	dimension	where	bodies	
move and respond to other bodies” (Pullen and Rhodes, p. 7).
My concerns with this strand of CMS are both practical and theoretical. My theoretical 
concern focuses not so much on the above organization studies on embodied generosity, 
but	rather,	via	Bakhtin’s	sociohistorical	contextualization	of	the	body,	on	Merleau-Ponty’s	
understanding	of	flesh-as-chiasmus.	My	practical	concern	is	that	these	critical	studies	that	
emphasize	corporeality	and	highlight	the	non-discursive,	fail	to	incorporate	a	reflexivity	
on their own obscuring acts, whilst their ideas gain ground in just those organizational 
practices where interpersonal and intercorporeally intense labor is growing (Iedema et al., 
2006).	In	this	limelight,	being	exposed	to	precarious	events	might	be	further	enabled	by	a	
kind	of	business	ethics	that	emphasizes	a	sense	of	embodied	generosity	that	exceeds	or	
precedes professional and safety measures imprinted in more contractual relations. The 
higher	the	stake	or	risk,	the	larger	the	‘non-discursive	gap’	one	has	to	somersault	over	
to	get	things	done	anyway.	To	push	the	metaphor	a	bit	further,	the	‘somersault	with	a	
twist’ makes for a more general argument about how people talk themselves (and others) 
over the sense of a threat, and into precarious situations. They do so, I argue, by talking 
about proper rule-following (the somersault) and about intercorporeal conjunction (the 
twist). We can trace how this particular technique, called a chiasmus in rhetoric, transpires 
by critically interpreting what appears to happen in team conversations. In this whole 
exercise,	the	human	body,	and	the	bodily	force	that	comes	with	it,	is	pivotal,	in	more	
than one sense. But it is the swirl itself that we are interested in here: the discourse that 
revolves around the (potentiality) of bodily force. And this entails not only the forensic 
ACT team discourse at hand, but even more so the organization of the sociohistorical 
interplay of images of the human body. Here, we draw answerability away from the 
limited	confines	of	the	personal	responsibility	construct	 in	the	previous	chapter,	and	
into	a	responsiveness,	and	a	responding,	to	the	world.	Where	a	‘responsible	choice’	in	
daily team dialogue, is a micro-cosmos of answering the past, present or future of the 
world at large, and a deeply disconcerting one, in particular for the forensic ACT practice.
Below	I	explore	how	team	discourse	prefigures	a	sense	of	corporeality	that	helps	the	
argument put forward to instigate two separate measures that make people physically 
move from one place to another: the compulsory admission of patients, and the 
deployment	of	practitioners	to	‘risky’	patients.	In	other	words,	it	is	about	how	the	team	
‘talks’	patients	into	the	clinic,	and	about	how	practitioners	talk	themselves	into	visiting	
a	patient’s	home	that	might	pose	a	threat.	The	initial	wonder	which	set	off	this	particular	
study	is	twofold.	One	thing	I	still	find	striking	is	that	we	have	people	at	work	to	whom	
it appears an everyday thing to risk their physical and mental well-being without any 
substantial physical safeguards, to care for people who have proven to be unpredictable 
and/or violent themselves (this being a patient placement criterium) or are close to 
people	(spouse,	drug	dealer,	etc.)	who	could	be.	The	other	thing	that	I	find	remarkable	
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is how compulsory care can seem like the sensible thing to instigate for patients who 
really do not want that care (or are really unable to consent to), and may end up in 
solitary	confinement:	itself	considered	extremely	dangerous	(exacerbating	and/or	making	
irreversible the symptoms, risk of suicide and self-harm) for the patients themselves, 
and considered a form of torture if prolonged for more than a few weeks, by some law 
experts.	It	seems	as	if	there	are	just	no	alternatives	viable,	thinkable.	Via	critical	discourse	
analysis, this chapter does not so much answer the question of why practitioners do this 
kind of work, as it attempts to formulate an answer to the question of how they do it, how 
they	make	sense	of	it.	Recalling	Sullivan’s	understanding	of	the	different	relationships	
of the researcher toward her qualitative data: in the previous chapter I jumped into the 
adventure of the practitioner’s story (retold, that is) and discerned motifs that together 
indicate a spatiotemporal structure that predisposes people in organization to come to 
a sense of personal responsibility and not move beyond that. Here, that more trusting 
attitude	toward	the	data	is	set	aside,	and	with	it	much	of	the	proximity	to	the	practice	
itself, in favor of a deep suspicion of the meanings in team dialogue. (Power) structure 
itself becomes the main motif of the story as told by me-as-critical-researcher, and 
the observations are, as it were, compliant to, and illustrative of, that plot. Important, 
though, to note is that I am not claiming that the structure of the chiasmus is the only 
exclusive	route	to	help	understand	how	this	process	of	foregrounding	and	backgrounding	
transpires, but one indeed that may happen to be particularly compelling when we do 
follow its consequence through.
5.2 Bakhtin’s discursive straitjacket
Alongside the deinstitutionalization of mental health care inpatients since the 1980s in 
the	Netherlands,	a	similar	outflow	since	2005	from	penitentiaries	in	the	criminal	justice	
system has transpired.18	These	trends	might	not	indicate	an	end	to	Foucault’s	 ‘age	of	
confinement’	that	started	with	the	prisons	(‘tuchthuizen’) and General Hospitals of the 
mid-sixteenth	century	and	resulted	in	the	modern-day	penitentiaries	and	psychiatric	
institutions,	but	they	might	well	hint	at	a	reconceptualization	of	confinement.	No	longer	
wholly dependent on the physical containment of persons in closed, stationary sites, 
contemporary	confinement	is	enabled	by	arrangements	of	conditionality	and	coercive	
interventions, surveilled and enforced by a cross-sectoral intertwining of services in the 
public, semi-public and private spheres. Forensic ACT is deeply entrenched – and as 
such a case in point – in this cross-sectoral intertwining. But when push comes to shove 
within	this	‘open	confinement,’	human	bodies	are	at	stake.	Push	comes	to	shove	when	
people see danger in the way a patient is behaving while that patient does not agree 
with being treated to avert this perceived danger. Many patients of the forensic ACT team 
18 WODC (Research and Documentation Centre, Statistics Netherlands (CBS): 2005, 50,000; 2016, 
35,000 persons in detention
undergo this process, recurrently, mirroring a national trend of increased compulsory 
admissions (Mulder et al., 2006; Van der Post, 2012). A substantial amount of routine 
desk	work	is	devoted	to	reporting	and	fulfilling	requirements	for	procedures	such	as	
those that instigate compulsory admissions of their patients. The compulsory admission 
by	court	order	(‘rechterlijke machtiging’ or RM) is a procedure in the Netherlands that 
enables a person to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital without his or her consent. 
Risk assessment is part and parcel of the procedure, itself part of a legal framework (the 
‘Special	admissions	to	psychiatric	hospitals	Act’	or	‘Wet Bopz’ in abbreviated Dutch) in 
the health care domain and can be enacted if a person is diagnosed as having a mental 
disorder which is the cause of (potential) danger which can be avoided in no other way 
than by clinical admission, whilst that person is unwilling or unable to give consent. 
‘Danger’	can	mean	a	number	of	things	according	to	the	Wet Bopz, such as danger to 
seriously injure oneself or another or their property. The enactment of the procedure 
is highly protocolled, with most steps delineated in terms of scope, timeframe and 
jurisdiction. The procedure is initiated by having the patient assessed by an independent 
psychiatrist, who writes a medical statement. The patient is assigned to an attorney, 
which is followed by being summoned to a hearing in which a judge will decide on the 
authorization of the admission. A relative, friend or legal guardian of the patient can 
request the procedure via the public prosecutor or request it via the care provider. The 
care provider cannot make the same formal request to the prosecutor by itself, but as 
some persons do not have anyone close willing to make such a request, the care provider 
may by loophole suggest that the public prosecutor initiate such a procedure on his own 
initiative.	This	loophole	is	used	in	forensic	ACT	in	the	absence	of	significant	others	making	
such requests. So, in practice, the corporeal displacement of patients is preceded by an 
enabling discursive process in forensic ACT organizing: the team considering the sense 
of it and their subsequent plotting and administering. Key in the compulsory admission 
process is the patient evaluation by an independent psychiatrist (independent from the 
organization admitting the patient, or at least not involved in the ongoing treatment 
of the patient). The psychiatrist assesses if there is in fact (potential) danger caused by 
a mental disorder, and, if so, writes a medical statement, which will then be used to 
legally enable the instigation. The statement describes the mental and/or addiction 
disorders at hand, the reasoning why there is danger, and why the measure of compulsory 
admission is the only viable option to end that danger. From a critical purview, we could 
argue	against	the	official	rhetoric	of	the	causal	chain	(disorder	→ danger → isolation), 
that in practice it is presupposed that the causal chain actually works in the opposite 
way, namely: the isolation in admission → reduction of danger → reduction of disorder. 
For if not for the last (less obvious) step, why the need for the medical statement by a 
psychiatrist? In other words, the legitimization of the force of separation is ultimately 
based on medical (not civil/justice) grounds. Separation, especially by force, however, is 
in itself a grave danger to the patient involved, a measure contrary to what one would 
expect,	on	medical	grounds.	At	a	societal	level,	we	seem	not	primarily	concerned	with	
the stated goals (reduction of danger and ultimately reduction of mental disorder), but 
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more	so	with	physical	separation	(compare	Bauman’s	responsibility	=	proximity).	The	
court-ordered procedure serves as the discursive enabler to cross over to the use of 
bodily force to enact that separation. It is the temporary suspension of order through 
a	routinized	state	of	exception	that	enables	 that	use	of	 force,	which,	 from	a	critical	
perspective,	is	exactly	the	structural	arrangement	of	carnival.	For	this,	we	turn	to	Bakhtin	
who has studied this phenomenon in ancient folklore and beyond.
Bakhtin’s work in organization studies roughly falls into one of two themes: polyphony 
and carnival/the carnivalesque. While authors of the polyphonic organization concern 
themselves mostly with Bakhtin’s Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, the Speech Genres 
essay and his essays in the bundle The Dialogic Imagination, authors on carnival herald 
Bakhtin’s dissertation (completed in 1940 and published in 1965 as) RAHW and his carnival 
chapters in the beforehand books. Carnival, and its key concept of the grotesque, in 
organization studies is associated with a creative overturning of traditional organizational 
culture	and	managerial	order,	disclosing	a	zone	of	proximity	 ‘without	footlights’	that	
draws everyone in to participate, to mock their own roles and their relationships, 
making old meanings ambivalent, and making room for new meanings to emerge, albeit 
temporally. As Rhodes (2001) suggested,
carnival,	then,	is	a	practice	that	both	opposes	and	destabilizes	official	views	of	reality.	
In	doing	so,	 it	creates	 itself	 in	opposition	to	official	culture	on	a	series	of	planes,	
for	example,	from	seriousness	to	laughter,	from	the	dogmatic	to	the	open.	(p.	376)
Islam et al. (2008) added, “the Rabelaisian grotesque was thus a fundamentally populist 
reply to aristocratic appropriation of cultural forms, a protest against regulation and 
taboo	through	the	celebration	of	filth	and	the	praise	of	folly”	(p.	1574).	Carnival	as	an	
ambiguous	zone	of	proximity	seems	to	be	at	play	here	in	forensic	ACT	and	arguably	in	
other public sector corporeally intensive hybrids, but it is a version distant from the joyful 
and	‘democratic’	carnival	that	other	authors	prefer	reading	into	Bakhtin.	Critical	scholars,	
such as Berrong, Bernstein and Agamben have been quick to highlight both the violent 
outbursts and the societal function inherent in carnival as a historical phenomenon (e.g., 
as a safety valve, see also Islam et al., 2008). Whereas the connections with violence may 
be obvious and urgent, conceptually critical is the way in which these scholars understand 
carnival as a temporary suspension. A suspension in which the old and established is 
set	in	a	different	light	but	never	discarded,	on	the	contrary:	it	is	in	its	zone	of	exception	
where the presence of force may be felt most acutely:
During these feasts (which are found with similar characteristics in various epochs and 
cultures), men dress up and behave like animals, masters serve their slaves, males and 
females	exchange	roles,	and	criminal	behavior	is	considered	licit	or,	in	any	case,	not	
punishable. That is, they inaugurate a period of anomie that breaks and temporarily 
subverts the social order. (Agamben, 2005, p. 71)
Moreover, Agamben (2005) drew in Karl Meuli to make his fundamental point about the 
relation between force and law:
A	closer	analysis	shows	that	what	at	first	sight	seemed	simply	to	be	rough	and	wild	
acts	of	harassment	are	in	truth	well-defined	traditional	customs	and	legal	forms…
(Meuli, 1975, p. 473). If Meuli’s hypothesis is correct, the “legal anarchy” of the anomic 
feasts…brings to light in a parodic form the anomic within the law, the state of 
emergency as the anomic drive contained in the very heart of the nomos…It is as if the 
universe of law – and more generally, the sphere of human action insofar as it has to 
do	with	law	–	ultimately	appeared	as	a	field	of	forces	traversed	by	two	conjoined	and	
opposite tensions: one that goes from norm to anomie, and another that leads from 
anomie	to	the	law	and	the	rule.	Hence	a	double	paradigm,	which	marks	the	field	of	
law with an essential ambiguity; on the one hand, a normative tendency in the strict 
sense, which aims at crystallizing itself in a rigid system of norms whose connections 
to life is, however, problematic if not impossible (the perfect state of law, in which 
everything is regulated by norms); and, on the other hand, an anomic tendency that 
leads	to	the	state	of	exception	or	the	idea	of	the	sovereign	as	living	law,	in	which	a	
force-of-law that is without norm acts as the pure inclusion of life. (pp. 72–73)
As	I	will	argue	below,	the	human	body	is	one	of	those	battlefields	‘of	forces	traversed	
by two conjoined and opposite tensions,’ an ongoing war of discourse swerving around 
the	depth	of	flesh.	Concerned	not	so	much	with	anomic	violence	as	with	the	historical	
possibility of an ethics on the margins of the linguistic order, Mikhail Bakhtin described 
in his RAHW how “in the grotesque concept of the body a new, concrete, and realistic 
historic awareness was born and took form” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 367), when the world 
of the Middle Ages with its vertical social and spiritual hierarchy was crumbling and 
the	Renaissance	emerged.	He	described	how	this	passage	is	reflected	in	the	writing	
of	François	Rabelais’	Gargantua and Pantagruel, where a focus on the human body 
contributed to overthrowing the medieval picture of the world. This original conception 
of the grotesque body was both positive and ambivalent, and representative of a 
corporeality of the people as a whole “who are continually growing and renewed,” while 
degrading the medieval norm of “all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract” (Bakhtin, 1984a, 
pp. 19–20). In this grotesque realism the body is presented as something universal, 
connected to other spheres of life, where:
all	that	is	bodily	becomes	grandiose,	exaggerated,	immeasurable	[…]	The	essential	
principle of grotesque realism is degradation, that is, the lowering of all that is high, 
spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the material level, to the sphere of earth 
and body in their indissoluble unity. (Bakhtin, 1984a, pp. 19–20)
In this original sense of the grotesque, “Man’s encounter with the world in the act 
of eating is joyful, triumphant; he triumphs over the world, devours it without being 
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devoured himself. The limits between man and the world are erased, to man’s advantage” 
(Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 281). During the Renaissance (its literary development), we are witness 
to a drama that will ultimately lead to the body breaking away from:
the collective, growing, and continually renewed body of the people with which it had 
been	linked	in	folk	culture.	[…]	Renaissance	realism	did	not	cut	off	the	umbilical	cord	
which tied them to the fruitful womb of the earth. Bodies could not be considered 
for themselves; they represented a material bodily whole and therefore transgressed 
the limits of their isolation. The private and the universal were still blended in a 
contradictory unity. (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 23)
Bakhtin suggested the canon of the grotesque body is with us to (t)his day, having 
“prevailed in art and creative forms of speech over thousands of years” (Bakhtin, 1984a, 
pp. 318–319). With the grotesque body, the image of the human body as collective, 
ongoing and open is foregrounded as deeply positive, even if (physical) transgression and 
force is imminent. Indeed, in the canon of this collective body-in-becoming, where the 
limits between self and world are blurred, violence and transgression are manifestations 
of that ongoing body itself,	not	a	threat	to	it;	where	interlinking	of	images	of	excrement,	
gluttony,	sex,	birth,	and	decapitation	are	met	with	cheerful	 laughter.	Bakhtin	(1984a)	
insisted	that	 it	 is	difficult	 for	us	to	 imagine	today	(in	his	day)	what	the	sense	of	the	
grotesque was in Rabelais’ era of the early Renaissance, how “we have ceased long ago 
to understand the grotesque canon, or else we grasp it only in its distorted form” (p. 29).
Near the end of the Renaissance in the passage toward modernity, Bakhtin tells us that 
the image of the body once again became an abstract ideal, now an object of one’s 
own property that should be kept pure and proper. In the canon of the proper form 
(suggested	here	as	the	‘proper	form’;	Bakhtin	depicts	it	in	different	terms	like	classical	
and modern), the image of the body is the polar opposite to that of the grotesque: 
individualized,	private	and	smooth	like	Michelangelo’s	David,	expressing	“this	ideal	in	
terms of a modern version of the classical Greek body—image” (Ferguson, 1997, p. 26). 
The image of the proper form is closed, completed, limited, seen from the outside as 
individual. What remains is opaqueness and an impenetrable smooth surface. All the 
events taking place within it acquire one single meaning: death is only death and hence, 
no signs of duality are left (Bakhtin, 1984a, pp. 281–322). Discourse on the proper form is, 
as	the	new	official	culture	(Bakhtin,	1984a,	p.	130),	seemingly	harmonious,	unambiguous	
and serious, which does not allow the ambivalence and joyfulness of the grotesque that 
liberated “man from all the forms of inhuman necessity that direct the prevailing concept 
of the world” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 49). In Bakhtin’s view, it is this canon of the proper form 
that dominates our thinking about the body to (t)his day. In this age of organization, 
the ideal is a smooth body sculpted to perfect proportions, a “closed instrumentality 
responsive to reason and command which is its primary datum,” as Ferguson (1997, 
p. 26) elaborated. The proper form, then, is a realm of rules, calculation and polish, in 
which the immaculate organization may be understood primarily to be made up of such 
stuff:	procedures	and	regulations	such	as	job	descriptions	and	mission	statements	that	
optimize both goal-directedness and its sweeping compliance to them. Deviation, defect, 
dirt and disease are perceived to eat away at this proper form, (threaten to) violate it, 
and should be separated, at least, and swiped clean, at best. In the table below are some 
of	the	key	differences	between	two	canons	of	the	body	as	described	by	Bakhtin	(1984a)	
on display.
Grotesque body Proper form
‘Golden	Age’ Early Renaissance (Rabelais) Classic Age and (late) Modernity
Shape Open	 and	 unfinished	 in	 the	 act	 of	
becoming,	unfinalizable
Closed, completed, limited, seen from 
the outside as individual
Key feature Depths	of	orifices	(“gaping	mouth”) Opaqueness of impenetrable smooth 
surface
Manifestation On the boundary dividing one body 
from the other and at their points of 
intersection
Enclosed within the body’s limits of 
absolute beginning and end that never 
meet
Inside/outside Swallows and rends the world apart, 
is enriched and grows at the world’s 
expense
Private individuality that does not 
merge with other bodies and with the 
world
‘Desire’ Retains only that which leads beyond 
the body’s space or into the body’s 
depths	Affirming	the	physical	body	
as open to the world, encompassing 
it and endlessly reproducing it and 
itself
Attributes	of	the	unfinished	world	and	
signs of inner life are removed. No 
signs of duality are left. All the events 
taking place within it acquire one single 
meaning: death is only death
Interpretation 
of bodily acts
Sexual	 life,	 eating,	 drinking,	 and	
defecation have a direct relation to 
the life of society and to the cosmic 
whole
The meanings of these acts have been 
transferred to the private psychological 
level
Table 1 Bakhtin’s depiction of the two canons of the body (1984a, pp. 281–322)
Bakhtin (1984a) suggested that the canon of the grotesque body is with us to some 
extent	to	this	day:
In	 the	 new	 official	 culture	 there	 prevails	 a	 tendency	 toward	 the	 stability	 and	
completion of being, toward one single meaning, one single tone of seriousness. 
The	ambivalence	of	the	grotesque	can	no	longer	be	admitted.	The	exalted	genres	
of	classicism	are	freed	from	the	 influence	of	the	grotesque	tradition	of	 laughter.	
However,	the	tradition	of	the	grotesque	is	not	entirely	extinct.	(p.	101)
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Indeed, “The grotesque mode of representing the body and bodily life prevailed in 
art and creative forms of speech over thousands of years. From the point of view of 
extensive	use,	this	mode	of	representation	still	exists	today”	(Bakhtin,	1984a,	pp.	318–
319). Bakhtin (1984a) warned us that in “history’s living reality these canons were never 
fixed	and	immutable.	Moreover,	usually	the	two	canons	experience	various	forms	of	
interaction:	struggle,	mutual	influence,	crossing,	and	fusion.	This	is	especially	true	during	
the	Renaissance”	(p.	30).	The	two	canons,	then,	do	not	exist	separately,	but	they	feed	
off	one	another	in	oppositional,	violent,	co-existence,	more	or	less	polarized	from	one	
era to the other. Moreover, according to Morson and Emerson (1990) in their seminal 
study	on	Bakhtin,	the	specific	interplay	of	these	two	canons	generates	a	‘polarized	body’:
A second binary opposition that emerges in Rabelais and his world: in addition 
to polarized language, we are presented with the “polarized body”…two 
polarizations, within language and within images of the body….The grotesque also 
unites two qualities or orientations in the world that Bakhtin deeply respected: 
the interdependence of bodies and the messiness of life.…If Socialist Realist art 
(and	what	might	today	be	called	fascist	art)	emphasizes	the	clean,	closed-off,	and	
narcissistic	body,	the	art	of	the	grotesque	stresses	exchange,	mediation,	and	the	
ability to surprise. The grotesque restores “the ever uncompleted whole of being.” 
(pp. 448–449)
In	this	textual	and	sociohistorical	polarization	of	the	body,	the	two	opposite	images	come	
to	be	juxtaposed	and	framed	by	the	two	respective	canons.	In	light	of	the	grotesque	
canon,	 the	proper	 form	 is	 seen	as	distant,	hierarchical,	 authoritarian	 (‘fascist’),	 and	
disembodied. In light of the proper form canon, the grotesque in turn is portrayed 
as diseased, disgusting, violent, and unruly. In the sociohistorical polarization of the 
body, then, we may discern a structure with the image of the body in the canon of the 
grotesque	(A)	and	in	the	canon	of	the	proper	(B)	which	are	flipped	over	discursively	into	
an abject body in light of the proper form (B’) and in light of the grotesque canon (A’). 
The overarching pivot (C) is the body and its property of physical force in particular, which 
in	my	observations	has	not	been	discussed	explicitly,	and	only	became	clear	to	me	(how	
it is done) when I asked this question to practitioners directly.
Cheerful transgressive 
body of the people (A)
Separate the diseased 
and unruly body (B')
Smooth surface of the 
pure individual (B)
Suspend the authoritarian, 
cut off individual (A')
Bodily force (C)
In	 the	 team	excerpts	below	 there	 is	 talk	 about	whether	 it	 is	 responsible	 to	have	 a	
particular	patient	clinically	admitted	against	his	will.	The	crux	here	is	on	how	in	the	team	
meetings the enactment of the compulsory admission procedure is tied to a narrative of 
the grotesque as framed in the canon of the proper form. The grotesque imagery seems 
to support drawing to a close in considering a patient a proper case for the procedure. 
What	 is	obscured	 is	 the	way	 the	patient’s	body	 in	effect	becomes	absorbed	by	 the	
organizational	body	(i.e.	the	institution	that	the	patient	is	compelled	to	‘be	admitted’	to)	
having	fulfilled	the	proper	requirements.	The	two	excerpts	below	comprise	a	sequence	
recorded	in	two	moments	of	time	in	one	meeting,	where	the	case	of	Mr.	C.	is	explored	
in deliberations before the decision to instigate the procedure of compulsory admission.
Uriah Mr. C.?
Sam Terrible. We’ve tried to have him uh admitted in the clinic. Well, today we’ll hear 
more about it, right?
Nick Well, he would think about it.
Stan	 The	pathway	to	housing	office	called	yesterday,	right	before	their	meeting.	They	
said	that	he	was	at	the	office	having	all	these	delusions	about	violation	and	semen	
oozing	from	his	orifices	and	so	on,	so	that’s	uh…
Sophia Gross…
Stan Some intense discussions about it followed. He’s gone now but we’ll be informed 
soon, as he’ll return shortly uh…
Nick	 He	was	going	to	consider	it	and	he	wants	to…he	is	afraid	he’s	going	to	be	confined.	
So, we said that it’s really voluntary. If he wants to leave, then he’s free to leave. 
He’s been talking already about a week. So, he does appear to be considering it.
Stan In any case, there’s a bed available today, so that’s open. (day 20, 17 Apr. 2013)
Here, team members are considering the possibility of having Mr. C. admitted, but the 
objections	of	Mr.	C.	himself	seem	to	foreclose	any	finalizing	plot	toward	enacting	that	
possibility.	There	is	a	description	of	Mr.	C.’s	delusions	mentioned	in	proximity	to	clinical	
admission, but the voluntary option is emphasized and linked to Mr. C.’s potential to plot 
his	own	course.	Excerpt	2	below	is	taken	at	a	point	later	on	in	the	same	meeting,	when	the	
case of Mr. C. is brought back into discussion. Ed, who did not partake earlier, seems eager 
to move toward closure on the topic, drawing a course of action. Several arguments are 
assembled	to	narrow	down	the	open-endedness	of	the	previous	discussion	and	finalize	
Mr.	C.’s	case	into	something	that	fits	the	proper	arrangements.
Ed: Just one little question more. Mr. C. He’s decompensating now probably, really, on 
drugs, right?
Sam: Yes.
Sophia: Yes.
Ed: I think a voluntary admission is fairly, uh…; I think there’s a very slim chance, huh?
Stan: Yeah, and it’s pretty clear that he says…
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Ed: Because he’s on antipsychotic medication. He’s on antipsychotics and still he’s 
crazed. Getting crazier every day. Yes, I think we should we should deploy some 
stronger measures. Here’s this man: entering the clinic, on a voluntary basis. 
Whenever he gets a craving, he walks right out. Then we won’t have made any 
progress whatsoever. So, I…Yeah. Just to inform you, I think we should, that we 
should have him…That there should at least be considerable pressure if we are to 
attempt this. That he does get to hear: the court order is already prepared.
Sam:	 Yes,	otherwise	maybe	we	should	have	the	parole	office	do	something,	 instigate	
article 14A…
Ed:	 Yes,	 but	 those,	 those	 admissions	 instigated	 by	 the	 parole	 office	 are	 just	 like	
voluntary ones. You can just walk out. Yeah, that doesn’t, uh, carry any weight. I 
actually do think that we should consider uh a court order petition already, too.
Sophia: Because now he’s got nothing?
Sam: No.
Ed: He’s only got parole. But that doesn’t enable anything if someone’s in a, uh, well, 
maybe we should discuss it shortly, yes, let’s just try that court order on his own 
request, that strengthens the procedure, but I do think it’s heading that way, 
and that we should be ready to act on the spot, because the man is becoming 
frightening. (day 20, 17 Apr. 2013)
Ed	sets	a	different,	more	pressing	tone	on	the	issue	here	and	underlines	the	urgency	to	
step up their action. Again, bodily aspects (taking antipsychotics, being crazed, getting 
a	craving,	being	able	to	‘walk	out’)	are	deployed	to	argue	they	are	dealing	with	serious	
transgressions in need of more forceful counteraction. Running parallel, another bodily 
image emerges whose contours are formed by procedural demarcations. Accompanying 
this	image	is	a	rhetoric	style	that	fits:	by	stating	that	he’s	‘just	informing’	the	others,	he	
deploys an authoritative style to which others need not, should not, respond. And he 
proposes a similar scenario as regards to Mr. C., compelling him to comply by means 
of a warning/threat that a court order is ready to be instigated. Mr. C.’s voice here, in 
a way, is silenced as he is made into the proper form of the procedure, before actually 
instigating	it.	In	effect,	in	this	team	meeting	Mr.	C.’s	body	is	on	a	threshold	of	having	the	
compulsory	admission	imposed	on	it,	in	effect,	to	have	his	body	relocated	and	confined,	
usurped by the care provider’s bureaucratic body whole. In other words, drawing nearer 
to the procedure, the images of Mr. C. are arranged in a particular way. His bodily 
transgressions	are	made	explicit:	his	addiction,	his	delusions	and	his	capability	to	walk	
out. Equally important is that these notions are framed in the discourse of the proper 
form about the sequence, purpose and management of possible courses of action toward 
the individuated case made abnormal. Then, a switch of image and discourse occurs. The 
individuated case is set into the light of the grotesque body: the public (non-private) and 
collective task of usurping the patient into clinical admission.
Engage the patient’s body as 
open and transgressive (A)
A risky body should 
be isolated (B')
Delineate patient into 
regulatory framework (B)
Incorporate patient’s body 
into the clinic (A')
Bodily force (C)
By instigating the procedure, individuality is suspended by making the sense of Mr. 
C.’s body a public menace, which renders him the legitimate object of the provider’s 
discursive authority. This brings to mind how, according to Bakhtin, during and after the 
Renaissance the grotesque progressively became a product of the canon of the proper 
form: something unruly and undesirable, something to be contained and placed outside 
the public place. The grotesque image is thus embedded in the canon of the proper form, 
where Mr. C. is a risk-assessed, diagnostic-related case of a particularly voiceless person, 
a discordant in need of resolve. Thus, in the scenario of instigating compulsory admission, 
he is delineated to form elements of a proper, time-framed case to which are attached 
protocols and directives to adhere to. Made to submit to this procedural proper form is an 
image of the grotesque body: a body of becoming that transgresses the norms of order, 
forms	a	danger	to	the	public,	to	be	provided	by	forensic	ACT	with	forensic	(‘belonging	to	
the public,’ from the Latin forensis) care. Looking back onto CMS on corporeal generosity, 
it	is	exactly	this	idea	of	corporeal	generosity	that	is	part	and	parcel	of	a	larger	tension	
between itself and a countercurrent of regulation and enforcement.
This whole theoretical concoction only matters when it helps us to understand how 
human bodies are incorporated and decorporated by organizational bodies, and how 
we may recognize this pattern. How patients, in the case of forensic ACT, are talked into 
compulsory admission via a regulatory discourse: swallowed into the organizational 
body	of	the	clinic	and	separated/isolated	from	within	(‘organized’	in	a	quite	literal	sense).	
And	how	practitioners,	via	a	communal	sense	or	‘esprit de corps,’ may consciously and 
willingly suspend their own risk of being harmed. And choose to be deployed outward 
from	the	organization	(excreted)	and	into	potentially	harmful	situations.	Outside,	the	
organizational body itself is not physically present, but the practitioners may still be 
locked	into	a	suspended	order,	that	of	the	discretionary	space.	And,	finally,	how	in	both	
cases, the organizational device of risk (threat) assessment may be the pivotal discursive 
instrument, the somersault with a twist, of the crossing-over, in which organizational 
embodiment	is	simultaneously	an	abjectification	of	the	human	body.
What	I	suggest	at	play	here,	rather	than	a	difference	of	body	versus	non-body,	 is	an	
ongoing chiasmus on the body, resulting from a discursive polarization of the body 
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into a proper and a grotesque image. Taking a critical move some may call recolonizing 
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011), I have thus dragged the body, or at least its circumscription, 
back into the quagmire of discourse. Along the lines of the study of Dale and Burrell 
(2014)	of	organizational	wellness	and	‘unwellness,’	 I	argue	that	these	two	images	are	
locked in an interplay of discursive foregrounding and obscuring. Indeed, my approach 
follows up on their focus on the “inherent contradictions” (p. 168) of organizational 
discourse of the body, where they, too, draw upon Merleau-Ponty. Dale and Burrell (2014) 
emphasized the urgency of Merleau-Ponty’s work for CMS, as follows.
Merleau-Ponty’s	approach	suggests	the	existing	critical	literature	pays	insufficient	
attention to the ongoing organization of embodiment. By providing a sensitivity 
to the individual level of phenomenology and to how this is socially and culturally 
mediated, Merleau-Ponty would imply that there is rarely a corporeal tabula rasa for 
humans upon which organizations “later” inscribe themselves…the body is always 
already a product of the social and cultural norms and institutions in which the 
individual is conceived, matures and learns to labour…Organizations are a central 
part of this, not only at the point at which we enter them as producers, but also 
because in Western nations we live in societies that are almost totally constructed 
by and through organization(s)…Even the unemployed, the pre-employed and the 
retired confront an organized world in which their habits and habitus are shaped. 
And here of course lies the covert issue of categorizing what is “normal” and what 
“pathological.” (pp. 165–166)
In other words, zooming in on how either body image is foregrounded or obscured via 
the chiastic structure, I hope to illustrate how physically precarious events are stepped 
over	and	 into	quotidian	organizational	praxis,	enabled	through	devices	such	as	risk	
assessment	tools	and	compulsory	admission	protocols.	Both	the	discourse	of	‘micro’-
interactions	of	situated	talk	and	the	‘macro’-level	Discourse	on	the	body	are	at	play	in	
understanding	how	this	polarization	works	to	constitute	two	different	‘absent	present’	
bodies	(Shilling,	2012).	Specifically,	I	argue	that	the	folding	of	the	human	body	in	and	
out of organization, is a discursive process in which the body in question is either pulled 
in through the genre of the proper form which calls for a removal of the grotesque, and 
conversely, that the body is deployed outward through the genre of the grotesque which 
calls	for	a	suspension	of	the	proper:	official,	regulated,	procedural.	This	single	case	study	
makes	for	an	extreme	case	that	may	expose	how	these	processes	intertwine,	getting	the	
point across in a somewhat “dramatic way” (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This, in turn, might help 
scrutiny of the above-mentioned organization studies on embodied generosity which 
seem to forego a deep ambivalence in their own discourse on the (human) body. But 
first,	a	more	elaborate	answer	to	the	question	of	what	a	chiasmus	really	is.
5.3	 χ
Chiasmus is a concept which has been embraced by thinkers – besides Merleau-Ponty 
– such as Derrida, Levinas, and more recently Butler and Critchley, and its use has been 
spilling over from literary studies into studies on the cultural, political, social and ethical 
(see e.g., Korhonen et al., 2018, and Wiseman & Paul, 2014). The unsettling impetus of the 
chiasmus,	then,	may	serve	not	only	as	a	“figure	of	speech,	but	as	a	generative	principle,	
an	aesthetic	idea,	a	method	of	composition,	a	tool	of	ideological	manipulation,	a	matrix	
of social interaction, a philosophical problem, a metaphor, an elemental image or sign” 
(Paul & Wiseman, 2018, p. 1). Along with Butler (1997) and in particular Merleau-Ponty, 
we	might	use	the	concept	of	chiasmus	to	explore	the	unending	intertwining	between	
language and the body as the (seeming) object, or rather the abject as argued below, 
of that language. For we may discern a pattern in processes of shared understanding, 
and in the ways practitioners talk about corporeality as abject to overcome the moral 
objection	to	expose	one’s	body	or	the	body	of	another	to	(the	threat	of)	physical	force	
or, more precisely, physical violence. Below I will illustrate how in situated talk and in 
Discourse on the body we may discern this chiasmus, enabling practitioners who are well 
aware	of	risks	and	contradictions	in	their	work,	to	make	sense	of	such	exposure,	anyway.
In its original rhetorical sense, a chiasmus means that two grammatical forms or ideas (A 
and	B)	are	followed	by	their	variants	(A’	and	B’).	Frequent	in	classical	texts,	an	example	
from Virgil’s Aeneid is Speluncam Dido dux et Troianus eandem – Dido and the Trojan 
leader (come) to the same cave.19	Here	‘Speluncam’ is A, Dido is B, dux Troianus is B’ and 
eandem	 is	A’.	Another	example,	again	with	the	cave	theme,	from	Virgil:	Hic vasto rex 
Aeolus antro – Here King Aeolus in a huge cave. Vasto here is A, rex is B, Aeolus is B’ and 
antro	is	A’.	According	to	Johnson	(see	footnote	19),	in	both	examples	of	the	cave,	the	
chiasmus	works	in	an	additional	semantic	way	by	literally	placing	the	figures	involved	
inside the cave, through the placing of the words in the sentence. The chiastic structure 
itself,	then,	is	an	‘incorporation’	of	the	B	and	B’	by	the	A	and	A’	elements.	Another	aspect	
of	incorporation	flows	from	the	explicit	of	a	central	theme	C,	where	both	A	and	B	revolve	
around a central theme (C) as: A B C B’ A’. According to Breck (1987), the distinctiveness 
of the chiastic structure lies in its pivotal theme, around which the other propositions 
of	the	unit	are	developed:	a	‘crossing	point’	illustrated	by	the	Greek	letter	chi	(χ)	(p.	71).
19	 Both	examples	found	on	the	web:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rfihGGy_-vM,	by	Ben	
Johnson, LatinTutorial, LLC. The description here paraphrases the clip Chiasmus (Figures of 
Speech), uploaded 14 August 2017. Retrieved 13 December 2018.
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Both whole writings and individual units have been structured chiastically in the Scriptures 
(note	χ	as	the	sign	of	the	cross).	The	pivot	C	itself	might	be	a	hidden	theme	and	not	
explicated	in	the	text	itself.	Breck	(1987)	provided	an	example	(Book	of	John	1:6–7),	in	
which	C	is	explicated:
A: If we say we have fellowship with Him
B: and (yet) walk in the darkness,
C: we lie and do not do the truth.
B’: If we walk in the light as He is in the light,
A’: we have fellowship with one another....
The chiastic pattern works like a Mobius strip where a symmetric structure is inverted 
halfway and the opening and closing A’ complete a circle. A chiastic line of reasoning 
appears elegant and articulates a sense of closure, a balance of order, binding oppositions 
together.	A	chiasmus	may	allow	us	to	understand	how	a	line	of	reasoning	is	flipped	upside	
down yet still make sense like an orderly course of reasoning (of anticipated action). It 
may	also	enable	us	to	articulate	obscured	central	themes	that	are	not	actually	explicated,	
to critique its self-evident appearance and to articulate alternatives.
Only in one of the most recent rewritings of this chapter did I realize that this chiasmus 
and its use in reading and writing is basically what doing deconstruction is about. 
Simon Critchley’s dissertation of 1988 “Chiasmus: Levinas, Derrida and the Ethics 
of Deconstructive Reading” (altered and published as the 1992 book The Ethics of 
Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas), points us to deconstruction as a way of opening 
up to (radical) alterity:
As Derrida remarked once in an interview: “Deconstruction is not an enclosure 
in nothingness, but an openness toward the other…Philosophy, particularly in its 
Hegelian moment, has always insisted on thinking of its other (art, religion, nature, 
and so forth) as its proper other, thereby appropriating it and losing sight of its 
otherness.” (Critchley, 1992, p. 28)
A
B’
B
A’
C
In other words, we are, through deconstruction, opening up the apparent closure that is 
the chiastic structure of language circumscribing its radical alterity: the body. Critchley 
pointed	us	to	the	writing	of	ethics	as	an	explosive	problem,	“…	namely	that	if	ethics	is	
defined	in	terms	of	respect	for	alterity…how	is	alterity	respected	in	a	discourse	upon	that	
alterity?” (Critchley, 1992, p. 12). It is a problem that pervades the relationship between 
Levinas and Derrida themselves and their ideas, as they both mark its chiastic structure. 
Critchley cited a passage on Derrida (in 1975 Proper Names) where Levinas noted:
Indeed the ridiculous ambition of “improving” a true philosopher is not our intention. 
To meet him on his way is already very commendable and is probably the very 
modality of the philosophical encounter. In underlining the primordial importance 
of	the	questions	posed	by	Derrida,	we	wished	to	express	the	pleasure	of	a	contact	
made in the heart of a chiasmus. (Levinas, 1996/1975, p. 62)
Derrida, in his turn responded to Levinas in a letter (in Peeters, 2012, p. 254):
I	don’t	express	properly,	or	enough,	how	touched	I	am	by	the	way	you	send	me	
your	texts,	and	everything	they	give	me	to	read,	to	think.	Forgive	me.	The	strange	
relationship	that	you	have	so	lucidly	and	generously	defined,	“contact	at	the	heart	
of	a	chiasmus”,	is	still	for	me	a	living	experience.	Especially	since,	on	this	chiasmus	
– and such is the logic of the chiasmus – I feel unstable enough to pass over, often, 
to	your	side.	[…]	Across	the	distance,	the	silences,	the	dispersion,	all	the	difficulties	
that	make	encounters	so	rare,	please	believe	in	my	proximity,	very	attentive	and	
very friendly, very cordial – for I am sure that at the heart of the chiasmus the heart 
must always prefer itself.
Another	scholar,	drawing	on	Derrida	and	Merleau-Ponty,	keen	on	using	the	figure	of	the	
chiasmus is Judith Butler, who in Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (1997) 
has	more	explicitly	drawn	it	in	to	characterize	the	utterance	(as	in	Austin’s	speech	act	
theory)	as	the	tense	and	overflowing	intertwining	of	the	bodily	act	of	uttering	with	the	
discourse of speech itself, which are “incongruously interrelated” (p. 11). Inquiring into 
what marks the performative, Butler (1997) locates in the chiasmus of the utterance the 
force	of	the	performative;	because	when	we	utter,	we	forcefully	break	with	prior	contexts	
and meanings and thrust, and “this force is never fully separable from bodily force” (p. 
141).	Butler	explained	this	by	the	example	of	the	threat	as	a	chiasmus:	both	corporeal	
and linguistic. Drawing on the Lacanian scholar Feldman, Butler (1997) emphasized the 
tension	and	unfinalizability	that	marks	the	meanings	that	are	uttered	by	the	body	whose	
performance is out of bounds of (the intentions of) that speech, making its meanings 
always	unstable,	and	overflowing:
That body becomes a sign of unknowingness precisely because its actions are never 
fully consciously directed or volitional...the body is the blind spot of speech, that 
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which	acts	in	excess	of	what	is	said,	but	which	also	acts	in	and	through	what	is	said.	
That the speech act is a bodily act means that the act is redoubled in the moment 
of speech: there is what is said, and then there is a kind of saying that the bodily 
“instrument” of the utterance performs. (p. 11)
In uttering a threat, the linguistic interpretation alone does not provide us with a sense 
of its seriousness. For that, we need the corporeality of the utterance as well, the gestural 
aspect	of	it.	Certainly,	there	is	quite	a	difference	from	someone	texting	you	a	threat	on	
your phone to someone actually shouting the same words in your face while towering 
over	you	with	clenched	fists	waving.	As	Butler	(1997)	argued,	“The	threat	prefigures	or,	
indeed, promises a bodily act, and yet is already a bodily act, thus establishing in its very 
gesture the contours of the act to come” (p. 11), with this act of threat and the threatened 
act “related as a chiasmus” (p. 11).
Earlier work on the chiastic relationship between sense and the body was done in 
1959–1961	when	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty	wrote	his	text	“The	intertwining	–	the	Chiasm,”	
posthumously published as Chapter Four in The Visible and the Invisible (1968/1964). 
Merleau-Ponty made his meaning of chiasm accessible by describing how hands feel 
themselves and feel each other by holding each other:
This can happen only if my hand, while it is felt from within, is also accessible from 
without,	itself	tangible,	for	my	other	hand,	for	example,	if	it	takes	its	place	among	
the	things	it	touches,	is	in	a	sense	one	of	them,	opens	finally	upon	a	tangible	being	
of which it is also a part. Through this crisscrossing within it of the touching and 
the tangible, its own movements incorporate themselves into the universe they 
interrogate, are recorded on the same map as it; the two systems are applied upon 
one another, as the two halves of an orange. (p. 133)
In Merleau-Ponty’s (1968/1964) purview, the body we have here is a sense of “carnal 
being, as a being of depths…a sensible sentient (p. 136). But then, one wonders with 
Merleau-Ponty, is the body a thing or an idea? It is neither, according to him, as the 
body is:
the measurant of the things. We will therefore have to recognize an ideality that is 
not	alien	to	the	flesh,	that	gives	it	its	axes,	its	depth,	its	dimensions.	But	once	we	have	
entered into this strange domain, one does not see how there could be any question 
of leaving it. (p. 152, italics in original)
The chiasm of the “sensible sentient” is a reciprocal and reversible intertwining, like a 
single movement but in two phases, “it incorporates into itself the whole of the sensible 
and	with	the	same	movement	incorporates	itself	into	a	‘Sensible	in	itself’”	(Merleau-Ponty,	
1968/1964, p. 138). And this body is more than the visible body that meets the eye; it is 
a body of depth, “incomplete, gaping open; as though the physiology of vision did not 
succeed in closing the nervous functioning in upon itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968/1964, 
p. 147). Merleau-Ponty (1968/1964) emphasized that the chiastic reversibility is “always 
imminent and never realized in fact. My left hand is always on the verge of touching my 
right hand touching the things, but I never reach coincidence; the coincidence eclipses 
at the moment of realization” (p. 147). This sensible non-coincidence marks an ongoing 
shifting, an “hiatus between my right hand touched and my right hand touching, between 
my voice heard and my voice uttered, between one moment of my tactile life and the 
following	one”	(Merleau-Ponty,	1968/1964,	p.	148).	Ideas	cannot	be	ideas	except	as	in	a	
carnal	experience	as	in	both	the	occasion	to	think	them,	but,	moreover,
it is that they owe their authority, their fascinating, indestructible power, precisely to 
the fact that they are in transparency behind the sensible, or in its heart. Each time we 
want to get at it immediately, or lay hands on it, or circumscribe it, or see it unveiled, 
we do in fact feel that the attempt is misconceived, that it retreats in the measure 
that	we	approach.	The	explicitation	does	not	give	us	the	idea	itself;	it	is	but	a	second	
version of it, a more manageable derivative. (Merleau-Ponty, 1968/1964, p. 150)
In the concluding passages, Merleau-Ponty (1968/1964) indicated how, through this 
carnal	experience	of	the	world	and	its	ideas,	phrases,	too,	can	be	understood	only	by	
fully welcoming them, with the meaning not:
on the phrase like the butter on the bread, like a second layer of “psychic reality” 
spread over the sound: it is the totality of what is said, the integral of all the 
differentiations	of	the	verbal	chain;	 it	 is	given	with	the	words	for	those	who	have	
ears to hear. And conversely the whole landscape is overrun with words as with an 
invasion. (p. 155)
According to Erdinast-Vulcan (2013), “What we ultimately encounter in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work,	then,	 is	a	full-fledged	deconstruction	of	the	dualism	of	body	and	language,	a	
rejection	of	the	primacy	of	body	as	that	which	is	irreducible,	self-evident,	and	axiomatic”	
(p. 154). The analogy of chiasm is associated with the crossing-over that occurs in the 
optic chiasm of the optical nerves at the base of the human brain (see for a discussion 
of the post-ocularcentric position Gardiner, 1999, Erdinast-Vulcan, 2013, Leder, 1990). 
The	non-visual,	then,	becomes	the	depth	of	flesh,	but	the	problem	with	Merleau-Ponty’s	
choice	of	the	word	flesh,	as	other	scholars	have	pointed	out	(Dillon	1990,	see	also	–
Erdinast-Vulcan,	2007),	 is	 in	his	description	of	this	flesh,	which	closely	resembles	the	
concept	of	the	grotesque.	But	 if	we	consider	this	depth	of	flesh	not	as	 ‘what	has	no	
name’ but as a phenomenon thoroughly interwoven in the discursive tension such as 
Agamben described (force and law) and Bakhtin traced sociohistorically (the proper and 
the grotesque body), then Merleau-Ponty’s idea of chiasm providing a concept that 
could give shape to the ideas of reversibility and non-coincidence is mistaken. It is not 
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the	flesh,	the	human	body,	the	‘what	has	no	name’	which	is	the	marker	of	reversibility,	it	
is the ongoing discursive tension itself, the swirl, marked by a polarization of the body 
traceable to ancient times from which Merleau-Ponty does not escape himself. It is not 
so much that between the sentient and the sensible there is a chiasm, it is rather that the 
chiasm on the human body is already within the sentient and within the sensible, and 
providing this perceiver with predisposed images such as the grotesque to make sense 
of	that	what	appears	to	be	the	‘what	has	no	name.’	This,	admittedly,	may	seem	nitpicking	
alongside a vast plane of agreement between Bakhtin and Merleau-Ponty. However, the 
rift widens when the gist of Merleau-Ponty is drawn upon in arguments that not only 
forego this crack but hitherto fail to open up the potentiality of violence at the heart of 
this intertwining. On a more reconciling note,
…both Bakhtin and Merleau-Ponty are working toward a recognition of the 
inescapable liminality of our embodiment, discourse, and subjectivity, but their 
respective itineraries do not lead to the disempowerment of agential subjectivity 
that has gained such currency in postmodernist thought. The dynamic of mutual 
decentering that emerges from the work of Bakhtin and Merleau-Ponty does the very 
opposite of this: it is precisely this living on borderlines – not relative but relational – 
that highlights the immense responsibility of being human and grants us the freedom 
of contraband. (Erdinast-Vulcan, 2013, p. 158)
In sum, with Derrida, Levinas, Butler and Merleau-Ponty, we have touched upon the 
workings	of	the	chiasmus	as	an	ongoing	encounter	of	different	ideas	crossing	over	and	
into each other, holding and being held at the same time. This two-phase movement 
marks	sense	as	an	intertwining	of	corporeality	and	linguistics,	each	flowing	into	each	
other	with	 the	unfinalizable	body	as	 the	pivot,	 the	heart	of	 the	chiasmus	 that	 is,	 in	
turn, the ethical of deconstructive reading, circumscribing its depth, its gestural being, 
gaping	upon.	Below,	a	second	set	of	excerpts	revolves	around	the	question	whether	it	is	
responsible to make a home visit to a patient who might turn violent. The forensic ACT 
team employs a set of patient placement criteria, as do most mental health care teams, 
to	regulate	the	inflow	and	outflow	of	their	caseload.	Eligible	for	this	forensic	ACT	team	
are patients with (severe) mental illness that have been repeatedly convicted of a violent 
offense	and/or	have	recently	shown	violent	or	threatening	behavior	toward	either	civilians	
and/or practitioners. The forensic ACT practice thus has its members reaching out to 
patients many of whom have a documented history of aggressive behavior, although 
deployment is not accompanied by the physical means to secure themselves. Hence, 
practitioners	may	and	do	sometimes	find	themselves	in	perilous	situations	outside,	in	
which they can only talk or run their way out. In the above we have seen patients facing 
an ambiguous mental health care practice that provides not only open-ended care but 
helps instigate procedures to physically coerce their bodies into clinical admission against 
their will. Below we see practitioners confronted with the risk of aggressive behavior of 
their patients in face-to-face meetings. Both themes, I might add, were discussed very 
frequently and at times intensely in most of the observed meetings.
5.4 Being dis/membered
According to Morrissey et al. (2009), in the United States “the inattention of the mental 
health community to risk assessments and the over-reliance of the criminal justice system 
on such measures have created disconnects in care” (p. 1211; for Dutch disconnects, 
see Wierdsma, 2008, and Zwemstra, 2009). However, risk assessment seems to be on 
the rise in mental health care as well, and (semi-)public sector organizations in general, 
where, as Hillman et al. (2013) put it, “the management of risk in healthcare systems 
has fallen victim to a wider societal trend to attempt to eradicate uncertainties through 
reasoned	calculation”	(p.	951).	Hillman	et	al.	(2013)	warned	against	‘undignified’	care:	“the	
mediation of institutional risk and accountability into everyday caring relationships not 
only reduce patients as a moral demand…but can even constitute patients as an enemy, 
posing a potential threat to those who care for them’”(p. 952). The practitioner, then, 
is managed to care less for her patients and more for the minimization of risk and the 
aesthetic of accountability. In the case of forensic care, risk assessment is already part 
and parcel of what makes this care forensic, and the practitioners employed are aware, or 
are made aware, that risk is something that they will need to acknowledge and manage 
on a daily basis. Risk-taking, then, becomes less of an occupational hazard and more of 
an occupational norm, something which practitioners will have to digest in order to do 
the	work	involved.	But	this	occupational	norm	may	have	its	corporeal	effects	in	itself.	As	
Dale and Burrell (2014) contended,
Prior to entry into an organization, people may have an understanding that certain 
occupations	are	 risky,	but	 rarely	do	 individuals	expect	or	understand	 that	 their	
embodiment changes as a result of their occupation [...] The nature of risk-taking 
changes	as	“fitness	for	purpose”	becomes	taken	for	granted.	(p.	172)
Moreover, Dale and Burrell (2014) pointed toward the idea of normative involvement:
As we willingly enter into the occupation, we also willingly allow the occupation to 
enter ourselves. This welcome embrace is particularly evident in the rise of “the new 
managerialism” (Deem et al., 2007), HRM, the “management of meaning” (Gowler 
and Legge, 1983) and the “management of identity” (Collinson, 2003). The ways in 
which these occupy embodiment very often obscure the relations of power under 
which they are constructed. They are seductive, such that the employee is caught 
in a close, tight enfolding with these forms of occupation. The construction of the 
willingly occupied body, engaged in meaningful sanctioned activity, is in itself an 
occupation of sorts. In this case, the recesses of the mind and cavities of the body 
5
142 143
5 | Organizing moral prolapsePart 2 | Answers?
are willingly opened up to occupation, and internalized control is embraced as the 
individual’s choice. (p. 171)
The forensic ACT team at hand uses the Short-Term Assessment of Risk and Treatability 
(START; Webster et al., 2004, 2006, 2009) risk assessment form characterized as a tool 
in structured professional judgment to evaluate patient risk across seven domains 
(violence to others; suicide; self-harm; self-neglect; unauthorized absence; substance 
use; risk of being victimized). It is regarded as less time-consuming than other tools 
such as the widely used HCR-20 (Historical Clinical Risk management), but little to no 
evidence has actually been found for its use as an intervention for the reduction of violent 
behavior among forensic psychiatric outpatients (O’Shea & Dickens, 2014). But as one 
team member intimates, the START is not really used for each and every patient in their 
caseload anyway, only for some patients who have already raised concern in the team. 
The	sense	of	filling	in	the	form	together	in	a	small	group	(multidisciplinary,	usually	two	
practitioners) is mostly to gain awareness of the usually higher-than-considered risk of 
potential future violence, and in this way it informs the team’s decision to deploy two 
members (or one, which is the norm). So, the practical reasoning goes: established risk → 
two practitioners deployed instead of one → less danger. Most of the time though, the 
START is not used at all, and assessment of risk is done through everyday deliberation in 
and around the daily planning meeting. There is much to be said about the application 
of risk assessment, but from a critical purview one might say that the action of risk 
assessment not so much reduces the risk of violent behavior (which START states it is 
for, but for which there is no evidence), but for providing practitioners, who ultimately 
take that risk, with peace of mind that at least they have taken a methodical step to 
better prepare themselves for the action of physically deploying themselves in a risky 
situation.	When	outreaching	work	is	the	norm	such	as	in	the	forensic	ACT	team,	next	to	
the START a number of devices are enacted that facilitate this deployment: professional 
requirements	to	assemble	a	team	of	practitioners	fit	and	willing;	the	protocol	of	placing	
a red cross beside a patient considered dangerous; the morning meetings themselves in 
which the deployments are planned and evaluated; and so on. These arrangements do 
much in routinizing the work, up to the point where interventions to potential threats 
are	prescribed	in	protocol.	Written	protocols	and	procedures,	then,	explicate	the	links	
between situation and prescribed intervention, but in situated talk these links work 
on a more implicit level, and these are the ones on which the analysis below focuses. 
More	specifically:	How	are	the	grotesque	and	proper	images	of	the	corporeal	self	(of	
practitioners) set into the light of their corresponding canons? In other words, how does 
the	corporeal	chiasmus	of	risk	assessment	work?	The	following	excerpt	is	taken	at	a	point	
midway	through	a	meeting.	Setting	aside	the	obvious	finalizing	remarks	about	Mr.	F.,	the	
real concern here is the link between the problem of a physical threat and the resolve 
that two people go – instead of nobody, or instead of having the police accompany 
team members.
Steve: Has Sam met that man once already?
Kate: No.
Nancy: Well, yeah I don’t know if he should go, eh, it’s kind of a scary guy.
Kate: No, the idea was like, give him the note and just run away then.
Steve: You’ve met him, right?
Ken: Who?
Steve: Mr. F.
Ken: Oh, HIS PLACE? No, you should not go there alone! Because, when you open that 
door, uh…
Nancy: Not even to give him a note?
Ken: …as soon as you open the door, uh, if you don’t like ring or knock the door properly, 
you’ll	be	scolded.	You	should	never	go	there	by	yourself.	That	man	is	explosive.	
Kerosene. He’s a tank of kerosene.
Kate: Yeah, if you say so, well then uh...
Ken: No, I would not go there alone.
Kate: Who’ll join then? (day 4, 4 Oct. 2012)
There	 is	 a	 frivolity	about	 the	final	question	 that	does	not	 seem	 to	 follow	 from	 the	
description of the scene that preceded it. But apparently, it does, as it is the normal 
conclusion	after	many	team	discussions	about	similar	situations.	How	so?	In	the	excerpt	
below,	a	similar	conclusion	is	arrived	at,	but	the	extended	dialogue	in	this	excerpt	enables	
a	view	on	the	interplay	between	the	images	and	discourses	of	the	body.	At	first,	concerns	
of	sexual	transgression	and	fear	are	expressed	through	the	proper	form.	But	this	image	of	
potential harm to the proper form is subsequently overtaken by a discourse shift that sees 
the practitioner’s individual body ejected outward toward the patient by foregrounding 
its body as grotesque: as joint members of the organizational body whole. In other 
words, from the perspective that everything should be clean and proper (in organization), 
deviations are seen as frightening and sickening. But to go and do something about 
it	 (in	a	sense	of	agency)	–	other	than	taking	distance	or	 ‘cleaning	dirt’	–	the	way	of	
talking changes: teamwork, a sense of collective agency, is foregrounded which uplifts 
the	(individual’s)	sense	of	danger.	Exactly	what	you	would	expect	in	the	canon	of	the	
grotesque.
Sam:	 Mr.	W.	Mary.	Uh,	yeah	great,	but…he	is	rather	sexually	intimidating	and…	
Nancy: Mary normally does her visits alone, right?
Nicole: Otherwise I’ll accompany Mary.
Sam: Uh…
Sophia: Yes, I don’t think it’s an uh nice guy to visit alone, either.
Sam: I think it’s scary, I think it’s really scary.
Nicole: Yes, but then you just accompany Mary, right?
Sam: That I go with her?
Nicole: No, me. 
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Sam: Uh…
Nicole: You, you are really busy.
Sam: Yes, no, I know, but Mr. W.
Sophia: Sure, he is really a bit…
Sam: I’ve been visiting him alone for so long, he and I are really, he just doesn’t know 
better than me visiting him, you know, and last week I thought it was already a bit 
tense with Tara and I, and that if I didn’t look him in the eye for a second, he just 
kept looking at me all the time, so it’s all quite tricky, you know. 
Nicole: Uh, okay, well, then, uh…
Nancy: Did you feel it like that, Tara?
Tara: Uh…
Sam: Yeah, I don’t know how you felt that. 
Tara: Well, yes, I didn’t feel it like that, but that’s, you know him really well and I don’t. 
I did think he thought “yes an odd one out, but uh, I’ll focus my attention on Sam 
because that’s easier,” but I didn’t feel…
Nicole: But intuitively?
Tara: No, I didn’t get that, but I don’t know if I’m able to assess it, you know, because I 
don’t really know him. But, uh, what you just said: “the tension was rising with him,” 
he didn’t give me that vibe, personally.
Sam: Yes. 
Tara: But yeah, you know him well and you know how he reacts.
Sam: Yes, yes, it was just the tension when I tried to have a conversation the three of us 
and that he, at a certain point, that he indicated quickly that he uh well and I looked 
another way and he looked behind his back. So yeah, it was all pretty precarious.
Tara: Yes, that’s what you said, and I believe you instantly of course, because I don’t know 
him well, but that’s not how I felt it. But that surely doesn’t mean that it wasn’t like 
that.
Nancy: Okay, but Mary shouldn’t go there alone, so who’ll join her? (day 16, 11 Apr. 2013)
Here,	two	team	members,	Sam	and	the	recently	started	team	member	Tara,	exchange	
evaluations of the visit to Mr. W. they undertook the day before. Here (and elsewhere in 
the meeting) they evaluate not what was said at the visit, but how the visit felt. Along 
the conversation, bodily senses and movements are put into words and knowing the 
other becomes something that manifests itself in a porous zone (i.e. the canon of the 
grotesque body seems at work). However, the under- or meta current of this conversation 
is	delineation:	articulating	 the	demarcations	of	 the	 riskiness,	 the	extent	of	 fear	and	
precariousness. Such talk is the proper form in meetings in which the delineation of 
the practitioner’s body’s senses (feeling tense, being intuitive, feeling the vibe, making 
a connection) contribute to a shared team understanding of what was going on. This 
makes	for	a	daily	routine,	which	has	the	individual	partake	in	a	‘normalized	intensity’	
(McCann et al., 2008).
The visit, then, is understood as an open-ended event in which a connection with the 
patient	should	be	established,	 like	a	“joint	space	of	exploring	where	no	one	has	full	
control over the other or the unfolding of the conversation” (Helin, 2013, p. 238). This 
open-ended engagement is understood to be beyond full prescription, but formally 
part of the team’s discretion, as daily routine body work. Foregrounded to enable a 
risky	deployment	outward,	toward	the	patient	is	an	image	of	a	‘we,’	an	esprit de corps, 
a	corporeality	that	exceeds	individual	bounds,	that	is	a	body-of-two	which	in	effect	is	
deployed in forensic ACT. As a member of a collective enduring organizational body of 
deployment in hazardous, unpredictable and intricate situations, to answer the other is 
to	move	beyond	the	delineations	of	the	proper	form:	to	shrug	off	the	image	of	a	‘proper’	
practitioner that does not connect, does not engage, does not care. The grotesque body 
becomes the prevailing canon enabling an open-ended engagement with the patient. 
The risk of getting hurt is resolved not by simply withholding an answer (not being 
deployed,	which	is	obscured)	but	through	a	 ‘grotesque’	argument	 in	which	the	body	
becomes two bodies: being a member part of an ongoing collective. In a sense, opposite 
to	the	compulsory	admission	case	below,	where	the	patient’s	‘grotesque’	but	individuated	
body is plotted into proper form’s grotesque absorption, here a sense of collective 
body suspends the proper form to enable individual members of the organization to be 
temporarily	‘cut	off’	outward.
In a working environment saturated with protocols, training and scripted instruments, 
the	practitioner	ultimately	finds	herself	in	situations	that	lie	beyond	that	which	protocol	
can enter but does circumscribe, does discursively incorporate: a zone of discretion 
where	the	proper	form	is	suspended,	 like	a	miniature	state-of-exception	(Agamben,	
2005)	which	exposes	the	unfinalizability	of	bodily	force.	One	figurehead	of	forensic	ACT	
in the Netherlands summarized this mechanism succinctly in an interview for a national 
TV news item on the daily work of forensic ACT:
If I had behaved like a “true” practitioner, like if I had told them how to run things 
properly	here,	I	would	have	been	thrown	off	the	balcony.	Literally,	yes.	It’s	something	
A caring practitioner 
engages (A)
Unprotocolled behavior 
should be expelled (B')
The proper practitioner is 
delineated by risk protocol (B)
Suspend the individual’s 
body into discretion (A')
Bodily force (C) 5
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you get a feel for, a bit. I’m from this town as well, so it’s easy for me…to connect. 
But at the pace the patient sets.20
Being a good practitioner, then, and this is typical of professional work, is something 
more than complying with the ways of the proper, procedural form. Another canon is 
put into play here, and in this canon of the grotesque body the proper form is seen in a 
negative	light:	detached	and	stiff,	impervious.	What	is	called	for,	instead,	is	an	ability	to	
adapt to unforeseen circumstances and to establish, not through knowledge of protocol 
but	by	affective	craft,	an	‘authentic’	personal	connection.	As	the	grotesque	body	involves	
a	sense	of	ongoing	positivity	and	ambivalence,	it	prefigures	the	way	its	members	may	
embrace a sense of corporeality in these open-ended situations. Human bodies may be 
exposed	to	corporeal	violence	at	workplaces	where	it	is	normalized	to	the	extent	that	
individuals	might	only	‘come	to	their	sense’	of	its	abnormality	at	a	point	distant	to	it,	for	
example,	the	evening	after,	at	home,	as	we	heard	Olive	say	in	the	previous	chapter.	It	
is	only	then	and	there	that	they	exit	the	grotesque	body	of	organization,	until	the	next	
morning.
5.5	 A	bitter	carnival	of	twenty-first	century	organizing21
Key	in	the	analysis	of	these	processes	of	discursive	prefiguration,	 I	have	argued,	 is	a	
crossing-over	of	two	different	canons	on	the	human	body:	where	one	image	of	the	body	
is set in light of the other, and vice versa. This rhetorical crossing-over pattern is called 
a	chiasmus,	which	may	work	not	only	in	terms	of	‘grand	narrative’ Discourse, but also at 
the	‘micro’	level	of	organizational	discourse.	Unable	to	touch	upon	the	unfinalizable	body	
itself	directly,	to	penetrate	it,	language	circumscribes	its	ways	around	the	depth,	the	flesh,	
the gesture, by crossing-overs. I have indicated how this chiastic structure does that and 
how	it,	in	effect,	articulates	a	normalizing	order.	In	contemporary	organizational	practices	
such	as	those	of	the	forensic	ACT	team,	we	see	some	exceptional	people	engage	each	
other	in	exceptional	circumstances.	Their	bodies	are	moved	outward,	inward,	separated,	
isolated, conjoined, absorbed, by a discursive interplay of images and ways of talking 
about the body: shaping it, polarizing it by an unending twisting and turning around 
the physicality of bodily force. This chiastic interplay between grotesque body and the 
proper form unfolds in both the prosaic of everyday conversation and in the grander 
scale of sociohistorical transitions, as the body-image:
offers	itself	as	a	kind	of	accumulated	history	of	itself.	 It	 is	in	this	context	that	the	
divergent and even contradictory views of, and interests in, the contemporary body 
20 EO (2013). De Vijfde Dag. 28 August 2013. https://www.npostart.nl/de-vijfde-dag/28-08-2013/
EO_101196127.	Retrieved	on	4	November	2018.
21 Adopted from M.A. Bernstein’s (1992) Bitter Carnival: Ressentiment and the Abject Hero.
can	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	quite	different	historical	locations	of	the	body-
images which each invokes. (Ferguson, 1997, p. 26)
In drawing nearer to the point of engaging the patient, on the threshold of deployment 
the practitioner’s body becomes polarized. The grotesque body canon becomes the 
prevailing discourse in the need for open-ended engagement with the recipient. The 
risk	of	getting	hurt	is	resolved	by	a	‘grotesque’	argument	in	which	the	individual	body	
becomes	(two)	bodies:	being	a	member	part	of	an	ongoing	collective,	an	unfinalizable	
body. The proper form image becomes abject, a cold harness that prohibits real contact, 
real care. Opposite, yet in a sense parallel to the compulsory admission case where 
the	patient’s	‘grotesque’	body	is	plotted	into	the	proper	form,	thus	enabling	its	forced	
absorption into the provider, here the body of the practitioner is delineated properly 
into an idea of a collective body, thus enabling its suspended discharge out of the 
organization’s	corpus.	The	forensic	ACT	practitioner	thus	finds	herself	in	a	bitter	carnival,	
one in which an ethics of an embodied generosity runs parallel with a precaritization of 
the body. As Gardiner (2004) puts it succinctly,
carnival and prosaics are not antithetical notions, as is sometimes implied in the 
literature. Bakhtin’s evocation of the carnivalesque is best understood as indicative of 
his desire to draw our attention to the underlying sociocultural forces that continually 
subvert our received commonsensical notions and habitualized viewpoints, and 
to encourage a renewed awareness of the hidden and all-too-often suppressed 
potentialities that lie within “the dregs of an everyday gross reality” (Bakhtin, 1981, 
p. 385). (p. 42)
I have tried to trace the process of how such potentialities within the organizational 
prosaic may enable the enactment of what may amount to a gross reality for some.
In	the	first	case,	 instigating	a	court-ordered	compulsory	admission,	I	argued	that	the	
patient’s body becomes polarized in drawing nearer to the point of discursive closure. 
That polarization entails an image of a grotesque body that has lost its private and 
individual character, a body of becoming that transgresses the norms of order, to be 
delineated by forensic ACT care. The abject body becomes a rhetorical device that 
enables the proper procedure. This brings to mind how, according to Bakhtin, during 
and after the Renaissance the grotesque progressively became a product of the canon 
of the proper form: something unruly and undesirable, something to be contained and 
placed	outside	the	public	place.	Thus	the	patient	 is	made	a	proper	form,	fitting	the	
procedural requirements of the tools, devices and legal frameworks at hand. On the 
threshold	of	instigating	the	procedure	of	physical	confinement	and	thereby	suspending	
the individual’s freedom of movement, imposing the proper form becomes grotesque: 
enabling the patient’s body to be forced into the corpus of the provider’s organization, 
and from within the isolation of her body organized.
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In the Netherlands, a new Bill on compulsory care is to be enacted in 2020. This Bill marks 
a Discourse shift in the grander narrative between the two canons of the body. While 
the	current	legal	framework	enables	confinement	but	prohibits	(to	a	large	extent)	the	
enforced breach of the surface of the body, with the new Act coming into force, more 
compulsory arrangements will be enabled outside the clinic and inside the body of the 
recipient – reviving the times before the General Hospitals and the proper form. The 
original Bill contains a telling passage that reads:
Care that is accompanied with either a far-reaching restriction of freedom or of 
privacy of whom it concerns, or with an impairment on the integrity of the body, is 
to be applied with great care and restraint. Protocoling the forms of care…should 
thus be obvious. (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2010a, p. 56)
One	might	question	 to	what	 extent	 the	body	of	 the	 recipient	will	 become	a	more	
permanent grotesque body in this compulsory outpatient care: public and permeable, 
in spite of (though enabled by) the arrangements prescribed to augment a patient’s 
individual rights. Until that time of permanent emergency, suspension lies at the point of 
instigating	the	admission.	Another	interrelated	bill	coming	into	effect	in	the	Netherlands	
is about forensic care (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2010b, which is the House 
of Representatives of the Netherlands),	which	 institutionally	 unifies	 several	 current	
health care arrangements provided to convicted persons. The target of the coming 
into	force	of	these	two	laws	together	 is	to	enhance	the	effectiveness	of	the	forensic	
and involuntary mental health arrangements. In light of the argument of the chiastic 
structure	circumscribing	the	unfinalizable	body	in	Discourse and discourse I have tried to 
assemble, another word of caution seems appropriate. The threshold between care and 
justice	is	forecasted	to	be	enhanced	in	this	legal	intertwining,	for	example,	by	introducing	
the possibility of a measure of lifelong surveillance, facilitating regular involuntary 
commitments	 in	the	criminal	 justice	domain,	and	arranging	confidentiality	 loopholes	
for	the	exchange	of	recipient	information	between	both	domains.	While	the	growl	of	
this	wicked	problem	between	‘mad	and	bad	and	sad’	may	to	the	general	public	fall	on	
deaf ears, the ambivalence for hybrid teams and for the identity of their members on 
the threshold may become more tangible. And with this new paradigm on the rise, the 
threshold	between	‘the	norm’	and	the	‘mad,	bad	and	sad’	may	widen	and	become	more	
permeable.	Ultimately,	immediately,	this	should	be	of	growing	concern	for	the	‘general	
public’ as well, when it involves an abdication of Levinas’s burden of ethical responsibility 
in a precarious order of justice: “diminishing the violence to which they [the Others] are 
exposed	in	the	order,	or	disorder,	of	the	determinism	of	the	real’	(Levinas	1987:	121)”	
(Byers & Rhodes, 2007, p. 247). As ten Bos argued with Giorgio Agamben:
…during the Roman Empire, very rarely “used” by the political sovereign, nowadays the 
state	of	exception	has	become	the	rule.	The	disquieting	suggestion	made	by	Agamben	
is that the normal and civil order in which we, as average citizens of our late-capitalistic 
society, might feel so protected and secure might easily turn into a perverted order 
where the law is suspended and where we lose our civil status and become, indeed, 
less-than-human. If we are to believe Agamben, the likelihood that this happens to 
the citizens of our precious democracy has never been bigger. (ten Bos, 2005a, p. 18)
By means of the concept of chiasmus, we may discern patterns in the ways practitioners talk 
about	corporeality,	to	instigate	a	suspension	of	what	is	deemed	a	closed-off	individual	interest	
and to instigate separation of what is deemed a dangerous threat to the public. In other words, 
while crossing over through the opposite canon whilst obscuring bodily force itself, (moral) 
objections	to	expose	oneself	or	another	to	a	(threat	of)	physical	force	are	overcome,	enabled,	
and enacted. This invites a reevaluation of Hancock’s (2008) concluding remarks:
if this [ethics of embodied generosity] is to be achieved it will not be through 
compliance, or the actions of isolated subjectivities, but rather through the 
emergence of a mutual recognition of, and state of generosity toward the other; 
one	that	seeks	not	closure,	but	a	genuine	openness	to	difference,	creativity	and	the	
conviviality of an ethical organizational life. (p. 1371)
I have argued the opposite, and tried to illustrate that this state of openness is already put 
to work, circumscribed by an image of the grotesque body, that as such did settle into a 
new	regime:	a	‘precaritization’	of	the	body	“that	describes	that	process	of	acclimatizing	
a population to unsecurity” (Butler & Athanasiou, 2013, p. 43). This kind of ethics has 
already been put into play by its evocation of the grotesque, embedded in a precarious 
praxis	where	the	procedural	prescriptions	of	the	proper	form	do	enable,	but	ultimately	
do	not	apply.	Put	differently,	 (business	ethics)	discourse	on	the	responsible	put	 into	
practice, is interlocked with its own negation, and the more tangible the stake, the more 
painstakingly this becomes visible, visceral. It is in light of these discursive dynamics of 
the	‘mad,	bad,	and	sad,’	that	we	turn	our	attention	to	the	unfinalizable	relation	of	the	
self and other inherent in discourse itself, and in addressing these anticipated others we 
come	to	find	ourselves	in	the	heart	of	Bakhtin’s	responsibility-as-answerability.
And this silk seems Fire to me.
And now no longer Fire, but Blood.
And blood is but a sign of that which we
Call, in our poor language, Love.
Love is but a sound… At this late hour,
What	comes	next	I	can’t	reveal.
No,	not	fire,	nor	blood,	but	only	satin
Creaks beneath the timid needle.
From “The Seamstress” (1901), Zinaida Gippius
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6 Navigating Narrenschiff narratives22
I am a sick man…I am a spiteful man. I am an unpleasant man.
Notes from Underground, Dostoevsky
Whereas in Chapter 4 I ventured into personal responsibility of the self and in Chapter 5 
the embodied crossing-over onto the other was scrutinized, in this chapter a third party 
takes center stage. On a grand narrative scale, Foucault illustrates how the discursive 
construction of societal stranger as an outside third party plays a pivotal part in the way 
the western subject is plotted, governed, into the modern age. Following Foucault towards 
his	 idea	of	governmentality,	we	then	move	towards	Bakhtin	and	how	his	 ‘anticipated	
interlocutor’ is pivotal to a dialogic understanding of responsibility: responsibility as 
answerability. In short, the anticipated interlocutor is embedded in the addressive nature 
of the language in which we are immersed, and the presence of this anticipation in 
various shapes and sizes within our utterances may tell us how receptive we are to the 
unfinalizable	other:	be	it	societal	strangers,	others	around	us,	or	the	otherness	we	sense	
from within us. The point of all this is to argue two things: methodologically, we should 
pay close attention to utterances as they may reveal anticipated interlocution by third 
parties addressed parallel in conversation with real life others. And, theoretically, the 
presence of a third party or super addressee may contribute to an understanding of the 
sense of answerability as it unfolds, not only in dialogue, but more so in the absence of 
dialogue between stakeholders, in this case between the two regimes of criminal justice 
and mental health care.
6.1 Prisoners of the passage being patient
In the beginning of his Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason 
(Foucault, 2001/1967), Michel Foucault describes how an allegory called the Ship of Fools 
came into fashion between the end of the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, when 
madness	and	the	madman	became	major	figures	as	they	symbolized	a	great	social	unrest,	
a fear of the ambiguity and upheaval of changing times. The allegory entails a story of 
a ship, “whose crew of imaginary heroes, ethical models, or social types embarked on a 
great	symbolic	voyage	which	would	bring	them,	if	not	fortune,	then	at	least	the	figure	
of their destiny or their truth” (Foucault, 2001/1967, p. 11). Foucault suggested that of 
these	imaginary	ships	of	fools,	there	seem	to	be	one	kind	that	has	its	tangible	existence	
registered in historical archives: Narrenschiff	 that	conveyed	their	 ‘insane’	cargo	from	
22 I presented a previous version of this chapter (besides the parts described in a previous foot-
note) at the aforementioned 8th Annual Liverpool Symposium on Current Developments in 
Ethnographic Research in the Social and Management Sciences of 2013 in Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands and at the 15th International Bakhtin conference of 2014 in Stockholm, Sweden.
town to town, up and down the Rhine. Foucault described that in this era madmen led 
a	wandering	existence,	not	yet	confined	to	the	General	Hospitals	that	were	to	be	built	
soon. He suggested that, alongside the symbolic connotation of the Narrenschiff, there 
was a practical reason for some cities, apparently overpopulated with madmen, to hand 
these over to boatmen. So, it came to be that groups of madmen were shipped from one 
town	to	the	next,	always	on	the	move,	as	passengers	par excellence:
The madman’s voyage is at once a rigorous division and an absolute Passage. In one 
sense, it simply develops, across a half-real, half-imaginary geography, the madman’s 
liminal position on the horizon of medieval concern – a position symbolized and 
made real at the same time by the madman’s privilege of being confined within the 
city	gates;	his	exclusion	must	enclose	him;	if	he	cannot	and	must	not	have	another	
prison than the threshold itself, he is kept at the point of passage. A highly symbolic 
position, which will doubtless remain his until our own day, if we are willing to admit 
that what was formerly a visible fortress of order now has become the castle of our 
conscience. (Foucault, 2001/1967, pp. 8–9, italics in original)
In his 1973, “Foucault decoded – Notes from Underground,” Hayden White (known for 
his claim that the discourse on history is marked by ideological emplotment) elaborated 
how Foucault traced the history of madness into modernity to reveal:
no consistent progress in the theoretical conceptualization of it as an illness, that, 
on the contrary, the history of the treatment of the insane revealed a consistent 
tendency	to	project	very	general	social	preconceptions	and	anxieties	into	theoretical	
systems	which	justified	the	confinement	of	whatever	social	group	or	personality	type	
appeared to threaten society during a particular period. (p. 39)
Medicine, and psychiatry in particular, was not a science, according to Foucault, but was 
entangled with societal forces more so than with understanding the needs of the patient, 
marked by a refusal to listen to the patient, a refusal that was challenged by Freud.
The clinic and hospital were microcosms of the attitudes toward man prevailing 
in the macrocosmic world of society in general. As thus envisaged, medicine was 
more	a	political	than	a	scientific	discipline;	and	this	was	especially	the	case	in	that	
branch of medicine purporting to deal with the mentally ill, for here the prejudices 
which	informed	the	maltreatment	of	any	social	deviant	were	reflected	in	all	their	
brutality,	incomprehension,	and	lack	of	scientific	knowledge.	It	is	within	the	context	
of considerations such as these that Foucault assessed the importance of Freud 
for Western cultural history. Freud’s revolution – which represents a third shift in 
our attitude toward the insane – consisted of nothing more than a willingness to 
listen to the mentally ill, to try to grasp the nature of madness from within the 
experience	of	the	insane	themselves,	and	to	use	their	perspective	on	the	world	for	
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an understanding of the distortions present in the perceptions of the world of those 
who were manifestly “sane.” (White, 1973, p. 41, emphasis added)
In another study of Foucault (1977), Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, he 
illustrated how the image of another kind of societal outsider came into being in 
early modernity: the delinquent. Foucault argued that the discursive development of 
the delinquent was intricately bound to that of the madman. He described how the 
contemporary concept of the delinquent, like that of the madman and the asylum, is a 
historical production enveloped in the establishment of the prison or, more precisely, in 
the institutionalization of disciplinary practices and their techniques as part and parcel 
of	an	increasing	social	stratification.	Crucially,	the	delinquent	 is	someone	who	is	 less	
defined	by	her	particular	offenses	than	by	her	life	as	offender.	Yet	as	dangerous	as	one	
delinquent may become toward any given individual, she poses no threat to the civil-
state order and is indeed a functional element in that order (in accordance with the 
‘personal	safety	state’	of	Zygmunt	Bauman	(2006).	Foucault	(1977)	elaborated	how,	in	
the nineteenth century, the perception of delinquents “as close by, everywhere present 
and	everywhere	to	be	feared…a	perpetual	threat	to	everyday	life,	but	extremely	distant	
in	its	origin	and	motives”	(p.	286),	was	normalized	in	sociopolitical	discourse	–	a	definition	
which nowadays induce another image of societal stranger.
Drawing	closer	to	the	nexus	of	criminology	and	psychiatry,	in	“About	the	Concept	of	the	
‘Dangerous	Individual’	in	19th-century	Legal	Psychiatry,”	one	of	the	few	journal	articles	
of	Foucault	(1978),	he	traced	how,	next	to	the	crime	and	the	penalty,	the	criminal	as	a	
person became a third element in the historical development of legal justice practice. 
Foucault (1978) warned us against the “psychiatrization of criminal danger” (p. 3), and the 
horrifying society to emerge when the law authorizes “to intervene against individuals 
because of what they are” (p. 18). Punishment, such as:
imprisonment, forced labor, constant surveillance, partial or total isolation, moral 
reform – all this implies that punishment bears on the criminal himself rather than 
on the crime, that is on what makes him a criminal, on his reasons, his motives, his 
inner will. (Foucault, 1978, p. 9)
Nevertheless,	we	are	witness	to	exactly	this	trend,	according	to	Foucault,	who	turned	
his attention to a 1975 criminal court case: a trial of a man accused of multiple rapes. Of 
particular interest to Foucault is the silence of the accused and the intolerance of the 
court against that silence, compelling the suspect to speak up and be answerable for his 
actions,	in	effect	to	answer	the	question	of	who	one	really	is:	“Beyond	admission,	there	
must	be	confession,	self-examination,	explanation	of	oneself,	revelation	of	what	one	is.	
The penal machine can no longer function simply with a law, a violation and a responsible 
party” (Foucault, 1978, p. 2). In his analysis of another case, of the kidnapping and murder 
of a child, Foucault furthered the argument that the suspect must be known as a person, 
as a being answerable in order to be responsible and to be condemned.
In his plea, which was directed against the death penalty more than in favor of the 
accused, the lawyer stressed the point that very little was known about him, and 
that the nature of the man had only barely been glimpsed at in the interrogations 
and	in	the	psychiatric	examinations.	And	he	made	this	amazing	remark	(I	quote	
approximately):	“Can	one	condemn	to	death	a	person	one	does	not	know?”	This	
is probably no more than one illustration of a well-known fact, which could be 
called the law of the third element, or the Garofalo principle, since Garofalo was the 
one who formulated it with complete clarity: “Criminal law knew only two terms, 
the	offense	and	the	penalty.	The	new	criminology	recognizes	three,	the	crime,	the	
criminal and the means of repression.” In large part, the evolution, if not of the penal 
systems, at least of the day to day penal practice in many countries, is determined by 
the gradual emergence in the course of the 19th century of this additional character. 
At	first	a	pale	phantom,	used	to	adjust	the	penalty	determined	by	the	judge	for	the	
crime, this character becomes gradually more substantial, more solid and more real, 
until	finally	it	is	the	crime	which	seems	nothing	but	a	shadow	hovering	about	the	
criminal, a shadow which must be drawn aside in order to reveal the only thing which 
is now of importance, the criminal. (Foucault, 1978, p. 2)
The ability to answer for oneself and to draw up an intelligible story is anticipated to 
such	an	extent,	that	if	a	suspect	fails	to	compose	herself	in	this	way	and	refrains	from	
answering for herself, then the trial, and increasingly the machinery of criminal justice in 
general, comes to a halt. The absence of the possibility of interlocution with the suspect 
leads to the moment when “justice will then agree that it cannot proceed with the case 
since	the	subject	 is	 insane	and	will	commit	him	to	psychiatric	confinement	(Foucault,	
1978,	p.	10).	 It	 is	then,	 in	this	 ‘unexplained’	crime,	that	the	discipline	of	psychiatry	 is	
drawn	in	so	we	may	still	make	sense	without	in	effect	having	to	enter	into	dialogue	with	
a suspect unable or unwilling to provide any motive or leanings: “…if one has nothing 
more than the crime on one hand and the author on the other, pure and simple judicial 
responsibility formally authorizes punishment, yet does not allow one to make sense of 
it”	(Foucault,	1978,	p.	9).	What	I	seem	to	want	to	be	getting	at,	is	that	Foucault	explained	
how in criminal courts a suspect is more clearly “punishable” when that suspect is able 
and willing to answer for his or her actions, to be answerable not so much for the crime 
itself	but	for	being	that	person	explaining	his	or	her	story	about	the	crime	as	it	unfolded:	
“In order to punish, one needs to know the nature of the guilty person, his obduracy, the 
degree of his evilness, what his interests or his leanings are” (Foucault, 1978, p. 9). The 
(legal)	responsibility	of	the	suspect,	the	author,	is	related	to	the	‘psychological	validity’	
of her story, in other words, the one on trial is deemed more punishable when her story 
is not one of crisis or irrationality but a story that in a psychological way makes perfect 
sense to us.
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A	paradox,	then:	the	legal	freedom	of	a	subject	is	proven	by	the	fact	that	his	act	is	
seen to be necessary, determined; his lack of responsibility proven by the fact that 
his	act	is	seen	to	be	unnecessary.	With	this	untenable	paradox	of	monomania	and	
of the monstrous act, psychiatry and penal justice entered a phase of uncertainty 
from which we have yet to emerge; the play between penal responsibility and 
psychological determinism has become the cross of legal and medical thought. 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 11)
This intertwining has grown into a “psychiatric and criminological continuum” in which 
psychiatry	does	not	only	concern	itself	with	the	inexplicable	crime,	but	where	the	whole	
of legal theory of responsibility has been permeated with the analysis of conduct and 
emotion,	an	“infinite	labyrinth	in	which	the	legal	and	psychiatric	problem	of	crime	found	
itself” (Foucault, 1978, p. 12), where the judicial notion of responsibility makes way for 
the level of danger to society one appears to pose, “Moreover, it meant noting that 
the accused whom the law recognized as not responsible because he was ill, insane, 
a victim of irresistible impulses, was precisely the most seriously and immediately 
dangerous” (Foucault, 1978, p. 13). The changing sense of responsibility in criminal 
law was accompanied with a similar change of the concept in civil law, according to 
Foucault. From the nineteenth century and the age of industrialization onward, two major 
elements in this sense of legal responsibility emerged: risk incurred by third parties (e.g., 
innocent bystanders) and the fact that the culprit often only made a minor error (e.g., not 
paying attention) and was regarded at fault in the sense of carrying the load of possible 
consequences. Part of the solution was the idea that risks could never be eradicated but 
should be minimized:
By eliminating the element of fault within the system of liability, the civil legislators 
introduced into law the notion of causal probability and of risk, and they brought 
forward the idea of a sanction whose function would be to defend, to protect, to 
exert	pressure	on	inevitable	risks.	 In	a	rather	strange	way,	this	depenalization	of	
civil liability would constitute a model for penal law…just as one can determine 
civil liability without establishing fault, but solely by estimating the risk created 
and against which it is necessary to build up a defense (although it can never be 
eliminated), in the same way, one can render an individual responsible under law 
without having to determine whether he was acting freely and therefore whether 
there was fault, but rather by linking the act committed to the risk of criminality 
which his very personality constitutes. The purpose of the sanction will therefore 
not be to punish a legal subject who has voluntarily broken the law; its role will be 
to	reduce	as	much	as	possible	–	either	by	elimination,	or	by	exclusion	or	by	various	
restrictions, or by therapeutic measures – the risk of criminality represented by the 
individual in question. (Foucault, 1978, p. 16)
In sum, Foucault traced several epochs wherein the discursive construction of the third 
party indicates larger schemes of western societal development. While detaining the 
‘madman’	at	the	point	of	passage,	a	prisoner	of	the	threshold,	maintains	its	relevance	
to this day, an intertwining of two societal strangers, the psychiatric patient and the 
delinquent, increasingly came to dominate criminological thought. Psychiatry, less 
a	discipline	of	 listening	than	one	of	classification,	came	to	fulfill	a	pivotal	role	 in	the	
workings of the justice system geared towards holding its suspects answerable. If no 
sensible,	relatable	explanation	could	be	gathered	from	the	one	answering	for	the	crime,	
then	psychiatric	classification	could	at	 least	provide	for	an	answer	the	patient	could	
not	or	would	not.	Following	developments	in	civil	law,	the	third	figure	of	the	patient/
delinquent, then, was to be reframed into a discourse of risk to other third parties 
involved: punishment for a particular crime was remodeled into minimizing the risk 
a	particular	prisoner	of	 the	passage	embodied.	On	the	doorstep	of	 the	twenty-first	
century, this epistemic intertwining between the madman and the delinquent is further 
institutionalized by the organizational crossing-over of the regimes of criminal justice 
and mental health care, with forensic ACT a case in point. Morrissey and Meyer (2005) 
suggested that in the case of the United States, for instance:
Jails have clearly supplanted state hospitals as the main revolving door for the most 
disabled people in the public mental health system…The growing recognition of this 
situation has led a number of programs around the country to develop specialized 
ACT teams that shift the focus from just preventing hospitalization to preventing jail 
detention and recidivism for persons with severe mental illness who are involved in 
the justice system. The name “forensic ACT” or FACT is the emerging designation 
for these hybrid teams. (p. 532)
Set against this grand narrative of mental health care and criminal justice intertwining, 
we may be able to discern a diminishing epistemic divide between the madman and the 
delinquent in the small stories of daily work life; where the Narrenschiff may regain some 
of its original meaning, large and small. An all too obvious interpretation is that we have 
forensic	ACT	teams	navigating	their	‘prisoners	of	the	passage’	through	the	murky	waters	
of	public	services,	perpetually	confined	inside	and	outside.	In	the	ambiguity	and	upheaval	
of these changing times, a time of “verwarde personen”	(confused	persons,	‘verward’ also 
translatable	as	entangled,	messy,	disordered,	rambling,	and	so	on),	as	articulated	first	
in law enforcement discourse and becoming a more common denominator of the non-
norm, the sociopolitical question of who is or should be responsible for managing the 
patient/delinquent is directed toward teams in this hybrid domain. Below, we again take 
this	seemingly	extreme	case	of	the	patient/delinquent,	to	pursue	a	little	less	obvious	take	
on	the	Ship	of	Fools:	to	what	extent	the	contemporary	worker	might	be	a	prisoner	of	
the	passage	herself,	confined	by	another	type	of	arrangement	that	makes	her	answer	an	
internally persuasive discourse that simultaneously impairs her active receptivity toward 
the otherness of the other. On how the forensic ACT practitioner, concerned with both 
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the	 ‘real’	 third	party	of	the	 life	of	the	patient/delinquent	and	with	the	 lives	of	those	
around her, becomes entangled in both the sectoral threshold between criminal justice 
and mental health, and in an internal dialogue with anticipated third parties about what 
plot needs to unfold vis-à-vis what one should answer for, from one person to the other.
6.2 The polyphonic kybernetes
Taking	 care	 for	 and	 against	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 patient/delinquent	 is	 not	without	 its	
organizational	complexities:	chaos,	crises	and	calamities	abound;	centrifugal	forces	that	
refract the attention of team members daily, necessitating large amounts of interpretative 
labor to plot a commonsensical course. A plot is the patterning of characters, objects 
and such that make up an accountable sequence of events, the backbone of a story, 
while a plot device is anything in a story that serves to advance the plot, that helps 
answer	the	ongoing	question	in	forensic	ACT,	and	organizing	more	broadly:	‘What’s	the	
story?’ (see also Weick et al., 2005; Latour, 2013). Counteracting this centrifugal mania 
is	a	melancholy	 (lingering	on	a	single	subject,	as	Foucault,	2001/1967,	explained)	of	
organizational devices, like: procedures, protocols and plans; measuring tools; diagnostic 
and risk assessment instruments; meetings; job descriptions; and so on. These devices 
do	much	to	ground	individual	work	experiences	into	a	shared	past	and	a	common	sense	
of immediate and future consequence. Helping in the everyday sensemaking of both 
the	expected	and	the	unforeseen,	these	organizational	devices	have	an	influence	on	
matters	of	responsibility,	to	such	an	extent	that	“they	are	deeply	consequential	for	the	
lived activities of those of us who organize our actions in their terms” (Suchman, 2007, 
p.	20).	Shared	experience	 is	codified	by	plot	devices	and	generates	rapid,	regulated	
responses necessary to engage in our daily work life. To uphold this routine, considerable 
organizational	effort	seems	to	go	out	to	the	‘housekeeping’	of	plot	devices	(cycles	of	
mission statements, red tape reduction, redundancies, and so on), so that work events are 
foreshadowed,	and	prefigured.	The	experience	of	the	everyday	work	life	is	thus	plotted	
into	familiar	rhythms	(for	emplotment	in	OMT,	see	Cunliffe	&	Coupland,	2012;	Rhodes	
et al., 2010; Ricoeur, 1990). What logistic	devices,	devices	of	the	plot	of	the	‘flow,’	have	in	
common	is	that	they	invoke	not	an	open-ended	engagement	but	a	codified	exchange,	
that is either a proper (originating from proprius: to take as one’s own) or a failing	fit	of	
character of the patient/delinquent. To be allowed lock passage to services means to not 
enter into open-ended dialogue but to subject oneself to the helmsman’s course: to be 
tailored	and	identified	as	a	finalized	character	in	the	(inter-)	organizational	placement	
plot. As Foucault (1988) stated long ago about the historical development of mental 
disease	science,	it	is	“only	of	the	order	of	observation	and	classification.	It	would	not	be	
a dialogue” (p. 238). Placement logistics thus operates precisely on the idea that “man 
is	a	final	and	defined	quantity	upon	which	firm	calculations	can	be	made;	a	character	
in the mouths of others, not directed to him dialogically and therefore a second-hand 
truth” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 59). In the discourse of interorganizational logistics, patients are 
supposed	to	be	classified	into	codified	cases	by	gatekeeping	devices,	rather	than	being	
persons who are addressed as such and who may hold their interlocutors answerable.
As I have argued earlier, what makes forensic ACT, and all forensic care for that matter, 
particular is how it is organized, itself and in connection with other stakeholders, on the 
threshold between the criminal justice domain (police, parole, penitentiary, criminal court, 
etc.)	and	the	non-criminal	justice	domains	(health	care,	welfare,	housing,	etc.).	Different	
logics, regimes, or genres one might add, reign in these domains, each with their own 
criteria on what constitutes factuality, relevance, agency, normality and breaches thereof. 
This	betwixt	and	between	becomes	tangible,	urgent,	when	patients	are	deemed	to	be	
on the brink of causing danger to others, but not yet quite so clearly as to instigate 
immediate,	decisive	action.	In	the	below	excerpts,	taken	from	several	team	meetings,	
team members discuss the threshold between the two regimes. They deliberate toward 
which regime they should steer particular patients: the prolonged imprisonment of 
ISD	(‘inrichting stelselmatige daders’:	 institution	for	habitual	offenders)	 in	the	criminal	
justice system, or the compulsory admission (discussed in the previous chapter) via an 
‘RM’	(rechterlijke machtiging: court order) within the health care domain. The borderline 
between regimes becomes a contested threshold for the involved organizations and 
their members. As described in the previous chapter, the compulsory admission by court 
order (RM) is a procedure in the Netherlands that enables a person to be admitted to a 
psychiatric hospital without his or her consent. ISD is a long-term sentencing measure 
(max.	2	years)	for	persistent	(petty)	offenders,	established	in	2004	within	the	criminal	
justice domain (Goderie et al., 2008). The ISD-measure focuses on the reduction of 
recidivism by both prolonged imprisonment in a state penitentiary and a resocialization 
program. Meant as an ultimate remedy, there are strict eligibility requirements and formal 
procedures for a judge to ultimately have it enacted. Below we see a deliberation where 
both regimes are considered in light of each other.
Ken: Mr. G.? O dear, Mr. G. 
Ed: Yeah, good question. But he’ll be back shortly. ISD. There’s a meeting with parole 
officer	X	today.
Uriah: He was eligible for ISD, right? […]. Let’s see what’s the fastest way. 
Steve:	 Yes,	well,	it’s	just	that,	where	he’ll	be	most,	uh,	yeah,	a	RM	is	going	to	be	difficult,	
you know, as to where we are going to have him admitted then…
Ed: Well, they’ll make the request to handle it as an emergency RM, as I understood it.
Uriah: For forensic clinic X?
Steve: Yes, but they won’t just have him admitted there before we tried admitting him at 
addiction clinic X, yeah…
Ken: Forensic clinic X, that’s a real forensic clinic where you need to be convicted before 
you may be admitted, that’s no voluntary admission.
Steve: Well, it’s not a voluntary admission, but one with an RM. 
Ken: Hey, Mr. G.’s case is a quite the pain in the neck, isn’t it? (day 1, 24 Sep. 2012)
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In	the	above	excerpt,	team	members	are	exploring	the	options	available	to	have	Mr.	G.	
admitted. Several logistic aspects come into play, such as the ISD eligibility, it being an 
emergency case, having a conviction that enables admission, and the RM. They prefer Mr. 
G.	to	be	admitted	to	a	forensic	clinic	but	face	the	requirement	of	first	having	him	admitted	
to a (less secure) addiction clinic. Some concerns are voiced at the beginning and the end 
of	the	excerpt,	but	the	conversation	is	mostly	an	exchange	of	logistic	technicalities.	The	
hesitant	tone	of	Steve,	however,	who	brings	in	the	RM	as	a	possible	yet	difficult	option,	
foreshadows the predicament as it will be discussed at a later point. After the closing 
remark, the team moves on to discuss other patients, but minutes later they return to 
Mr. G.’s case.
Nick:	 So,	if	you	want	to	call	parole	officer	X	for	a	meeting	on	how	to	proceed,	Stan	spoke	
to	Mr.	G.’s	family	to	inform	them	that	it’s	the	parole	officer’s	duty	to	visit.	
Uriah: Yes.
Nick:	 You	might	be	able	to	join	them,	to	support	parole	officer	X.	It	won’t	be	a	system	
therapy	meeting,	but	parole	officer	X	will	do	the	talking	as	the	supervisor	in	charge.	
Uriah: Yes, but I don’t need to be present for that.
Steve: What about, uh, because I feel that, I said that before my vacation and I’m still 
thinking about that, that there should be a RM/ISD meeting with that public health 
officer	X,	he	was	supposed	to	take	care	of	that?	
Nick: Yeah, that’s taken care of.
Steve: It’s taken care of? But that doesn’t mean, I think, that this is still mostly a criminal 
justice	issue	and	I	find	it	difficult	that	we	now,	and	that	has	happened	before	with	
Mr. Z., that we, you know, that this person gets drawn into psychiatric care and that 
we end up being responsible. That he might attack someone in our clinic or does 
who-knows-what and that people say something like: “Well, how could you have 
put	this	man	there	in	the	first	place!”
Nick: Yes, it’s been getting worse for him the last two weeks, since he left the penitentiary 
and really started using. His father is worried, everybody is worried. He was seen 
in town, […] Then he was taken into custody. Detained. Assessed by public health. 
Good, we met up with his family. 
Uriah: We had his family here, I talked with them. 
Steve:	 He’s	in	the	special	program	for	young	frequent	offenders,	right?	It’s	just	bizarre,	I	
think. 
Uriah: So yeah, we told [deleted for privacy considerations] to make a statement, because 
we think he should be prosecuted. Then later I got a call through Nick. He’s being 
released now. 
Steve: And that’s while he did [deleted for privacy considerations]? Like, you know?
Nick: Yes, but there wasn’t enough evidence, to detain him any longer. 
[…] 
Ken: I think, I think that, I agree with you, you should really…
Steve: Yeah, I think it’s bizarre if this turns out to be an RM, actually, a bit. (day 1, 24 Sep. 
2012)
Here,	team	members	first	discussed	the	option	of	accompanying	the	parole	officer	who,	
enacting his duty to supervise the patient, will engage in a conversation with Mr. G. 
and others. While Nick suggested the added value of Uriah’s presence at that meeting, 
Uriah rejected the idea. This is followed by Steve who contested the zone of contestation 
between the ISD and RM, argued against the RM path by pointing toward the potential 
consequences, not only in terms of endangering others, but also to be held answerable 
for it. He described the threat the patient might pose to others, and forecasted trouble 
the team will get into vis-à-vis their colleague practitioners. Uriah, in an interview, 
elaborated upon the case of Mr. Z.
Look, from my perspective it’s how you frame this, you know, someone may have a 
disorder,	and	behavior	can	be	explained	by	it,	but	sure,	it’s	still,	yeah,	menacing	for	
the person involved. With this guy we know he thrashed someone into the hospital 
when he was admitted, that kind of thing really gets to people, to everybody […] 
Funny thing is, I had heard of him from before I started working here […] his name 
came up as someone who should return to the clinic and people reacted instantly, 
like: “Yeah, he shouldn’t be here! How did he end up here?” I remember that it was 
hard for them, while they were struggling with the idea that they did not want to 
adhere to too many placement criteria either, thinking: we’re here for, you know, 
most people. […] So yeah, he really made an impact, the question is what to do in 
which situation, how to handle each patient, uh, it’s an occupational hazard: things 
become normal, you know. (interview II, 1 November 2012)
Returning to the case of Mr. G., Nick’s description shifted toward more prosaic detail, 
voicing the concerns of the people involved. Steve, however, shifted back toward another 
logistic	arrangement,	the	program	for	young	persistent	offenders.	This	is	a	program	for	
young	persistent	offenders,	which	was	started	in	2012	(a	list	of	young	delinquents	drawn	
up by the city). The program, involving more than 40 organizations, focuses on quick 
police	and	legal	action	(‘fast-lane’),	deploying	(mental)	health	care	where	needed	and	
preventing siblings from going down the same path. Instigated to resolve bureaucratic 
hindrances for resolute action, the program became a topic of its own within the zone 
of contestation between the criminal justice and mental health care domains. Steve 
expressed	his	incomprehension	of	how	reality	fails	to	comply	with	the	purposes	of	the	
arrangements already deployed. It then becomes clear that, although the team actively 
intervened to have the case pass the criminal justice threshold, the ISD regime could 
not be enacted due to a lack of felicity conditions. Compared to the things (the details 
of which have been deleted for privacy considerations) Mr. G. is thought to have done, 
team members agreed on the bizarreness of the predicament and of the idea of an RM 
in particular, implying the obviousness that this is a criminal justice issue, although even 
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this	is	slightly	undermined	in	the	utterances	as	they	are	expressed	(‘actually,	a	bit’).	In	the	
excerpt	below,	in	the	same	meeting	but	half	an	hour	later,	the	team	for	the	second	time	
returns to the case of Mr. G. Although returning to the same case in a single meeting is 
not remarkable (as a recipient may appear twice or three times on the planning schedule 
in	different	tasks),	the	intensity	and	duration	of	these	particular	episodes	combined	are	
definitely	out	of	the	ordinary.
Steve:	 So,	there	should	be	some	kind	of	extended	meeting	with	uh	[overlapping	voices,	
inaudible]	because	he’s	in	the	special	program	for	young	frequent	offenders,	so	
you would think that this would enable us to do more? 
Ken: There is a coordinator, do we know who he is?
Steve:	 Yeah,	it’s	public	health	officer	X.
Uriah: Yes, but I think that’s just retarded, you have to, if WE say, and more people are 
saying it’s dangerous, then he should be taken into custody [loud overlapping 
voices, inaudible].
Nick: The coordinator was aware of the situation, he was called by the special police 
intervention team then.
Steve: I’m almost at that point where I would call the mayor myself, like the Minister of 
Justice did in Mr. O.’s case, like: “How is this possible?”
Ken:	 Exactly,	exactly.	Actually,	the	coordinator,	his	boss	should	have	him	take	the	initiative	
to arrange this and uh…
Nick: He knew he was taken into custody, arrested and he also agreed on his release, he 
wasn’t, we can’t detain him any longer legally speaking. 
Uriah: Yeah, well, I think someone should put pressure on that guy, because it’s a REAL 
danger. He could just kill someone. And then we’ll be like: What else should we have 
done? So, you should really lay it on him, Steve, like: This just CANNOT happen. 
Steve: Yes.
Ken: Okay, so who’s going to call the coordinator?
Nick: Well, I think Steve should. (day 1, 24 Sep. 2012)
In	the	above	excerpt,	discussing	the	characteristics	of	the	program	for	young	frequent	
offenders,	a	responsibility	 is	 indicated	for	taking	the	action	that	the	team	considers	
crucial. The intensity of how team members will take up their own course of action if this 
person does not act according to the urgency the team believes to be at hand, increases 
with the forecasting of reported speech and the tone that should be used against him. 
Nick and Ed emphasized the authority that they think their team should have in this 
matter, and that anticipated others should listen. Then the tone instantly quietens down 
again, when the question is raised who inside the team will take an actual step to enact 
what has been foreshadowed. In the following two weeks the case of Mr. G. lingers 
on. Team members deliberated with their stakeholders on how to proceed, in ad hoc 
gatherings and in themed network meetings. Eventually the provisional outcome of those 
deliberations	is	explicated	in	the	final	excerpt	below.
Ed: But this guy is now so addicted and acting on impulse, it’s bound to go wrong. 
He’s just one misdemeanor away from ISD, which I think would actually be better 
and	more	justified.	I	would	think	it’s	strange	in	fact	to	tackle	this	problem	with	an	
involuntary commitment, though we decided in the [Special network on young 
frequent	offenders]	meeting	that,	uh,	because	we’re	able	to	see	in	advance	what	
may happen, that we at least give it another try, to anticipate it, and that we will 
do, uh, that we will do that. With a bullet, this one.
Ken: Yes.
Uriah: Yes, well, not for now, but it’s kind of weird that you’re not able to act, right? It’s 
quite	weird,	I	think.	That	it’s	like	waiting	for	a	violent	offense,	I	think	that’s	uh,	yeah	
it doesn’t feel right. 
Ed: Right, and considering he’s on parole, with conditional sentencing, but doesn’t 
comply with those conditions…
Nick: And then there’s the appeal running.
Ed:	 Yeah,	but	that’s	a	different	procedure	altogether.	(day	5,	8	Oct.	2012)
Here,	Ed	explained	that	together	with	their	stakeholders	it	is	finally	decided	to	have	Mr.	G.	
admitted via an RM, although he seems to portray it as the wrong route to follow, almost 
apologizing for it. His argument in favor of the decision is to at least give it another try 
and	that	the	team	is	capable	of	foreseeing	any	harm	that	could	occur.	An	explanation	
for this decision (in other data) is that the threshold to cross over to ISD is considered 
by other organizations (in the criminal justice domain) to be more complicated and 
time consuming, so the team may at times be pressured by its criminal justice partners 
to instigate a non-forensic court-ordered admission to get someone out of harm’s way 
more quickly than the ISD could. In his utterances, Ed’s use of pronouns is interesting, 
first	legitimizing	his	own	viewpoint	before	deploying	a	‘we’	that	refers	to	collaborative	
network,	and	then	deploying	another	 ‘we’	that	refers	to	the	forensic	ACT	team	itself,	
himself	part	of	both	‘we’s.’	Uriah	appears	to	align	himself	with	Ed’s	own	implicit	 (and	
earlier)	disagreement,	by	explicating	the	dilemma	and	what	that	does	to	them	(‘it	doesn’t	
feel	right’),	which	is	then	confirmed	by	Ed,	although	he	reframes	it	as	a	technical	matter	
of	not	fitting	the	proper	requirements	of	the	parole.	
The question is whether the resolve to ’responsibilize’ a forensic ACT team with a cluster 
of responsibilities is by any means a proper response to their wicked problems at hand. 
This	wickedness	is	complex	logistically	in	the	sense	that	is	nearly	impossible	to	have	their	
‘cases’	comply	with	the	plethora	of	service	providers,	but	it	is	also	morally	‘verward’ in the 
sense that they are organized into situations where strong personal appeals are made 
to	them:	under	the	veil	of	team	empowerment	they	are	‘ployed’	into	the	management	
of their morality in such clustering of diverging responsibilities. As such, along with ten 
Bos	and	Rhodes	(2003),	a	reflexive	self-management	is	created	on	the	part	of	the	team	
and	its	members,	akin	to	Foucault’s	 ‘governmentality.’	As	ten	Bos	and	Rhodes	(2003)	
argued, organizational discourse about and by the team, 
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… uses the language of empowerment, loyalty and shared values…[it] is not about 
telling people what to do, it is about convincing people to tell themselves what the 
organisation would like to have the power to tell them. This does not rely on an all-
seeing panoptic management to attempt to implement, instead it is the eye within 
the worker who becomes the agent. It suggests a divided worker—on the one hand s/
he requires cultivation; on the other hand s/he becomes the agent of this cultivation…
We would argue that the treatment of workers like…empowered team-members 
merely	constitutes	other,	more	contemporary	examples	of	this	humiliation—ones	
that see people’s humanity, their potency, as merely the object of someone else’s 
will for action. (p. 421) 
An	example	of	this	contraption	is	a	clause	in	the	organization’s	code	of	conduct,	of	which	
in late 2012 a poster was put on the door of the forensic ACT team room for everyone 
to	take	notice	of	(and	was	taken	down	some	time	later,	apparently	having	fulfilled	its	
purpose).	A	passage	in	the	whole	text	of	the	code	reads:	
Employees venture to put themselves on the line, in their pursuit of tailor-made 
solutions, not surrendering directly to the limits that the organization seems to 
impose on them.
The	employer	thus	seems	to	explicitly	plot	that	its	forensic	ACT	employees	do	more,	than	
it	is	willing	to	explicate	itself,	and	expects	from	them	a	personal	stake	in	that	effort.	Ten	
Bos (1997, p. 1010) in a discussion on Bauman’s moral impulse, cited Green (1994, p. 147) 
regarding a similar code of conduct rule: 
When an employee or manager of a company learns of a condition created by the 
company that threatens human life or health and that has been missed or neglected 
by others responsible for correcting it, the employee must take steps outside his 
or her normal area of authority to report and to try to correct the problem - even if 
doing so could seriously damage her or his career. 
Ten Bos asked what could be wrong with such a rule, when it supports whistleblowers 
to	follow	their	moral	 impulse	even	though	it	might	be	at	their	own	expense.	Yet	this	
idea	of	seizing	an	exceptional	moment	of	blowing	the	whistle	of	responsibility	does	not	
compare	to	the	idea	that	putting	yourself	out	there	–	‘in	spite	of	the	organization’	–	is	
the everyday work life norm, especially where one might recurrently end up harmed in 
situations	of	crisis	where	trusted	plots,	even	‘emergency	plots,’	stop	making	sense.	For	
the team and their practitioners, then, this amounts to a double bind (Bateson et al., 
1956, 1963; Hennestad, 1990; Tracy, 2004), materialized in individual employees, who 
may	wake	up	to	find	themselves	a	site	of	the	management	of	morality.	Here	we	arrive,	
according to ten Bos and Willmott (2002), at the pessimist in Bauman, where totalizing 
forces of the organization feed upon the moral impulse itself, “redirecting or manipulating 
[it] rather than destroying it” (p. 778). Yet Bauman (1993) also suggested a loophole, that 
“the	social	management	of	morality	is	a	complex	and	delicate	operation	which	cannot	
but precipitate more ambivalence than it manages to eliminate” (p. 13). This hints at the 
optimist in Bauman, who: 
contends that complete and irreversible engulfment by totality is nigh impossible. 
Closure by totality is always precarious and thus subject to deconstruction and 
dissolution. Redemption is always a possibility. People may cling to totality as it 
proffers	them	some	degree	of	security	and	authority.	Yet,	insecurities	can	never	be	
completely eliminated because “totalitarian logic” cannot adequately deal with the 
ego’s	openness	to	infinity,	an	openness	that	makes	possible	reversals.	The	dedicated	
company man/woman may become the whistleblower; or a murderer may become 
a saint (ten Bos & Willmott, 2002, p. 778–779).
But	what	if	ambivalence	is	not	intended	to	be	eliminated	in	the	first	place,	but	managed	
in	effect	to	nourish	and	to	employ,	deploy	 it,	as	ten	Bos	and	Rhodes	(2003)	argued?	
Returning	to	the	pessimistic	view,	a	‘moral	impulse’	is	not	only	redirected	or	manipulated,	
rather, it is generated, constituted as a functional element in the larger order of morality 
management,	an	anchor	of	difference	between	explicit	organizational	compliance	and	the	
aberrant of one’s implicit yet anticipated virtue. And the practitioner who fails to dance 
on this smooth ice awaits not paradise but discipline and punishment. 
In	the	excerpts	of	the	forensic	ACT	team	discussing	patient	Mr.	G.	above,	we	can	observe	
the team estimating the level of risk, convinced that something should be done quickly 
to avert anyone (such as a third party) getting hurt. The team and the patient are quite 
literally on the threshold of two possible ways to eliminate the risk of (further) criminality, 
and	the	predicament	becomes	tangible	exactly	because	the	edges	of	both	regimes	grind	
against each other. For an ISD measure to be installed by the criminal court, a delinquent 
has to have committed a minimal amount of crimes, to justify the prolonged sentencing. 
The (emergency) compulsory admission, on the other hand, can only be court ordered 
if there is a causal link between the presence of danger and the presence of disorder 
and the conclusion that there is no other way to avert the danger than by compulsory 
admission. Both arrangements, or sanctions, ultimately have the same target: eliminate 
the danger to the third party (for as we have seen above, the danger to the patient is 
not eliminated when clinically admitted). And it is to this third party that the team most 
forcefully refers in their conversations (risk to someone in the clinic, someone on the 
street). 
From	within	the	criminal	law	–	psychiatry	nexus,	the	motive	or	leanings	of	the	‘criminally	
insane’ are not really of any relevance to the question of what action should be taken to 
minimize risk. In that plot, the patient is nothing more than a plot device himself, and the 
agency, the ability to steer the circumstances one way or the other, into one regime or 
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the other, is absent. From such a view, the patient is akin to a dangerous puppet, whose 
strings should be pulled to organize the elimination of criminality. By contrast, we hear 
practitioners emphasizing not only their concerns for third parties as they anticipate 
danger, but also their own ability to answer and to have others answer, to pull strings, 
and to do beyond what is normally required of them. But we hear practitioners such as Ed 
and Steve struggle, they correct their own sentences, or stop halfway through, or pause 
and halt, such as we have seen Ed do in the previous chapters on numerous occasions 
as well, and that may indicate anticipated interlocution, giving shape and content to 
Ed’s	discourse.	In	such	a	purview,	the	fault	lines	between	‘the	worker’	and	‘the	manager’	
and	‘the	patient’	fade	and	one	is	left	with	an	anticipation	of	equally	anticipating	others.	
Without a clear puppet master, the forensic ACT team is itself an open-ended steersman 
(see also ten Bos & Kaulingfreks, 2002), lost in an ongoing play on the edges of its wicked 
problems. This navigator, cyborg, kybernetes, then, is always on the threshold, adrift on a 
multitude of boundary lines crisscrossing, poised to disbalance, always ready to tip over. 
Is this navigator, then, holding all the (business) cards, pulling the strings, at the helm 
of our vessel? Surely, in Hieronymus Bosch’s plot of the Ship of Fools, the helmsman is 
concerned	only	with	filling	his	belly,	holding	not	an	oar	but	just	another	spoon	to	feed	
himself with. In a more optimistic purview, we could regard the navigator not as a devised, 
scripted enclosure, but rather in principle as something never (completely) stable. It is 
this instability that has been at the forefront of Bakhtin’s understanding of anticipated 
interlocution, relevant to governmentality in its Foucauldian sense. 
6.3 Answerability’s anticipated others
In his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1984b), Bakhtin draws our attention repeatedly to 
the ways in which the protagonist in Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground (2000/1864) 
anticipates the response of others to what he thinks and says. For the most part, those 
others,	and	their	responses,	are	not	‘real’	but	imagined.	They	nevertheless	completely	
preoccupy the thought of the protagonist, the unnamed Underground Man, and that 
anticipation pervades, guides, governs his thoughts, his discourse, and his actions. Notes 
from Underground	is	a	novella	in	two	parts.	The	first	appears	to	be	a	diary	excerpt	of	
a	bitter,	secluded	narrator,	who,	in	the	second	part	called	‘Apropos	of	the	Wet	Snow,’	
recounts	a	story	of	three	episodes	in	St.	Petersburg.	Recurring	themes	in	the	first	and	
second	part	are	critiques	against	the	influx	of	Western	European	thought	in	Russia,	in	
particular against the then current ideas of both nihilism and of the utopian society (the 
‘crystal	palace’).	In	the	first	part,	the	Underground	Man	argues	against	the	rationality	of	
humankind, arguing that humanity and its individual members, in their nature, desire 
irrationality and chaos as well, and will go as far as to destroy themselves if only for the 
sake of proving logic and reason wrong. But aware of the truth of this undercurrent, 
the narrator feels condemned to dwell in it and contemplate, rather than to emerge 
to the societal surface and act upon these thoughts. In the second part, we do see the 
Underground Man skimming to the societal surface: in his encounters with a military 
man he wants to stand up to but who does not even notice him; with a group of old 
acquaintances	who	he	seems	to	want	to	belong	to	but	fails	miserably	at;	and	finally	with	
a	woman	who	is	first	drawn	to	his	honesty	and	who	he	subsequently	pushes	away.	As	
Bakhtin argued, Dostoevsky the author has drawn up a hero without outer characteristics 
and	without	a	real	plot	which	both	help	the	hero	find	some	stability	in	time	and	place	–	
without	a	clear	chronotopic	grounding	–	being	endowed	with	some	definitions	that	help	
shape his form and thought. Instead, we have a hero who is all consciousness, drawn 
out in his own discourse, “pure voice”	(Bakhtin,	1993,	p.	53),	generating	a	hermetic	flow	
of thought from which there is no escape and which seeks to encompass all: “There is 
literally	nothing	we	can	say	about	the	hero	of	‘Notes	from	Underground’	that	he	does	not	
already	know	himself	[…]	and	he	stubbornly	and	agonizingly	soaks	up	all	these	definitions	
from within. Any point of view from without is rendered powerless in advance and denied 
the	finalizing	word”	(Bakhtin,	1993,	p.	52).	Denying	the	possible	finalizing	final	word	of	
the other is what drives the hero to anticipate that response, all possible responses, in 
his own discourse. 
What the Underground Man thinks about most of all is what others think or might 
think about him; he tries to keep one step ahead of every other consciousness, 
every other thought about him, every other point of view on him. At all the critical 
moments	of	his	confession	he	tries	to	anticipate	the	possible	definition	or	evaluation	
others might make of him, to guess the sense and tone of that evaluation, and tries 
painstakingly to formulate these possible words about himself by others, interrupting 
his own speech with the imagined rejoinders of others. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 52)
Ironically,	the	hero	without	predefined	qualities	is	obsessed	with	both	soaking	up	external	
definitions	of	 him	and	proving	 them	wrong,	 perpetually	 entangled	 into	 in	 internal	
dialogue, an “inescapable open-endedness, the vicious circle of that self-consciousness” 
(Bakhtin, 1993, p. 51), that pushes outward any actual person in the real world who might 
try to connect with him. All these ephemeral events with actual other persons become 
not plot but “material for his self-consciousness” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 51). Bakhtin argued 
that Notes from Underground	is	one	of	Dostoevsky’s	first	full-blown	attempts	to	do	away	
with the “monologic design” of the novel, in which the “hero is closed and his semantic 
boundaries	strictly	defined:	he	acts,	experiences,	thinks,	and	is	conscious	within	the	limits	
of	what	he	is,	that	is,	within	the	limits	of	his	images	defined	as	reality;	he	cannot	cease	
to	be	himself,	that	is,	he	cannot	exceed	the	limits	of	his	own	character”	(Bakhtin,	1993,	
p. 52). In contrast, in the way Dostoevsky developed the Underground Man, we have a 
hero here that seems conscious of the author’s design, knowing that all: 
definitions,	prejudiced	as	well	as	objective,	rest	in	his	hands	and	he	cannot	finalize	
them precisely because he himself perceives them; he can go beyond their limits and 
can thus make them inadequate. He knows that he has the final word, and he seeks 
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at	whatever	cost	to	retain	for	himself	this	final	word	about	himself,	the	word	of	his	
self-consciousness, in order to become in it that which he is not. His consciousness 
of	self	lives	by	its	unfinalizability,	by	its	unclosedness	and	its	indeterminacy.	(Bakhtin,	
1993, p. 53) 
But	how	do	we	move	towards	something	of	a	firmer	grasp	of	this	anticipation?	The	
utterance is key here, in that every utterance is addressed to some other, and within 
each utterance the dialogue with that anticipated other is already present: “When 
constructing my utterance, I try actively to determine this response. Moreover, I try to 
act in accordance with the response I anticipate, so this anticipated response, in turn, 
exerts	an	active	 influence	on	my	utterance	(I	parry	objections	that	 I	 foresee,	 I	make	
all kinds of provisos, and so forth).” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 95). In this discourse, as Bakhtin 
argued, there are no mere objects, and therefore there is “no word about an object, no 
secondhand referential word – there is only the word as address, the word dialogically 
contacting another word, a word about a word addressed to a word” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 
237). Bakhtin argued that the speaker already is the listener to the response and that is 
“precisely	what	matters”	(Bakhtin,	1986,	p.	95).	So,	although	an	‘actual’	response	can	be	
missing,	the	utterance	can	still	be	permeated	by	the	influence	of	an	addressee	and	her	
anticipated reaction. 
When speaking I always take into account the apperceptive background of the 
addressee’s	 perception	 of	 my	 speech:	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 he	 is	 familiar	 with	
the situation, whether he has special knowledge of the given cultural area of 
communication, his views and convictions, his prejudices (from my viewpoint), his 
sympathies and antipathies—because all this will determine his active responsive 
understanding of my utterance. These considerations also determine my choice of a 
genre	for	my	utterance,	my	choice	of	compositional	devices,	and,	finally,	my	choice	
of language vehicles, that is, the style of my utterance. (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 95–96)
This	anticipated	interlocution	defines	the	discourse	of	the	Underground	Man,	which	is	
always addressed to someone, and to speak about himself means to address himself. 
But the hero never only speaks to one other, or only to himself: 
… while speaking with himself, with another, with the world, he simultaneously 
addresses a third party as well: he squints his eyes to the side, toward the listener, the 
witness, the judge. This simultaneous triple-directedness of his discourse and the fact 
that he does not acknowledge any object without addressing it is also responsible 
for	the	extraordinarily	vivid,	restless,	agitated,	and	one	might	say,	obtrusive	nature	
of this discourse. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 237, emphasis added) 
This	 third	party	 (in	dialogue	 the	speaker	 is	 the	first	party	and	 the	addressee	 is	 the	
second	party)	 is	“‘a	stranger,	a	man	you’ll	never	know’—[who]	fulfills	his	functions	 in	
dialogue	outside	the	plot	and	outside	his	specificity	in	any	plot,	as	a	pure	‘man	in	man,’	
a	representative	of	‘all	others’	for	the	‘I’”	(Bakhtin,	1993,	p.	264).	Bakhtin	explained	how,	
in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (2005/1879–1880), the presence of this third 
party can completely overtake one’s thought: 
We will pause on one passage where this function of “the other” as such, whoever 
he	may	be,	 is	 revealed	with	extraordinary	 clarity.	 The	 “mysterious	visitor,”	 after	
confessing his crime to Zosima and on the eve of his public penance, returns to 
Zosima at night to murder him. What guided him was a pure hatred toward “the 
other” as such. Here is how he depicts his condition: “I went out from you then into 
the darkness, I wandered about the streets, struggling with myself. And suddenly 
I hated you so that I could hardly bear it. Now, I thought, he is all that binds me, 
and he is my judge. I can’t refuse to face my punishment tomorrow, for he knows 
all. It was not that I was afraid you would betray me (I never even thought of that), 
but	I	thought,	‘How	can	I	look	him	in	the	face	if	I	don’t	proclaim	my	crime?’	And	if	
you had been at the other end of the earth, but alive, it would have been all the 
same, the thought was unendurable that you were alive knowing everything and 
condemning me. I hated you as though you were the cause, as though you were to 
blame for everything.” (SS IX, 390-391, The Brothers Karamazov,	Part	Two,	Book	Six,	
Ch. 2). (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 264) 
On the other hand, the complete absence of the third party in dialogue is unbearable 
too, as Bakhtin argued, referring to Thomas Mann’s (1948/1947) work Doctor Faustus. In 
Mann’s	story	the	devil	explains,	
That is the secret delight and security of hell, that it cannot be denounced, that it 
lies hidden from language, that it simply is…which is why the words “subterranean,” 
“cellar,” “thick walls,” “soundlessness,” oblivion,” “hopelessness,” are but weak 
symbols...“here all things cease,” every mercy, every grace, every forbearance, every 
last trace of consideration for the beseeching, unbelieving objection: “You cannot, 
you really cannot do that with a soul” – but it is done, it happens, and without a word 
of accountability, in the sound-tight cellar, deep below God’s hearing, and indeed 
for all eternity. (Mann, 1948/1947, pp. 260–261)
Bakhtin noted that Mann had the fascist torture chambers in mind describing such a hell 
(the goal of torture, then, may not be to force someone to speak, it is to enforce the idea 
that the unspeakable is happening without anyone, not even a third party such as God, 
listening). In between these two limits (the near absolute presence or absence of the 
third party), every utterance carries within itself another particular third addressee, one 
with an ideal responsive understanding (“God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate 
human conscience, the people, the court of history, science, and so forth,” Bakhtin, 1986, 
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p.	126).	This	third	party,	or	super	addressee,	should	be	understood,	Bakhtin	insisted,	first	
and foremost as “a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 126). 
The	boundaries	between	the	words	of	one’s	‘own’	and	of	‘the	other’	are	not	rigid,	but	in	
a “tense dialogic struggle” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 143). It is these anticipated others, both the 
second and third parties, “already ringing in the hero’s ears” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 253) that 
fuse with the voices of other characters in Notes from Underground. The Underground 
Man (or who is to say it was not a woman?), unable to bear being a weak party in 
dialogue,	remains	“in	his	inescapable	opposition	to	the	‘other	person.’	A	real-life	human	
voice	and	the	other’s	anticipated	reply	are	equally	 incapable	of	finalizing	his	endless	
internal dialogue” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 254). Bakhtin argued that the reckoning “with an 
absent	interlocutor	can	be	more	or	less	intensive.	In	Dostoevsky	it	is	extremely	intense…
[and]	the	significance	of	this	style	in	his	subsequent	work	is	enormous”	(Bakhtin,	1993,	
p.	205),	and	the	sideward	glance	toward	this	absent	other	may	be	traced	in	his	texts	by	
two characteristic traits: “a certain halting quality to the speech, and its interruption by 
reservations” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 205). As Bakhtin elaborated, “especially where ellipses 
appear, the anticipated responses of others wedge themselves in” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 
214), and it is these ellipses and self-interruptions which may help us trace empirically 
the dialogic character of discourse, its addressivity, and the moral predicaments one 
may	find	oneself	in.	
Bakhtin (1981) suggested two types of discourse that come forth from a struggle between 
internal voices: authoritative discourse and internally persuasive discourse. It is when we 
assimilate the words of others on a fundamental level in which it determines “the very 
basis of our behavior” (p. 342), that we internalize these types of discourse. Authoritative 
discourse	already	has	 the	external	 authority	 attached	 to	 it	 and	does	not	need	our	
internal persuasion, for it demands that we acknowledge it, “that we make it our own…
the authoritative word is located in a distanced zone, organically connected with a past 
that is felt to be hierarchically higher…religious, political, moral; the word of a father, of 
adults and of teachers, etc.” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 342). Internally persuasive discourse, on 
the other hand, has no authority attached to it at all, and is: 
tightly interwoven with “one’s own word”…the internally persuasive word is half-ours 
and half-someone else’s. Its creativity and productivity consist precisely in the fact 
that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of 
our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It 
is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely developed, applied 
to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with 
new	contexts.	More	than	that,	it	enters	into	an	intense	interaction,	a	struggle	with	
other internally persuasive discourses. Our ideological development is just such 
an intense struggle within us for hegemony among various available verbal and 
ideological points of view, approaches, directions and values. The semantic structure 
of an internally persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open;	in	each	of	the	new	contexts	
that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean (Bakhtin, 
1981, p. 346, emphasis in original).
Internally persuasive and authoritative discourse may be fused into a single discourse 
but	this	unity	is	very	rare	according	to	Bakhtin,	who	stressed	the	sharp	gap	that	exists	
mostly between these two discourses and the struggles between them, which shape one’s 
(moral) consciousness. We may compare this struggle between these two discourses with 
the rules-based (compliance, and failure to comply with that authority) and the moral 
impulse (to do what feels right, and inversely, to betray yourself and your integrity if you 
do not) distinction. A predicament hard to resist, and the forensic ACT practitioner, then, 
may end up remaining a prisoner of the passage, and becomes in this plotted threshold 
between compliance and moral impulse, something like a divided self (Bochner, 1997; 
Laing, 1960). 
In the following, I will deploy the genre in which Notes from Underground (a diatribe: 
“a conversation with an absent interlocutor,” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 154) was written, the 
Menippean	 satire.	 This	 ‘inside-out’	 discourse	 allows	 a	more	 dialogical	 inquiry	 into	
answerability,	and	the	genre	was	“able	to	wield	such	immense	influence	–	to	this	day	
almost entirely unappreciated in scholarship – in the history of the development of 
European novelistic prose” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 119). The Menippean satire allows for a 
writing	that	“seeks	to	offer	an	escape	from	boundaries	as	well	as	being	illusive,	playful,	
seductive	and	fluid”	(Phillips	et	al.,	2014,	p.	12).	Weinbrot	(2005)	described	the	promise	
of the Menippea more dramatically: 
One could set the dead against the recent living, the ancient against the modern, 
nation against nation, man against woman, cleric against courtier, and always seek to 
find	or	exploit	a	truth	hidden	in	the	world	of	warm	flesh	and	hot	blood.	(pp.	66–67)	
Moreover, as Sullivan and McCarthy (2005, p. 633) argued, “the advantage of the 
Menippean design is that it interrogates the participants, encourages them to hear 
their own characterization, and invites them to respond…it emphasizes the potential 
to	be	different	through	dialogue	with	the	other.”	 In	other	words,	a	Menippean	satire	
discloses	an	unrestrained	space	to	play	with	different	 ideas,	and	flesh	out	felt	truths	
and urgent problems, in the face of convention and self-evidence. What writing in the 
genre of Menippean satire does, according to Weinbrot, is to oppose a threatening, 
false	orthodoxy	by	mocking	attitudes	that	have	become	normal.	It	is	“a	genre	for	serious	
people who see serious trouble and want to do something about it” (Weinbrot, 2005, p. 
63).	In	Menippean	texts,	hyperboles	and	other	devices	are	used	to	expose	these	attitudes,	
and	different	styles	and	multiple	voices	are	adapted	to	unhinge	the	seeming	univocity	
of	discourse.	 It	 is	here	that	 I,	as	a	searching	author,	a	 ‘needy	self’	 (Sullivan,	2011),	try	
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to prod into an autoethnographic story of anticipated interlocution, paraphrasing the 
Underground Woman more than once. 
6.4 What is to be done?
At that time I was only 24-years old. I had been a civil servant at the Ministry of Health. 
There,	in	the	office,	I	tried	to	fit	in,	but	I	noticed	that	my	colleagues	not	only	considered	me	
unusual, but – as I also kept thinking – seemed to look at me with a certain repugnance. 
There	was	one	in	our	office	who	had	a	preposterous	teddy	bear	tie.	Another	seemed	to	
make a daytime job out of Solitaire, more than anything else. I would not even have dared 
to glimpse at anyone, but neither of these men was embarrassed – either with regard to 
his clothes, or somehow morally. And even if they had imagined that, it would have been 
the same to them, so long as their managers did not dare to pay heed. I know now that 
it was I who, owing to my endless vanity and self-demanding, repeatedly looked upon 
myself with furious disappointment and, consequently, attributed my view to everyone 
else.	Of	course,	all	I	ever	wanted	was	to	be	so	confident	as	to	wear	a	teddy	bear	tie,	but	
I would settle with at least an amazing intellect, if you will. All these colleagues I reviled 
and	feared	concurrently,	always	the	one	to	drop	my	eyes	first,	which	plagued	me	further:	
“I never have been a coward at heart, though I have always been a coward in action,” or 
so	the	saying	goes	(Dostoevsky,	2000/1864,	p.	51).	So	finally	I	changed	jobs	and	moved	
to	another	Ministry,	a	move	which	would	amount	to	a	fiasco	as	well	which	I	realized	on	
my	first	workday	there,	but	which	I	managed	to	stretch	out	to	an	unnoted	drama	of	two	
years, shrinking more into my corner as yet another pale shadow from a pen-pusher 
family tradition. 
Well, by all means, I remained so, washing up into the role of manager at a mental health 
care provider. In the second year I came to work here, I started this part-time doctoral 
study into the workings of the forensic ACT team at hand. From the moment I heard of 
the	existence	of	this	team,	I	could	not	wait	to	find	how	this	nexus	between	health	care	
and criminal justice was played out in everyday practice. But in the daily planning meeting 
that	morning,	on	my	very	first	day	of	fieldwork,	I	became	daunted	quickly	by	stories	of	
absorbing verbal abuse and even threats of physical violence, and by the light-hearted 
way the practitioners discussed them. When the meeting came to an end, a nurse, whom 
I will call Cindy, agreed I could accompany her on a visit to a patient’s house. On our way 
there,	I	asked	Cindy	about	her	experience	doing	this	kind	of	work,	and	she	told	me	how	
exciting	and	diverse	it	was.	She	said	it	felt	like	the	right	thing	to	do,	providing	care	to	
vulnerable people who were in real need of it. However, Cindy continued, being deployed 
to sometimes volatile home circumstances meant that she had to be constantly on guard: 
not knowing what those circumstances were until the door was shut behind her. As we 
drew near to the house, I asked Cindy about the patient. I remember she responded by 
describing	him	as	quite	an	imposing	figure.	On	approaching	his	front	door,	I	nervously	
asked her how I should behave. She smiled, and I recall her saying… 
Cindy: It’s no big deal, but he’s is a bit wary of meeting strangers, especially men he’s not 
familiar	with.	But	it’s	going	to	be	fine.	(day	1,	24	Sep.	2012)
I	managed	to	clear	my	throat	for	one	final	question:	“Okay...is	there	anything	in	particular	
I should avoid?” To this, her unstirred reply was: 
Cindy: Nah, just act naturally. 
But	the	sense	of	‘acting	naturally’	had	already	abandoned	me.	I	became	painfully	aware	of	
not having acted naturally from the moment I stepped into that team meeting, conscious 
of my foolish awkwardness. And as far as I could tell, me acting naturally in the eyes of this 
patient amounted to being a bearded stranger: the one thing that would set him alight. 
As I tried to recompose myself, Cindy rang the door. We waited for the door to open…
Only in hindsight did it come to me that I had not written about this event previously. 
It was as if I had never answered for what occurred that day, after I departed: for what 
I	did	and	what	I	did	not	do.	It	is	only	just	now,	on	my	final	passage	toward	academic	
scholarship, that I am beginning to answer: not just for what happened then, but more 
so	for	where	I	came	to	find	myself	afterward.	In	an	attempt	to	understand	responsibility	
in the wicked problems of the forensic ACT team and follow through the consequence of 
tracing	the	significance	of	anticipated	others	in	answerability.	Nothing	really	happened	
when we were waiting at the door. I am sure nothing happened, but I still remember 
wondering	whether	Cindy	had	played	me	for	a	fool,	to	give	me	a	little	scare	(‘surely	a	
managerial clerk knows nothing about practice!’). Or maybe it was only her response to 
‘just	act	naturally’	that	kept	nagging.	What	did	she	mean,	really?	I	should	have	asked	her.	
But I left the whole incident behind me. I later decided my thesis would be a theoretical 
piece on responsibility with just an illustrative case study, instead of an ethnography. 
This led me to focus on non-participatory observations of team meeting discussions. 
Yes,	meetings	that	were	conveniently	situated	in	my	own	natural	office	room	habitat.	You	
might say – as I am sure you would – that this is a turn away from those monumental 
in-depth studies such as Watson’s (1994) and Jackall’s (1988). Unable to touch upon the 
tangible work life of these practitioners, in my circumscriptions I turn my approach to 
the	inquiry	upside	down:	“Instead	of	bringing	possible	knowledge	into	the	context	of	
our actual life from where it is made answerable, we attempt to bring our actual life into 
communion	with	a	possible,	theoretical	context”	(Bakhtin,	1993,	pp.	50–51).	A	world	made	
up	with	stuff	like	‘unfinalizability,’	‘chronotopes,’	‘functionalist	technocracy,’	no	less...	A	
world	so	detached	it	does	not	matter	if	I	or	anyone	else	would	actually	exist.	You	might	
say	I	did	not	experience	anything	happening	in	front	of	that	door,	because	I	was	too	busy	
attempting not to live the moment, a move similar to the non-participatory observation 
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of the team meetings afterward. Present yet not present at these team meetings, I was in 
awe	of	the	practitioners	and	concurrently	conflicted	about	being	different,	not	belonging,	
remaining disconnected and targeting my answerability toward larger wholes instead of 
manifesting in shared moments. It is what it is. 
I know I have already mentioned that I was always somewhat of an awkward outsider, be 
it	in	management,	team	practice	or	scientific	community.	It	would	have	eased	my	mind	
to be an insider: to live the rituals and think the thoughts that come with that whole. To 
be a humble servant, you might say, and write like I am supposed to. Like you suppose 
me to write, like you feel entitled to have me write in a particular way, turn me into the 
imposter you have long sensed I am. Well, who reads nowadays, anyway...And the patient, 
you	ask?	Did	he	even	have	a	name?	An	absent	other	completely	finalized	to	the	point	of	
a grotesque caricature in my account. To be sure, he is only described in the words of 
others, and he might as well have been lying dead behind the front door. I have been told 
he was not dead, but I do not actually know how he is doing now. But the story of Cindy 
is	not	over,	at	least.	So	I	do	have	a	partial	response,	alright?	Years	after	that	first	day,	I	
sought out Cindy and found she was still working for the same organization as I was – in 
fact, in a building right opposite from my own workplace. I decided to email her and ask if 
she remembered me, and whether she would be willing to talk about what had happened 
then. To my delight, she replied the same day. I happen to have a verbatim transcript.
>>> [Cindy] 26-03-2015 10:20 >>>
Hi Chris,
It’s a long time ago and I can still remember that situation and you 
;-) A visit to Westside [deleted for privacy considerations] Had he been 
standing on the balcony, refusing to open the door?
It’s nice to hear that you’re still doing research here. It would be nice 
to meet and talk about the text for your paper.
Best, 
[Cindy]
I met Cindy soon after at her new workplace, an acute psychiatric unit. We found a place 
near	the	coffee	machine	and	the	instant	soup	boxes	and	began	to	talk.	After	a	little	while	
I had her read the story I had written down about this event.
Cindy It’s funny that you wrote your thoughts like that… [smiles while reading] Yeah, that 
was	some	patient,	for	sure…[reads]	Oh	how	nice,	I’m	a	‘Cindy’!	[Laughs]…‘But	it’s	
going	to	be	fine’	[laughing]…Yeah,	what	is	that,	‘just	act	naturally’?…It’s	pretty	funny,	
actually.” (interview IV, 16 Apr. 2015)
She	smiled	when	she	read	my	text.	I	finally	asked	her	what	had	been	on	my	mind	all	the	
time.
One of the things I didn’t really grasp is whether you were having fun with me, testing 
me,	by	telling	me	that	‘it’s	going	to	be	fine’	and	asking	me	to	‘just	act	naturally.’
Before I turn towards her answer, I remembered that aesthetic writing is what we love 
to do, be it beautiful, clear, truthful, neutral, (dis)passionate, and so on. We could have 
endless debates on what it properly should entail, and, in fact, we do so. But the aesthetic, 
for	Bakhtin,	and	for	our	purposes	here,	is	something	more	than	a	reflection	on	these	
attributes. According to Haynes (2013), 
The uniqueness of Bakhtin’s approach to aesthetics is that it is based not on traditional 
aesthetic values such as truth, goodness, or beauty, but on the phenomenology of 
self–other relations, relations that are embodied – in actual bodies – in time and 
space. (p. 18) 
Haynes observes how Bakhtin (1990), in “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,” describes 
aesthetic activity as a composition of three moments: projecting the self, returning 
to one’s singular place, and consummating (making whole) the other. Now, all three 
moments are relevant to our discussion. The moment of consummating the other is 
relevant, in that the writer has a responsibility to give shape and unity to her characters: 
“the author knows and sees more not only in the direction in which the hero is looking 
and	seeing,	but	also	in	a	different	direction,	in	a	direction	which	is	in	principle	inaccessible	
to the hero himself” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 13). But the author who refuses to return to her 
own	unique	place	and	endeavors	to	empathize	wholly,	loses	herself	in	‘aestheticizing’	her	
answerability, and her world becomes a set of roles and plays. In doing so, she aspires 
to live her (academic) life as if it were a story with herself as the protagonist, and forgets 
she is answerable for the role she plays – as the one playing outside that role – and not 
as “the one represented, i.e. the hero” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 18). But surely this is no concern 
to you, and these detached musings seem no more than needless procrastination. As 
to Cindy’s response… 
Cindy:	 No,	no	I	wasn’t.	You	know,	what’s	difficult	about	these	patients	is	that	they	have	
such a history. I didn’t want to go through that whole history with you because 
it might give you preconceptions that would lead to fear or prejudice and make 
you	engage	with	him	differently.	And	of	course,	if	you	don’t	have	a	practitioner’s	
background,	it’s	important	for	you	to	go	with	an	experienced	professional	who	can	
read the subtle cues and think on the spot: “the patient is becoming uneasy, let’s 
take a step back.” That’s just how the interaction together should unfold, although 
it	isn’t	always	that	obvious,	of	course.	I	thought:	it’s	your	first	day	on	the	road.	If	I	
described everything beforehand, you’d already have a judgment about the patient, 
and	I	was	also	curious	to	see	–	I	wanted	you	to	just	experience	it,	what	we	were	
about, what we usually do. But he wasn’t there. That was a conscious decision, to 
first	see	the	patient	and	to	ask	you	afterwards	about	your	experience.	But	there	was	
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no	debriefing	since	the	patient	was	absent.	I	wasn’t	aware	of	this	[points	toward	
my	text]	at	the	time…	That	may	also	be	how	I	do	things:	I	like	to	have	people	just	
experience,	you	know?	Maybe	I	have	a	certain	playfulness:	just	let	it	happen	and	see	
how	it	affects	you,	and	then	afterwards	we	share	experiences	and	compare	them	
with	the	electronic	patient	record…I	had	the	confidence	that	I	would	be	able	to	
read the patient because I knew him – and that’s a risk in itself. So yeah, it is trust, 
the	fact	is	that	you	really	had	to	have	confidence	in	me.	(interview	IV,	16	Apr.	2015)
Maybe it was a mistake to begin writing about that event, or the mistake was to impose 
my	text	and	put	her	on	the	spot	and	invite,	force	a	response	out	of	her.	What	could	she	
have	said,	anyway?	I	promised	to	send	her	the	final	text,	and	I	did	when	it	was	published	
in a journal not long ago. I am sure that she must have looked over my email somehow, 
or forgot to read it, or forgot to give me a response. Maybe, in the end, she did not like 
what she read. Surely, compared to the turbulence and meaningfulness of her daily 
work,	this	must	have	been	of	no	significance	in	any	case.	Even	now,	all	this	comes	out	
not too well in my recollection; it feels like corrective punishment of this spite in the 
underground. We seem to have grown unaccustomed to living life, it feels like a service, 
so	inferior	to	the	mediated	lives	we	are	fed	with.	Maybe	I	should	be	saying	‘I’	instead	of	
‘we,’	being	called	an	imposter,	an	amateur,	a	bungler,	myself.	But	I	am	done	with	writing	
now. However, my notes do not end here, being the kind of person unable to abdicate, 
and resolve…An inconclusive end, for now. 
6.5	 ‘The	court	of	dispassionate	human	conscience’
As to the purposes of the half-baked murmuring above, an attempt was made to 
illustrate the dead ends of academic inquiry when internal dialogue with anticipated 
others dominates. If “a continuous living process of questioning, discussing, creating, 
generating and regenerating meaning…in a continuous movement forward to a future 
of ever-broadening and deepening horizons, is the radical and fundamental essence 
of	Bakhtin’s	thought”	(Simons,	1988,	p.	22),	then	it	should	be	added	that	this	‘essence’	
cannot be drawn into a single coherent consciousness. Well, this is basically what Cindy 
told me. The genre of the Menippean satire, as a vessel for those who seek to challenge 
the	orthodoxies	of	our	practices	and	communities,	may	“remind	us	that	nightmares	occur	
while we are awake, and that sleep is not an acceptable alternative to moral responsibility” 
(Weinbrot, 2005, p. 302). Science, too, has its ways to do away with the third addressee. 
The	ongoing	dialogic	struggle	appears	to	be	absent	when	this	third	party	is	identified	
as	 the	 “‘objective	position’	as	 such,	with	 the	position	of	 some	 ‘scientific	cognition’”	
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 143). But Bakhtin warns us against this move, which fragments the 
whole utterance and our understanding of it. 
The	position	 of	 the	 third	 party	 is	 quite	 justified	when	one	person	 can	 assume	
another’s position, when a person is completely replaceable [cf. Levinas’ primal 
disrespect,	1961,	p.	298].	But	it	is	justified	only	in	those	situations,	and	when	solving	
those problems, where the integral and unrepeatable individuality of the person 
is	not	required,	that	is,	when	a	person,	so	to	speak,	is	specialized,	reflecting	only	a	
part of his individuality that is detached from the whole, when he is acting not as 
I myself, but “as an engineer,” “as a physicist,” and so forth. In the area of abstract 
scientific	cognition	and	abstract	thought,	such	a	replacement	of	one	person	with	
another, that is, abstraction from the I and thou, is possible (but even here, probably, 
only up to a certain point). In life as the object of thought (abstract thought), man in 
general	exists	and	a	third	party	exists,	but	in	the	most	vital,	experienced	life	only	I, 
thou,	and	he	exist.	And	only	in	this	life	are	such	primary	realities	as	my	word	and	the	
other’s	word	disclosed	(exist).	And	in	general	those	primary	realities	that	have	not	
yet been the subjects of cognition (abstract, generalizing) therefore go unnoticed 
by it. (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 144)
We	started	this	chapter	with	a	third	and	final	everyday	wicked	problem	of	our	forensic	ACT	
team: what is to be done with our prisoners of the passage, how do practitioners navigate 
them	along	logistic	devices,	themselves	edges	of	regimes	of	societal	othering	the	‘man-
in-man,’ plotting themselves into threshold situations where they come to answer a 
multiplicity	of	possible	others,	actual	and	anticipated.	Crucially,	the	team	excerpts	above	
address not so much the responsibility for the patient or for team colleagues, but are 
meant to indicate dialogues which are addressed, sideways, to third parties involved. 
That third party may be a practitioner of another organization or, more broadly, society 
at	large,	either	directly	as	a	proximate	fragment	of	the	public	in	harm’s	way	or,	more	
conceptually, as the general public body having a say, a verdict, a stake, in the (in)action 
that the team members deliberate. On the crossing of the mental health care court order 
and	the	criminal	justice	habitual	offender	procedure,	the	team	of	practitioners	itself	is	
drawn into a wicked problem they need to answer for, responsible for actions without the 
right to be wrong in their consequences (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Pivotal in coping with 
these predicaments is the presence of team dialogue itself, such as it unfolds in the daily 
planning meetings. An active receptivity towards the thoughts of responsive colleagues 
may facilitate the worrying practitioner to disclose a hermetic internal dialogue with 
anticipated others. And to come to a sense of closure from within the internally persuasive 
discourse	that	continually	finds	new	ways	to	mean,	amidst	the	ambivalence	and	ambiguity	
that these practitioners are organized into. 
A failure to move beyond regarding the other as a subject of cognition amounts to what 
Morson and Emerson (1990) have suggested that Bakhtin might have called “psychological 
otherlessness”: a refusal to risk genuine encounters with others (p. 188). Resonating 
Churchman, Levinas suggested a loophole that may denaturalize the thought of the 
navel-staring academic, “seeing the possibilities of the other as your own possibilities, 
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of being able to escape the closure of your own identity and what is bestowed on you, 
toward something which is not bestowed on you and which nevertheless is yours – this 
is paternity (sic). This future beyond my own being, this dimension constitutive of time, 
takes on a concrete content in paternity” (Levinas & Nemo, 1985, p. 70). And so, quite 
literally, I came to stop and talk with my then nine-year-old daughter about responsibility, 
for she, as a child, seems to understand the core concepts in life in a more practical and 
everyday sense, less detached one might say, than I do. I asked her what she thought of 
the people working in the forensic ACT team. 
Olivia: Yes, I think they’re brave. And really nice. That they want to help people. And uh…
put themselves on the line for someone who does something bad or something 
bad to them and that they go on anyway.
Chris: Yes. And do you think they are…uh, responsible? 
Olivia: What do you mean? 
Chris: That they, you know what responsibility is, yes you know what responsibility is, 
right? 
Olivia: Yes, but…
Chris:	 That	you	want	to	take	care	for	another	person	for	example,	to	take	care	something	
good happens and not something bad. 
Olivia:		 Well,	not	exactly,	but	they	should	act	if	it	gets	worse,	of	course.	
Chris: Yes, then they take that responsibility, right? Do you think they have a responsibility 
for	a	neighbor	[of	a	patient],	for	example?
Olivia: Not really.
Chris: But a bit?
Olivia: A little bit, yes. Because if you solve the problems of this patient, then you solve 
directly that the neighbor is safe.
Chris: Yes…
Olivia: You get it? 
Chris: Yes, yes, so then they have…
Olivia: …To kill two birds with one stone.
Chris: Yes. And if the team doesn’t do that, are they responsible for not acting? For the 
fact that the neighbor might stay unsafe?
Olivia:  Hmm…yeah well….Half yes, half no.
Chris: Hmm, that’s tricky, right? Hey, and talking about responsibility, suppose dad did 
this kind of work? And that I was a member of such a team?
Olivia: Hmm. 
Chris: What would you think about that?
Olivia: Uh…cool, but also not really, because I’d be afraid you were going to get beaten 
by this crazy person or something.
Chris: Hmm, yes. So am I a little responsible for you, too?
Olivia: For what? What do you mean?
Chris: For you as my daughter.
Olivia: But that has nothing to do with this, has it?
Chris: No? So, if I am responsible for something in my work, then I’m not responsible as 
a father for you anymore? 
Olivia: You are, but, that’s not really related with these people, you know?
Chris: Concerning those problems.
Olivia Hmm, yes. 
Chris: But you might also say: “Well, I think it’s scary that you do this kind of work, so I’d 
like you to do another kind of work because you’re responsible for me and if you 
put yourself in danger then you may not be able to take enough responsibility for 
me if you’re in the hospital.”
Olivia: But, mama. Mama. 
Chris: What about mama?
Olivia: Mama can always help you. 
Chris: That’s true. At home. 
Olivia: Yes. 
Chris:	 Because	these	people	do	exist,	so	someone	needs	to	help	these	people,	right,	you	
know? 
Olivia: Yes.
Chris: But rather by someone else, or preferably by us?
Olivia: It depends who.
Chris: Hmm.
Olivia: It depends who of us. 
Chris:	 Well,	not	you.	But	I	could,	for	example.	
Olivia: I’d rather you don’t.
Chris: Rather someone else?
Olivia: Yes. Rather by someone who does not have kids because he doesn’t have to look 
after	different	things	at	the	same	time.	(interview	V,	23	Aug.	2016)
Olivia encountered ambiguity: it makes sense that the team in some way is answerable to 
a neighbor if they can anticipate violence toward her, but the argument feels stretched. It 
depends on how such an event unfolds. As Olivia replied, the responsibilities as a father 
and as a team member do not seem to be related. But then they do. I can try to think 
away my responsibilities toward my daughter while at work and live my life in separated 
frames, but that does not mean they have gone. Maybe I should not be the one doing 
this kind of work, Olivia suggested. But what about the practitioners? Who answers to 
them? Those who work in an organization and help prepare for team members to be 
deployed in risky situations, may very well answer to them, not only for how well they 
have	prepared	(for	the	‘how’),	but	also	for	doing	that	in	the	first	place	(for	the	‘what’).	
We, then, are answerable, in light of our relation to another, each from within our own 
particular center of responsibility. And so am I, answerable to those I write about (even 
when, as I suggested above, I anonymize my data), those I write for, and those who 
are in any way impacted by my writing. Along with Bakhtin, then, I am learning that 
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responsibility is not about rules or empathy, nor is it about ideals and critical turning 
points. Instead, it is about becoming and remaining answerable to each other in the 
ambiguities of the everyday; about maintaining an active receptivity, a willingness to be 
open to the otherness of the other, beyond anticipation. Since in anticipated interlocution 
others transform into images of strangers, who in a zone of ambivalence quickly appear 
dangerous. 
Chris:	 So,	uh	let	me	think,	do	you	have	any	final	questions	you	want	to	ask	me?	I	asked	
you so many…
Olivia:	 Uh,	so	do	you	actually	do	any	interesting	stuff?
6
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7 Threshold
What	better	way	to	put	an	end	to	a	thesis	on	the	unfinalizable	than	to	withhold	any	
conclusive remark? Again, better in theory perhaps, but in practice…On the doorstep 
between health care and criminal justice, I have tried to make you witness to a team of 
practitioners facing wicked problems; where basic human needs such as housing, health, 
work, relationships and safety are at stake for their patients. Problems they are organized 
into but cannot hope to solve, while being deprived of the right to be wrong in doing 
something about them. And so, the question of responsibility is pressing, not only in daily 
practice but also in theory. Not only are there no easy answers to this question, but this 
inquiry should have made clear that it is not an easy question to begin with, either. Not 
for this team, and probably not for contemporary organizing practice more generally 
where	clusters	of	responsibilities	are	organized	into	 ‘responsibilized’	teams.	A	critical	
purview on the organization of responsibility brings one into the theory of underground, 
that of CMS: “the place where philosophy and critical social science come together: the 
place	where	philosophical	concepts	and	social	scientific	concepts	meet	without	being	
reduced to one another” (Spoelstra 2007, 163). To my mind, CMS could do with a little 
more moral outrage and draw nearer to the most vulnerable, to contest its own practices 
and boundaries, and to engage a mode of active receptivity. Yet in the face of a radical 
destruction	of	our	planet	and	a	conspiring	‘fast	science,’	the	conclusion	is	that	this	 is	
anything	but	obvious.	When	radical	alternatives	are	thus	needed,	box-breaking	ideas	
should come to the fore: to think in possibilities. I have aspired to provide one such study 
here,	in	the	domain	of	organizational	ethics,	drawing	first	and	foremost	on	the	work	of	
Mikhail Bakhtin. 
Ambivalence, ambiguity, suspension, disruption, awkwardness, messiness and other 
concepts	I	have	deployed	to	try	to	move	beyond,	‘unfinalize,’	seemingly	given	delineations	
and	demarcations,	engaging	in	an	‘antidiscipline’	that	does	not	seek	to	propagate	and	
appropriate a new truth, but that plays alongside the edges of our understanding of 
how organization works. The common phenomenon – the wickedness of the ethics of 
wicked	problems	you	might	say	–	is	that	of	the	unfinalizable:	in	the	intersubjective	and	
intrasubjective threshold, in the narrative threshold between the spatiotemporality of 
the everyday and of the adventure, and in the threshold between the word and the 
‘signified.’	If	we	wish	to	understand	and	critique	how	people	in	their	organizations	come	
to	find	themselves	answerable	 for	unresolvable	problems,	 it	helps	 if	we	 look	at	 the	
phenomenon manifested in these three interrelated areas. As it would be a little improper 
to	study	and	write	about	the	unfinalizable	in	a	traditional	finalized	way	–	or,	to	put	it	more	
dramatically: to avoid the fate of Mr. Why – I have tried to follow the content through in 
form and suggest answerability itself as a method of inquiry. I suggested that the quality 
of this method is indicated by how it draws in all those involved, evoking a readiness 
to answer each other: for how a larger work problem comes to be boiled down to a 
personal	concern,	for	how	people	with	good	intentions	expose	themselves	and	others	to	
situations of physical force, and for how people acting on moral impulse seem to become 
of no concern to each other. The method itself draws heavily on Sullivan’s translation 
of Bakhtin’s ideas of a dialogic approach to qualitative inquiry. Methodologically I have 
navigated with Sullivan along the spectrum of discourse analysis, to where questions 
demanded. 
7.1	 A	theoretical	reflection	on	active	receptivity
The path toward responsibility as an unwavering mode of active receptivity meandered 
along the obscure and not-quite-so obscure, and in this sense I felt right at home. I 
have tried to elaborate on this active receptivity, or mode of responsiveness, and lack 
thereof, in what has been written and done by scholars before me, by how the team of 
practitioners talk with each other and deal with their responsibilities in their daily work, 
and	by	the	ways	I	have	tried	to	construct	this	text	before	you:	open,	reflexive,	over-
signifying at times – well, perhaps (too) many times, really. This active receptivity refers 
to	an	ongoing	willingness	to	respond	to	the	openness	of	the	self-other	axis	and	the	
spatiotemporal	‘eventness’	and	to	the	openness	of	language	itself.	As	Levinas	(1969/1961)	
argued, with Bakhtin, language “presupposes interlocutors, a plurality” (p. 73). Reason 
lives	within	language,	and	rationality	comes	forth	with	the	language	that	finds	itself	in	
relating	oneself	with	another,	with	the	unicity	of	any	other,	with	the	unfinalizability	of	
their otherness: 
…	the	first	signification,	is	the	infinity	of	the	intelligence	that	presents	itself	(that	is,	
speaks	to	me)	in	the	face,	if	reason	is	defined	by	signification	rather	than	signification	
being	defined	by	the	impersonal	structures,	if	universality	reigns	as	the	presence	of	
humanity	in	the	eyes	that	look	at	me,	if,	finally,	we	recall	that	this	look	appeals	to	my	
responsibility and consecrates my freedom as responsibility and gift of self – then 
the pluralism of society could not disappear in the evaluation to reason, but would 
be its condition. (Levinas, 1969/1961, p. 208)
A monological world that imposes its authority on an equivalence between language and 
the person-as-object, disintegrates the addressivity of answerability, attempts to negate 
the sideward glance toward other, third addressees, and places us all in a torture chamber, 
figuratively	speaking.	Additionally,	I	have	suggested	that	Levinas’s	idea	of	the	infinite	is	
actually	more	like	the	idea	of	the	unfinalizable,	that	is	hard	to	escape	the	binary	good/bad	
approach also for philosophers such as Levinas and de Certeau, and that Merleau-Ponty 
was	wrong	to	dub	the	flesh	‘itself’	as	chiasmus.	I	did	not	mean	to	engage	in	yet	another	
critical Foucauldian study, but he has emerged as a source of inspiration throughout. 
Along	with	Erdinast-Vulcan,	this	has	been	a	loop	of	philosophers	of	exile,	self-professed	
troublemakers	and	the	self-destructive	insufferable.	Rather	than	exhaustive,	I	have	tried	
to draw in the relevant, without implying the irrelevance of the left out. I could have 
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drawn	in	the	work	of,	for	example,	Michel	Serres	on	noise,	Paul	Ricoeur	on	emplotment,	
Donna Haraway on cyborgs, and Gilles Deleuze on…I guess everything, but I did not for 
reasons pertaining more to practical limitations than anything else. There is so much 
more	to	explore.
Drawing upon the work of Bakhtin, as Holquist and others have argued, is almost 
exclusively	done	in	one	of	two	ways,	and	both	are	waning	in	numbers:	on	one	side	you	
have	the	Bakhtinians	in	the	field	of	literary	theory,	and	on	the	other	you	have	the	fringy	
characters	of	other	disciplines	seeking	to	 ‘apply	Bakhtin’	 in	their	own	field.	Certainly	
an awkward outsider among die-hards in the 15th International Bakhtin Conference 
(Stockholm, 2014), I claim to have gone a little further than just apply a concept like 
carnival into OMT. I put some work into reading Bakhtin and in an active receptive reading 
some of the works he read – which has turned out a greater conceptual inspiration than 
anything else. I have claimed with Morson that Bakhtin’s drive to produce the work that 
he	did	was	a	moral	one,	seeking	‘the	responsible’	out	in	pathways	available	and	promising	
to him. It is in this way that the deployment of his thought into this study should be 
regarded.	What	I	have	done	a	little	differently	from	some	other	Bakhtin-inspired	studies	in	
OMT/CMS is to draw Bakhtin into turbulent, violent and remote pockets of organizational 
practice. Where the potential (deemed positive) of the carnivalesque, the open-ended 
and	the	polyphonic	has	been	turned	against	itself,	focusing	not	explicitly	on	(underlying)	
power structures, but on the daily practice of people talking (each) other into and out of 
trouble. This has thus been a somewhat darker Bakhtin-inspired study. 
7.2 Practical implications of dialogue as the prime concern
Relentless pressure to have practitioners constantly make transparent what they do and 
when they do it, is, in the genre of the grid, a thing of daily life. The red tape associated 
with	this	trend	has	been	documented	amply	both	in	popular	and	scientific	discourse,	
which needs no repetition here. One particularly relevant aspect to this study does 
deserve special attention and that is the endangered space of practitioners to engage in 
meaningful, open-ended dialogue with each other. Not just because that is the humane 
thing to do, although that is an end in itself, but also, more instrumentally, because it 
should	be	clear	from	the	above	that	the	inextricably	difficult	problems	team	practitioners	
face together cannot be protocolized into a further allocation of the responsibilities 
externalized	into	the	individual	worker;	because	it	is	morally	wrong	to	do	so	and	because	
it	is	‘technically’	irresponsible	to	expect	a	single	person	to	deal	with	these	precarious	
situations. For the practitioner driven by a moral impulse, internally persuasive dialogue 
is	likely	to	take	over	at	the	expense	not	only	of	the	practitioner	in	question	but	also	at	
the	expense	of	the	patient	and	the	co-workers	 inside	and	outside	the	organizational	
boundaries. Open-ended dialogue, where space is made because team practitioners 
feel	that	it	is	necessary	to	do	so,	is	threatened	because	it	is	hard	for	‘the	organization’	
to account for what is done in these meetings (What do they really talk about? Why 
does it have to take so long?’). Of course, in health care, time should be spent with the 
patient	(‘nothing	about	us	without	us’),	but	undirected	space	and	time	is	vital	too:	to	
share	viewpoints,	concerns,	expertise,	for	doing	the	right	things	and	doing	them	with	
care, with an active receptivity toward each other. 
There are limits to the gravity and the sheer number of clusters of responsibilities one 
team can handle. And, it is an illusion to think we can just organize wicked problems 
away, or that wicked problems are a mere consequence of the way we are organizing 
ourselves.	There	are	advantages	 in	building	 teams	that	employ	different	disciplines	
with close connections to both patients and to the plethora of other public and health 
service	providers	involved	in	support	(and	supervision)	of	what	some	would	call	‘difficult	
patients’ and what I have also led you to believe they amount to. Of course a cold, 
distant and authoritative attitude toward the patient is not to be desired, but neither is 
engaging in a patient–practitioner relationship which is so open-ended that one could 
confuse it with friendship or family. The predicament of navigating between alignment 
and transgredience is part of an ongoing dialogue about what good care is, in principle 
and in daily work life. You could say it is better that people talk each other into trouble 
than	for	them	to	get	into	trouble	without	even	talking	about	it	first.	So	I	am	not	saying	
people should not talk to each other, on the contrary. Protocols and procedures will 
take you only so far: guiding one alongside proper compliance to clinical judgement 
in any particular case, inevitably. But what I am assuming is that the more turbulent 
these particular cases are, then the more pressure emerges to enforce particular grids 
upon	them	in	an	effort	to	control	and	avoid	risk.	I	have	argued	that	we	should	look	very	
carefully	into	the	effectiveness	of	these	devices	and	suggested	that	they	often	tame	the	
growl, but not the beast. And, in doing so, they provide us with a way of making sense, 
to	expose	ourselves	to	the	real	possibility	of	physical	force	and	possible	harm.	It	is	not	
possible or desirable to think that we could or should avoid situations where a gestural, 
physical force takes over the world of words. But it may well be a mistake to think these 
situations disclose a space for embodied generosity without the risk of threat and force, 
and	ignore	that	world	of	words	which	enable,	prefigure	and	constrain	us	to	engage	in	
these	situations	in	the	first	place.	
7.3 Methodological limitations and suggestions for further research
I	explored	the	possibility	of	a	scientific	method	of	answerability,	 in	other	words,	 if	a	
methodological	‘design’	could	be	evaluated	upon	the	criterium	of	evoking	a	mode	of	
responsiveness in those the wicked problem study concerns itself with. I have argued 
that	such	a	study	cannot	be	of	an	‘x	=	x’	type.	Then,	instead	of	a	fast-track	towards	an	
inference	to	the	best	possible	explanation,	or	the	abductive	approach,	we	end	up	in	a	
maximum	loop	while	remaining	receptive	towards	ongoing	changes	in	the	‘object’	of	
7
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inquiry and how we relate, answer, to it and to those of concern. In doing so, I poached 
on the dialogical approach developed by Sullivan, and, rather than a study on subjectivity, 
offered	a	single	case	study	on	responsibility.	My	study	could	have	been	larger,	more	
in-depth, with video-recorded observations, more triangulation and more empirical 
observations, in more settings than I have undertaken, and in terms of more traditional 
methodological criteria one may conclude that the quality of the study might have fared 
well	with	those	improvements.	But	they	complicate	the	study	as	well	in	expanding	what	
and who is involved, especially given that all of those techniques, settings and persons 
are	not	finalized	entities	either,	and	demand	good	care	of	their	own.	In	assuming	that	the	
question	of	responsibility	is	a	difficult	one	when	facing	wicked	problems,	I	have	thus	tried	
to	engage	in	big	problems	and	grand	narratives	yet	on	a	‘small	scale’,	with	small	stories,	in	
three	different	ways.	In	adopting	an	adventurous	attitude	toward	the	observations	of	the	
team, the narrative analysis of what I have presented of team dialogue and interviews in 
Chapter 4, and the way I talked about it, could seem uncritical. On the other hand, in the 
way the argument is built up it appears as if the message (the spatiotemporal threshold 
engendering	personal	responsibility)	was	already	premeditated	and	I	just	needed	to	find	
‘corroborative	evidence’	to	make	for	a	plausible	enough	story.	I	still	wonder	whether	it	is	
possible to convey a theoretically trying message with a belief that this message primarily 
emerged from the observations. Either way, in Chapter 5, trust in the content of the talk 
was gone in our search of how people talk each other into risky situations, zooming in 
more	exclusively	on	the	shape	people	talked,	and	framed	more	in	the	grand	narratives	
of critical inquiry. At the same time, the construct of chiasmus came to me very late in 
the	rewriting	of	this	chapter	and	appeared	as	a	coincidental	‘fit’	with	the	observations	
much more than a premeditated strategy into which to force the data. But, because of 
the,	arguably	neat,	fit,	I	stuck	with	it,	especially	when	it	emerged	that	the	construct	itself	
was	related	in	a	number	of	different	streams	of	thought	and	authors	 I	was	engaged	
with	already.	But	proximity	to	the	data,	to	the	people	of	this	team,	falters	in	this	chapter	
where the stretch from theory to data is a sparse and long one. One could argue that 
the	fixation	on	the	chiasmic	structure	itself	is	ironic	considering	the	message	I	meant	to	
convey. Finally, adopting a more dialogic approach to the data, in Chapter 6 the needy 
author	yearning	for	a	sense	of	balance	ends	up	finding	little,	first	by	a	shaky	narrative	
analysis	of	criminal	 justice	–	mental	health	nexus	 in	team	talk	–	and	then	by	a	more	
dialogic	approach	to	an	event	where	the	author	self	demonstrates	his	own	closing	off	of	
the other, be it the practitioner and the patient, again, in extremis. 
A suggestion for further research is to engage into the nitty-gritty of the questions I raised 
earlier concerning the qualitative inquiry of the forensic ACT patient. Concerning myself 
with	the	practitioner	first	and	foremost,	this	study	has	engaged	with	the	organization	
of the forensic ACT patient as well. But rather than serving as the means for another’s 
end in this study, further study on the organization of the Forensic ACT patient should 
engage	with	those	people	directly,	however	(morally)	difficult.	This	has	been	an	inquiry	
into the wickedness of wicked problems as much as an inquiry of responsibility as a 
responsiveness	to	the	other,	and	the	unfinalizable	sits	well	with	both	of	them.	A	wicked	
problem might become a little less wicked when we, instead of compartmentalizing it 
into fragments or incrementalizing it into non-sequiturs, let the moral outrage simmer 
and persevere in answering ourselves just how many assumptions are made as regards 
to the limits of self (us) and others (them) of those involved to blame or to ignore; to the 
discourse	of	normality	in	exposing	those	who	mean	well	to	the	problem’s	spearhead;	to	
the strain it takes to avoid othering in anticipation of one and other. During all of this 
writing, I have been an amateur in more than one sense, also in not having to pay lip 
service	to	a	discipline	or	a	faculty,	which	has	had	its	effects	on	the	‘homespun’	manner	of	
drawing	in	ideas	and	scholars.	With	Churchman	I	contend	that	the	‘we’	starts	in	primary	
school, encouraging a critical thinking that does not distance itself, engaging together 
in	complex	and	messy	examples,	such	as	the	forensic	ACT	team	does	every	day.	Where	
we	move	towards	a	mode	of	policy	which	turns	the	dial	down	in	 its	expectations	of	
transparency	and	efficiency,	and	rather	invests	in	a	tenacious	readiness	to	answer	each	
other	for	problems	–	some	of	which	we	might	at	 least	make	a	serious	effort	to	take	
responsibility for, together. A loophole before the ultimate word, you might say, and a 
maximum	loop	implication	in	terms	of	further	research.
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Appendix:	overview	of	the	data	
Sep. 2012
Mo Tu We Th Fr
     
3 4 5 6 7
10 11 12 13 14
17 18 19 20 21
24 (1) 25 (2) 26 27 28
Oct. 2012
Mo Tu We Th Fr
1 (3) 2 3 4 (4) 5
8 (5) 9 (6) 10 11 12
15 16 17 18 19 (7)
22 23 24 25 26 (8)(I)
29 30 31   
Nov. 2012
Mo Tu We Th Fr
   1 (II) 2 (9)
5 6 7 8 9
12 13 14 15 16
19 20 21 22 (III) 23
26 27 28 29 30
Mar. 2013
Mo Tu We Th Fr
    1
4 5 6 7 8
11 12 13 14 15
18 19 20 21 22
25 26 27 28 29 (10)
Apr. 2013
Mo Tu We Th Fr
1 2 3 (11) 4 (12) 5 (13)
8 (14) 9 10 (15) 11 (16) 12 (17)
15 (18) 16 (19) 17 (20) 18 (21) 19 (22)
22 (23) 23 24 (24) 25 (25) 26 (26)
29 (27) 30    
Daily team planning meeting days 1-27: 
recorded between 24 September 2012 (1) 
and 29 April 2013 (27).
Interviews I-III recorded on:
I (Olive): 26 October 2012
II (Uriah): 1 November 2012
III (Naomi): 22 November 2012
Excerpts	 of	 recordings	 of	 the	 dates 
underscored are presented in this thesis.
Interview IV (Cindy): 16 April 2015
Interview V (Olivia): 23 August 2016
Next	 to	 these	 ‘official’	 meetings	 and	
interviews, throughout and beyond this 
data gathering process many instances of 
‘member	checking’	transpired:	purposively,	
but also simply due to the fact that as 
an employee of the same organization I 
talked, carefully, about my research with 
team members, and other colleagues, 
some of which were closely connected 
to the team at hand. I also discussed the 
intermediate	findings	via	a	presentation	to	
the	team	at	their	office.	
Summary
On the threshold between mental health care and criminal justice, this thesis will make 
you witness to a team of practitioners facing wicked problems (Churchman 1967; Rittel 
& Webber, 1973); where basic human needs such as housing, health, work, relationships, 
and safety are at stake for their clients/customers/recipients and other depictions of the 
ones being patient, the persons in question. Part of a large mental health and addiction 
care organization, since 2011 this team provided what is called assertive community 
treatment (ACT) to persons with a criminal justice record and/or a history of violent 
behavior,	‘forensic	ACT’	in	short.	As	with	most	mental	health	care	teams,	the	forensic	ACT	
team	employs	a	set	of	eligibility	criteria	to	regulate	the	in-	and	outflow	of	patients.	People	
with	(severe)	mental	illness	who	have	been	convicted	of	a	violent	offense	and/or	have	
recently shown violent or threatening behavior toward either civilians and/or practitioners 
are eligible for forensic ACT, which sets the team apart from other ACT teams.
Every day these practitioners work toward realizing an amalgam of caring for and 
securing	persons	at	the	fringes	and	yet	in	the	heart	of	society:	an	extreme	alternative	case	
of	organizational	ambidexterity,	you	might	say.	Understanding	what	this	organizational	
borderline predicament means to the practitioners involved, as they enter into dialogue 
with	each	other	about	 their	daily	experiences,	has	 received	 little	attention	 thus	 far;	
let alone understanding of how their organization is itself related to their stories of 
responsibility. And this question of responsibility is pressing, not merely in daily practice 
but also in theory. Not only are there no easy answers to this question, but this inquiry 
aspires to make clear that it is not an easy question to begin with. Not for this particular 
team, and possibly not for contemporary organizing practice more generally where 
clusters	of	 responsibilities	are	organized	 into	 ‘responsibilized’	 teams	(Du	Gay,	2000;	
Painter-Morland, 2007). As Churchman (1967) suggested half a century ago, even with 
our	best	efforts	we	might	not	be	taming	the	whole	problem,	just	the	growl.	Who,	then,	
are these people facing unresolvable problems, thrown into dens to tame growls? And, 
more	particular	to	my	own	inquiry	into	the	‘responsible	organization’	here:	How	are	they	
thrown in? I hope to redirect some of the potential for moral outrage away from persons 
and particular organizations into a critical outlook on how we have come to understand 
and organize responsibility.
A critical purview on the organization of responsibility brings one into critical management 
studies (CMS). I will argue that CMS could do with a little more moral outrage and draw 
nearer to the most vulnerable, to contest its own practices and boundaries, and to engage 
a mode of active receptivity (Vetlesen, 1994, ten Bos & Willmott, 2002). Yet in the face 
of	a	radical	destruction	of	our	planet	and	a	conspiring	‘fast	science,’	the	conclusion	is	
that	this	is	anything	but	obvious.	When	radical	alternatives	are	needed,	box-breaking	
ideas (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2014) should come to the fore: to think in possibilities. I 
aspire to provide one such study here, in the domain of organizational ethics, drawing 
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first	and	foremost	on	the	work	of	Mikhail	Bakhtin	(1895	–	1975),	in	particular	his	concept	
of	unfinalizability,	to	explore	the	following	research	questions:
How	is	it	that	in	some	contemporary	work	practices	an	exposure	to	precarious	situations	
is accompanied by a sense of personal responsibility, from a self to another?
How do we actually deploy ourselves and others in those precarious situations by talking 
about	them	first?
And how do we seem to not need anyone in particular to make us do this anyway?
Beyond	the	seemingly	simple	question	‘Who	is	responsible	here?,’	the	above	questions	
probe into the everyday work of teams of practitioners responsible for engaging with 
complex	 problems.	 They	 question	 the	 idea	 of	 responsibility	 as	 a	 benign	 notion	 in	
organizational practice and theory, the assumptions of discursive and corporeal fault 
lines, and the possibility of moral abdication.
I deploy ambivalence, ambiguity, suspension, disruption, awkwardness, messiness and 
other	concepts	to	try	to	move	beyond,	 ‘unfinalize,’	seemingly	given	delineations	and	
demarcations,	engaging	 in	an	 ‘antidiscipline’	 (de	Certeau,	1984)	 that	does	not	 seek	
to propagate and appropriate a new truth, but that plays alongside the edges of our 
understanding of how organization works. The common phenomenon – the wickedness 
of	the	ethics	of	wicked	problems	you	might	say	–	is	that	of	the	unfinalizable:	in	the	self–
other	axis,	spatiotemporality	and	the	ambiguity	of	discourse.	Or,	put	simply:	if	we	wish	
to	understand	and	critique	how	people	in	their	organizations	come	to	find	themselves	
responsible	for	difficult	problems,	it	could	help	if	we	look	at	three	interrelated	issues.	
The	process	of	how	a	dilemma	at	work	becomes	a	personal	problem	is	the	first	issue.	
How our senses of time and place in organization make us take risks in a volatile world 
is the second issue. The third issue is how ambiguity, instead of opening practitioners up 
toward each other, may redirect their receptivity inward (and alterity outward).
Bakhtin	 located	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 ethical,	 not	 so	 much	 in	 the	 existence	 of	
indeterminism (the possibility of free will), but in linguistic open-endedness and one’s 
active receptivity to that open-endedness. Bakhtin’s quest from here on was to trace, 
not so much sociohistorical moral deeds, but rather, via philology, how that linguistic 
unfinalizability,	 the	 receptivity	 toward	 it,	 and	 its	 interplay,	 evolved	 and	manifested	
itself. The ways in which moral responsibility as the active receptivity in answering is 
related	to	the	‘lived	truth’	of	the	unfinalizable	in	the	swirling	triptych	of	self–other	axis,	
spatiotemporal	‘eventness’	and	discourse,	is	–	in	a	nutshell	–	Bakhtin’s	work.
As	it	would	be	a	little	improper	to	study	and	write	about	the	unfinalizable	in	a	traditional	
finalized	way	I	will	try	to	follow	the	content	through	in	form	and	suggest	answerability	
itself as a method of inquiry. I suggest that the quality of this method is indicated by 
how it draws in all those involved, evoking a readiness to answer each other: for how a 
larger work problem comes to be boiled down to a personal concern, for how people 
with	good	 intentions	expose	 themselves	and	others	 to	 situations	of	physical	 force,	
and for how people acting on moral impulse seem to become of no concern to each 
other. The method itself draws on Sullivan’s translation of Bakhtin’s ideas of a dialogic 
approach	to	qualitative	inquiry.	What	I	will	do	a	little	differently	from	some	other	Bakhtin-
inspired studies in CMS is to draw Bakhtin into turbulent, violent and remote pockets 
of organizational practice. Where the potential (deemed positive) of the carnivalesque, 
the	open-ended	and	the	polyphonic	is	turned	against	itself,	focusing	not	explicitly	on	
(underlying) power structures, but on the daily practice of people talking each other into 
and out of trouble. This will thus be a somewhat darker Bakhtin-inspired study, muddling 
through	an	ongoing	dialogue	about	good	care	and	its	‘responsible	organization.’
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Op de drempel tussen ggz en justitie opereren bemoeizorgteams, zoals forensisch 
assertive community treatment	(ACT)	teams,	die	zorg	bieden	aan	‘verwarde’	mensen	met	
kluwens problemen rondom (psychische) gezondheid en verslaving, werk, huisvesting, 
relaties, geld en schulden en veiligheid. Naast de steun in het herstel van hun cliënten 
signaleren deze teams wanneer er gevaar dreigt te ontstaan: voor de cliënt zelf, of voor 
anderen dichtbij de cliënt. In dat geval kunnen er procedures in gang worden gezet 
om een cliënt onder dwang op te nemen of, als er sprake is van justitiële voorwaarden, 
om terugkeer naar detentie af te dwingen. Maar als het onverhoopt een keer helemaal 
misgaat ergens in de keten, dan haalt het dagelijkse werk van deze professionals ineens 
de	voorpagina’s	van	de	media.	Te	midden	van	alle	complexiteit	mag	je	het	als	team	dus	
ook eigenlijk nooit bij het verkeerde eind hebben. Zoals forensisch ACT-boegbeeld Harry 
Gras eens zei: ga daar maar aan staan. En dat is wat hulpverleners van een forensisch 
ACT-team dag in dag uit doen. Maar hoe gaat zo’n team in de weerbarstige praktijk om 
met deze onverbiddelijke verantwoordelijkheid? En hoe kunnen we de organisatie van 
zo’n praktijk begrijpen? En ten slotte, wat vraagt het van onderzoek, van de onderzoeker, 
om tot een begrip daarvan te komen? Dit zijn vragen die als rode draden door dit 
promotieonderzoek lopen.
Het is inmiddels gebruikelijk dat multidisciplinaire, ambulante teams met een zekere 
bewegingsvrijheid worden ingezet op maatschappelijke uitdagingen. Dergelijke teams 
zouden beter aansluiten bij de cliënt en het sociale netwerk in de wijk en ook nog eens 
een	goedkopere,	effectievere	aanpak	vormen	dan	klinische	opnamen.	Maar	ze	staan	voor	
opgaven	die	vaak	geen	oplossing	kennen:	‘onvoltooibaar’	zijn	of	lijken	te	zijn.	De	vraag	
wie of wat verantwoordelijk is, is dan des te pregnanter. Hoe is dit georganiseerd, zowel in 
de dagelijkse praktijk waarin teamleden met elkaar praten hierover, als ook in een bredere 
context?	Door	 in	 te	 zoomen	op	een	 forensisch	ACT-team	waarin	dat	onvoltooibare	
aan de oppervlakte komt, ga ik na hoe de organisatie van verantwoordelijkheid in de 
praktijk ten uiting komt. Daarvoor heb ik met name een reeks dagelijkse team overleggen 
geobserveerd, waarin steeds weer twee vragen worden beantwoord: wat is er (gisteren) 
gebeurd en wat gaan we (vandaag) doen? In die overleggen ontvouwen zich verhalen 
over verantwoordelijkheid: in de verhouding tussen de een en de ander; met betrekking 
tot	de	beleving	van	context;	en	ten	aanzien	van	de	ambiguïteit	van	taal.
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift positioneert mijn onderzoek in een wetenschappelijke 
stroming die critical management studies (CMS) heet. CMS geeft kritiek op het idee van 
prestatiegerichtheid	 in	organisaties,	propageert	(zelf)reflectie	en	trekt	het	schijnbaar	
vanzelfsprekende in twijfel. Daarnaast licht ik het onvoltooibare toe, een belangrijk 
concept	van	de	Russische	filoloog/ethicus	Mikhail	Bakhtin	(1895	–	1975).	Ik	beschrijf	hoe	
Bakhtin’s begrip van het onvoltooibare in drie perioden is in te delen. Voordat ik dat 
drieluik gebruik als het tweede deel van dit onderzoek, ga ik in op mijn methodologische 
aanpak	en	ook	hierin	staat	de	dynamiek	van	de	verhouding	tussen	zelf/ander,	context	en	
taal centraal. Het tweede deel wordt voorafgegaan door drie volgende onderzoeksvragen, 
die in de hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 van deel twee worden behandeld:
Hoe gaat de blootstelling aan kwetsbare situaties bij een forensisch ACT-team gepaard 
met een gevoel van persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid?
Hoe komen hulpverleners en cliënten in dat soort situaties terecht?
Hoe lijken we, anticiperend op andermans reactie, het contact met die ander niet eens 
nodig te hebben om ons erin te begeven?
In	hoofdstuk	4	staan	de	verhouding	tussen	zelf/ander	enerzijds	en	de	context	anderzijds	
centraal, langs de verhaallijn van een uit de hand gelopen gesprek tussen een cliënt 
en twee hulpverleners. Mijn idee is dat de fundamentele structuur van een organisatie 
een bepaald verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel als het ware opwekt en dat die structuur 
overeenkomt met die van een antieke voorloper van de literaire roman. In hoofdstuk 5 
maakt	context	plaats	voor	de	ambiguïteit	van	taal.	Te	midden	van	overwegingen	om	een	
risicovol huisbezoek af te leggen en gedwongen opnameprocedure te starten, voltrekt 
zich	een	polariserende	strijd	tussen	de	ambiguïteit	van	taal	en	de	verhouding	tussen	
zelf/ander, over en door de grens van het lichamelijke vis-à-vis het organisatorische. In 
hoofdstuk 6 komt een derde binnen de verhouding tussen zelf/ander op de voorgrond 
te staan: een gevaarlijke buitenstaander misschien, of een begripvolle zielsverwant, of 
een	ideaal	zelfbeeld.	Met	beelden	van	de	 ‘verwarde	persoon’	verwrongen	tussen	de	
verhaallijnen van justitie en van geestelijke gezondheidszorg, doe ik een poging tot die 
derde te komen. Om na te gaan hoe die derde een bepaald idee van verantwoordelijkheid 
kan opleggen of iemand kan doen denken dat dat idee vanuit zichzelf komt.
De rafels van de drie rode draden en de bevindingen in deel twee blijken in deel 
drie van dit proefschrift vooral afgehecht als een betoog over ontvankelijkheid: een 
motief dat tevens in de verschillende verhalen van de hulpverleners is terug te vinden. 
Verantwoordelijkheid vanuit deze invalshoek is een proactieve openheid: een bereidheid 
om je te verhouden tot anders zijn. Dit proberen te organiseren is lovenswaardig, maar 
niet zonder valkuilen. Hetzelfde geldt voor onderzoek doen.
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